SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES G.R. No. 151312
PEDRO S. PALANCA AND
SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA.
DE PALANCA namely: IMELDA
R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R. Present:
PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL,
ESTEFANIA P. PE, CANDELARIA
P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,
PALANCA, CONSTANTINO R. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
PALANCA, EDMUNDO PALANCA,
LEOCADIA R. PALANCA and AZCUNA, and
OLIVERIO R. PALANCA, represented GARCIA, JJ.
by their attorney-in-fact, OFELIA P.
MIGUEL,
Petitioners, Promulgated:
- versus -
August
30, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE
(represented by the Lands Management
Bureau), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF
Executive Judge) and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF
Respondents.
X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision[1]
dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution[2]
dated December 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62081
entitled “Republic of the Philippines
(Represented by the Lands Management
Bureau) v. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Palawan
(now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District, Branch II presided over
by Former District Judge, Jose P. Rodriguez, et al.”
The antecedent facts[3]
are as follows:
On
It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements
as to notices, as prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496, namely publication in
the Official Gazette, were complied with.
During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the
application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan purportedly for and
in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the
Department of Agrarian Reform, some inhabitants of the subject properties and a
businessman by the name of Alfonso Guillamac. The
Provincial Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the application had no
clearance from the Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be
part of the timberland block and/or public forest under the administration of
the Bureau of Forestry and had not been certified as being alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Lands. He therefore requested that the resolution
on the application be stayed pending the examination and issuance of the required
clearance by the Bureau of Forest Development.[4] After
the lapse of three years from the date of the initial hearing, however, no valid
and formal opposition was filed by any of the oppositors in the form and manner
required by law.[5] Neither
did the Provincial Fiscal present witnesses from the relevant government
bureaus and agencies to support his contention that the subject lands had not
yet been cleared for public disposition.
On the other hand, petitioners submitted
the plan and technical description of the land, a survey certificate approved
by the Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they have
consistently paid the realty taxes accruing on the property. Petitioners
likewise presented six witnesses in support of their application, namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel, Lopez Libarra, Alejandro
Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero and Augustin
Timbancaya.
Both Constantino Palanca
and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that: (1) they
were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca; (2) they, together
with their other siblings, were applicants for the registration of two parcels
of land located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3) their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject properties by
continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their father built a house on
each parcel of land and planted coconut trees; (5) since their father’s death,
they have continued their possession over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse to all claimants;
and (6) the properties have been declared for taxation purposes and the
corresponding taxes religiously paid for over forty (40) years.[6]
Lopez Libarra
and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the
late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the latter as an
overseer and a “capataz” respectively in the cultivation
of the subject properties. Cabajar, in particular,
claimed that he helped clear the lands sometime in the mid-1920s, planted upon
such lands coconut trees which are now bearing fruit, and continued working
with Pedro S. Palanca until the latter’s death in
1943. He subsequently went to work for the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca whom he confirms now own and manage the properties.[7]
For his part, Libarra
testified that he had been the overseer of the two coconut plantations of the
late Pedro S. Palanca since 1934. He identified the
location of the properties, averring that one plantation is in Talampulan,
Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and
Augustin Timbancaya, who
testified thus:
Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a
Forester in the Bureau of Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of Forestry.
He was once assigned as the Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in
Palawan. Presently, he is a member of the Composite Land Classification Team
No. 32 in the province with station at Puerto Princessa
City. He has been employed with the Bureau of Forest Development for about 30
years, starting as a Forest Guard in 1947. As chief of Land Classification Party
No. 55, he covered the territory from Puerto Princesa
City northward up to Busuanga, where the land in
question is located. His duty was to supervise the team that conducted the
limitation, segregation and deviation of agricultural lands within the area. He
served in this capacity for twelve (12) years until December 1975. As such, he
issued certifications after due classification by his office, of alienable and
disposable land for administration by the Bureau of Lands and eventual
disposition to interested parties. He had been in Busuanga,
Palawan a number of times and is familiar with the lands in question, one of
which is in Talampetan, Capari
Island and the other in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island. He is aware that the lands in question
are claimed and administered by the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca.
The improvements on the land are at least 40 years old in his estimation. He
recalls having issued a certification of release of this property for
disposition to private parties, but could not remember the exact date when he
did so. He identified Exhibits “JJ” and “KK” to be certifications to the effect
that Talampulan in Panlaitan
Island and Talampetan, a portion of Capari Island, both in Busuanga
(formerly Coron), Palawan, are fully cultivated and
mainly planted to coconuts before World War II by herein applicants, the heirs
of Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully convinced that the
lands in question have already been released before the war for agricultural
purposes in favor of Pedro S. Palanca, applicants’
predecessor-in-interest. Releases of agricultural lands which are done in bulk
at present was not in vogue before the last war, for releases at that time were
made on a case-to-case basis. Under the pre-war system, an application for a
piece of land was individually referred to the then Bureau of Forestry which in
turn conducted a classification of the area as to its availability, whether it
be for sale, homestead, etc. On the basis of the Bureau of Forestry
investigation, a certification was then issued as to its availability for the
purpose for which the application was made. The certification was made on the
basis of such application, and was called the isolated case release or the
case-to-case basis. This procedure was followed in the case of herein
applicants and there seemed to be no reason to doubt that the area was in fact
released to herein applicants. Therefore, the area is no longer under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
Alfonso Lucero also testified that as
Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he was the one directly in charge of
classification and release of lands of public domain for agricultural purposes.
His office is directly under the bureau chief in Manila, although for
administrative purposes he is carried with the district forestry office in
Puerto Princesa City. The certifications he issue
carry much weight in land classification and releases in the province unless
revoked by the Manila Office.
Augustin O. Timbancaya testified
that he is a licensed geodetic engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His
services were engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the
other applicants, to conduct and prepare a land plan for two parcels of land
subject of the application. He went personally to the lands in question. He
executed Exhibit “U”, the Plan of Land covered by PSU-04-000073, containing an
area of one hundred seventy-six thousand, five hundred eighty-eight (176,588)
square meters situated at Talampetan, Capari Island, Busuanga, Palawan,
approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also identified Exhibit
“V”, the Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074, containing an area of two hundred
thirty-nine thousand, nine hundred eighty (239, 980) square meters located at Talampulan, Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan, which was also approved by the Director
of Lands on June 25, 1973. Both lands are in barrio Panlaitan,
Busuanga (formerly Coron),
Palawan, and have an aggregate total area of four hundred sixteen thousand five
hundred sixty-eight (416,568) square meters. All these surveys were properly monumented. He personally prepared the technical
description for both lots. He also prepared the Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificates and had the same notarized by Atty. Remigio
Raton, the first on January 24, 1972 and the second on March 14, 1972. He
believes that both parcels of land have been released for agricultural purposes
because if it were otherwise, the survey plans he executed would not have been
approved by the Director of Lands. In other words, the approval of the Land
Plans by the Director of the Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in
question have been previously released for alienation and disposition. Both
parcels of land have been fully developed and the coconuts planted thereon are
about 50 years old. He has no doubt that these lands were released for agricultural
purposes long ago.[9]
After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a
decision on
On
In
addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the proceedings
committed perfidious acts amounting to extrinsic fraud which is one of the
grounds for the annulment of a judgment. Respondent maintained that a culture
of collusion existed between and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal
and the ranking officer of the District Forestry Office, Alfonso Lucero, such
that the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present its case to
the court.
On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Palawan, Branch II, dated December
15, 1977, in Land Registration Case No. N-21, LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the
Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398,
T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all subsequent TCTs
issued thereafter are also declared NULL and VOID. Private respondents
Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca are DIRECTED to
surrender said transfer certificates of title to public respondent Register of
Deeds of Palawan; and the latter is also DIRECTED to cause the
cancellation thereof.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the CA in a resolution[13]
dated December 21, 2001. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded
settled jurisprudence and applicable land laws when it ruled that the subject
properties covered by their application for registration were forest lands and
that, consequently, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to
award the same to them. They opine that it is not necessary for them to prove
that the government had expressly given a grant of the subject properties to
Pedro S. Palanca, their predecessor-in-interest,
separate of the legislative grant given to them purportedly under Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular
land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be
deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands[14] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[15] They
likewise argue that the CA erred in relying upon Executive Proclamation No. 219
and upon Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A to nullify petitioners’
mother title. According to petitioners, the reversal of the CFI’s decision violated
the principle of res judicata
as well as the rule on incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.
Respondent, on the other hand, denies the
allegations of the petition in its comment[16]
dated August 6, 2002 and contends that (a) the claim that the subject parcels
of land are public agricultural lands by virtue of a legislative grant is
unfounded and baseless; (b) the land registration court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was devoid of jurisdictional competence
to order titling of a portion of forest land; (c) the CA is correct in declaring
that there must be a prior release of the subject lands for agricultural
purposes; (d) the rules on res judicata and the incontestability of Torrens titles do
not find proper applications in the exercise of the power of reversion by the State;
and (e) estoppel and laches will not operate against
the State. Respondent also reiterates its contention that collusion existed
between the parties in the proceedings below which prevented a fair submission
of the controversy, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that
an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property registered in
favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest
reservation never prescribes. Verily, non-disposable public lands registered
under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time[17] and
the defense of res judicata
would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the
public domain.[18] That
being said, it must likewise be kept in mind that in an action to annul a
judgment, the burden of proving the judgment’s nullity rests upon the
petitioner. The petitioner has to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the judgment being challenged is fatally defective.[19]
Under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the Court finds that respondent met the required burden of proof.
Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondent’s petition to annul the
decision of the land registration court. This petition for review, therefore,
lacks merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon
which petitioners anchor their claim states:
Sec. 48. The following-described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x
x
(b) Those
who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
The above provision clearly requires the
concurrence of two things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is public agricultural
land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration must have possessed and
occupied the same for at least thirty years prior to the filing of the
application. That the petitioners, through Pedro S. Palanca,
have been in possession of the properties since 1934 is not disputed. What is
in doubt is the compliance with the first requisite.
To reiterate, the validity of the CFI
decision was impugned on the basis of the court’s lack of jurisdiction. If the
properties were alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a land
registration court, had jurisdiction over them and could validly confirm
petitioners’ imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties were indeed public
forests, then the CA was correct in declaring that the land registration court
never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and, as a
result, its decision decreeing the registration of the properties in favor of
petitioners would be null and void.
The reason for this is the fact that public
forests are inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests on the
part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private
property.[20]
Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never
ripen into ownership.[21] It
bears stressing that unless and until the land classified as forest is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.[22]
In the present case, Land Classification
Map No. 839, Project 2-A[23] indicated
that the Talampulan and
While it is true that the land
classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In
the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.[24] When
the property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have
had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership.[25]
This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.[26] Thus,
the Court has emphasized the need to show in registration proceedings that the
government, through a positive act, has declassified inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[27]
Petitioners’ reliance upon Ramos v.
Director of Lands[28]
and Ankron v. Government[29] is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on
October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the
properties is sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide as
follows:
Section 6. The
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
—
(a) Alienable
or disposable,
(b) Timber,
and
(c) Mineral
lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner
transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Section 7. For the purposes of the administration
and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Based on the foregoing, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the courts no longer have the authority, whether express
or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.[30]
To the Court’s mind, petitioners have failed to present
incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had
previously been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of Alfonso Lucero that a
certification had been issued releasing the properties for agricultural
purposes is not sufficient to prove this fact. The best evidence would be the
document itself which, however, was not produced in this case. It was error for
the land registration court to have taken Mr. Lucero’s testimony at face value,
absent any other evidence to conclusively prove that the land had been released
for public disposition.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners’
contention that the State has the burden to prove that the land which it avers
to be of public domain is really of such nature applies only in instances where
the applicant has been in possession of the property since time immemorial.
When referring to this type of possession, it means possession of which no
person living has seen the beginning and the existence of which such person has
learned from the latter’s elders.[31] Immemorial
possession justifies the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest.[32] The
possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-named
exception as their possession, by their own admission, only commenced sometime
in 1934.
To reiterate, where there is a showing that
lots sought to be registered are part of the public domain, the applicant for
land registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 must secure a
certification from the government that the lands claimed to have been possessed
by the applicant as owner for more than 30 years are alienable and disposable.[33] Petitioners’ failure to do so in this case,
when taken with the evidence adduced by respondent showing that the lands in
question indeed remain part of the public domain and form part of the national
reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the
registration of such lands in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their
reversion to the State.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] CA Rollo, pp. 195-212.
[2] Id. at 339-340.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 70-71.
[5] Under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), applications for registration through judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles shall be heard in the same manner and shall be subject to the same procedure as established in Act No. 496, as amended (Land Registration Act). In this connection, Section 34 of the Land Registration Act states:
Any person claiming an interest[,] whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.
[6] Records, pp. 75-82.
[7]
[8]
[9] CA Rollo, pp. 201-203.
[10] Id. at 1-126.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] 39 Phil. 175 (1918).
[15] 40 Phil. 10 (1919).
[16] Rollo, pp. 180-288.
[17] Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 223.
[18] Heirs of Mariano Lacson v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. L-77148,
[19] Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 83290,
SCRA 792.
20 Director
of Forestry v. Muñoz,
132 Phil. 637 (1968); Fernandez Hnos. v.
Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 929 (1931); Vaño v. Government of the
Philippine
[21] Republic v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 1378887, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 574.
[22] Amunategui
v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69; Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-58867,
[23] CA Rollo, p. 99.
[24] Director of Lands, et al. v. IAC,
et al., G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339; Yngson
v. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-36847,
[25] Director of Lands v. CA, supra
note 22; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 (1960); Republic
v. CA, G.R. No. 39473,
[26] Director of Lands v. CA, supra note 22.
[27] Director of Lands, et al. v. IAC,
et al., supra note 24.
[28] Supra note 14.
[29] Supra note 15.
[30] Zarate
v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501,
[31] Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189,
[32] Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 (1946).
[33] Gutierrez Hermanos
v. CA, G.R. Nos. 54472-77,