FELOMINA[1]
ABELLANA, G.R.
No. 160488
Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
SPOUSES
ROMEO PONCE and
LUCILA
PONCE and the REGISTER Promulgated:
OF
DEEDS of BUTUAN CITY,
Respondents. September
3, 2004
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is
a petition for review on certiorari assailing the June 16, 2003 decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69213, which reversed and set aside
the August 28, 2000 decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 4270.
The facts
as testified to by petitioner Felomina Abellana are as follows:
On July 15, 1981, Felomina, a spinster, pharmacist and
aunt of private respondent Lucila Ponce, purchased from the late Estela
Caldoza-Pacres a 44,297[4]
square meter agricultural lot[5]
with the intention of giving said lot to her niece, Lucila. Thus, in the deed of sale,[6]
the latter was designated as the buyer of Lot 3, Pcs-10-000198, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-27, Homestead Patent No. V-1551 and located
at Los Angeles, Butuan City.[7] The total consideration of the sale was
P16,500.00, but only P4,500.00 was stated in the deed upon the request of the
seller.[8]
Subsequently,
Felomina applied for the issuance of title in the name of her niece. On April 28, 1992, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 2874[9]
over the subject lot was issued in the name of Lucila.[10] Said
title, however, remained in the possession of Felomina who developed the lot
through Juanario Torreon[11]
and paid real property taxes thereon.[12]
The
relationship between Felomina and respondent spouses Romeo and Lucila Ponce,
however, turned sour. The latter
allegedly became disrespectful and ungrateful to the point of hurling her
insults and even attempting to hurt her physically. Hence, Felomina filed the instant case for revocation of implied
trust to recover legal title over the property.[13]
Private
respondent spouses Lucila, also a pharmacist, and Romeo, a marine engineer, on
the other hand, claimed that the purchase price of the lot was only P4,500.00
and that it was them who paid the same.
The payment and signing of the deed of sale allegedly took place in the
office of Atty. Teodoro Emboy in the presence of the seller and her siblings
namely, Aquilino Caldoza and the late Lilia Caldoza.[14]
A year
later, Juanario approached Lucila and volunteered to till the lot, to which she
agreed.[15] In 1987, the spouses consented to Felomina’s
proposal to develop and lease the lot.
They, however, shouldered the real property taxes on the lot, which was
paid through Felomina. In 1990, the
spouses demanded rental from Felomina but she refused to pay because her
agricultural endeavor was allegedly not profitable.[16]
When
Lucila learned that a certificate of title in her name had already been issued,
she confronted Felomina who claimed that she already gave her the title. Thinking that she might have misplaced the
title, Lucila executed an affidavit of loss which led to the issuance of
another certificate of title in her name.[17]
On
August 28, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision holding that an implied
trust existed between Felomina and Lucila, such that the latter is merely
holding the lot for the benefit of the former.
It thus ordered the conveyance of the subject lot in favor of
Felomina. The dispositive portion
thereof, reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring, directing and ordering that:
a) An implied trust was created with plaintiff as trustor and private defendant Lucila A. Ponce married to private defendant Engr. Romeo D. Ponce as trustee pursuant to Article 1448 of the New Civil Code;
b) The implied trust, having been created without the consent of the trustee and without any condition, is revoked;
c) The private defendants, who are spouses, execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiff of the land, covered by and embraced in TCT NO. T-2874, in controversy and in the event private defendants refuse to execute the deed of conveyance, the public defendant City Register of Deeds of Butuan to cancel TCT No. T-2874 and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff;
d) The private defendants spouses to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the sum of PhP25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and PhP4,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
e) The dismissal of the counterclaim of private defendants spouses[;] and
f) The private defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Private
respondent spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals which set aside the
decision of the trial court ruling that Felomina failed to prove the existence
of an implied trust and upheld respondent spouses’ ownership over the litigated
lot. The appellate court further held
that even assuming that Felomina paid the purchase price of the lot, the
situation falls within the exception stated in Article 1448 of the Civil Code
which raises a disputable presumption that the property was purchased by
Felomina as a gift to Lucila whom she considered as her own daughter. The decretal portion thereof, states –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, in Civil Case No. 4270, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is heretofore rendered dismissing the complaint below of plaintiff-appellee, F[e]lomina Abellana.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Felomina
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.[20] Hence, the instant petition.
The
issue before us is: Who, as between
Felomina and respondent spouses, is the lawful owner of the controverted
lot? To resolve this issue, it is
necessary to determine who paid the purchase price of the lot.
After a
thorough examination of the records and transcript of stenographic notes, we
find that it was Felomina and not Lucila who truly purchased the questioned lot
from Estela. The positive and consistent
testimony of Felomina alone, that she was the real vendee of the lot, is
credible to debunk the contrary claim of respondent spouses. Indeed, the lone
testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient as in the present case.[21] Moreover, Aquilino Caldoza, brother of the
vendor and one of the witnesses[22]
to the deed of sale, categorically declared that Felomina was the buyer and the
one who paid the purchase price to her sister, Estela.[23]
Then
too, Juanario, who was allegedly hired by Lucila to develop the lot, vehemently
denied that he approached and convinced Lucila to let him till the land. According to Juanario, he had never spoken
to Lucila about the lot and it was Felomina who recruited him to be the
caretaker of the litigated property.[24]
The
fact that it was Felomina who bought the lot was further bolstered by her
possession of the following documents from the time of their issuance up to the
present, to wit: (1) the transfer certificate of title[25]
and tax declaration in the name of Lucila;[26]
(2) the receipts of real property taxes in the name of Felomina Abellana for
the years 1982-1984, 1992-1994 and 1995;[27]
and (3) the survey plan of the lot.[28]
Having
determined that it was Felomina who paid the purchase price of the subject lot,
the next question to resolve is the nature of the transaction between her and
Lucila.
It
appears that Felomina, being of advanced age[29]
with no family of her own, used to purchase properties and afterwards give them
to her nieces. In fact, aside from the
lot she bought for Lucila (marked as Exhibit “R-2”), she also purchased 2 lots,
one from Aquilino Caldoza (marked as
Exhibit “R-1”) and the other from Domiciano Caldoza (marked as Exhibit “R-3”),
which she gave to Zaida Bascones (sister of Lucila), thus:
Q I am showing to you again Exhibit R, according to you[,] you bought Exhibits R-1, R-2 and R-3, do you remember that?
A Yes sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Aquilin[o] Caldoza conveyed this land in Exhibit R-1 to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this now titled in your name?
A No. I was planning to give this land to my nieces. One of which [was] already given to Mrs. [Lucila] Ponce.
Q I am talking only about this lot in Exhibit R-1[.]
A Not in my name.
Q In whose name was this lot in Exhibit R-1 now?
A In the name of Zaida Bascones.
Q Who prepared the deed of sale?
A At the start it was in the name of Rudy [Torreon].[30] Because Rudy [Torreon] knew that there is some trouble already about that lot he made a deed of sale to the name of Zaida Bascones, which I planned to give that land to her (sic).
Q As regards Exhibit R-1, you bought it actually?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the … original deed of sale was in the name of Rudolfo [Torreon]?
A Yes, sir.
Q And later on Rudolfo [Torreon] again transferred it to Zaida Bascones?
A Yes, sir.[31]
Likewise,
in the case of Lucila, though it was Felomina who paid for the lot, she had
Lucila designated in the deed as the vendee thereof and had the title of the
lot issued in Lucila’s name. It is
clear therefore that Felomina donated the land to Lucila. This is evident from her declarations, viz:
Witness
A In 1981 there was a riceland offered so I told her that I will buy that land and I will give to her later (sic), because since 1981 up to 1992 Mrs. Lucila Ponce has no job.
Q Where is the land located?
A In Los Angeles, Butuan City.
Q Who was the owner of this land?
A The owner of that land is Mrs. Estela Caldoza-Pacr[e]s.
The husband is Pacr[e]s.
x x x x x x x x x
Q What did you do with this land belonging to Mrs. Estela-Caldoza- Pacr[e]s?
A I paid the lot, then worked the lot, since at the start of my buying the lot until now (sic).
Q You said that you told Lucila Ponce that you would give the land to her later on, what did you do in connection with this intention of yours to give the land to her?
A So I put the name of the title in
her name in good faith (sic).
Q You mean to tell the court that when you purchased this land located at Los Angeles, Butuan City, the instrument of sale or the deed of sale was in the name of Lucila Ponce?
A Yes, sir.[32]
x x x x x x x x x
Q Did you not ask your adviser Rudolfo [Torreon] whether it was wise for you to place the property in the name of Lucila Ponce when you are the one who is the owner?
A Because we have really the intention to give it to her.[33]
Generally,
contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. When, however, the law requires that a
contract be in some form in order that it may be valid, that requirement is
absolute and indispensable. Its
non-observance renders the contract void and of no effect.[34]
Thus, under Article 749 of the Civil Code –
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
In the
instant case, what transpired between Felomina and Lucila was a donation of an
immovable property which was not embodied in a public instrument as required by
the foregoing article. Being an oral
donation, the transaction was void.[35] Moreover, even if Felomina enjoyed the
fruits of the land with the intention of giving effect to the donation after
her demise, the conveyance is still a void donation mortis causa, for
non-compliance with the formalities of a will.[36] No valid title passed regardless of the
intention of Felomina to donate the property to Lucila, because the naked
intent to convey without the required solemnities does not suffice for
gratuitous alienations, even as between the parties inter se.[37] At any rate, Felomina now seeks to recover
title over the property because of the alleged ingratitude of the respondent
spouses.
Unlike
ordinary contracts (which are perfected by the concurrence of the requisites of
consent, object and cause pursuant to Article 1318[38]
of the Civil Code), solemn contracts like donations are perfected only upon
compliance with the legal formalities under Articles 748[39]
and 749.[40] Otherwise stated, absent the solemnity
requirements for validity, the mere intention of the parties does not give rise
to a contract. The oral donation in the
case at bar is therefore legally inexistent and an action for the declaration
of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.[41] Hence, Felomina can still recover title from
Lucila.
Article 1448[42]
of the Civil Code on implied trust finds no application in the instant
case. The concept of implied trusts is
that from the facts and circumstances of a given case, the existence of a trust
relationship is inferred in order to effect the presumed intention of the
parties.[43] Thus, one of the recognized exceptions to
the establishment of an implied trust is where a contrary intention is proved, [44]
as in the present case. From the
testimony of Felomina herself, she wanted to give the lot to Lucila as a
gift. To her mind, the execution of a
deed with Lucila as the buyer and the subsequent issuance of title in the
latter’s name were the acts that would effectuate her generosity. In so carrying out what she conceived,
Felomina evidently displayed her unequivocal intention to transfer ownership of
the lot to Lucila and not merely to constitute her as a trustee thereof. It was only when their relationship soured
that she sought to revoke the donation on the theory of implied trust, though
as previously discussed, there is nothing to revoke because the donation was
never perfected.
In declaring Lucila as the owner of the disputed lot,
the Court of Appeals applied, among others, the second sentence of Article 1448
which states –
“x x x However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.”
Said presumption also arises where the property is
given to a person to whom the person paying the price stands in loco parentis or as a
substitute parent.[45]
The abovecited provision, however, is also not
applicable here because, first, it was not established that Felomina stood as a
substitute parent of Lucila; and second, even assuming that she did, the
donation is still void because the transfer and acceptance was not embodied in
a public instrument. We note that said provision
merely raised a presumption that the conveyance was a gift but nothing therein
exempts the parties from complying with the formalities of a donation. Dispensation of such solemnities would give
rise to anomalous situations where the formalities of a donation and a will in
donations inter vivos, and donations mortis causa, respectively, would
be done away with when the transfer of the property is made in favor of a child
or one to whom the donor stands in loco
parentis. Such a scenario is
clearly repugnant to the mandatory nature of the law on donation.
While Felomina sought to recover the litigated lot on
the ground of implied trust and not on the invalidity of donation, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to address the latter issue in order to arrive at
a just decision that completely disposes of the controversy.[46] Since rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, they must be applied in a way
that equitably and completely resolve the rights and obligations of the
parties.[47]
As to
the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, the same
should be deleted for lack of basis.
Aside from the allegations in the complaint, no evidence was presented in
support of said claims. The trial court made these awards in the dispositive
portion of its decision without stating any justification therefor in the ratio
decidendi. Their deletion is therefore
proper.[48]
Finally,
in deciding in favor of Felomina, the trial court ordered respondent spouses to
execute a deed of sale over the subject lot in favor of Felomina in order to
effect the transfer of title to the latter.
The proper remedy, however, is provided under Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that “x x x [i]f real or
personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest the title of any party
and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form of law.”
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the June 16,
2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69213 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The August 28,
2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 2, in Civil
Case No. 4270, is REINSTATED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Declaring petitioner Felomina Abellana as the absolute owner of
Lot 3, Pcs-10-000198;
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Butuan City to cancel TCT No.
T-2874 in the name of respondent Lucila Ponce and to issue a new one in the
name of petitioner Felomina Abellana; and
(3) Deleting the awards of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
for lack of basis.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
[1] Also spelled as “Filomena” in some parts of the
records.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and
concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Hakim S.
Abdulwahid (Rollo, p. 28).
[3] Penned by Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos (Rollo, p. 59).
[4] In the Deed of Sale, the area of the lot is 44,298
(See Exhibit “A”, Records, p. 7), while in the Transfer Certificate of Title,
the lot area is 44,297 square meters (Records, p. 392).
[5] Particularly described as follows:
“A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3, Pcs-10-000198, being a portion of Lot 564 and 565, Cad-121, Butuan-Cabadbaran Public Land Subdivision), situated in the Barrio of Los Angeles, Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte, Island of Mindanao. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 2, of the Consolidation Subdivision plan Pcs-10-000198, on the SE., along line 2-3, by Lot 566, Butuan-Cabadbaran Cad. 121, on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 4, of the Consolidation Subdivision plan Pcs-10-000198, on the NW., along line 4-1, by Lot 563, Butuan-Cabadbaran Cad. 121.” (Transfer Certificate of Title, Exhibit “B”, Rollo, p. 392)
[6] Exhibit “A”, Records, p. 7.
[7] TSN, 7 November 1995, pp. 69-70; 27 November 1995,
pp. 188-191.
[8] TSN, 28 November 1995, pp. 284-285.
[9] Exhibit “B”, Rollo, p. 392.
[10] TSN, 7 November 1995, pp. 75-76; 28 November 1995, p.
298.
[11] TSN, 7 November 1995, pp. 75-79.
[12] TSN, 7 November 1995, pp. 85-86.
[13] TSN, 27 November 1995, pp. 150-160.
[14] TSN, 26 July 1996, p. 503; 4 November 1996, pp.
542-544; 28 November 1996, pp. 589-592.
[15] TSN, 26 July 1996, pp. 506-508.
[16] TSN, 26 July, 1996, pp. 509-510.
[17] TSN, 26 July 1996, pp. 510-512.
[18] Rollo, pp. 113-114.
[19] Rollo, p. 37.
[20] Resolution dated October 2, 2003 (Rollo, p. 51).
[21] Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.
[22] The other witness was the late Lilia Caldoza, sister
of the seller.
[23] TSN, 29 November 1995, pp. 237-240.
[24] TSN, 18 September 1997, pp. 709-712.
[25] Exhibit “B”, Records, p. 392.
[26] Exhibit “Q”, Records, p. 407.
[27] Exhibits “N”-“P”, Records, pp. 404-406.
[28] Exhibit “R”, Records, p. 408.
[29] She was 76 years old when she testified on November
7, 1995.
[30] Son of Juanario Torreon and interchangeably referred
to as “Rudy” and “Rudolfo” in the transcript of stenographic notes.
[31] TSN, 27 November 1995, pp. 180-181.
[32] TSN, 7 November 1995, pp. 69-70 (Emphasis supplied).
[33] TSN, 27 November 1995, p. 188 (Emphasis supplied).
[34] Dauden-Hernaez v. De los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27010,
30 April 1969, 27 SCRA 1276, 1281-1282; Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1993 edition, pp. 549-550.
[35] Bagnas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 38498, 10 August
1989, 176 SCRA 159, 167; Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-35648, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 54, 57-58.
[36] Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[37] Concurring Opinion of Justice Reyes, J.B.L. in Armentia
v. Patriarca, 125 Phil. 382, 395 (1966).
[38] Article 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
[39] Article 748.
The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation
requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing
the right donated.
If the value of the
personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
[40] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence,
1993 edition, p. 536.
[41] Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of
Raymundo Baba, G.R. No. 138945, 19 August
2003, 409 SCRA 306, 314.
[42] Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is
sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by
another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter
is the beneficiary. However, if the
person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of
the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being
disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
[43] Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 152 Phil. 548, 561
(1973); Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117228, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA
282, 299.
[44] Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[45] Morales, supra.
[46] Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, 384
Phil. 15, 22-23 (2000).
[47] Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6
February 2001, 351 SCRA 294, 307.
[48] Siguan v. Lim, 376 Phil. 840, 856 (1999).