FIRST DIVISION
|
P e t i t i o n e r, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS R e s p o n d e n t. |
|
G.R. No. 157331 Present: PANGANIBAN,
CJ,
Chairman, YNARES-SANTIAGO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
x - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before us is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, assailing the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
18 October 2002[1]
and 19 February 2003,[2] respectively, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 24077, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold Alva.
The CA, in the
assailed resolutions, dismissed petitioner’s appeal of the trial court’s
judgment of conviction for failing to post a new
bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal.
The Facts
The present petition
stemmed from an Information[3] charging petitioner with having
committed the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, alleging as follows:
The
undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows:
That
in or about and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to
December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to
said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00,
and by means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were
false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made
solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00
which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
The
resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-143803
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (
On
On
A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation,
or on 18 May 1999, petitioner’s counsel again moved for the deferment of the
promulgation, due to prior “undertakings of similar importance.”[8]
On
In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner
and counsel, the RTC issued an Order[10] directing the
promulgation of its decision in absentia
and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his
failure to appear before it despite due notice.
In its decision dated
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered: finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences him to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum
of prision mayor to seventeen
(17) years as maximum of reclusion
temporal in accordance with the provisions of Article 315, first, and
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and further for the accused to return the P120,000.00
to the complainant with an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
compounded annually from January 1, 1994 (the amount has been given to the
accused in October and December 1993).
Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the
Incongruous to the above inference, however, in an
Order[14] dated 25 May 1999,
judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the
bonding company that issued petitioner’s original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of petitioner
within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its
undertaking should not be forfeited.
In the interregnum, Police
Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section,[15]
manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on
On
On
On
In an Order[18]
dated
On
In an Order[20]
dated
The “Notice of Appeal” filed by accused cannot be given due course as
it was filed out of time. Although accused filed a “Motion for Reconsideration”
dated 23 July 1999, the Court considered it as a mere scrap of paper and was
not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not stop the
reglementary period to file appeal.
On
In an Order dated
The Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused,
dated November 20, 1999 is granted in the interest of justice, considering that
the one who prepared the Motion for Reconsideration appears to be the accused
himself, who may not appear to be a lawyer and may not be conversant with the
rules, among others, governing motions.
Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself, same is denied
for lack of merit. The Decision has examined and discussed the evidence
presented and the merits of the case.
Because of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration, the appeal
is deemed filed on time, and the appeal is given due course.
Let the records of the case, together with
three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes be transmitted to the
Hon. Court of Appeals.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals,
in a Resolution[21]
dated
Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court against the
accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment, and it
appearing from the record that no new bond for his provisional liberty on
appeal has been posted, appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days
from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright.
On
x x x x
3. Upon learning of the
course of action taken by the presiding judge, and for purposes of appealing
the decision subject of the instant case, on
x x x x.
In a Resolution[23]
dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal
filed by petitioner for “appellant’s failure to post a new bond for his
provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our
Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact that his personal
bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired, x x x.”
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[24] thereto seeking its reversal.
According to petitioner’s counsel, he was of the understanding that the “Show Cause” Resolution of
Asked to comment on the
Motion
for Reconsideration,
respondent People of the
On
Finding no merit in appellant’s motion for reconsideration (citation
omitted) filed on
WHEREFORE, appellant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now comes to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court alleging the following errors:[28]
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR PETITIONER’S PROVISIONAL
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY
THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED
FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED
TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and
VI.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID
The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are raised in
this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of error, all six
can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that is, whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioner’s alleged failure to
post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2) whether or not petitioner failed to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite
the posting of the subject bail bond.
Petitioner faults the
appellate court for expressing “x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein
petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court or custody of the
law, or that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the
records of the case would readily prove the contrary.”[29] In issuing said resolution, petitioner
concludes that the Court of Appeals made “x x x no careful examination of the
records x x x.” Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following manner:
x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals
(sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower
court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the
promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the
court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by
the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is
not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon.
Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the
comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being
contemplated by law and the Rules of Court.
Equally, petitioner
further posits that:
x x x Although
it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail
shall be cancelled if sentenced to an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as
provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, there must be a showing by the prosecution
with notice to the accused of the fact that, the accused is a recidivist,
has previously escaped from confinement, evaded sentence, has committed an
offense while under probation, there are circumstances indicating the
probability of flight if released on bail, etc. But there was none of the said
instances that may be attributable to herein petitioner.[30]
Respondent People, in contrast, counters that “x x
x [a]lthough a personal
bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was executed in favor of petitioner by Mega
Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision,
there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner had surrendered, was
arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation
of the judgment of his conviction in his absence. x x x.” To illustrate its
point, respondent People cites the following facts: 1) the return of the
Warrant of Arrest issued on
Respectfully returned
this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the
accused is not within our area of responsibility. Further
request that the warrant of Arrest be forwarded to the Police Station which has
Jurisdiction over the address of the accused.
However, the name of the accused will be
included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference.
2) the fact
that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated, or on
In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance
& Surety Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to produce the herein
accused within the period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby rendered
against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos.[31]
Respondent
People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed a
valid bail bond securing petitioner’s provisional liberty even after
conviction. Stated in another way, petitioner’s admission to bail presumes that
the latter surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself
under the custody of the law.
And,
3) “that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for
reconsideration dated November 7, 2002 submitted before the Court of Appeals,
purportedly to extend the expired personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did
not automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an effective bail bond,”[32] as petitioner made no
extension of the previous personal bond before the same expired.
We disagree in petitioner’s
assertions; hence, the petition must fail.
A definitive disposition of the
issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioner’s bail bond on
appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail
notwithstanding the
Section
5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses
the foregoing prefatory matter viz:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the
period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall
be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That
the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That
the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That
the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;
(d) That
the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
(e) That
there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
The appellate court
may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. [Emphasis supplied.]
From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to
admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than
twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail
bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the
concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any
of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar
circumstances.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1)
day as minimum of prision mayor
to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion
temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioner’s application for bail was discretionary
upon the RTC.
It
is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that
the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law.[33] In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the
Basic
is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person
who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would
be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has
yet to be curtailed.[34]
All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond
dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation
was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records
of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly
filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the
That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to
object, as evidently required under the quoted rule, to the application or
approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused), fortifies the
declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC
does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioner’s application
for bail, much less the approval of such application.
Noting that the raison d'être for such requirement is the
discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after conviction,
though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in accordance with
applicable legal principles. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated
circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be
accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with
notice to the accused. It is on this basis that judicial discretion is balanced
in determining whether or not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail
pending appeal of his conviction vis-à-vis the increased possibility or
likelihood of flight.
Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of
the prosecution of such application or, at the very least, failing to allow it
to object, is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and
arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent People’s right of
procedural due process.
This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the
original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification – his failure to appear
before the
While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a
certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating therein
the reason for the latter’s absence, the RTC
found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered
the promulgation of its judgment in absentia.
It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner.
Upon examination, the subject medical certificate[36] merely states that
petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It failed to
elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioner’s
physical incapability to present himself before the
court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner
unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject document failed to
indicate evidence of affiant’s[37] identity making its due
execution doubtful.
Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as
Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioner’s original bail
bond is revealed by the Process Server’s Return,[38] indicated at the dorsal
portion of the RTC’s Produce Order, indicating petitioner’s change of address without
prior notice to the RTC, it states:
PROCESS
SERVER’S RETURN
This certifies that on the 17th day
of May, (sic) 1999, undersigned
return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic)
Diliman, Quezon City for
confirmation and indeed the addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the aforementioned
address.
By
failing to inform the
Prescinding from the above discussion, the
conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty
(20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his
bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from
being admitted to bail on appeal.
The issue of the validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal having
been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as
amended, petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is,
therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law
to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents
and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner
filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal – even until
now – he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of
the law.
Inexorably,
having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or
not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues.
The manner of review of petitioner’s conviction is governed by the Rules
of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents the procedural
requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said
Rule finds application to the case at bar, viz:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment
or failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of
the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or
on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.
[Emphasis supplied.]
By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the act
of jumping bail, among otherthings, will result in
the outright dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. As pointed out by the Court in
the case of People v. Mapalao,[39] the reason for said rule is that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison
or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of
the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the
prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by
jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal
processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed
himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal.
This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has waived his
right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc,[41] we enunciated that:
There are certain fundamental rights
which cannot be waived even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for
the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may
waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have
waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.
Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law,
despite the posting of the subject bail bond, petitioner argues that his act of
filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the RTC’s
judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be
considered a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. He rationalizes that:
[T]he records of the
case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before
the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after
the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to
the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved
by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is
not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon.
Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the
comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated
by law and the Rules of Court.
For the resolution of the second issue, it
should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing
discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish
the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term “jurisdiction of
the court (over the person of the accused)” with that of “custody of the
law”, it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The term:
Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while (the term) jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced (citation omitted).[42]
Moreover,
jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an
accused escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated.[43]
Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner – when he
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged –
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.
As to whether or not petitioner has
placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say the same for
“[b]eing in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law (citation omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.”[44]
In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and
unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under
the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia
without calling attention to a very disturbing fact – that petitioner admits of
being the author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by
authorities.
In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes
that his appeal, and consequently, this petition, will succeed and he can then
appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, which
dismissed petitioner’s appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this
connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue
forthwith a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva
and for proper disposition of the case in line with the
foregoing discussion.
Costs
against the petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief
Justice
Chairman
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned
by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by
Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Sergio L. Pestaño; Annex “A” of the
Petition; Rollo, p. 35.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] “Considering
that this is the second time that this case was set for promulgation of
decision and the Medical Certificate brought by the representative of the
accused in the person of Joey Perez, states that the accused has hypertension,
let the promulgation be held in absentia.”
Issue
a warrant of arrest against the accused to serve the sentence.
Given
in open court,
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Petitioner’s
address on record is Unit No. 12 Fersal Condominium,
[16] RTC
records, p. 229.
[17] The
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by registered mail on
[18]
[20]
[21] Court
of Appeals rollo,
p. 32.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Annex “1” of the Motion for Reconsideration;
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Petition,
p. 11; Rollo, p. 30.
[30] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[31]
[32]
[33] Guillen v. Nicolas, 360 Phil. 1,
13 (1998).
[34]
[35] Quote
Section 6 of Rule 120, Rules of Court.
[36]
[37] Signed by a certain Rodel Quintin M. Aquino, M.D., with PRC
License No. 90073.
[38]
[39] G.R.
No. 92415,
[40] Francisco,
Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.
[41] 73 Phil. 366, 369 (1941).
[42] Miranda,
et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, __ March 2006.
[43] Gimenez v. Nazareno,
160 SCRA 1,
[44] Miranda, et al. v. Tuliao, supra.