ROBERTO G.
FAMANILA, G.R. No. 150429
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr.
Seventh
Division) and BARBERSHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED and
NFD INTERNATIONAL Promulgated:
MANNING AGENTS, INC.
Respondents. August 29, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
50615 dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision[2] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for payment of disability and other benefits for lack of
merit and the Resolution[3]
dated October 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
In
1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of
petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as Messman[4]
for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and
co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On
Owing
to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the
Thereafter,
authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim
amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200.[7] Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by
his signature in the Receipt and Release dated
On
On
I. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE
SINCE PETITIONER’S CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD APPLICABLE TO
THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LABOR
CODE OF THE
Petitioner
claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because
he was permanently disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent
which makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
The
petition lacks merit.
It
is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not extend
to questions of fact. More so in labor cases where the doctrine applies with
greater force.[14] The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already
determined the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, they are accorded not only great
respect but also finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence.[15] We reviewed the records of the case and we
find no reason to deviate from the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court
of Appeals.
A
vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a
voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code,
the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud.[16] If consent is given through any of the
aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable.[17] A voidable contract is binding unless annulled
by a proper action in court.[18]
Petitioner
contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the
Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors
that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for
petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his
consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated
consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the findings of the Court of
Appeals that:
In
the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s
consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner has
not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the subject document, the
same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept
the agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing.
Moreover,
the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by petitioner in
his appeal does not show on its face any violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof
to show that the consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable.
Absent any evidence to support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord,
decide against the unreasonableness of the consideration.[19]
It
is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are
considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the
worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not amount to
estoppel.[20] The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand
on the same footing.[21] However, not all waivers and quitclaims are
invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of
change of mind. It is only where there
is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking,[22]
as in this case.
To
be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms,
leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit
that legally pertains to them.[23] We have reviewed the terms and conditions
contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by
petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in part:
That
for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS
(US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged to my full and complete satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G.
FAMANILA, x x x hereby remise, release and forever discharge said vessel “HANSA
RIGA”, her Owners, operators, managers, charterers, agents, underwriters, P and
I Club, master, officers, and crew and all parties at interest therein or
thereon, whether named or not named, including but not limited to BARBER SHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. and
ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all claims, demands, debts, dues, liens,
actions or causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in
admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from and under the laws of the
United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any other foreign country now held, owned or possessed by me or by any
person or persons, arising from or related to or concerning whether directly or
indirectly, proximately or remotely, without being limited to but including the
said illness suffered by me on board the vessel “HANSA RIGA” on or about 21st
June 1990 at Portland, Oregon and disability compensation in connection
therewith.
This
instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of any
character and/or claims or damages and/or losses and/or any other liabilities
whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at common law or in equity, tortious
or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring as a
consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the vessel “HANSA
RIGA”, including but not limited to all damages and/or losses consisting of
loss of support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all benefits of whatsoever
nature and extent incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all damages
and/or indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law, equity and/or
admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to the laws of the United
States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and of
all other countries whatsoever.
I
hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this
instrument which was read to me in the local dialect and I agree that this is a
FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties and things referred to
herein, and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and
final bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be
prosecuted by me or by any one claiming by, through, or under me, against
any of the persons or things
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing
referred to or related herein.[24]
It
is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment
the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.[25] Further, dire necessity is not an acceptable
ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner
was forced to sign it.[26]
Regarding
prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims against
the respondents is the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor
Code which provides that:
ART.
291. Money Claims. – All money claims
arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
x
x x x
Since
petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim
arising from his employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared
permanently and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave rise to his
entitlement to disability benefits up to the time that he filed the complaint
on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed thereby effectively
barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dismissing petitioner’s complaint for disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 35-41. Penned by Associate
Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
Cosico and Alicia L. Santos.
[2] CA rollo,
pp. 32-36.
[3] Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[4] CA
rollo, p. 48.
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 11.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 55-57.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
G.R. No. 130866,
[14] Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag,
G.R. No. 157010,
[15] Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148893,
[16]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1330.
[17]
Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on
Obligations and Contracts, 1993 Ed., p. 571, citing 8
[18]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1390.
[19] Rollo, p. 39.
[20]
[21] Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of
Free Workers, G.R. Nos. 75700-01,
[22] Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 91298,
[23] Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Asset Builders Corporation, G.R. No. 147410, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA
148, 166.
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 55-56.
[25]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1315.
[26] Veloso v. Department of Labor and Employment,
G.R. No. 87297,