SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1836.
DR. JAIME O. SEVILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ABRAHAM B. BORRETA, RTC, Branch 154, Pasig City, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On September 19, 2002, Dr. Jaime O. Sevilla filed a verified complaint against Presiding Judge Abraham B. Borreta, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154, accusing him of Ignorance of the Law in violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.01 and Delay of Justice under Canon 1, Rule 1.02, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in connection with Civil Case No. 37822 entitled Carmelita C. Sevilla v. Dr. Jaime O. Sevilla, for Support.[1]
The pertinent facts in this administrative matter are undisputed.
On P40,000 to Mrs. Sevilla and P32,000 to their
son, Carlos Rafael Sevilla.
On
On P72,000, the total amount of accumulated unpaid support, as
ordered by the court, nor has he shown any intention to obey the said order.
On
Complainant Dr. Sevilla thru counsel immediately filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated
On P72,000, evidenced by the Sheriff’s Return dated
On
On
On
In his Comment, respondent judge avers that his issuance of the HDO had legal basis and the decision to issue the HDO was left to his sound judgment and discretion. Respondent, explaining the alleged lack of legal basis of the HDO, contends that complainant’s refusal and/or erratic failure to give support, may give rise to an action for contempt of court which is in the nature of a criminal action[8] and was punishable by imprisonment – his basis for his issuance of the HDO.
On the accusation that he failed to act promptly in lifting the HDO, respondent claims that he acted on the motion with dispatch, in good faith, without malice, and in accordance with law. He points out that what complainant wanted was to dictate on the calendar of the court. Respondent adds that his intention in requiring Mrs. Sevilla to comment on the motion to lift the HDO was to give her due process, and ascertain the compliance of the judgment for support thru the Sheriff’s Return, to the extent that he even directed the sheriff to explain why the latter lifted the garnishment without an order from the court.
On the instructions of this Court to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to investigate, and report its findings on the complaint,
the OCA found that on the matter of delay, more than one month had lapsed from P72,000 was too modest an amount for complainant to
think of absconding.
On the charge of ignorance of
the law, the OCA opined that indeed contempt of court is in the nature of a
criminal proceeding, but contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a
special civil action that cannot be converted to a criminal case. The OCA
observed that the contempt in this case was merely an incident of the main
civil case. Further, respondent judge clearly violated Circular No. 39-97.
Based on the Court’s recent
promulgations involving the erroneous issuances of HDO,[9] the OCA recommended that respondent judge be
reprimanded with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Court Administrator that respondent judge erred in issuing the hold-departure order and failed to appreciate the circumstances necessitating the lifting of the hold- departure order more promptly.
Indeed, contempt is in the nature of a criminal action, but only with regard to its procedural aspect. A contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has elements of both a civil and a criminal proceeding, it is not a criminal proceeding even though the contemptuous act involved could be a crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the original case. It is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of a new process.[10] Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action.
Circular 39-97 provides that an HDO may
be issued only in criminal cases by the RTC.
Respondent cannot feign lack of knowledge of the circular because he
cited it in his Order dated
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Abraham B. Borreta of the
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 58.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Circular No. 39-97, GUIDELINES IN THE ISSUANCE OF HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDERS.
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are issued contain complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
. . .
[7] Rollo, p. 59.
[8]
[9]
Citing A.M. No. 99-9-141-MTCC,
[10]
People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09,
[11] Rollo, p. 62.
[12] Supra, note 9.