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TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) EQUITIES, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus - SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 129434 Present: pUNO, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, *AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: August
18, 2006 |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the June 17, 1997 Resolution[1] of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0035, entitled “Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, versus Benjamin
‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et al; respondents.”
Sometime
in 1983, Atty. Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. and his law firm organized into a corporation
the Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Incorporated (TMEPEI), petitioner herein,
with a capital stock of P30,000,000.00 divided
into 300,000 shares at P100.00 per share. Atty. Narciso acted as Treasurer.
On
On
Meanwhile, on
Executive
Order No. 2
REGARDING THE FUNDS, MONEYS, ASSETS, AND
PROPERTIES ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED OR MISAPPROPRIATED BY FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, MRS. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, THEIR CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES, AGENTS, OR NOMINEES.
WHEREAS, the Government of the
WHEREAS, said assets and properties are in
the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
buildings, shopping centers, condominium, mansions, residences, estates, and
other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various
countries of the world;
WHEREAS, a Presidential
Commission on Good Government has been established primarily charged with the
responsibility of recovering the aforesaid assets and properties for the
Philippine Government.
x x x
(3) Require all persons in the Philippines
holding such assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure
of the same to the Commission on Good Government within thirty (30) days from
the publication of this Executive Order, or the substance thereof, in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
On
Dear
Sirs:
Re: PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK SHARES UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2
I
have the honor to inform that TRANS MIDDLE EAST PHILS. EQUITIES, INC. (TMEPEI)
IS THE OWNER OF 6,299,177 SHARES of Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIB) which are registered in the books of PCIB as
follows:
Name
of Registered Owner Number
of Shares
TRANS
MIDDLE EAST PHILS. EQUITIES, INC. 6,119,067 shares
Edilberto
S. Narciso, Jr. 180,110 shares
TOTAL 6,299,177 shares
This
matter is being reported conformable to Executive Order No. 2 of President Aquino,
as the beneficial owner of said shares is former Gov. Benjamin Romualdez and it
would thus appear that these shares are within the jurisdiction or cognizance
of the Commission under Executive Order No. 2.
However,
as of P70,000,000.00 which are
due and payable.
Thus, on
In July
1987, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (hereinafter referred to as
respondent court) Civil Case No. 0035, entitled “Republic of the
In its
Second Amended Complaint dated
Defendants Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and Juliette Romualdez acting by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence
and connection with the latter defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes
and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and
the Filipino people, among others:
x x x
[j] effected, with the active
collaboration among others, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the
sale of shareholdings of the First Philippine Holdings Corporation in the
Philippine and Commercial and International Bank (PCIB) to Trans Middle East
Philippines Equities, Inc., a front organization of defendant Benjamin
Romualdez. The acquisition of PCIB shares was packed by PCIB and financed by
PCIB and Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc., through loan extended to SOLOIL
Inc., for and in behalf of Trans Middle East Equities, Inc. The manner by which PCIB in effect funded
the purchase of shares of its own capital stock was done in violation of
banking laws, rules and regulations on (i) loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and other related interest (DOSRI), (ii) single borrower’s Limit
(SBL), (iii) disclosure requirements, and (iv) duty to ascertain identity of
borrower and purpose of the loan.
In his
Answer dated
They [he and other lawyers in the law firm] have not singly or
collectively made any attempt to conceal, hide or dispose of any or all of the
assets and properties of Benjamin Romualdez; to the contrary, said persons
shortly after the revolution and in compliance with Executive Order Nos. 1 and
2 of President Corazon C. Aquino, voluntarily and without bargaining for
immunity, disclosed to the PCGG all of the assets and properties of Benjamin
Romualdez known to them. More
particularly, the ownership by Benjamin Romualdez of Trans Middles East
Philippines Equities, Inc. which, in turn, owns 6,299,177 PCIBank shares was
voluntarily disclosed to the PCGG by answering defendant himself. This disclosure enables the PCGG to
immediately place all of the 6,299,177 PCIBank shares under sequestration and
subsequently to received approximately P6,600,000.00
in cash dividends accruing to those shares.
The answers
of Attys. Bengzon, Jimenez, and Faustino state the same allegations contained
in Atty. Narciso’s answer.
On March 24, 1988, petitioner TMEPEI filed with
respondent court a Motion to Intervene alleging that it is the registered owner
of 6,119,067 common shares of the PCIB and the recognized owner of 180,110
shares or a total of 6,299,177 shares which correspond to only 12.97% of the
common shares of the bank; and that the PCGG sequestered its shares without due
process and exercised all rights of ownership thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the PCGG from exercising acts of ownership.
On
On
On
On
On
The PCGG
filed its Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by respondent
court.
Hence,
the PCGG filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions of respondent court dated
On
On
On
On
On
On
Hence, the present
petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE RESOLUTION DATED
II.
RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT SUBPOENA AS WELL AS THE REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE RULE.
In its Comment, the PCGG alleged that respondent
court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued its assailed
Resolution. Petitioner cannot claim
denial of due process since it failed to file seasonably its comment on the two
manifestations and motions of Atty. Narciso despite notice. When those incidents
were heard on March 11 and
The petition lacks merit for the following reasons:
First, a motion for reconsideration is needed before
a petition for certiorari can be resorted to,[4]
subject to some exceptions.[5] In this case, petitioner did not file with
respondent court a motion for reconsideration of its assailed Resolution before
it resorted to certiorari. Neither did
it explain why it should be excused from complying with such requirement.
Second, on petitioner’s contention that it was denied due
process, let it be stressed that where a party was given an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.[6]
Here, petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be
heard. “To be heard” does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through
pleadings, and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
as in this case, there is no denial of due process.[7]
Respondent
court directed petitioner to file its comment on the manifestations and motions
of Atty. Narciso. However, despite notice,
petitioner did not file any comment. Records disclose that if filed the same only
on
Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments
or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its
interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.[8] What is repugnant to due process is the
denial of the opportunity to be heard,[9]
which is not present here.
Lastly, it bears
stressing Atty. Narciso, in his two manifestations and motions, was seeking
advice or “directive” from respondent court.
It is not the duty of any court to give advice or “directive.” The court
only decides actual controversies
involving rights legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[10] Thus, the motions should have been dismissed
outright. At any rate, we fail to discern any
taint of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court when it
issued the challenged Resolution. If at
all, it only committed an error of judgment.
One last
word. It has been confirmed that Atty. Narciso is
now dead. Verily, the issues raised by petitioner and the PCGG and the questioned
Resolution of respondent court have become moot.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose S. Balajadia (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr. (deceased) and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval.
[2] Rollo, p. 134.
[3] Annex “A,” Petition, id., pp. 34-55.
[4] Gabi Multi Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 155126, November 9, 2004, 441 SCRA 484; Sunshine Transportation, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116025, February 22, 1996, 254 SCRA 51.
[5] (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings are ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
[6] Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219,
[7] Batul v. Bayron, G.R. No. 157687, 424 SCRA 26.
[8] Air Philippines Corporation v.
International Business Aviation Services, Phils., Inc.,
G.R. No. 151963,
[9] Gaoiran v. Alcala, G.R. No. 150178,
[10] Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.