THIRD DIVISION
|
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES,
INC., and/or ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No.
159354 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, and TINGA,
JJ. |
|
DIOSCORO D. Respondent. |
Promulgated: April
7, 2006 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] and Resolution,[2] dated February 14,
2003 and August 7, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 70836, which reversed the October 4, 2001[3] Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission affirming the Labor Arbiter’s Decision of June
15, 2000.[4]
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On P22,000.[6] Additionally, after each voyage his earned
leave credits are monetized and paid in cash.
He said he was disembarking because he was going to take the board
examinations for marine engineers.
Two months later, on September 27, 1997, Sedan sent a letter to
petitioners applying for optional retirement, citing as reason the death of his
only daughter, hence the retirement benefits he would receive would ease his
financial burden. However, petitioners
deferred action on his application for optional retirement since his services on
board ship were still needed. Nonetheless,
according to petitioners, the company expressed intention to extend him a loan
in order to defray the costs incurred for the burial and funeral expenses of his
daughter.
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondents to pay complainant retirement gratuity/separation pay of P253,000.00 (23 yrs. x P22,000.00 at ½ month for every year of service).
2. Ordering respondents to pay complainant 10% of the total monetary award by way of attorney’s fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners appealed the said decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, the NLRC found the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter consistent with the evidence on record. Hence, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack
of merit. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals anchored on the following grounds:
1. PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING RETIREMENT GRATUITY/SEPARATION PAY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS INFORMED/NOTIFIED OF PETITIONERS’ NEED FOR HIS SERVICES OR DIRECTING HIM TO REPORT FOR WORK, INCLUDING [ACTION] ON HIS APPLICATION FOR OPTIONAL RETIREMENT.
2. PUBLIC
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN REFUSING THE SUBJECT CLAIM.[10]
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that the retirement
gratuity and attorney’s fees awarded by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had no
basis in fact or law since pursuant to the Agreement between the company and
the employees, the granting of optional retirement is the exclusive prerogative
of the employer, herein petitioners. Unless
such prerogative was exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, private respondent
cannot demand it as a right. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners to pay private respondent P200,000 as financial assistance, to wit:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED,
this petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated October 4, 2001 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2002 of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No.
00-12-08578-97/NLRC CA No. 026697-00 entitled, “Dioscoro
D. Sedan, complainant-appellee vs. Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. and/or Erwin L. Chiongbian,
respondents-appellants” are hereby reversed and set aside for
having been rendered/issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction and, in lieu thereof, petitioners are hereby ordered
to pay respondent Dioscoro D. Sedan the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition raising as sole
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING THE RESPONDENT PHP200,000.00 AS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WHEN IN FACT IT WAS THE RESPONDENT WHO REFUSED TO REPORT FOR WORK.[12]
Petitioners contend that by refusing to report for work and insisting on
applying for optional retirement, private respondent wrongly assumed that he
was justified in abandoning his job. Petitioners
maintain that private respondent’s refusal to report back to work, despite
being duly notified of the need for his service, is tantamount to voluntary
resignation. Therefore, petitioners contend,
the respondent should not be entitled to any financial assistance.
Moreover, granting arguendo that private
respondent was entitled to financial assistance, petitioners protest the amount
of the financial assistance awarded by the Court of Appeals for being
disproportionately excessive. Petitioners cite Manggagawa
ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC,[13] where the
employee was given only P10,000 as financial
assistance.
In his Comment, private respondent argues that the Court of Appeals awarded
him P200,000 for equity consideration. Private respondent claims that the retirement
policy of the company, which states that “[i]t will
be the exclusive prerogative and sole option of this company to retire any
covered employee,”[14] must be
interpreted in favor of the working class. Otherwise, private respondent laments, he will
be placed at the mercy of the company, contrary to the constitutional mandate
to afford full protection to labor.
At the outset, we rule for petitioners on the matter of optional
retirement benefits.
Private
respondent is not entitled to retirement benefits. The pertinent law governing retirement is found
in the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.
In case of
retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits
as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement and other agreements: Provided,
however, That an employee’s retirement benefits
under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than
those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement
providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee
upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five
(65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment may retire and shall
be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
x x x
The
age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement between the
employer and the employees. However, in
the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under the aforecited
article of the Labor Code, the legally mandated age for compulsory retirement
is 65 years, while the set minimum age for optional retirement is 60 years.
In the instant case, there is an agreement[15] between
petitioner shipping company and its employees.
The agreement states:
x x x
B. Retirement under the Labor Code:
Any employee whether
land-based office personnel or shipboard employee who shall reach the age of
sixty (60) while in active employment with this company may retire from the
service upon his written request in accordance with the provisions of Art. 277
of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, Book 6, Rule 1, Sec. 13 and he
shall be paid termination pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days pay for every
year of service as stated in said Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. However, the company may at its own volition
grant him a higher benefit which shall not exceed the benefits provided for in
the Retirement Gratuity table mentioned elsewhere in this policy.
C. Optional Retirement:
It will be the exclusive prerogative and sole option of this company to retire any covered employee who shall have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of credited service for land based employees and 3,650 days actually on board vessel for shipboard personnel. Such employee shall be entitled to a Retirement Gratuity which shall be computed in accordance with the following table:
|
Years
of Service |
Monthly Basic Pay (Percentage) |
|
15 years 16 years 17 years 18 years 19 years 20 years 21 years 22 years 23 years 24 years 25 years 26 years 27 years 28 years 29 years 30 years or above |
55% 56% 57% 58% 59% 60% 63% 66% 69% 72% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% |
The computation of the benefit shall be based on the
final basic pay, for every year of credited service, a fraction of at least six
(6) months being considered as one whole year but shall be exclusive of fringe
benefits and other special emoluments.[16]
x x x
Clearly,
the eligibility age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.[17] However, employees of herein petitioners who
are under the age of 60 years, but have rendered at least 3650 days (10 years)
on board ship or fifteen (15) years of service for land-based employees may
also avail of optional retirement, subject to the exclusive prerogative and
sole option of petitioner company.[18]
Records show that private respondent was only 48 years old[19] when he applied
for optional retirement. Thus he cannot claim
optional retirement benefits as a matter of right. His application for optional retirement was
subject to the exclusive prerogative and sole option of the shipping company
pursuant to the abovecited agreement between the
workers and the company. In this regard,
no error was committed by the appellate court when it set aside the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC granting herein private respondent P253,000 retirement gratuity/separation pay.
So now we come to the grant of financial assistance by the appellate
court. We are not unmindful of the rule
that financial assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character.[20] Neither are we unmindful of this Court’s pronouncements
in Arc-Men Food Industries Corporation v. NLRC,[21] and Lemery Savings and
Loan Bank v. NLRC,[22] where the
Court ruled that when there is no dismissal to speak of, an award of financial
assistance is not in order.
But we must stress that this Court did allow, in several instances, the
grant of financial assistance.[23] In the words of Justice Sabino
de Leon, Jr., now deceased, financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of
social justice and exceptional circumstances, and as an equitable concession.[24] The instant case equally calls for balancing
the interests of the employer with those of the worker, if only to approximate
what Justice Laurel calls justice in its secular sense.[25]
In this instance, our attention has been called to the following circumstances:
that private respondent joined the company when he was a young man of 25 years and
stayed on until he was 48 years old; that he had given to the company the best
years of his youth, working on board ship for almost 24 years; that in those
years there was not a single report of him transgressing any of the company
rules and regulations; that he applied for optional retirement under the
company’s non-contributory plan when his daughter died and for his own health
reasons; and that it would appear that he had served the company well, since
even the company said that the reason it refused his application for optional
retirement was that it still needed his services; that he denies receiving the
telegram asking him to report back to work; but that considering his age and
health, he preferred to stay home rather than risk further working in a ship at
sea.
In our view, with these special circumstances, we can call upon the same “social
and compassionate justice” cited in several cases[26] allowing
financial assistance. These
circumstances indubitably merit equitable concessions, via the principle of “compassionate
justice” for the working class. Thus, we
agree with the Court of Appeals to grant financial assistance to private
respondent. The only catch is whether,
as the shipping company alleges, the amount of P200,000
that the Court of Appeals granted him is “arbitrary and excessive”.
The propriety of awarding financial
assistance has long been tackled by this Court.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,[27] we laid down the
rule that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in the instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. A contrary rule, we said
would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing an erring employee.
Subsequent to PLDT, in the 2004
case of Piñero v. NLRC,[28] Piñero who was dismissed for an illegal strike was granted
one-half (½) month’s pay for the 29 years of his service. His infraction was deemed not so reprehensible nor unscrupulous as to warrant complete
disregard of his long years of service with no derogatory record. In Aparente,
Sr. v. NLRC,[29]
for blatant disobedience of company rules, one-half (½) month’s pay for every
year of service was also deemed equitable.
In the 1998 case of Salavarria v.
NLRC,[30]
for the teacher who had previously been meted with a two week suspension for
the same offense, illegally soliciting contributions from students, the Court
granted one month’s salary for every year of service because, said the Court,
she never took custody of the illegally solicited funds.
Considering the doctrine in the abovecited NLRC cases and taking into account equitable
results in those cases, we find the grant of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) by the Court of Appeals, neither arbitrary nor
excessive. Private respondent who has no
derogatory record in his 23 years of service should be granted equitable
assistance equal to one-half month’s pay for each of his 23 years of service.
To conclude, in the instant case,
private respondent has no claim against petitioners for retirement
benefits. We agree with the appellate
court, however, that financial assistance could be awarded him but only as an
equitable concession under the special circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals granting
assistance to private respondent in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
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|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo,
pp. 73-80. Penned by Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, and Mariano C. del
Castillo concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] “Dioscorro” in some parts of the records.
[6] Rollo, p. 320.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] G.R. No. 90964,
[14] Rollo, p.
281.
[15] Nominated as “Retirement Gratuity”, Rollo, pp. 280-282.
[16] Rollo, pp.
280-281.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
143013-14, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 565, 590.
[21] G.R. No. 127086,
[22] G.R. No. 96439,
[23] Piñero
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149610, August 20, 2004,
437 SCRA 112, 120 citing Salavarria v. Letran College, G.R. No. 110396, September 25, 1998,
296 SCRA 184 and Aparente, Sr. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 82,
93.
[24] Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, supra at 590.
[25] Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
[26] Supra note 23.
[27] No. L-80609,
[28] Supra note 23.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.