SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156380.
September 8, 2004]
DOMINGO A. CAÑERO, petitioner, vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari
filed by DOMINGO A. CAÑERO against the UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(hereinafter, referred to as “UP,” for brevity), assailing the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals, which, on December 14, 2001, reversed and set aside
the decision of the lower court and dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Entry in the Tax Declaration.[3]
The facts show that on December 26, 1991, petitioner and his
spouse Juanita L. Cañero filed a petition for reconstitution of title of a lot
in Barangay Culiat, Tandang Sora,
The petition was assigned to Branch 82 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of
Let a copy of this ORDER/NOTICE be published once a week for two
(2) consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and that the same be also posted
in the main entrance of the City Hall of Quezon City, the Bulletin Boards of
this Court, the Sheriff’s Office of Quezon City and at the Barangay Hall of the Barangay
where the property subject of this petition is situated, all at the expense of
the herein petitioners. Similarly, let
copies of the said Order together with the petition be furnished to all
government agencies concerned, such other interested parties, the petitioners
and/or counsel for their reference, information and guidance.[7]
Hence, the trial court: 1) served copies of the Order to various
government agencies, among which were the Land Registration Authority,[8]
the Land Management Bureau,[9]
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[10]
the Solicitor General,[11]
and the Office of the City Prosecutor;[12]
2) caused the publication of the Order in the Official Gazette on 10 February
1992 and on 17 February 1992;[13]
and 3) posted copies of the Order at the entrance of the Quezon City Hall, at
the bulletin boards of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and at the Culiat Barangay Hall.[14]
Despite the notices, no opposition was filed against the petition. On April 1, 1992, it issued the Order[15]
granting the petition for reconstitution and the Register of Deeds issued TCT
No. RT-57204(240042) in favor of the Cañero spouses.
Sometime later, petitioner received information that respondent
UP had claimed title and secured a tax declaration in its name for the said
lot. Moreover, Tax Declaration No.
C-128-00026, issued by the City Assessor of Quezon City in the name of
petitioner carried an annotation that the lot appeared to duplicate the
property of respondent UP under Tax Declaration No. B-128-00238.
On September 6, 1994,
petitioner filed an action[16]
to quiet the title of the said lot with the RTC of Quezon City against UP and
the City Assessor of Quezon City.
Petitioner relied on his reconstituted title. He averred that even before the title was
issued in his and his wife’s name, his father had been in open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lot. He
alleged that his “designated caretakers” occupy the lot at present. Petitioner contended that UP has no legal
title or claim over the lot since it failed to raise objections during the
reconstitution proceedings. Thus,
petitioner prayed to: 1) deny any claim
which respondent UP may have over his lot; 2) cancel any land title which
respondent UP has for the property; and 3) cancel the annotation in Tax
Declaration No. C-128-00026 stating that his lot appears to duplicate
respondent UP’s property covered under Tax Declaration No. B-128-00238.
On September 28, 1994, defendant CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
(City Assessor for brevity) filed its answer[17]
explaining its annotation on petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. C-128-00026. The City Assessor alleged that on March 19,
1994, Cañero presented his owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 240042 to declare
his property for tax purposes. When the property was plotted on the tax map, it
appeared to overlap and duplicate a portion of the property owned by respondent
UP.[18]
UP had declared the said property for tax purposes many years earlier, the
latest declaration of which was in 1985, under Tax Declaration No. B-128-00238,
with property Index No. 15-2094, under TCT No. 192689, dated August 15,
1973. In contrast, Cañero’s property was
declared for tax purposes for the first time only on 19 March 1992. Prior to this date, the City Assessor had no
knowledge of the existence of TCT No. 240042.
Thus, the City Assessor issued Tax Declaration No. C-128-00026, with the
annotation that for taxation purposes, Canero’s property appeared to duplicate
UP’s property. Moreover, on May 5, 1994,
the City Assessor was furnished a copy of a letter by UP, addressed to the
General Manager of the National Housing Authority, that UP owns the entirety of
its campus, including the lot of Cañero.
For its part, respondent UP filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging
that it had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said
lot from the year 1914.[19]
Tracing its origin, it alleged that the government owned several parcels of
land amounting to some 4,930,981.3 square meters in Diliman,
Midstream, petitioner filed an “Urgent Motion To Amend Complaint
Or To Consolidate This Case With Other Cases Which Have Raised The Issue Of
Ownership Over The Same Property In Question Here.”[20]
Petitioner alleged that he learned of the pendency of a case before Branch 84,
Quezon City RTC, captioned Civil Case Q-92-11187 (Felix Rodeo, et al. vs. Jorge
Chin and Renato B. Mallari) and of Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No.
Q-5910 (92) (In Re: Petition for Reconstitution of Original Certificate of
Title No. 192689; University of the
UP filed its Opposition to petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend
Complaint or to Consolidate with other cases.[22]
It alleged that it had not yet received a copy of the purported Amended
Complaint, in violation of Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It stated that Civil Case No.
Q-92-11187 is an action for the cancellation/nullification of the title of
Messrs. Chin and Mallari. UP was not
impleaded as a party and could not be bound by any decision rendered
therein. On the other hand, on June 17,
1994, in LRC Case No. Q-5910 (92), the RTC already granted UP’s petition for
reconstitution, after denying petitioner’s Motion to Intervene on the ground that the issue of ownership is not
involved in reconstitution proceedings.
Finally, UP claimed that there was no common question of law or fact
among Civil Case No. Q-92-11187, LRC Case No. Q-5910 (92), and the case for
quieting of title. It was pointed out
that petitioner’s Urgent Motion merely
showed that he does not even know the exact location and metes and bounds of
the property he claims to own.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation[23]
with the lower court, averring that Quezon City RTC Branch 85 has issued a
judgment in Civil Case Q-93-18569 (Maria Destura vs. Jorge Chin, et al.).[24]
The judgment ordered the reinstatement of TCT No. 36048 in the names of Spouses
Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael. Petitioner averred that the judgment covered
their lot.[25]
Petitioner’s case for quieting of title was off-loaded to Branch
222 of the RTC of Quezon City. The
records do not show whether the Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint or
Consolidate the Cases was resolved by either of the two lower courts which,
exercised jurisdiction over the case.
The presentation of evidence on the Motion to Dismiss commenced
on October 6, 1995. UP presented the
testimonies of the following witnesses: 1) Constantino Rosas, the City Assessor
of Quezon City; 2) Mr. Nestor Dagaraga, Chief of the Tax Mapping Division of
the City Assessor’s Office of Quezon City;[26]
3) Engineer Ernesto Erive, Chief of Surveys Division of the Lands Management
Sector, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital
Region; and 4) Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys
Division of the Land Management Bureau.
On August 15, 1997, petitioner started the presentation of his
evidence. Petitioner called as his
witness, Atty. Liwliwa H. Bucu, the present Branch Clerk of Court of Quezon
City RTC, Branch 82, the court which took cognizance of petitioner’s
reconstitution proceedings.
Both parties presented voluminous documentary evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court denied respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss. It held that:
a) UP’s claim that the action to quiet title was in actuality a
petition to annul UP’s title, is unsupported by evidence;
b) Prescription cannot bar petitioner’s action to quiet title as
Cañero is in possession of the land through the presence therein of “designated
caretakers”;
c) Since both UP and petitioner submit they are in possession of
the land, a full blown trial on the merits is necessary to enable both parties
to substantiate their claims;
d) The trial court believes it can render judgment in accordance
with petitioner’s prayer as he cannot be deemed to be without sufficient cause
of action; and
e) The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
function of the trial court which granted the reconstitution proceedings still
remains, because UP has not adduced sufficient evidence, either in a proceeding
to annul the said judgment or in an answer as a special or affirmative
defense.
Respondent UP’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, it
elevated the order to the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It raised the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE IS NOT A COLLATERAL
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-91-5467 WERE VALID DESPITE
LACK OF NOTICE TO THE UNIVERSITY, AN INDISPENSABLE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT.[27]
The Court of Appeals found in favor of respondent UP. The dispositive portion of its Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders dated April 23, 1998 and
September 15, 1998 of the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and respondent Domingo A. Cañero’s complaint for “Quieting of Title and
cancellation of Entry in the Tax Declaration” is hereby DISMISSED.[28]
On January 2, 2004, petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. UP filed its Opposition. The Special Former Third Division of the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion.
On January 8, 2003, petitioner raised the matter to this Court
through an ordinary appeal. Petitioner
posted the following issues:
I. Whether or not the reversal and/or nullification by the
Honorable Court of Appeals of the April 23, 1998 and September 15, 1998 orders
of the Honorable Regional Trial Court of Quezon City-Branch 222, which denied
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-94-21587,
is/are in accord with law and/or with the applicable decisions of this Most
Honorable Court.
II. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals deprived the
Petitioner of his constitutional and statutory right to due process in
oreversing and/or nullifying the April 23, 1998 and September 15, 1998 orders
of the Honorable Regional Trial Court of Quezon City-Branch 222, which denied
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-94-21587.[29]
In a Manifestation which he filed with the trial court,
petitioner declared that the lot here in dispute is the same property as
the lot in Civil Case No. Q-93-18569.[30]
The said case was raised to the Court of Appeals, and later to the Supreme
Court as Heirs of Pael vs. Court of Appeals.[31]
We rule that the lot subject of the case at bar belongs to
respondent UP. In numerous earlier
jurisprudence, we have held that this subject lot is part of the mass of land
owned by respondent UP under TCT No. 9462.
The most recent case, Heirs
of Pael vs. Court of Appeals,
cannot be more categorical. There, we
stated:
The disputed property, however, is part of the UP Diliman Campus,
covered by TCT No. 9462. It was established, after the survey conducted by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region
(DENR-NCR) that the property claimed by Chin and Mallari overlaps the property
covered by UP's title. x x x
It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP's title has been
settled in several other cases decided by this Court. The case of Tiburcio, et
al. vs. People's Homesite & Housing Corp. (PHHC), et al. (106 Phil. 477
[1959]) was an action for reconveyance of a 430-hectare lot in Quezon City,
filed by the heirs of Eladio Tiburcio against PHHC and UP. A portion of the
disputed land was covered by TCT No. 1356 registered in the name of PHHC and
another portion was covered by TCT No. 9462 registered in the name of UP.
Affirming the validity of TCT No. 1356 and TCT No. 9462, this Court ruled:
. . . the land in question has been placed under the operation of
the
Thus, this Court held that the decree of registration in the name
of the predecessor-in-interest of PHHC and UP, as well as the titles issued
pursuant thereto have become incontrovertible.
This Court again affirmed the validity and indefeasibility of UP's
title in the case of Galvez vs. Tuason (10 SCRA 344 [1964]). where Maximo
Galvez and the heirs of Eladio Tiburcio sought the recovery of a parcel of land
in
The rulings in Tiburcio vs. PHHC and Galvez vs. Tuason were
reiterated by this Court in PHHC vs. Mencias (20 SCRA 1031 [1967]) and Varsity
Hills vs. Mariano (163 SCRA 132 [1988]).
x x x
Finally, it should be emphasized that this Court’s Decision in
Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC, as well as in the subsequent cases upholding the validity
and indefeasibility of the certificate of title covering the UP Diliman Campus,
precludes the courts from looking anew into the validity of UP's title. Thus,
the appellate court's discourse in the case at bar as regards the origin of
UP's certificate of title, whether it came from OCT 730 or OCT 735 is
intolerable, to say the least. The rule is that material facts or questions
which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially
determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and that
such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be
litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies,
regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action, whether the
subsequent action involves the same or a different form of proceedings, or
whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action,
subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. In such cases, it is
also immaterial that the two actions are based on different grounds, or tried
on different theories, or instituted for different purposes, and seek different
reliefs. By the same token, whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case
between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (J.C. Lopez &
Associates, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, 364 SCRA 472 [2001], citing Veloso,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 196 [1996].)
Our decision in the Heirs
of Pael vs. Court of Appeals
and petitioner’s admission that his lot is the same as the lot in the
said case completely negate petitioner’s cause of action. Hoist with his own petard, petitioner Cañero
is bound by res judicata.
Petitioner avers that by filing a Motion to Dismiss based on the
ground of lack of cause of action, respondent UP admitted as facts all his
allegations therein. Thus, the trial
court did not err in ruling that he had sufficient cause of action.
We do not agree. We rule
that the appellate court is correct in holding that the trial court should have
dismissed the complaint to quiet title.
Petitioner’s reconstituted title is his basis for filing the action to
quiet title against respondent UP. The
reconstituted title and the proceedings from which it hailed from are, however,
void.
R.A. No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the
reconstitution of
We further note that even if the subject lot had not already been
registered in the name of respondent UP, still the reconstitution proceedings
are void for lack of notice to adjoining property owners. We quote Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act
No. 26 (An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens
Certificate Of Title Lost Or Destroyed), viz:
Sec. 12. Petitions for
reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court
of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having
an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other
things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or
lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had
been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property;
(d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which
do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration
thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support [of] the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same; Provided,
That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved
by the Commissioner of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The Court shall
cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The
court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail
or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the
names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of
the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area
and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any
interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication,
posting and service of the notice as directed by the court. (Emphases ours.)
Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration
proceeding. Thus, notice of the proceedings must be given in the manner set
forth by the letter of the law.35 A
cursory perusal of the petition for reconstitution36 filed by petitioner, clearly reveals that the
adjoining property owners were never mentioned and, hence, not notified. Upon cross-examination by counsel for
respondent UP, Atty. Liwliwa Bucu, the clerk of court of Branch 82, declared37 that aside from the notices sent to the concerned
government agencies, the publication in the Official Gazette and the posting of
the Order in several conspicuous public places, no other notice was sent by the
trial court to any party. Respondent UP
owns the entirety of the land surrounding the lot in issue; yet it was not
notified of the reconstitution proceedings.
It is hoary doctrine that defects in the notices required under the law
to be sent to interested parties, deprive the court of jurisdiction. As early as the case of Manila Railroad Company vs. Moya,38
we had already ruled that if no notice of the date of hearing of a
reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of
reconstitution is null and void, even if, otherwise, the said order should have
been final and executory.
We explained the rationale of this rule in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,39
viz:
x x x (S)aid defects have not invested the Court with the authority
or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of
obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not
been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and
void. We hold that the mere Notice that "all interested parties are hereby
cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should not be
granted" is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it
must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. x x x
The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs.
Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., supra is rightly so because one who seeks the
reconstitution of his title to property is duty-bound to know who are the
occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property
involved, specially where the property is so [v]ast and situated in a suitable
residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have been
or are being constructed openly and publicly.
Particularly apt to the case at bar is the ruling of this Court
in Alabang Development Corporation
vs. Valenzuela:40
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the
Court notes that some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of
Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names
and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the
owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest
in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing, such
that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof
by registered mail or otherwise.
x x x
And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the
same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published
in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which
enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and
Section 13 which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been
complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute
non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to
proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere
Notice that “all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause
if any they have why said petition should not be granted” is not sufficient for
the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with
exactness and precision.
In sum, RTC, Branch 82 never acquired jurisdiction over the
reconstitution proceedings because it failed to notify the respondent, an
adjoining property owner. Its judgment
must perforce be declared void. A void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect
is sought to be given to it. It has no
legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot
affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily,
no protection to those who seek to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
was no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in, before the trial.41
Moreover, even if the validity of petitioner’s title to the lot
had been sustained, it cannot be overlooked that petitioner had registered his
title 18 years after respondent UP. The
established rule unbent by the passage of time is that where there are two
certificates of title purporting to cover the same land, the person claiming
under the certificate earlier registered is the rightful owner of the lot in
dispute.42 UP’s title is earlier and
should be upheld.
The appellate court also correctly ruled that petitioner’s action
to quiet title had likewise prescribed.
Petitioner tried to avoid the bar of prescription by averring that his
“designated caretakers” had been occupying the lot at his behest. From the inception of petitioner’s action to
quiet title in 1991 until the filing of his petition for certiorari before us in 2003, neither hide nor hair of petitioner’s
“designated caretakers” was ever seen or mentioned in any pleading filed before
this Court or before the lower courts.
Even when faced with the threat of dismissal of his action, petitioner
still maintained the anonymity of his “designated caretakers.” His posture leads us to no other conclusion
but that these “designated caretakers” do not exist and are merely part of the
myth he propagated to substantiate his claim of ownership of the lot. In contrast, respondent UP was able to prove
that it was in possession of the lot by showing the existence therein of
buildings and structures it had erected, and which it controls and
maintains. Both parties were given more
than ample opportunity to substantiate their claims during the hearing of
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to due process as his title was nullified by the appellate court on
grounds not raised in the respondent’s petition for certiorari. He avers that he
should have been afforded the opportunity to establish his title in a
full-blown trial based on the merits.
We are not impressed. The appellate court found that the
reconstitution proceedings were void as the lot was already registered earlier
in the name of respondent. Further, it
found that notice to adjoining property owners was not given by the trial
court. For this reason, it never acquired jurisdiction over the quieting of
title case and all the proceedings granting the petition for reconstitution are
null and void.43 As a rule, the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by this Court.44 As there
is no patent error in the appreciation of the facts by the appellate court, we
sustain its judgment.
Respondent UP had correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari when it assailed the
interlocutory order of the trial court to the appellate court. While in the regular course of appeal, the
interlocutory acts of the court may be assigned as errors, such remedy may not
necessarily be adequate as it can be availed of only in the future and prejudice
may have been caused in the interim, hence certiorari
is permitted to be availed of.45 In the
case at bar, grave and irrepareable damage will accrue to respondent UP had it
waited to avail of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, further trial on the merits would have been a wasteful occupation
of the lower court’s time and resources.
The trial court erred when it stated that petitioner should not
be bound by the Court’s judgments in earlier jurisprudence where we affirmed
the validity of the title of respondent UP, as he was not a party to any of
these previous cases.[32]
All the foregoing cases, akin to petitioner’s complaint, deal with the same
parcel of land or pieces thereof of the same large mass covered by a single
certificate of title, registered under the name of respondent UP. If we were to sustain the trial court’s
stance that in order to be bound by such jurisprudence, one must be a party to
each of the cases aforementioned, our dockets would be clogged ad infinitum with complaints filed left
and right by unscrupulous land grabbers nipping any piece they can get from the
lands of respondent. Certainly, such
interpretation of the applicability of res judicata is intolerable for
it will defeat the indefeasibility of respondent UP’s title. Petitioner, just like any other litigant, is
bound by our judgment that UP holds title to the lot.
We strongly admonish courts and unscrupulous lawyers to stop
entertaining spurious cases seeking further to assail respondent UP’s
title. These cases open the dissolute
avenues of graft to unscrupulous land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the
campus of respondent UP. By such
actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the hucksters who want to earn a
quick buck by misleading the gullible to buy the Philippine counterpart of the
proverbial
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. The petition for certiorari
is dismissed. Treble costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez J., on
official leave.
Chico-Nazario J., on leave.
[1] Dated December 14, 2001.
[2] Dated December 16, 2001.
[3]
Domingo A. Cañero vs. University of the
[4] Certification of the Register of Deeds, Exhibit “H” for the Petitioner, Original Records, p. 15.
[5]
[6]
[7] Original Records, p. 19.
[8] Exhibit “A-4”;
[9] Exhibit “A-3”;
[10] Exhibit “A-2”;
[11] Exhibit “A-1”;
[12] Exhibit “A-5”;
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Captioned “Domingo A. Cañero vs. University of the Philippines and the Register of Deeds for Quezon City, docketed as Q-94-21587; Original Records, pp. 1-13.
[17] Original Records, pp. 55-66.
[18]
Certification,
[19] Rollo, p. 98.
[20] Original Records, pp. 124-125.
[21]
[22]
[23] Records, pp. 148-149.
[24]
[25]
[26] TSN, December 8, 1995; Original Records, pp. 809-823.
[27] Petition for Certiorari; CA Records, p. 6.
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 5.
[30] Original Records, p. 148.
[31] Heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael vs. Court of Appeals, Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, G.R. No. 133547 and G.R. No. 133843, November 11, 2003.
33 Republic of the
34 Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 949.
35 Republic of the
36 Original Records, pp. 16-18.
37
38 L-17913, 14 SCRA 358 (1965).
39 The Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. De Bernal, et. al., 102 SCRA 370 (1981).
40 Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., 116 SCRA 261 (1982).
41 Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Hon. Nicanor S. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394 (1983).
42 Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915), at 595-596; Garcia vs. CA, 95 SCRA 380 (1980).
43 Adjap Allama and Hatib
Sali Mahaddi vs. Republic of the
44 Amigo, et al., vs. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).
45 Villalon, et al. vs. IAC, et al., 144 SCRA 443 (1986).
[32] Order, September 15, 1998, Rollo at 121.