EN BANC
EDUARDO
M. COJUANGCO, JR.,
Complainant, -
versus
- ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, Respondent. |
Adm. Case No. 2474
Present: DAVIDE,
JR., C.J., Puno, PANGANIBAN, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
CARPIO, *AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, *CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA,
tinga, and **CHICO-nazario,
JJ.
Promulgated: September
15, 2004 |
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D
E C I S I O N
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PER
CURIAM:
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“The practice of law is a
privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a
test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.”[1]
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J.
Palma, alleging as grounds “deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.”
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant and respondent
met sometime in the 70’s. Complainant
was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and
respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns,
complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel.
Consequently, respondent’s relationship
with complainant’s family became intimate.
He traveled and dined with them abroad.[2] He frequented their house and even tutored
complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student
of Assumption
Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without
the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only
the next
day that respondent informed complainant and assured
him that “everything is legal.”
Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man and has three children. Upon
investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their
tutoring sessions. Immediately,
complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila
and discuss the matter with the family.
Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant
also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from
Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented
himself as “bachelor” before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his
marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent
was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene
Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982,
complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3]
for declaration of
nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa,
docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P.
In the Decision[4]
dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant
filed with this Court the instant complaint[5]
for disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:
“a. In
grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions
with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in
intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an
overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and
apprehensions about respondent’s courtship and advances, considering that he is
a married man with three (3) children;
b. Respondent courted Maria
Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her travels
abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for
complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her
pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment
whatsoever to his marrying;
c. With his moral ascendancy
over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment
or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in
inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the
requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the
“advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only
twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with
her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a
‘bachelor.’ x x x.”
Respondent filed a motion
to dismiss[6]
on the ground of lack of cause of
action. He contended that the
complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s oath.
There is no allegation that he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill
or ignorance of the law” in serving complainant’s interest. Anent the charge of grossly
immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainant’s daughter with “utmost
sincerity and good faith” and that “it is contrary to the natural course of
things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.”
In the Resolution[7]
dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28,
1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538[8]
a Resolution[9] (a)
setting aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P
declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa
null and void ab initio; and (b)
remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose
the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984,
respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings[10]
on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P poses a
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.
Respondent sought refuge in
this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.[11] In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we
enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment proceedings.[12]
Thereafter,
the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19, 1998,
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:
“Considering the length of time that this case
has remained pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice, manifest
whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or
supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or
otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.”[13]
In
his Manifestation,[14]
complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
On
the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the
ground that he needed more time to locate vital documents in support of his
defense. The scheduled hearing of
December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a
warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be
deemed submitted for resolution.[15]
Respondent again failed to
appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered submitted for
resolution.[16]
On
March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a
Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years. Thus:
“The main issue to be resolved in this case is
whether or not respondent committed the following acts which warrant his
disbarment:
a)
Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant;
b)
His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition
to his contracting a second marriage;
c)
The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct
in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in
Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the
marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term “spinster” with
respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer
well versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was
entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The respondent
betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the
family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years.
SO ORDERED.”
The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and
Recommendation, but it reduced respondent’s penalty to only one (1) year
suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBP’s Report
and Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be
stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional
activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts,
may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.[18]
Respondent claims that he
had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with “wanton
recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.”
While, complainant himself
admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,[19] however, professional competency alone does
not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this
case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification[20]
from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On
the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[21]
from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondent’s
subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982.
That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second marriage was
confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeth’s
classmate and family friend.[22]
Undoubtedly, respondent’s
act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His
act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality.[23]
This is not the first
occasion that we censure immorality. Thus,
we have somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, i.e., “that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community.”[24]
Measured against this definition, respondent’s act is manifestly
immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman
into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a “bachelor”
so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the
following cases are relevant:
1) In
Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25]
respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies
to sever them. There, we ruled that “[S]uch
pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole.” As such, “there can be no
other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred.”
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26]
respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant
with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute “a grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession,” warranting respondent’s disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27]
respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting.
We held that “the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage
is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.” Thus, lacking the good moral character
required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted
to the bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28]
respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter
satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at
all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
(5)
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who
supported him and spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with
another woman. We ruled that he
“failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar.” For this,
respondent was disbarred.
(6) In Obusan
vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30]
respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with
his former paramour. Here, we ruled
that “abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a former
paramour, a married woman,” constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting
disbarment.
The circumstances here speak
of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It
was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s
complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with
Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs
only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he
attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover,
he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from
complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hongkong. He
did this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had
the temerity to assure complainant that “everything is legal.” Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits
of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his
conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot
be charged with immorality. His
reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of
marriage. In such relationship, the
man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity.[31] How
could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he
was previously married to Elizabeth?
If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to
walk away.
Respondent’s culpability
is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of
Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.[32] Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity
of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality,
the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment
proceeding. Suffice it to say that a
subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,[33]
a disbarment case is sui generis for
it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him,[34]
or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course,[35]
then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate
him from a wrongdoing actually committed.
So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence ---
in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability
attaches.[36]
The interdict upon
lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is that they “shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial
duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
“CANON 1 – A lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.”
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our
Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in
the enumeration. They knew then that
more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are
most obliged to venerate the law. As
stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]
“Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.”
Corollarily, the above
responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in the
country has to take before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the
imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J.
Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his
oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let respondent’s name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the
country with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice
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REYNATO
S. PUNO Associate
Justice LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice (On
Official Leave) MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice (On
Official Leave) CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice ADOLF
S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN Associate
Justice CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice RENATO
C. CORONA Associate
Justice ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice DANTE
O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
(On
Leave)
MINITA
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
* On Official Leave.
** On leave.
[1] In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661.
[2] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), April 21, 1983 at 49-51.
[3] Annex “D”, Complaint, Rollo at 13-19.
[4] Annex “F”, id. at 32-36.
[5] Dated November 8, 1982, id. at 1-6.
[6] Dated February 8, 1983, id. at 53-56.
[7] Supra.
[8] “Leo J. Palma vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, etc.”
In Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P, for declaration of nullity of marriage mentioned earlier, the trial court issued an order dated January 17, 1983 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration/new trial. This prompted him to file with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the said order.
In this Resolution, this Court ordered respondent judge “to conduct a new trial in the case below and to allow petitioner to file his answer, which answer should be filed within ten (10) days from finality of this Resolution. The records show that respondent judge acted with undue haste in declaring petitioner in default on the complaint filed on August 24, 1982 and in rendering his ex parte decision of November 2, 1982 as well as in refusing to give due course to the timely appeal filed by petitioner and instead ordering the execution of the judgment.”
[9] Rollo, at 197-198.
[10] Id. at 199 - 201.
[11] Dated December 13, 1984.
[12] OSG Records
at 5. The OSG issued the Order dated
December 20, 1984 suspending the scheduled hearing until the Court orders
otherwise. (OSG Records at 1)
[13] Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at 11.
[14] Dated November 13, 1998, id. at 13.
[15] Order dated December 4, 2001, id. at 51.
[16] Order dated January 24, 2002, id. at 97.
[17] In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
[18] Bustamante-Alejandro vs. Alejandro, et al., AC No. 4256, February 13, 2004.
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 provides:
“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
[19] TSN, April 21, 1983, at 98.
[20] Annex “A”, Rollo at 7.
[21] Annex “C” and Annex “D”, id., at 12 and 13.
[22] TSN, July 12, 1982, at 1-42.
[23] Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 (1957).
[24] 7 C.J.S. 959.
[25] Adm. Case. No. 6148, February 27, 2004.
[26] A.C. No. 5170, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 229.
[27] 101 Phil.313 (1957).
[28] 106 Phil. 256 (1960).
[29] 117 SCRA768, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963.
[30] 128 SCRA 485, Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984.
[31] Article 109 of the Civil Code.
[32] TSN, April 21, 1983 at 90-93.
[33] 31 Phil. 562 (1970).
[34] Calub vs. Suller, 323 SCRA 556 (2000).
[35] Rayos Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 (1998).
[36] Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, supra.
[37] 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556.