EN BANC
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, G.R.
No. 155746
DOROTEO LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners, Present:
DAVIDE,
C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,*
CALLEJO,
SR.,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA
and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
JUDGE
GENEROSA G. LABRA,
Branch
23, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu,
and the CITY OF CEBU,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October
13, 2004
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated
July 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City[1]
upholding the validity of the City of Cebu’s Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the
lower court’s order dated August 26, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
In 1964, the
Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was
Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square
meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased
Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including
Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.[2]
Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for
specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of
petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale
in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot
1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.[3]
After
acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order
of demolition.
However, when
the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia
wrote two letters[4]
to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a
period of 120 days from February 22, 1999.
Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029
as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.[5] Then,
on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772[6]
which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On
July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843[7] was
enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate
expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered
in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the
benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants
thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for
the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor
Garcia on August 2, 2000.
On August 29,
2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of
Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its
decision on July 1, 2002 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners whose
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 26,
2002.
In this
appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it
sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to
the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of “public use” contemplated
in the Constitution.[8] They allege
that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to
petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably
being a big source of votes.
In sum, this
Court is being asked to resolve whether or not the intended expropriation by
the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners
contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under Section
48 of RA 7160,[9] otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,[10] local legislative power shall
be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise
of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.
Local
government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature.[11] By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred
upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was
enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC.
19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No.
1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by the
SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income
residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the
most serious social problems of the country, local government units do not
possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in
seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of
this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws;[12]
and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.[13] Thus, the exercise by local government units
of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160
itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws.
The exercise
of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner’s right to
private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary
for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately
connected with the rights to life and liberty.[14] Whether directly exercised by the State or
by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in
derogation of private rights.[15] For this reason, the need for a painstaking
scrutiny cannot be overemphasized.
The due
process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the
expropriation of a private individual’s
property. The courts
cannot even adopt
a hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is
invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and
determined. In De Knecht vs.
Bautista,[16]
we said:
It
is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due
process affords. It is a mandate of
reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it
is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an
oppressive manner. It is, as had been
stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of
justice. That is the standard that must
be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is
entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice,
“Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only
under pain of nullity. xxx.
The
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of public character.[17]
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property
should be expropriated. In this case,
there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular
choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of
petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized housing project.
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no
more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for
public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his
property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the
public.[18]
RA 7279 is
the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban
land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:
SEC
9. Priorities in the Acquisition of
Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
(a) Those
owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands;
(d) Those
within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet
been acquired;
(e) Bagong
Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where
on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The
local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands. (Emphasis supplied).
SEC.
10. Modes of Land Acquisition.
− The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture
agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes
of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late
Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila,[19]
we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict limitations on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially
with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized
housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring
it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only
after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical
violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them
allegedly for public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the
City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No.
1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property without any attempt to first
acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu
City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of
RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’
property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find
Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the
petitioners’ right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998,
petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the
illegal occupants of their property.
The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained
finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia
requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the
City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation
site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance
No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. It was trickery and bad
faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned
ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the
Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with
certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These
principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.[21]
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing
substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been
thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject
ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, as earlier
discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate
manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor
ordinance;
third, the fact that
petitioners’ small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose
of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
fourth, the
ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end
sought and the means adopted. While the
objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers,
the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was
legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic
liberties and the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings
have not achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government has tried
to remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however,
government’s kid-glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication and
proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor program that
is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly respectful of
everyone’s basic rights is what this problem calls for, not the improvident
enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in no
rational fashion.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Branch 23 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
W E
C O N C U R:
HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR.
Chief
Justice
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
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LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
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ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
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MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ |
(on leave)
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
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ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
|
(on leave)
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
|
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DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
|
(on leave)
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
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|
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
* on leave
[1] Presided by Judge Generosa G. Labra.
[2] The records of the case do not state why and how the lots reverted to the Province of Cebu.
[3] Now deceased.
[4] Dated February 22, 1999 and May 20, 1999.
[5] The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (Lina Law).
[6] Entitled, “AN ORDINANCE FURTHER AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 1656 AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 1684 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 1966 REVISED ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CEBU, BY INCORPORATING THEREIN A NEW DISTRICT CALLED SOCIALIZED HOUSING SITES.”
[7] Entitled “AN ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY TO INSTITUTE EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MRS. CRISPINA VDA. DE LAGCAO, OWNER OF LOT NO. 1029 LOCATED AT GREEN VALLEY, CAPITOL SITE, CEBU CITY, TO ACQUIRE THE SAME FOR PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE.”
[8] Article IV, Section 9 – “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
[9] Section 48. Local Legislative Power – Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.
[10] The law was approved on October 10, 1991 and it became effective on January 1, 1992.
[11] City of Cincinnati vs. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L. ed 950, 50 S Ct. 360.
[12] Article 3, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.
[13] Article 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution.
[14] Joaquin G. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, vol. 1. p. 43, 1987.
[15] City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 1919.
[16] G.R. No. L-51078, 30 October 1980, 100 SCRA 660.
[17] City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community of Manila, supra.
[18] Urban Estates, Inc. vs. Montesa, 88 Phil. 348 (1951).
[19] G.R. Nos. 132431 and 137146, February 13, 2004.
[20] Sec 19. Eminent Domain – “xxx. Provided however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: xxx.”
[21] Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157.