|
ANITA
ESTEBAN, Petitioner, -
versus - HON.
REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO ESTEBAN,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 135012 Present: panganiban, J., Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona,
and *CARPIO MORALES, JJ. Promulgated: September 7, 2004 |
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In
this present petition for certiorari,[1]
Anita Esteban seeks to annul the Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August 20, 1998
issued by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, San Jose City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and
SJC-31(97). The Orders denied
petitioner’s application for cancellation of the cash bail posted in each case.
Gerardo
Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash
bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.
While
out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was
again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained.
“Fed
up with Gerardo’s actuation,” petitioner refused to post another bail.[2] Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed with the trial court an
application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal
cases.[3] She alleged therein that she is
“terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as
certified to by the City Jail Warden.”[4]
In
an Order dated July 9, 1998,[5]
respondent judge denied petitioner’s application, thus:
x x x
“In these
cases, accused was allowed enjoyment of his provisional liberty after money was
deposited with the Clerk of Court as cash bail. Applicant-movant (now petitioner) did not voluntarily surrender
the accused. Instead, the accused was
subsequently charged with another crime for which he was arrested and
detained. His arrest and detention for
another criminal case does not affect the character of the cash bail posted by
applicant-movant in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SLC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and
SJC-31(97) as deposited pending the trial of these cases. Money deposited as bail even though made by
a third person is considered as the accused’s deposit where there is no
relationship of principal and surety (State
vs. Wilson, 65 Ohio L-Abs, 422, 115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money so deposited takes the nature of property in custodia legis and is to be applied for
payment of fine and costs. And such
application will be made regardless of the fact that the money was deposited by
a third person.
“WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the application for cancellation of bail bonds is hereby
DENIED.
“SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration[6]
but was denied in an Order dated August 20, 1998.[7]
Hence,
the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner
states that she is constrained to bring this matter directly to this Court as
the issue is one of first impression.[8]
Petitioner
submits that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail, her application
for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is allowed under Section
19, now Section 22, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
“Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. – Upon application
of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled
upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall
be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of
the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all
instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.” (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s
submission is misplaced.
The
first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among others,
the surety or bondsman surrenders
the accused to the court that ordered the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by
the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.
We
hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled.
Petitioner did not surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal
cases, to the trial court. The accused
was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case.
Moreover,
the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash deposit which, as
mandated by Section 14 (formerly Section 11) of the same Rule 114, shall be
applied to the payment of fine and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be
returned to the accused or to any person who made the deposit. Section 14 provides:
“Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused
or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the
amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall
be discharged from custody. The
money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine
and costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
whoever made the deposit.” (Underscoring
supplied)
The
Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A cash bond may be posted either by the
accused or by any person in his behalf.
However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is
regarded as the money of the accused.
Consequently, it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that
may be imposed by the court. This was
the ruling of this Court as early as 1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.[9] Therein we declared that “when a cash bail
is allowed, the two parties to the transaction are the
State and the defendant.
Unlike other bail
bonds,
the money may then be used in the payment of that in which the State is
concerned – the fine and costs. The
right of the government is in the nature of a lien on the money
deposited.” We further held in the
same case that:
“x x x.
Similar cases have frequently gained the attention of the courts in the United
States in jurisdictions where statutes permit a deposit of money to be made in
lieu of bail in criminal cases. The
decisions are unanimous in holding that a fine imposed on the accused may be
satisfied from the cash deposit; and this is true although the money has been
furnished by a third person. This is so
because the law contemplates that the deposit shall be made by the
defendant. The money, x x x, must
accordingly be treated as the property of the accused. As a result, the money could be applied in
payment of any fine imposed and of the costs (People vs. Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App. Of New York, 7 N. E., 910, a
case frequently cited approvingly in other jurisdictions; State of Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112 Iowa, 403; Mundell vs. Wells, supra.). But while as between the State and the
accused the money deposited by a third person for the release of the accused is
regarded as the money of the accused, it is not so regarded for any other
purpose. As between the accused and a
third person, the residue of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a
creditor of property obtain (Wright &
Taylor vs. Dougherty [1908], 138 Iowa, 195; People vs. Gould [1902], 78 N. Y. Sup., 279; Mundell vs. Wells, supra.).”[10]
In
fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge in denying petitioner’s application for cancellation of the
accused’s cash bail.
WHEREFORE, the present
petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate
Justice Chairman |
|
|
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
(On
official leave) CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
|
|
|
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairman,
Third Division
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
* On Official leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Petition, Rollo at 5.
[3] Annex “C” of Petition, Rollo at 16-21.
[4] Id. at 19.
[5] Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo at 13-14.
[6] Annex “D” of Petition, Rollo at 22-24.
[7] Id.
at 15.
[8] Petition, Rollo at 3.
[9] 52 Phil. 114 (1928).
[10] Id. at 119.