SECOND
DIVISION
MILAGROS G. FLORES, G.R. No. 149224
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,**
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
TERESITA BERCASIO and Promulgated:
JOVITA CASTILLANO,
Respondents. September 1, 2004
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D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari to
set aside the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated April 27, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63887, denying
the petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari
and dismissing the petition, and the Resolution[2]
dated July 17, 2001, denying the motion for reconsideration thereon.
Petitioner Milagros G. Flores, 50 years old, was a
registered nurse based in New York, United States of America. She owned a parcel of land located at No. 16
Aguila St., Dizon Subdivision, Baguio City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 44901.[3]
On May 3, 1996, the petitioner executed a Deed of Sale in
the United States in which she sold the property to respondents Teresita
Bercasio and her sister Jovita Castillano for US$75,000, with a downpayment of
US$38,000, the balance to be paid in thirty-six (36) monthly installments
commencing on July 1, 1996. The
respondents executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the property in favor
of the petitioner as security for the payment of the balance of the purchase
price.[4] The respondents, thereafter, returned to the
Philippines and took possession of the property.
On June 6, 1999, the petitioner and her husband Federico G.
Flores filed a Complaint[5]
for Foreclosure of Mortgage and Damages against the respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4410-R. In their complaint, the petitioner and her
co-plaintiff alleged that they were the registered owners of the property, and
that the respondents failed to pay the installments due thereon. Thus:
7. Defendants violated the terms of the installment payment
stipulated in Annex “B” and that of the balance of $37,000 and the stipulated
10% interest per year they have only paid the plaintiffs US$8,300.00 as
follows: $500.00 in March 1997, $5,800.00 in September 1997, $2,000.00 in
September 1997, and refused without just cause to pay the balance.
8. As of June 1, 1999, defendants are indebted to the
plaintiffs in the total sum of US$39,800.00 computed as follows which they have
refused to pay without just cause:
a)
Principal
----------------------------------------
$37,000.00
b)
Interest:
$37,000 x 10% = $3,700 x 3 years - 11,100.00
--------------
$48,100.00
Less payments --------------------------------- 8,300.00
--------------
Balance $39,800.00
plus legal interest on the
unpaid installments from their respective due dates.
9. For having been compelled to institute this suit by
defendants’ refusal, in gross and evident bad faith, to perform their just,
valid, and demandable obligation, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel
for a fee of P85,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of
their counsel and will spend for litigation in [an] estimated sum of P200,000.00
which the defendants should be ordered to pay.[6]
The petitioner and her husband prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, as follows:
1.
[O]rdering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay unto
the Honorable Court within the reglementary period the sum of US$39,800.00 with
legal interest on the unpaid installments on their respective due dates, until
the same is fully paid, plus the additional sums of P85,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, plus whatever appearance fees plaintiffs would be paying their
counsel at P1,500.00 per court appearance, and P200,000.00 or
which may be proved during the trial as litigation expenses, plus costs of this
suit; and
2.
[I]n
default of such payment, the above-described property and the house and all
other improvements existing thereon be ordered sold to pay off the
above-mentioned mortgaged debt and its accumulated legal interests, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Plaintiffs further pray for
such other reliefs as are just and equitable in the premises.[7]
Refuting the petitioner’s allegations, the respondents
averred in their answer to the complaint that they had already paid the balance
of US$37,000 and, in fact, even made an overpayment amounting to US$6,704.[8] As counterclaim, the respondents sought
moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
At the pre-trial, the petitioner averred that she was the
sole registered owner of the property and amended the complaint by dropping her
husband as plaintiff.[9] Thereafter, trial ensued in due course.
On December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering the dismissal of the case for the petitioner’s failure to implead her
husband, an indispensable party. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED on the ground that the plaintiff, Milagros G. Flores,
has no legal capacity to bring the action without joining her husband Federico
G. Flores.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The petitioner’s counsel received on January 3, 2001 a copy
of the trial court’s decision and, on January 11, 2001, filed a Notice of
Appeal[11]
of the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The trial court issued an Order on January 25, 2001 giving due course to
the appeal.[12]
On March 20, 2001, while the case was pending appeal in the
CA, the petitioner filed in the same court a motion for leave and extension of
time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[13] She alleged therein that she made a mistake
in filing an ordinary appeal, in lieu of a petition for certiorari, the
decision of the court a quo being
“not appealable.” The petitioner prayed
for a fifteen-day extension, reckoned from receipt of the CA’s resolution
granting her leave of court to file the petition, or up to March 31, 2001,
whichever came first.[14]
In the meantime, on April 4, 2001, the CA received the
petitioner’s petition for certiorari (ex
abundanti cautela) which the petitioner filed via registered mail on March 26, 2001.[15]
On April 27, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution[16]
denying the petitioner’s motion for extension.
The petition for certiorari was, likewise, dismissed on the ground that
even if the motion for extension of time to file her petition was granted, such
extension could not exceed fifteen (15) days, or only up to March 19,
2001. The appellate court ruled that
the petition was filed out of time since it was filed only on March 26, 2001.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
resolution was denied by the CA on July 17, 2001.
The
petitioner assails the resolution of the CA, contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRAVENED APPLICABLE RULES AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN:
1. DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE AND EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, DESPITE PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASON FOR ITS GRANT;
2. DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, DESPITE ITS
FILING WITHIN THE EXTENSION PERIOD SOUGHT AND DESPITE BEING MERITORIOUS;
3. DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[17]
The petition is denied due course.
First. The
petitioner had sixty (60) days from January 5, 2001 or until March 6, 2001
within which to file her petition for certiorari in the CA. Indeed, while the CA may grant for
compelling reasons an extension of time for the filing of a petition before it,
such extension should not exceed fifteen days.
Thus, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, even if it had granted
the petitioner’s motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file
the petition or until March 21, 2001, the petition should be denied for having
been filed out of time, since the petitioner filed her petition only on March
26, 2001, well beyond the period therefor.
Second. The
assailed decision, even if erroneous, was merely an error of judgment and not
an error of jurisdiction. Hence, the
proper remedy of the petitioner was to appeal by a writ of error from the
decision of the RTC.[18]
Third. The
petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, namely, an appeal by writ of error from the said decision; as such, the
petition is inappropriate.[19] The remedy of appeal and a petition for
certiorari are mutually exclusive.[20]
We find that the petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the
Rules of Court, in the interest of substantial justice, is barren of
merit. It must be stressed that rules
of procedure must be faithfully followed in the absence of persuasive reason to
deviate therefrom, as in this case.[21] Besides, the petitioner still has the remedy
of appeal in the CA.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
DUE COURSE. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
On official leave
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairman
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairman’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
**Acting Chairman.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 121-122.
[3] CA Rollo, p. 8.
[4] Id. at 9.
[5] Id. at 8.
[6] Id. at 9-10.
[7] Id. at 10-11.
[8] Id. at 47.
[9] Id.
at 31-32.
[10] Id. at 49.
[11] Id. at 50.
[12] Id. at 51.
[13] Id. at 2.
[14] Id at 4-6.
[15] Id. at 56.
[16] Id. at 134.
[17] Rollo, p. 14.
[18] In Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998), we ruled that:
… An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. …
[19] Heirs of Pedro Atega v. Garilao, 357 SCRA 203 (2001).
[20] Obando v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 673 (2001).
[21] See Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 305 (2000).