FIRST DIVISION
RENNIE DECLARADOR, G.R. No. 159208
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus -
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
HON. SALVADOR S. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
GUBATON, Presiding Judge,
Branch 14,
FRANK BANSALES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the
portion of the Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Frank Bansales was born on
On
That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July
25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President
Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
the latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which
caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength considering that the attack was made by the accused using a long knife
which the latter carried along with him from his house to the school against
his lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting
upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death.[3]
In view of
the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on
In
view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the
prosecution, the court finds CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense charged, he is entitled to a special
mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) month of reclusion
temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil indemnity of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral
expenses, attorney’s fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and
unearned income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy
Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The
parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his
teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National
High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable
in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of
Pursuant
to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the
Child in conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to
the
Furnish
copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private
Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office,
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
Rennie Declarador, the surviving
spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that
portion of the decision of the trial court’s decision suspending the sentence
of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply
to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death,[6]
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this
Court in People v. Ondo,[7]
petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing
the benefits of a suspended
sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that
petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering that the offense
charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines;
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition
in court assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his
sentence. He further avers that Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of
sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence,
the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the
accused.
In reply,
petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that
respondent’s sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. It insists that the
entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the
sentence actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for
the crime charged as provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the
following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2)
whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his
petition with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner.
Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has
sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari.[8] This is in line with the underlying spirit of
the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their
object.[9] Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on
the petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of
the assailed portion of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that
a petition for review on certiorari which
seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[10]
A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of
certiorari may be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.[11] This is an established policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.[12]
However, in Fortich v. Corona,[13]
the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and
in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court
may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
directly filed before it.[14] Moreover, this Court has suspended its own
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take
cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales
was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or
abuse of superior strength. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act)
No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court found him guilty of murder.
Article 192
of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art.
192. Suspension of Sentence and
Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the
proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the
imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon
application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of
the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend
all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any
other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age,
or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the
reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
or the government training institution or responsible person under whose care
he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful
offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department
of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social
case study report over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation
and supervision by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or government training institution as the court may designate
subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a
youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its
provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or
life imprisonment or to one who is
convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law,
the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:
Sec.
32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and
Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be suspended without need of
application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the
case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation
of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court,
the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad
litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following
disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the
juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment;
Participation in group counseling and similar activities; Commitment to the
Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in
conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.
The
Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the
compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition
measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress
report on the matter. The Family Court
may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if
practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose
presence may be deemed necessary.
The
benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with
the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted
of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment,
or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is
convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing
the benefits of a suspended sentence. “Punishable” is defined as “deserving of,
or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished;
liable to punishment.”[15] The word “punishable” does not mean “must be
punished,” but “liable to be punished” as specified.[16]
In U.S. v. Villalon,[17]
the Court defined punishable as “deserving of, or liable for, punishment.” Thus,
the term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned
with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.
The disqualification
is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor,
and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual
penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a
juvenile.[18] Despite the disqualification of Bansales,
respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against
him. By this act, respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note
that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on
SEC. 38. Automatic
Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law.
The law
merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended,
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided
in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have
been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua to death or death,
are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.
Case law
has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed
together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary
or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto.[19] Statutes in
pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy.[20]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending
the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Judge Salvador S. Gubaton; rollo, pp.
26-31.
[2] Exhibit “B,” records pp. 7-8.
[3] Records,
p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
Under Republic Act No. 9346 (An act
prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines), the imposition
of the death penalty has been prohibited.
[7] G.R. No.
101361,
[8] Paredes v. Gopengco, 140 Phil. 81, 93 (1969).
[9] Narciso v. Sta. Romana Cruz, 385 Phil. 208, 222 (2000); Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384
Phil. 322, 335 (2000).
[10] Rule 65, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[11] People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787,
[12] Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 562, 572.
[13] 352 Phil. 461, 481 (1998).
[14] Government of the
[15] People v. Superior Court of the City and
Country of
[16] The
Thrasher 173 F. 258 (1909).
[17] 37 Phil. 322 (1917).
[18] People v. Hughes, 32 N.E. 1105 (1893).
[19] Agpalo, R. Statutory Construction, p. 212 (1995).
[20] Co v. Civil Register of