FIRST DIVISION
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TOWER INDUSTRIAL SALES and john Kenneth
ocampo, petitioners,
- versus - Hon.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth Division), National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC, third Division) and
RUFO PAMALO, JR., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 165727 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: April 19, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The right to file a
special civil action of certiorari is
neither a natural right nor an essential element of due process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. [1]
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court impugns the Resolution[2]
dated 31 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82933 dismissing
the Petition for Annulment of the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which found private respondent Rufo Pamalo, Jr. to have been
illegally dismissed. Said Resolution of the Court of Appeals succinctly stated:
This petition for annulment of the NLRC decision
suffers from the following fatal deficiencies:
(1) Per reading of the petition, this petition is treated
as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not being a petition for annulment
of NLRC decision;
(2) Only Photostat copies were attached of the assailed
NLRC decision dated November 29, 2002;
(3) No certified true copies of pleadings and other
supporting documents filed before the Labor Arbiter and NLRC were attached to
the petition;
(4) The Verification does not comply with Sec. 4, Rule 7
of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which failed to manifest that the
allegations were based on authentic records.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED. [3]
Likewise impugned in this Petition
for Certiorari is the Resolution[4] of
the Court of Appeals dated 31 August 2004, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The following facts are undisputed:
Tower
Industrial Sales, a company engaged in selling various brands of home
appliances and managed by petitioner John Kenneth Ocampo, employed private
respondent as a company driver in 1987.
He worked everyday from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and his last salary was
pegged at P285.00 a day. [5]
On
12 February 2002, private respondent filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter
for unfair labor practice and claimed overtime pay, premium
for holiday pay and service incentive leave pay against Alon Development
Corp. and/or Tower Industrial Sales, and Fernando Ocampo,[6]
owner of both Alon Development Corp. and Tower Industrial Sales, and father of
petitioner John Kenneth Ocampo.[7]
On
19 February 2002, a week after private respondent commenced the complaint with
the Labor Arbiter, Fernando Ocampo issued a memorandum to the private
respondent requiring him to explain his absence without official leave on said
date. [8]
On
4 March 2002, another memorandum was issued to the private respondent requiring
him to explain his absence from work on said date without permission from
management and calling his attention to the fact that he had not submitted any
explanation relative to the memorandum issued to him on 19 February 2002. [9]
On
6 March 2002, private respondent submitted his handwritten explanation
regarding his absences, saying that with respect to his absence on 19 February
2002, at around 9:00 a.m., his wife left word to a certain Carol of
petitioners’ office that he cannot come to work as he was attending a wedding
of a relative wherein he was a sponsor.
He also explained that he failed to report for work on 4 March 2002
because he attended the hearing of the case he filed
against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. [10]
Prior
to the above incidents, private respondent was also given a memorandum on 1
August 2001 as a warning for his absences in the month of July 2001. Moreover,
he was given another memorandum on 13 August 2001 for damage to company
property when he bumped a tree while driving the company’s Toyota Camry car. He
was required to pay half of the expenses for the repair of the damaged car. [11]
On
9 March 2002, Fernando Ocampo issued a memorandum putting private respondent on preventive suspension pending investigation
of his case for gross misconduct, habitual tardiness and destruction of company
property, and further requiring him to attend the hearing on 4 April
2002 at 3:00 p.m. at the conference room of petitioners’ office. Petitioners’ security guard, a certain Mr.
Cornelio Rivera, allegedly handed a copy of the memorandum to private
respondent, but the latter purportedly refused to acknowledge receipt
thereof.
Private respondent did not appear at
the investigation on 4 April 2002.[12] Instead, on 18 April 2002, he filed an Amended Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal on 9 March 2002 and claimed for overtime pay, premium for holiday pay
and separation pay. In his position
paper, he prayed for 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
overtime pay and legal holiday pay in addition to the charge of illegal
dismissal. [13]
On
16 April 2002, Fernando Ocampo issued a notice of termination to the private
respondent effective 9 March 2002 for gross misconduct and for committing acts
prejudicial to the interest of the company. [14]
On
29 November 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners, finding that private respondent was validly dismissed.
Rising
to the occasion, private respondent filed a timely appeal to the NLRC.
On
28 November 2003, the NLRC reversed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Respondent Tower Industries Sales is ordered
to reinstate the complainant and to pay him full backwages computed from
his date of dismissal on March 14, 2002 up to his reinstatement, which is
partially computed in the amount of one hundred seventy five thousand three
hundred eighty eight pesos and 77/100 (P175,388.77), plus legal holiday pay
of P8,500.00.[15]
(Emphasis added)
Aggrieved by the NLRC decision, petitioners
filed a Petition for Annulment of the same before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied said
Petition for Annulment on the grounds which, for emphasis, are herein
reiterated:
(1)
Per reading of
the petition, this petition is treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, not being a petition for annulment of NLRC decision;
(2)
Only Photostat
copies were attached of the assailed NLRC decision dated November 29, 2002;
(3)
No certified true
copies of pleadings and other supporting documents filed before the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC were attached to the petition;
(4)
The Verification
does not comply with Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
which failed to manifest that the allegations were based on authentic records.[16]
On
15 July 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied for having been filed 71 days late and for lack of merit.
In
a last ditch effort at vindication, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
I.
Whether the nlrc had gravely abused its discretion when it reversed
the arbiter’s decision upholding the dismissal from employment of private
respondent;
II.
Whether the petitioners are liable to pay private respondent his
backwages;
III.
whether the petitioners are obligated to reinstate the private
respondent as driver despite strained relationship with the petitioners; and
IV.
Whether the honorable court of appeals had gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petition OF the petitioners and theN likewise
denied their motion for reconsideration.[17]
The
fundamental issues needing resolution are: (1) whether
or not the dismissal of private respondent was valid, and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 82933 on purely
technical grounds.
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
In brief, petitioners decry the decision of
the NLRC for its failure to give weight to the evidence adduced by petitioners
that private respondent’s role as driver is vital to the viability of the
business of petitioners, which demands that goods be delivered on time. Thus,
petitioners lament that private respondent’s proclivity to go on absences
without leave, his habitual tardiness, and destruction of company property are
detrimental to their business, which tendency smacks of gross misconduct - a
just cause for the termination of employees under the Labor Code.[18]
We deviate from petitioners’
standpoint.
Article 277 of the Labor Code, which guarantees the right of an employee to security of
tenure, provides that -
(b) Subject to the
constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this code
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations x x x. (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear therefrom that the dismissal of private
respondent may be sustained only if shown to have been made for a just and
authorized cause and with due process.
In conjunction with
the above-mentioned policy of the law, it is well-encrypted in our jurisprudence
that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just
cause, and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
unjustified and, therefore, illegal. It is the employer who must prove its
validity, and not the employee who must prove its invalidity. To allow an
employer to dismiss an employee based on mere allegations and generalities
would place the employee in a dangerous situation. He would be at the mercy of
his employer and the right to security of tenure, which this Court is bound to
protect, would be unduly emasculated.[19]
Patently, the Labor Arbiter clearly
lost sight of the foregoing doctrine when he held that the claim of private
respondent that he was illegally dismissed suffers from lack of substantial
proof to warrant an affirmative finding that he was illegally dismissed without
just cause. [20]
In contrast, respondent NLRC, mindful
that it is the employer which has the onus probandi to show that private
respondent’s dismissal was based on a valid ground, evaluated the evidence
presented before the Labor Arbiter and concluded that the
charges hurled by petitioners against private respondent to justify his
termination were baseless.
Doctrinally, the findings of fact of the NLRC are conclusive on this Court, absent a showing that they were reached arbitrarily.[21] Here, the Court finds no cogent reason to deflect from the findings of the NLRC. We are, thus, bound by the findings of the NLRC that the alleged infractions of private respondent do not constitute gross misconduct to warrant his dismissal from service. Indeed, petitioners cannot rely merely on the weakness of the defense of private respondent or on his failure to present evidence to disprove the charge of gross misconduct. In the absence of substantial evidence, the contentions of petitioners are self-serving and incapable of showing that the dismissal of private respondent was justified.[22]
Rightly so, we give the stamp of
approval to the following factual findings of the NLRC that the acts committed
by private respondent that were characterized by the petitioners as gross
misconduct, i.e., his absences from
work on 19 February 2002 and 4 March 2002 without prior permission from the petitioners,
as well as his past absences in the month of July 2001 and damage to the
company car when he bumped it against a tree on 11 August 2002, are past
infractions that the latter had already been duly penalized for the commissions
thereof. Past infractions cannot be collectively taken as a justification for his
dismissal from the service.[23]
We
hasten to add that anent the damage to petitioners’ Toyota Camry car, private
respondent had been paying half of the damage of which P250.00
was being deducted to his pay, as the records show.[24] Thus, this issue is now water under the
bridge and must not be revived anew to rationalize private respondent’s
dismissal from his work - his bread and butter for the past 15 years prior to
his termination.
As
regards the absences without official leave incurred on 19 February 2002 and 4
March 2002, we are equally bound by the findings of the NLRC that while they
are clear violations of company rules, they cannot be considered as grave
enough to amount to gross misconduct. We add that in private respondent’s 15
years of service with petitioners, a day or two’s absences without prior leave
is trivial; hardly of habitual character.
On another note, we
cannot ignore the fact that private respondent’s dismissal was spurred by his
filing of a labor case against petitioners for overtime pay, service incentive
leave, and holiday pay. Private respondent must not be punished for asserting
his rights and for tapping all legal avenues to address clear violations of
such rights. All things being equal, private respondent’s termination soon
after he filed the labor case against his erring employer is a badge of bad
faith on the part of the latter, undeserving of sympathy from this Court.
In hindsight, if,
indeed, private respondent was a wayward employee, why did petitioners
countenance such behavior for no less than 15 years?
Neither
can this Court give credence to petitioners’ argument that the reinstatement of
private respondent is no longer possible because of the strained relations
between the petitioners, on one hand, and the private respondent on the
other. Strained relations must be
demonstrated as a fact, adequately supported by evidence on record.[25] Mere allegations of such by the petitioners,
without evidence, are self-serving. It
bears emphasis that the NLRC, based on the evidence presented before it,
concluded that reinstatement is still possible in the present case, a finding
which we have no reason to disturb.
Petitioners
allege that their strained relations with private respondent resulted from the
latter’s absences without leave, habitual tardiness and reckless disregard of
safety precautions. These are the very
same allegations presented by petitioners as justifying reasons for dismissing
private respondent and which the NLRC and, now, this Court, declared to be
baseless. Petitioners’ claim that they
will “not feel at ease with private respondent” if he continues to drive for
them hardly constitute strained relations.
What is more plausible is that petitioners feel some antagonism against
private respondent for instituting a labor case against them. As expounded by this Court in Kunting v.
National Labor Relations Commission[26]
–
“Strained relations,” as amplified in
Employee’s Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company v.
NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991], must be of such a nature or degree as to preclude
reinstatement. But, where the differences
between the parties are neither personal nor physical, nor serious, then there
is no reason why the illegally dismissed employee should not be reinstated
rather than simply given separation pay and backwages. More so if the cause of the perceived “strained
relations” is the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. As the Court held in Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 [1992], citing Anscor Transport and
Terminals v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 147 [1990]; Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila,
182 SCRA 538 [1990]:
“Obviously, the principle of ‘strained
relations’ cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some
hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation. That is human nature.
“Besides, no strained relations should
arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an
employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service,
by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with
his employer had already become strained.”
Still contrary to
petitioners’ position, this Court cannot attribute any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals for thwarting their
efforts to reverse the NLRC decision. Considering that
petitioners failed to show any redeeming value of their petition for annulment
of the NLRC decision, which the Court of Appeals treated as a petition for certiorari, it came as no surprise that the
Court of Appeals nipped their dilatory tactics in the bud and dismissed said
petition outright.
True,
the Court of Appeals anchored the denial of petition for annulment of the NLRC
decision on merely technical grounds. Equally true, Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[27]
provides that said rules should be construed liberally to effect substantial
justice. All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be
ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.[28]
In MTM Garment Manufacturing Incorporated
v. Court of Appeals,[29]
we stressed that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right
nor an essential element of due process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of
right, and never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari
must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the Rules. [30]
In
the same vein, in NYK International
Knitwear Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[31] this Court did not mince
words in ruling that for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari to reverse the Court of
Appeals’ denial of a petition on technical grounds there must exist compelling
reason to do so. Thus-
The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional
cases and for compelling reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural
defects in order to correct a patent injustice made. However, petitioners here
have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners are
hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari
is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. [32]
Hence,
inasmuch as the NLRC decision was based on substantial evidence on record and
its conclusions were in rhyme with the applicable law and prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter, there is, therefore, not an iota of doubt as to the soundness of
said decision to warrant a relaxation by the Court of Appeals of the technical
rules of procedure.
For
our part, given the factual milieu of this case, there is nothing legally
revolting about the assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals to warrant the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari that petitioners pray
from this Court.
As a postscript, private respondent remains
unemployed to date, despite diligent efforts to hunt for a job, because of his
advanced age.[33]
This all the more behooves this Court to
affirm the impugned resolutions of the Court of Appeals and write finis
to this case lest the beneficence of the rule on security of tenure continue to
elude the private respondent through the protracted twists and turns of this
case.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolution[34]
dated 31 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82933 and the
Resolution[35]
dated 31 August 2004, denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs.
so ORDERED.
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MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] MTM Garment Manufacturing, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152336, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 55, 66.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Mariano C. del Castillo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 112-113.
[3] Rollo, pp. 112-113.
[4] Id. at 123.
[5] Id. at 90.
[6] Fernando Ocampo Ochua in other parts of the records, Id. at 29.
[7] Id. at 90, 93, 79.
[8] Id. at 90.
[9]
[10] Id. at 90-91.
[11] Id. at 91.
[12] Id.
[13]
[14] Id. at 92.
[15] Id. at 95.
[16] Id. at 112-113.
[17] Id. at 16.
[18] Id. at 17.
[19] Sanyo Travel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 345 Phil. 346, 357 (1997).
[20] Rollo, p. 75.
[21] Sanyo Travel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19 at 358.
[22]
[23] Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 358 Phil. 141, 150 (1998).
[24] Rollo, p. 38.
[25] Paguio Transport Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 356 Phil. 158, 171 (1998).
[26] G.R. No. 101427, 8 November 1993, 227 SCRA 571, 578-579.
[27] SEC. 6. Construction.— These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
[28] MTM Garment Manufacturing, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, supra note 1.
[29]
[30] Id. at 66.
[31] 445 Phil. 654 (2003).
[32] Id. at 662.
[33] Rollo, p. 165.
[34] Rollo, p. 112.
[35] Id. at 123.