SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1377.
MERIAM BALAGTAS, complainant, vs. OLEGARIO R.
SARMIENTO, JR. Judge, MTCC, Branch 2 Cebu City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Therefore, every motion which may prejudice the rights of a party should be set for hearing. The intendment of the law will never be achieved if notice is not served, such as in this case.
On November 27, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the sworn Letter-Complaint[1] of Ms. Meriam Balagtas (Balagtas) dated November 11, 1998 accusing Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, of knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, gross ignorance of the law and serious irregularities in the performance of judicial duties in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 82863-R and 83186-R, entitled “People of the Philippines versus Hermann Peith,” for violation of B.P. 22.
Balagtas was the private complainant in the aforementioned criminal cases.
In the Letter-Complaint she submitted, Balagtas alleges
that on
Consequently, Balagtas filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Dated
The respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration in his
Order[7]
dated
Balagtas then filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge
Olegario Sarmiento[8] dated
The respondent judge granted the motion for inhibition in his Order[9]
dated
Balagtas now asserts that the respondent judge’s Orders
dated
Balagtas essentially contends that the respondent judge should
not have allowed Peith to leave the country since, as the accused in two
criminal cases, he is not only liable for the amount of the checks that bounced
but also for the imposable penalty for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law. She likewise objects to what she
claims to be derogatory remarks made by the respondent judge against her in his
Order of
In his Letter-Comment[11] dated May 24, 1999, the respondent judge explains that he allowed Peith to leave the country for one month to avail of his retirement benefits in Switzerland for the following reasons: (a) Peith has properties, family and a reputation to maintain in Cebu City; (b) he was appreciative of Peith’s gesture of asking permission to travel because Peith need not have done so; (c) he was hoping that Peith can bring in money to pay his obligation under the checks; (d) Peith had already been arraigned; hence, he may be tried in absentia; and (e) Peith executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Balagtas to secure the payment of his obligation. Besides, Balagtas had allegedly already foreclosed Peith’s property and the value of the bounced checks had already been satisfied.
The respondent judge also claims that the case is already before
another judge since he inhibited himself from hearing the cases in his Order
dated
In her Letter-Reply[14] dated June
26, 1999, Balagtas insists that had she been notified of Peith’s motion, she
could have opposed the motion with the following points, to wit: Peith has no
legal wife but only a live-in-partner in Cebu; as a foreigner, Peith cannot own
real property anywhere in the Philippines; and the value of the mortgaged real
estate is not sufficient to satisfy Peith’s monetary obligation. She adds that the respondent judge delved
into irrelevant issues when he stated in his
In a Resolution[16] dated
The investigating judges submitted their report and recommendation[17] dated August 1, 2003 to the OCA finding as follows: (1) as a first level court judge, the respondent is not authorized to issue hold departure orders as this power is vested in a Regional Trial Court judge; (2) Balagtas erred in filing her Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against Peith before the respondent judge’s court, hence, she is not entirely blameless; (3) upon the inhibition of the respondent judge, the cases were transferred to MTCC, Branch 5, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Oscar D. Andrino, who rendered a judgment on the cases on November 11, 2002; and (4) Peith was acquitted but was ordered to indemnify Balagtas for the face value of the checks with interest thereon. In view of these findings, the investigating judges recommend that the charges against the respondent judge be dismissed and the case considered closed and terminated.
In its Memorandum[18] dated
The Court agrees that the remark of the respondent judge in his Order
dated
The respondent judge deserves the sternest reproof for making these remarks. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.[20] Moreover, intemperate speech detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.[21]
The Court, however, deviates from the conclusion of both the OCA and the investigating judges that the respondent judge should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.
The OCA and the investigating judges overlooked the fact that
when Peith requested permission to leave for abroad on
Considering the litigious nature of Peith’s motion and the fact that the criminal and civil aspects of the cases were simultaneously instituted, the public prosecutor and the private offended party should have been notified, failing which, the respondent judge should not have acted upon the motion.
The Rules of Court is explicit on this point.[23] A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.[24]
In granting Peith’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic and fundamental constitutional principle, due process. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.[25] Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge[26]
for which any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (a) dismissal from
service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled
corporation; (b) suspension for three to six months without salary and
benefits; or (c) a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.[27]
However, in the case of De
Jesus v. Obnamia, Jr.[28]
where the respondent judge failed to ensure compliance with the three (3)-day
notice rule, the Court ordered him to pay a fine of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Court finds the respondent judge herein similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY,
respondent Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the
amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) and ADMONISHED to refrain
from resorting to insulting and offensive language in his future judicial
actions, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-21, with Annexes.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Ibid.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Supra, note 9.
[16] Supra, note 1 at 75.
[17]
[18]
[19] Supra, note 11.
[20]
Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, No. L-30001,
[21] Dela Cruz v. Bersamira, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567,
[22] Supra, note 2.
[23] “Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than then (10) days after the filing of the motion.” Rule 15, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[24] Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140356, March 20, 2001, 354 SCRA 736, citing Meris v. Ofilada, 293 SCRA 606 (1998) and Santos v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 632 (1996).
[25] Domondon v. Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696,
[26] Section 3, Rule 140.
[27] Section 10, Rule 140.
[28]
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1314,