SECOND DIVISION
BERNARDO REMIGIO, G.R. No. 159887
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus-
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, C.F. SHARP CREW Promulgated:
MGT., INC. & NEW COMMODORE
CRUISE LINE, INC.,[1]
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision[2]
and resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 67782 which affirmed the March 22, 2001 Resolution[4] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), awarding sickness allowance of US$3,400.00 to
petitioner but denying his claim for disability benefits.
The facts are undisputed.
On
After
petitioner passed the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel
and started performing his job as a drummer in December 1997. On
Upon the vessel's arrival at the
On
In a letter dated
On
In a letter dated
Mr. B. Remigio who had
Coronary Bypass (6x) abroad last April 2, 1998 has completed his cardiac
rehabilitation here at the
Lately he has been complaining of epigastric
discomfort probably from Ecotrin. He has been on ulcer regimen.
He may go
back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months.
He was unfit
from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998.[12] (emphases supplied)
On
In support of his claims,
petitioner submitted copies of: a) his
Contract of Employment with private respondents; b) communication of respondent
principal to respondent agency informing the latter about petitioner's
"heart attack," repatriation and replacement; c) History
and Physical Report of petitioner and Procedure Report of his cardiac catheterization; d) receipts
from a drugstore and the Philippine Heart Center; e) 2D Echocardiogram-Color Doppler Report; f) filled
up form of the Exercise Testing and Cardiac Rehabilitation Laboratory of the
Philippine Heart Center showing the results of the tests done on petitioner;
and g) the Discharge Summary of the Marine Medical Unit.[16] On the other hand, private respondents
submitted copies of: a) the Contract of Employment; b) referral letter dated
April 27, 1998 of respondent agency to the American Outpatient Clinic; c) demand
letter dated May 13, 1998 of petitioner's counsel; and d) medical report of Dr.
Leticia C. Abesamis of the American Outpatient Clinic
addressed to the manager of respondent agency.[17]
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents
jointly and severally to pay complainant, his sickness allowance in the amount
of US$3,400.00.
All
other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[19]
In ruling that petitioner
is not entitled to disability benefits, Labor Arbiter Caday
noted that the Schedule of Disability or
Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under
Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC does not provide for the payment of
compensation benefits in cases of cardiac catheterization or heart bypass.
Even assuming that it was included, he held that no medical report was
presented to show that petitioner's disability was total and permanent as to be
classified under Grade 1 of the said schedule of disability. Nonetheless,
petitioner's claim for sickness allowance was granted as there was no showing that
private respondents paid petitioner's basic wages after his repatriation, as
provided under Section 20, B(3) of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner was awarded US$3,400.00 as
sickness allowance, computed on the basis of his monthly wage of US$850.00
multiplied by four (4) months.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter in toto.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's
resolution, to no avail. Accordingly, he
filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order with the CA.[21]
On
The CA likewise did not find substantial evidence to prove
that the heart ailment incurred by petitioner during the term of his employment
resulted to his disability, i.e., rendered
him incapable of further seeking employment as a musician or to follow a
substantially gainful occupation. It noted
that petitioner's medical records abroad never mentioned that his heart ailment
resulted to a disability. Petitioner's
reliance on Dr. Abesamis's letter dated
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CA was
denied.[23] Hence, this petition in which petitioner prays
that he be awarded US$60,000.00 as
permanent total disability benefits, US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance, attorney's
fees and costs of suit. He assigns as lone
error, the following:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
AND DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[24]
The main issue is whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
At
the outset, private respondents' contention that the instant petition must be
dismissed outright for being grounded on a question of fact must be
rejected. The issue of whether petitioner is
entitled to permanent total disability benefits is a question of law as it
calls for the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on disability
benefits to the established facts on record.[25]
It raises the
following sub-issues, to wit:
1. Whether heart ailment suffered during the
term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no
proof of work-connection; and
2. Whether
the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to the
case of a seafarer's claim for disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC.
First.
In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits,
the Labor Arbiter and the CA considered that "cardiac catheterization,"
"heart bypass," or "heart ailment" is not found in the
Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or
Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner contends that the schedule of disability
under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC is not exclusive. Heart ailment, though not listed in the
schedule, is compensable. Private
respondents, on the other hand, concede that while petitioner's illness is not
listed under the 1996 POEA SEC, "this does not mean that the same is not
compensable."[26] However, since "heart ailment" is
not listed under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC, it is not an
"occupational disease." It was therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related. Having failed
to do so, he is not entitled to disability benefits.
We find merit in petitioner's argument.
Petitioner
bases his claim for disability benefits under Section 20 in relation to
Sections 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:
Sec. 20. Compensation
and Benefits
x x x
B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or
Illness
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers injury or illness during the
term of his contract are as follows:
x x x
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability
of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or
illness[,] the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of
benefits enumerated in Section 30 of [t]his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an
illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
Sec. 30. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT FOR
INJURIES SUFFERED AND DISEASES OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED
x x x
CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE
1. Fracture of
four (4) or more ribs resulting to severe limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 6
2. Fracture of
four (4) or more ribs with intercostal neuralgia
resulting in moderate limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 9
3. Slight
limitation of chest expansion due to simple rib functional without myositis or intercostal neuralgia
- Gr. 12
4. Fracture of
the dorsal or lumber spines resulting to severe or total rigidity of the trunk
or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects - Gr. 6
5. Moderate
rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr.
8
6. Slight
rigidity or one third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr.
11
7. Injury to
the spinal cord as to make walking impossible without the aid of a pair of
crutches - Gr. 4
8. Injury to
the spinal cord as to make walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of
crutches - Gr. 1
9. Injury to
the spinal cord resulting to incontinence of urine and feces - Gr. 1
x x x
NOTE: Any item in the schedule classified under
Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.
Sec. 30-A. SCHEDULE OF
DISABILITY ALLOWANCES
Impediment Grade Impediment
1 Maximum Rate x 120.00%
2 Maximum Rate x 88.81%
3 Maximum Rate x 78.36%
4 Maximum Rate x 68.66% 5 Maximum
Rate x 58.96% 6 Maximum
Rate x 50.00% 7 Maximum Rate x 41.80% 8 Maximum
Rate x 33.59% 9 Maximum
Rate x 26.12% 10 Maximum Rate x 20.15% 11 Maximum
Rate x 14.93% 12 Maximum
Rate x 10.45% 13 Maximum
Rate x 6.72%
14 Maximum
Rate x 3.74%
Maximum Rate:
US$50,000
To be paid in Philippine Currency
equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (emphases supplied)
"Disability"
is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental
function resulting from injury or sickness."[27]
Clearly, "disability" is not
synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former being a
potential effect of the latter. The
schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or
Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable
sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC,[28]
nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational Diseases."
The
unqualified phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996
POEA SEC covers all injury or illness occurring in the lifetime of the
contract. The injury or illness need not
be shown to be work-related. In Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC, [29] we categorically held:
The argument of petitioners that since
cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease it was incumbent upon
Capt. Arante to prove that his working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the same, is not meritorious. It must be noted that his claims arose from
the stipulations of the standard format contract entered into between him and
SEACORP which, per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984[30]
of respondent POEA was required to be adopted and used by all parties to the
employment of any Filipino seamen (sic) on board any ocean-going
vessel. His claims are not rooted from
the provisions of the New Labor Code as amended. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the death or illness of seam[e]n
need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not. Therefore, proof that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting a disease or illness, is not required to
entitle a seaman who dies during the term thereof by reason of such disease or
illness, of the benefits stipulated thereunder
which are, under Section C(2) of the same Circular No.
2, separate and distinct from, and in addition to whatever benefits which the
seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. (emphasis supplied)
This principle was
reiterated in the recent case of Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC.[31]
While indeed,
the Labor Code's provisions on disability benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC) require the element of work-relation for an
illness to be compensable, the 1996 POEA SEC giving a more liberal provision in
favor of the seafarer must apply. As a
rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public
policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting
parties.[32] In controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence,
or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be
resolved in the former’s favor.[33] The policy is to extend the doctrine to
a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of
labor.[34]
Second. Is the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability applicable to the case at bar? Petitioner claims to have suffered from permanent total disability as defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 192 (c) The following disabilities shall be
deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules; x x x
Petitioner likewise cites Vicente
v. ECC[35]
and Abaya, Jr. v. ECC,[36]
both of which were decided applying the Labor Code provisions on disability
benefits. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner erred
in applying the definition of "permanent total disability" under the Labor
Code and cases decided under the ECC as the instant case involves a contractual
claim under the 1996 POEA SEC.
Again, we rule for petitioner.
The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas."[37] Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."[38]
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC,[39] seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico,[40] GSIS v. CA,[41] and Bejerano v. ECC[42] that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC,[43] that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
The same principles were cited in the more recent case
of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.[44] In addition, the Court
cited GSIS v. Cadiz[45]
and Ijares v. CA[46]
that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job
for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his body."
Finally. Applying the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the facts on record, is petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit?
Petitioner contends that the certification of the company-designated physician that he may go back to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months even if his job was a drummer proves that he suffered from permanent total disability and thus entitled to permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 under the 1996 POEA SEC. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that: 1) petitioner did not present any proof that he suffered from permanent total disability, i.e., that his earning power is now reduced and that he is incapable of performing remunerative employment; 2) petitioner did not present any medical certificate showing that he suffered any disability; 3) on the contrary, the company-designated physician attested that petitioner could return to further sea duty; 4) even if he could not go back to sea duty, this does not mean that his earning capacity is impaired since as a musician, he may still perform on land; and 5) having admitted that he was a heavy smoker, petitioner is disqualified under Section 20(d) of the 1996 POEA SEC from recovering compensation for any incapacity or disability he suffered.
There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability.-- (a)
A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness
the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of
these Rules.
(b) A
disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X[47] of
these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial and
permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a
permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. (emphasis supplied)
In Vicente v. ECC:[48]
x x x the test of whether or not an employee
suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity
of the employee
to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he
incurred. Thus, if by reason
of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his
customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage
of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which,
in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total
disability), then the said employee
undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or
not he loses the use of any part of his body. (emphases supplied)
A total disability does not require that
the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is
that the injury must be such that the
employee cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom.[49] On
the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts
continuously for more than 120 days.[50] Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[51] we held:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[52] x x x
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages
in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do.[53] It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting
in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[54]
Applying the
foregoing standards, we find that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability.
It is undisputed that petitioner started to suffer chest pains on March 16, 1998 and was repatriated on April 23, 1998 after having been found as "not fit for duty." The medical report dated June 25, 1998 of the company-designated physician, Dr. Abesamis, establishes the following facts, viz: a) petitioner underwent a coronary bypass on April 2, 1998; b) petitioner was "unfit" from April 27, 1998 (date of referral) to June 25, 1998 (date of medical report); c) petitioner may not return to sea duty within 8-10 months after June 25, 1998; and d) petitioner may return to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months from June 25, 1998.
These facts
clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13
months -- from the onset of his ailment on
Private respondents' contention that it was not shown that it was
impossible for petitioner to play the drums during the 8-10 months that he was
on land is specious. To our minds, petitioner's
unfitness to work attached to the nature of his job rather than to its place of
performance. Indeed, playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed
and endurance. It demands the
performance of hitting strokes and repetitive movements that petitioner, having
undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become incapacitated to do.
The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does
not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits. In the same case of Crystal Shipping, Inc.,
we held:
Petitioners tried to
contest the above findings [of permanent total disability] by showing that
respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. (citation omitted) Nonetheless, this information does not alter
the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a
chief mate for almost three years. The law does not require that the illness
should be incurable. What is important
is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days
which constitutes permanent total disability.[56] (emphasis supplied)
That the company-designated physician did not specify that
petitioner suffered from any disability should not prejudice petitioner's claim
for disability benefits. In the first
place, it is well to note that it was respondent agency which referred
petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic giving only the specific instruction
that the designated physician indicate in the medical report "the
estimated treatment period and the exam conducted."[57] Moreover, what is important is that the facts stated in the medical
report clearly constitute permanent total disability as defined by law. It is well-settled that strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits.[58]
Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the
loss of earning capacity.[59] As in the case of Crystal Shipping, Inc.,[60]
an award of permanent total disability benefits in the petition at bar would be
germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making
ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
We do not agree that petitioner's admission that he was a
heavy smoker is enough ground to disqualify him from entitlement to disability
compensation under Section 20(D) of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:
Section
20.D. No compensation shall be payable in respect
of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from
his willful or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that
such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the
seafarer.
We have held that a worker brings with him possible
infirmities in the course of his employment and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees,
he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.[61]
In
the case at bar, it is noteworthy that petitioner's habit of smoking was not a
consideration when private respondents hired petitioner. It was likewise not shown that petitioner
suffered from any form of ailment prior to the heart ailment he suffered during
the course of his employment with private respondents. While smoking may contribute to the
development of a heart ailment, heart ailment may be caused by other factors
such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus, private respondents' peremptory
presumption, that petitioner's habit of smoking heavily was the willful act
which caused his illness and resulting disability, without more, cannot suffice
to bar petitioner's claim for disability benefits. Ruling otherwise would run contrary to the constitutional
mandate to extend full protection to labor.
Having suffered from permanent total
disability, petitioner is entitled to US$60,000.00 which is the amount due for
permanent total disability under Section 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC.
As
to the claim for sickness allowance, petitioner prays that private respondents
be held jointly and severally liable to pay him US$3,428.00, as opposed to the
award of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, of only
US$3,400.00. We find this claim warranted by the undisputed fact on record that
petitioner's basic salary is US$857.00 per month.[62] Multiplying the 120-day sickness allowance
due petitioner on the basis of the correct monthly rate of US$857.00, he should
be awarded US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance.
Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's
fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and
actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws. Attorney's fees is also recoverable when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest. Such conditions being present in the case at
bar, we find that an award of attorney's fees is warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67782 dated
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Also referred to as New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. in some parts
of the record.
[2] Dated
[3] Dated
[4] CA rollo, pp. 33-41.
[5]
[6] Note
that said POEA SEC has been revised by DOLE Department Order No. 4, Series of
2000 (2000 POEA SEC).
[7] CA rollo, p. 206.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Supra note 4.
[21]
[22] Rollo, p. 88.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Memorandum
(For the Private Respondents); rollo,
p. 172.
[27] Labor Code, Art. 167(n).
[28] See Sec. 32-A of the 2000 POEA SEC
titled "Occupational Diseases."
[29] G.R.
No. 84812,
[30] The
1984 POEA SEC and 1996 POEA SEC are similarly worded.
[31] G.R.
No. 123619,
[32] See Arts. 1306 and 1308 of the New Civil
Code; Delos Santos v. Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No.
154185,
[33] Mayon Hotel and Restaurant v. Adana,
G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 609, citing Nicario v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125340,
September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 619. (citation
omitted)
[34]
[35] G.R.
No. 85024,
[36] G.R.
No. 64255,
[37] E.O. No.
247, Sec. 3(i) and (j).
[38] Art. 1700, New Civil Code.
The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
[39] G.R.
No. 123891,
[40] G.R.
No. 134028,
[41] G.R.
No. 117572, January 29, 1998, 285 SCRA 430, 436 and G.R. No. 116015, July 31,
1996, 260 SCRA 133, 138.
[42] G.R.
No. 84777,
[43] Ibid., citing Ulibas
v. Republic, No. L-43320,
[44] G.R.
No. 154798,
[45] G.R.
No. 145093,
[46] G.R.
No. 105854,
[47] Rule
X. Temporary Total Disability
SECTION 2. Period of
entitlement [to Temporary Total Disability Benefit]
(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the
first day of such disability. If caused
by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days
except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond
120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case
benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and
permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of
physical or mental functions as determined by the System; x x
x
[48] Supra note 35.
[49]
[50] Rule
XI, Section 1(b) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
[51] Supra note 44.
[52] Ibid., citing GSIS v.
[53] Ibid., citing Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, supra Note
39.
[54] Ibid., citing Bejerano
v. ECC, supra note 43.
[55] CA rollo, p. 64.
[56] Citing GSIS v.
[57] CA Rollo, p. 88.
[58] Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, supra note 39, citing NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
107131, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 486, 494.
[59] Supra note 39.
[60] Supra note 44.
[61] Seagull
Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, supra, citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124927, May
18, 1999, 307 SCRA 189.
[62] Contract
of Employment and the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA; CA rollo, pp. 34, 36, 45 and
63, rollo, p. 29.