|
ERNELIZA Z. MAMARIL, Petitioner, -versus- CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 164929 Present: PANGANIBAN, PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA,
and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 10, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present Petition for Review on
Certiorari seeks a relaxation of the Rules on verification and certification
against forum shopping, petitioner’s Petition for Review of a Civil Service Commission
Resolution having been dismissed[1]
by the appellate court for failure to comply therewith.
On
On
Upon verbal query by DOTC Director
Carina S. Valera (Director Valera), then CSC Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon
advised the DOTC that the incumbents of the formerly coterminous DLLS positions
had no vested right to occupy the already permanent DLLS positions, and that they
were not automatically appointed thereto; and the positions which were made permanent
could only be filled up by following existing CSC rules and regulations as well
as DOTC policies and guidelines on the appointment of personnel.[4]
By letter of
The change of the nature of
the DLLS position which you held, from coterminous to permanent pursuant
to CSC Resolution No. 010233 dated
As your appointment was of
cotermin[o]us nature, your services automatically terminated with the
non-existence of the cotermin[o]us position and the advent of the new
appointing authority.
When the new DLLS permanent
positions are authorized to be filled up, you can apply therefor. In the
meantime, you may seek appointment to any other vacant position that suits your
qualifications. Needless to say, selection in any case will follow the usual
process in accordance with the DOTC guidelines and the CSC rules and
regulations. (Underscoring supplied)
Acting on
the above-said query of
In light of
the contrary advice previously given by the former CSC Chairman de Leon, the
DOTC, by letter of
By Resolution No. 01-1409 issued on
By petitioner’s own information, her
services were “effectively terminated” on
Petitioner
and Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 01-1409. By Resolution of
The DOTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of CSC Resolution No. 02-1504 which was denied, by Resolution No. 03-1019 dated
Petitioner thus
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution No. 03-1019 only insofar
as the CSC held that she was not entitled to backwages. By Resolution No. 04-0279[15]
issued on
Petitioner thereupon filed on March 7,
2004 before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 assailing CSC
Resolution No. 03-1019[16]
which the appellate court dismissed, as earlier stated, by Resolution of May
14, 2004,[17]
for non-compliance with the Rules, it not having been verified and it containing
no sworn certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the appellate court’s May 14, 2004 Resolution to which she attached a
verified petition with certification against forum shopping, but it was denied by
Resolution of August 6, 2004, the appellate court holding that her subsequent
compliance with the Rules “[did] not cleanse her Petition of its infirmity.”[18]
Hence, the present petition, petitioner
arguing that,
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS DID NOT ONLY COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT DOES NOT CLEANSE HER
PETITION OF ITS INFIRMITY, BUT ALSO DISREGARDED THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE
THAT RULES OF PROCEDURE, WHICH ARE MERELY SECONDARY IN IMPORTANCE, OUGHT NOT
TO BE APPLIED IN A VERY RIGID AND TECHNICAL SENSE AS THEY ARE USED ONLY TO
HELP SECURE NOT OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
IS ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES FROM THE TIME OF HER ILLEGAL TERMINATION BY
RESPONDENT DOTC UP TO THE TIME OF HER ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner pleads that the dismissal of
her petition by the appellate court should be without prejudice as its
infirmity was cured by her subsequent and substantial compliance[20]
with the Rules which should not be rigidly applied to defeat and override the
ends of justice.[21]
On the merits of her petition, petitioner
asserts that every employee of the civil service is entitled to security of
tenure and should not be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. She concludes that she having been “illegally
dismissed,” she must not only be reinstated but must be entitled to all the
rights and privileges that accrued to her by virtue of the office she held,
such as her right to back salaries.[22]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure lay down the rules on verification and
certification against forum shopping as follows:
SEC.
4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A
pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
“information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information, and belief,” or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended,
A.M. No. 00-2-10 SC,
SEC.
5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure
to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions." (Emphasis supplied)
The
purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.[23] Non-compliance with such requirement does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, hence, the court may order its
correction if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is
not verified if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.[24]
On the other hand, the rule against
forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. The lack of certification against
forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not curable by
the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.[25] The submission of a certificate against forum shopping
is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.[26]
The
rule on certification against forum shopping may, however, be also relaxed on
grounds of “substantial compliance” or “special circumstance or compelling
reasons.” The Court thus examined the records of the case on hand to determine
the existence of any circumstances or compelling reasons which call for the relaxation
of the Rules but appreciated none in light of the following discussion.
The general proposition is that a
public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any
service. As he works, so shall he earn.[27]
Compensation is paid only for service actually or constructively rendered.”[28]
Petitioner’s
services were actually terminated on
Octot v. Ybañez[29]
instructs that the good faith or bad faith and grave abuse of discretion in
the dismissal or termination of the services of a government employee come into
play in the determination of the award of back salaries upon his reinstatement.
In said case, the therein petitioner, a
security guard in the Regional Health Office No. VII, Cebu City who had been
convicted of libel by a trial court, was summarily dismissed pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 6 and LOI Nos. 14 and 14-A issued by then President
Marcos directing heads of departments and agencies of the government to weed
out undesirable government officials and employees, specifically those who were
facing charges or were notoriously undesirable on the ground of dishonesty,
incompetence or other kinds of misconduct defined in the Civil Service Law. The therein petitioner was eventually
acquitted of the criminal charge. Hence, his request for reinstatement was
granted but not his claim for back salaries from the date of his
dismissal. This Court, through then Chief Justice Teehankee, held:
In the absence of proof that
respondent Regional Director acted in bad faith and with grave abuse
of discretion, petitioner is not entitled to backwages and consequently cannot claim
for damages. In the case at bar, the record manifests that respondents
officials were not motivated by ill will or personal malice in dismissing
petitioner but only by their desire to comply with the mandates of Presidential
Decree No. 6. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The denial of the award of back
salaries, absent a showing of bad faith and/or grave abuse of discretion in the
termination of the services of a government employee who was reinstated, was
reiterated in Clemente v. Commission on Audit,[30]
Acting Director of Prisons v. Villaluz,[31]
and Echeche v. Court of Appeals.[32]
Petitioner, however, invokes the
rulings in Tañala v. Legaspi,[33]
De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission,[34]
Gabriel v. Domingo,[35]
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission[36]
to the effect that when an official or employee was illegally dismissed and
his reinstatement is ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not
having left his office and, therefore, is entitled to all rights and privileges
that accrue to him by virtue of the office.
To
begin with, petitioner cannot be considered to have been illegally dismissed. Her services were terminated effective
At any rate, no parity of
circumstances in the above-cited cases invoked by petitioner obtains in the
case at bar.
In Tañala,
payment of back salaries upon reinstatement was ordered upon acquittal in a criminal
case of the regular employee of the government who had been suspended as a
result of the filing of said case.[37]
De Guzman involved a proscribed abolition of office,[38]
hence, payment of back salaries was ordered upon reinstatement of the separated
employee. In Del Castillo, the therein
petitioner was preventively suspended and later dismissed for grave misconduct.[39]
He was eventually exonerated. He was
thus ordered reinstated. He thereafter
filed a “Motion for Clarificatory Relief” praying for an award of
backwages. Noting that the CSC did not
object to the payment of backwages and the Solicitor General in fact recommended
the payment thereof, this Court granted the motion.
In Gabriel,
the therein petitioner was holding a permanent position of Motor Vehicle
Registrar I at the Motor Vehicles Office, later renamed the Land Transportation
Commission. In 1979, the Land
Transportation Commission was reorganized, renaming plantilla positions. The therein petitioner’s position was changed
to Transportation District Supervisor, but since another had been appointed thereto,
he filed a protest. During the
pendency of his protest, he was extended a casual appointment but his services
were “in effect terminated” three days later, drawing him to file a
complaint for illegal termination of services which reached the CSC. The CSC eventually found that the issuance to
the therein petitioner of a casual appointment which resulted in the termination
of his services was illegal and that he was more qualified than the one
appointed to his renamed position of Transportation District Supervisor. The CSC accordingly directed his appointment
to his former position. He was appointed
alright but to a lower position. He later
filed a claim for backwages which was denied by the Commission on Audit
but which this Court ordered granted.
In all these
cases, the suspensions and/or dismissals were held unjustified, the therein
petitioners having been either exonerated from the charges-bases of suspension
or dismissal or were victims of proscribed abolition of office or issuance of
appointment to a different position which soon after resulted in dismissal
therefrom.
That the DOTC’s termination of petitioner’s
services in accordance with the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] See rollo, p. 34.
[8] Rollo, p. 78.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Paragraph No. 54, Petition for Review on Certiorari, id. at 3-17.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] CA rollo, pp. 13-20.
[17] Rollo, p. 18.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463; Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 786; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 532, 540 (2003).
[24] Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419, 427; Shipside Incorporated v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 346; Sy v. Habacon-Garayblas, A.M. No. MTJ-93-860,
[25] Vide: Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, supra at 465; Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419, 427; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[26] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, supra at 465.
[27] Villamor
v. Lacson, 120 Phil. 1213, 1219 (1964).
See also Gesite v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 123562-65, November 25,
2004, 444 SCRA 51, 59; Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 586,
599 (1997); Sales v. Mathay, Sr. No. L-39557,
[28] Gentallan, Jocelyn S., CSC Resolution
No. 001264 dated
[29] No. L-48643,
[30] 213 Phil. 264, 271 (1984).
[31] No. L-48352,
[32] G.R. No. 89865,
[33] 121 Phil. 541 (1965).
[34] G.R. No. 101105,
[35] G.R. No. 87420,
[36] 343 Phil. 734 (1997).
[37] Supra at 551.
[38] Supra at 172.
[39] Supra at 740.