ANDABAI
T. ARIMAO, G.R. No. 152651
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
SAADEA
P. TAHER,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision and Order
dated
The
facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On
In the interim, petitioner applied
for and was granted by the DECS-ARMM an academic scholarship with pay effective
Meanwhile, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 was denied.[4] Subsequently, she filed a petition for review
of the two CSC Resolutions before the Court of Appeals[5] which, however, denied due course to the petition
on
In the meantime, the position of Education
Supervisor II being occupied by respondent was devolved from DECS-ARMM to the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)- ARMM.
On
On
WHEREFORE, [p]remises considered,
the instant letter of Mrs. Arimao to reconsider the action of the Executive
Secretary in dropping her from the roll is hereby DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Thus, the Memorandum
Ordered [sic] of the Executive Secretary on Authority of the Regional Governor
dated
SO ORDERED.[12]
On
20 July 2000, Datu Guimid P. Matalam, Regional Vice Governor/Acting Regional
Governor, ordered petitioner to reassume
her former position as Education Supervisor II, and revoked the ARMM Executive Secretary’s Resolution dated 24
December 1998.[13] However, on
In the interest of the service and
considering the need to observe fairness and justice in dealing with our
personnel, you are hereby directed to implement the above mentioned resolution
rendered by the Regional Solicitor General on
As such, you are likewise directed
to maintain STATUS QUO on the part of Ms. SAADEA
P. TAHER, Education Supervisor II with permanent status duly approved by
the Civil Service Commission.
This Memorandum Order takes
effective [sic] immediately and superscede/ revokes all previous order
inconsistent herewith.[14]
However, on
Respondent thus filed a Petition for
Prohibition before the
On
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the respondents are ordered to cease and desist in prosecuting or carrying out the effects of the August 4, 2000 [M]emorandum and for respondents to cease and desist from continuance of any act which will be in violation of the right of petitioner with respect to the subject matter of the action or proceeding so as not to render the judgment ineffectual.
SO
ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the motion was denied on
On
Meanwhile, on
Petitioner now comes before us,
arguing that a writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of
the directive of the ARMM Governor implementing the CSC Resolution reinstating her
to her former position.[25] She claims that the trial court gravely
erred in taking cognizance of the
petition for prohibition filed by respondent,
and failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, considering
that the case, as declared by the trial court itself, involved personnel
actions which are within the CSC’s
exclusive jurisdiction.[26] In addition,
petitioner contends that by
virtue of the disapproval of her appointment, respondent’s appointment to
Education Supervisor II was invalidated,
and thus both of them are automatically restored to the their
former positions by operation of
law. She further claims that the AWOL
Order of the CSC was previously revoked on
In her Comment,[29] respondent
claims that since no appeal was taken from the AWOL order, it has become
final and executory and thus cannot be revoked by mere issuance of a
Memorandum.[30] She argues that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply to the case a quo because it raises a purely
legal question, that is, the propriety of petitioner’s assumption of her former
position despite having been declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. Due to the urgency of the situation and the
immediacy of the problem, recourse through the same officials who issued the
assailed memoranda would be futile.[31]
The
Court is thus tasked to resolve the
following issues:
1. Whether a writ
of prohibition lies to enjoin the directive
of the ARMM Governor to reinstate petitioner to the position of Education
Supervisor II despite petitioner’s having been declared on AWOL and dropped
from the roll;
2. Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
the petition for prohibition and whether
the filing of the petition for prohibition violated the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction;
3. Whether the AWOL order against petitioner validated
respondent’s occupancy of the position of Education Supervisor II;
4. Who, as between petitioner and respondent, is entitled
to the position of Education Supervisor
II.
The
petition must be denied.
Petitioner cannot be reinstated by mere
directive of the ARMM Regional Governor
The assailed Memorandum issued by ARMM
Regional Governor is reproduced in full,
thus:
TO : TESDA –ARMM
SUBJECT : Implementation of CSC Resolution
No. 96-3101, and CSC-ARMM
Directive Order Dated
DATE :
In the highest interest of public service and consistent with the legal and constitutional precept of promoting social justice, the above-captioned resolutions are hereby implemented.
As
such, you are hereby directed to re-instate ANDABAI T. ARIMAO to her former position as Education Supervisor II
pursuant to the foregoing resolution and the provisions of Sec. 13, Rule VI,
Book V of E.O. No, 292 which are further buttressed by the series of
communication of CSC Regional Office No. XII dated
This [M]emorandum shall take effect
immediately and shall take precedence over all memoranda, orders and other
issuances [sic] inconsistent herewith.
(Signed)
PROF. NUR P. MISUARI
Regional Governor[32]
Even
a cursory look at the Memorandum shows that the order of petitioner’s reinstatement was made in
reliance on, or in implementation of,
CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and CSC-ARMM Directive Order dated 26 July
2000, both of which ordained her reinstatement. However, these directives
relied upon by ARMM Regional Governor Misuari were rendered functus officio by no less than the CSC itself per its
Resolution No. 020743, which, as previously noted, ruled that the TESDA-ARMM is
not under legal obligation to reinstate petitioner because she was already
dropped from the rolls effective 24 December 1998. CSC Resolution No. 01-0132, ordering the
implementation of CSC Resolution No.
96-3101, was issued because petitioner purposely concealed and withheld from the CSC the information that she had
been declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls.[33]
With Resolution No. 020743, CSC Resolution No. 01-0132 was effectively revoked.
Likewise,
with the finality of the AWOL order and her having been dropped from the rolls,
petitioner legally lost her right to the position of Education Supervisor
II. In any case, she has already
received from the DECS-ARMM her salaries as Education Supervisor II for the
period October 1996 to 1997, or the period corresponding to the time the
position was still with the said department.[34]
Petitioner argues that the
Propriety of the Petition for Prohibition
The
trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the petition for prohibition.
The principal purpose for the writ of
prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of
jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal.
It is granted when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or to put a stop to multiplicity of actions. Thus, for a party to be entitled to a writ
of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[35]
Under Republic Act No. 6734, [36] executive power in the ARMM is vested in the
Regional Governor, who has control of all the regional executive commissions,
boards, bureaus and offices, and exercises general supervision over the local
government units within the Autonomous Region.[37] The assailed Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Misuari was presumably issued in the
exercise of his power of control and supervision. However, by ordering the reinstatement of petitioner
to her former position based upon an outdated CSC Resolution, despite the AWOL
order and her being dropped from the rolls, ARMM Regional Governor Misuari
acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Neither is the petition for
prohibition before the trial court violative of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Said doctrine precludes a
court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.[38] An exception to this rule is when the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative
agency.[39] In
the instant case, the legal question of whether a memorandum of the ARMM
Governor, ordering the reinstatement of an employee declared AWOL and dropped
from the rolls, was issued in excess of jurisdiction is a legal question which should be resolved by
the courts. For the same reason that the issues to be resolved in this case are
purely legal in nature, respondent need not abide by the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.[40] Besides, to allow the matter to remain with
the Office of the ARMM Governor for
resolution would be self-defeating and
useless and cause unnecessary delay since it was the same office which gave the
conflicting issuances on petitioner’s reinstatement.
Neither petitioner nor respondent
is entitled to the position of Education
Supervisor II
The finality of the disapproval of
petitioner’s promotion, as well as that of the Order declaring petitioner on AWOL
and dropping her from the rolls, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found by the CSC in its Resolution No.
020743, TESDA has no legal obligation to reinstate petitioner to the position
of Education Supervisor II. This,
however, should not be construed as a
declaration that respondent is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor
II.
Section
13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292, provides:
All
appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously
for approval by the Commission. The
disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position
invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and automatically
restores them to their former positions.
However, the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries
for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional
appointments.
Section 19 of the same rule states:
SEC.
19. An appointment though contested shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance if the appointee assumes the duties of the position and the appointee
is entitled to receive the salary attached to the position. However, the appointment, together with the
decision of the department head shall be submitted to the Commission for
appropriate action within 30 days from the date of its issuance otherwise the appointment
becomes ineffective thereafter.
Likewise, such an appointment shall become ineffective in case the
protest is finally resolved against the protestee, in which case he shall be
reverted to his former position.
It must be noted that while
respondent’s appointment to the position of Education Supervisor II was
approved as permanent and completed, it
was nonetheless made subject to the outcome of the protest filed against petitioner’s appointment.[41] At the back of the appointment, the following
appears:
This
appointment is subject to the outcome of the protest of Alibai Benito in the
appointment of Andabai Arimao former incumbent to the position.[42]
As a chain reaction of the
disapproval of petitioner’s promotional appointment as Director II,
respondent’s appointment to Education Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. The efficacy of respondent’s appointment was dependent on the
validity of petitioner’s promotional appointment which in turn was subject to
the outcome of the protest against it.
Thus, as of
Indeed, for all intents and purposes,
respondent became the Education Supervisor II by virtue of her appointment as
such on
In Monroy v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[46]
this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from
a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of
his wrongful tenure. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes
the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer
for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure.[47] In the instant case, respondent should account to petitioner for the salaries
she received from the time the disapproval of petitioner’s promotion became
final, up to the time when petitioner was declared on AWOL and dropped from the
rolls. However, respondent may be allowed to keep the emoluments she received during said period, there being no de jure officer
at the time,[48]
following our ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[49]
to wit:
[I]n
cases where there is no de jure
officer, a de facto officer who, in
good faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and
may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations
attached to the office.[50]
There is no question that respondent
discharged the duties of Education Supervisor II from the time she was appointed to the position
and even after her appointment was invalidated
as a result of the invalidation of petitioner’s promotional appointment. In view of the services respondent rendered
to the TESDA and the people of the ARMM, it would be iniquitous to deny her the
salary appertaining to the position corresponding to the period of her service.
All
the same, however, respondent cannot continue her unauthorized occupancy, notwithstanding
the fact that the position of Education Supervisor II has been vacant since
1999. Absent any showing that she has
been reappointed to the position after petitioner was declared AWOL and dropped
from the rolls, respondent cannot lay a valid claim thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Order dated
Respondent is ordered to VACATE the position of Education Supervisor II,
TESDA-ARMM, and turn over to petitioner the emoluments she received for the
position from
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[5]The
petition, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals, and Entry of Judgment issued, declaring that said
decision became final and executory on
[6]Arimao
moved for the reconsideration of the denial, but her motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
[10]Rollo, pp. 161-162. Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994,
states that officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty
(30) days without approved leave of absence are considered absent without leave
and may be dropped from the service without
prior notice.
[39]Miriam College Foundation , Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) citing
Philippine Global Communications,
Inc. v. Relova, 100 SCRA 254 (1980),
which held:
Absent
such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question
arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative
agency to resolve. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act
on the part of an administrative body.
Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach
taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the
legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to enable the National
Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional question thus arises and
calls for an answer.
[40]Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Commission on Elections,, G.R. No. 159139,
[41]An appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 801, 811 (1998).
[44]Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674,
[48]As per
the records, no new appointment to the position of Education Supervisor II has
been made up to the present.
[49]G.R.
No. 83896, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317, cited in General Manager, Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) v. Monserate, 430 Phil. 832,
847 (2002).
[50]