ASIAN TERMINALS,
INC. and RODOLFO G. CORVITE, JR.,
Petitioners, -
versus - DANILO Respondents. |
G.R. No. 149074
Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
challenging the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The facts are as follows:
Asian
Terminals, Inc. (Asian Terminals) petitioner, is a domestic corporation and the
exclusive provider of arrastre and stevedoring
services at the
Respondents
are employees as stevedores of Asian Terminals.
It is not disputed that early in the
evening of
The
parties, however, have opposing versions of what transpired next.
According to Wilfredo Acay, the group’s supervisor, one member, Reynaldo Adan, did not report for work. Wilfredo then directed the group to start
unloading the cargo from the vessel while they were waiting for Reynaldo’s replacement. However, they refused to work. Wilfredo then reported the matter to the head
checker who stated that if respondents did not want to work, they should “knock
off or leave.” At around
Respondents claimed that on that particular date and time,
they were busy arranging and classifying cargoes by color scheme to be unloaded. Since they were undermanned, they could not
move as fast as management wanted. Their
supervisor, Wilfredo Acay, asked for a replacement but
nobody came. Nonetheless, they continued to work. They only stopped when their supervisor told
them to go home. Later, he charged them
with refusal to work. On
Officer-in-charge
R.F. Salazar of Asian Terminals Legal Department conducted an investigation of
the incident. In his report[2] and
investigation dated
On
On
On
On appeal, the NLRC, in
its Decision[3] dated
Asian Terminals filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied by the NLRC.
Asian Terminals then
seasonably filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. Pursuant
to our ruling in St. Martin’s Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[4] the
petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. On
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the dismissal
of respondents from employment is without just cause and due process.
The requisites of a valid
dismissal for just causes are: (a) the dismissal must be for one of the causes
stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must have been
accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and defend
himself.[5] Article 282 of the Labor Code, provides:
ART. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Here,
Asian Terminals cited as a just cause respondents’ willful disobedience or
refusal to work.
The offense of willful disobedience
requires the concurrence of two (2) requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed
conduct must have been willful, that is characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.[6]
Settled is the rule that in an
illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi is
on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a valid
cause.[7] In this case, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that Asian Terminals failed to prove willful disobedience on the part
of respondents. Its own Position Paper states
that they did not refuse to work. It was
their head checker who told them to stop working, thus:
4. That on or about
It
can be gleaned that on that particular date and time, respondents unloaded
cargo from M/V Huang Jin Shan. They
started working at
On
the procedural issue being raised by respondents, Section 2, Rule
XXIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 2. Standards of due process, requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
1. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
Under
the above Rule, no employee may be validly dismissed unless the employer has complied
with the two notice requirements: (1) a
written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination to afford
the employee an opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance
of his representative, if he so desires; and (2) and a written notice stating
clearly the reason of the termination.[8] The procedure is mandatory and failure to
comply with these procedural requirements for terminating employment taints the
dismissal with illegality.[9]
In
the instant case, the Court of Appeals found that while an investigation was
conducted, however, both petitioners failed to send respondents the first
notice required by the Rule.
Petitioners
contend that the sworn statement of Wilfredo Acay,
sent to respondents, stating the charges is a sufficient notice. This sworn statement can not be considered as
the first notice required by the said Rule.
If at all, it is a mere narration under oath, of what transpired in the
evening of April 30, 1994; and that respondents were among the stevedores who
disobeyed Wilfredo Acay’s order to work.
In ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc. v. Daquero,[10] we held that in order to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.
Clearly, the first
requisite is not present here.
While respondents are
entitled to reinstatement, however, it may no longer be a feasible option. In their Motion to Resolve dated
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 50967 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, in lieu of
reinstatement, respondents are awarded separation pay equivalent to at least
one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher
(with a fraction of at least six [6] months being considered as one [1] whole
year) and their full backwages, allowances, and other benefits, or their
monetary equivalent, corresponding to the period from the date of their
dismissal to the date of their supposed actual reinstatement. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 29-37. Ponencia by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (retired) with Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 53-56.
[3]
[4] G.R. No. 130866,
[5] Rodriguez, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153947, December 5, 2002, 393 SCRA 511, 516, citing RDS Trucking v. National Labor Relations Commission, 294 SCRA 623 (1998).
[6] Bascon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144899, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 122, 131 citing Dimabayao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 363 Phil. 279 (1999).
[7] R.P. Dinglasan
Construction, Inc. v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156104,
[8] Rodriguez, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, p. 517, citing C & A Construction Co., Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, 318 SCRA 784 (1999), Kams International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 SCRA 316 (1999); Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303 SCRA 38 (1999).
[9]
[10] G.R. No. 147473,
[11]