THIRD DIVISION
DOMINGO B. PANTIG, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1791
Complainant, (Formerly AM OCA IPI
No. 02-1427-RTJ)
Present:
VITUG, J., Chairman,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA and
CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
|
JUDGE
LAMBERTO A. DAING, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, JUDGE CARMELITA
GUTIERREZ-FRUELDA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, JUDGE PEDRO M. SUNGA,
JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, all in San Fernando City, Pampanga and
JUDGE PAMELA ANN A. MAXINO, Municipal Trial Court, Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1. |
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July
8, 2004
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R E
S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is an administrative matter stemming from the
affidavit-complaint[1] filed
by complainant Dominador
Pantig
charging the following judges with conduct unbecoming of
officers of the court: Judge Lamberto Daing, Jr., Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 46; Judge Pamela Ann Maxino, Municipal Trial Court
of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1; Judge Pedro Sunga, Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42 and Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda, Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga, Branch 43.
In his affidavit-complaint, Pantig
alleged that he and his siblings (Baltazar, Pedro and Ursula Pantig-Sahagun)
were co-owners of Lot 1471, a 13.99 hectare fishpond. In 1969, ownership of Lot
1471 (together with Lots 1747 and 1801) was awarded, pursuant to original
registration, to Venancio Baltazar. However, Baltazar’s ownership over Lot 1471
was challenged by complainant Pantig and his siblings in an action for
reconveyance. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41
ruled in favor of the Pantigs and ordered Baltazar to surrender the possession
of Lot 1471. The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by Judge Felipe
B. Kalalo read:
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
That portion of the Decision
rendered on August 24, 1969 confirming applicant-respondent’s title to Lot
1471, is hereby set aside;
2.
Petitioner’s title to Lot
1471, described in plan AP-19164 (Exhibit D) and in its technical description
(Exhibit H), is hereby confirmed and orders that the same be decreed in an
undivided equal shares in favor of petitioners Baltazar Pantig, Domingo Pantig,
Pedro Pantig, Filipinos, of legal ages, all married, the first two being
residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, and the last two being residents of Guagua,
Pampanga; and
3.
Upon the finality of this
decision, respondent Venancio Baltazar is hereby ordered to surrender
possession of Lot 1471 to the petitioners and to render within sixty (60) days
thereof an accounting of the produce thereof from 1969.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree issue.
With costs against applicants, respondent Venancio Baltazar.[2]
The April 5, 1984 decision of Judge Kalalo was affirmed by
both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.[3] It became final
and executory on February 7, 1997. However, in spite of the issuance of a writ
of execution and an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the name of
complainant Pantig, the Baltazars continued to be in possession of the property
without any accounting of the produce rendered.
Complainant Pantig alleges that the final and executory
decision has not been implemented because of the maneuverings of the Baltazars
through their counsel, Atty. Ernesto Pangalangan, and the acts of the
respondent judges which amount to conduct unbecoming of officers of the court.
As summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), the acts complained of are:
a)
JUDGE LAMBERTO A.
DAING, JR.
Complainant alleges that he filed an indirect
contempt charge against the Baltazars’ counsel, Atty. Ernesto Pangalangan,
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 12056 before the RTC, Branch 45, San Fernando
City presided by respondent Judge Lamberto A. Daing, Jr. A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed
by Atty. Pangalangan after which the court ordered him to file his position
paper. Complainant received a copy of
Atty. Pangalangan’s position paper on 28 June 2000 and filed his comment
thereon on 03 August 2000. However,
despite lapse of almost two (2) years, respondent Judge has not resolved the
motion to dismiss in violation of the rules.
b)
JUDGE CARMELITA
GUTIERREZ-FRUELDA
Complainant avers that, relative to the
above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-850 LRC Rec. No. N-35668
entitled “Baltazar Pantig, et al. vs. Venancio Baltazar,” RTC, Branch 41,
San Fernando, Pampanga issued an order on 01 September 1999 finding defendant
Baltazars guilty of indirect contempt and ordering them to pay P25,000.00
each for their refusal to render an accounting on the produce of the subject
fishpond from 1969 up to the present.
Upon the motion of plaintiff Pantigs, the court issued another Order
dated 07 June 2000 further ordering the imprisonment of defendant Baltazars
until they comply with the Order of 01 September 1999.
Complainant
maintains that on 27 June 2000 the Baltazars filed their first Urgent Motion to
Reconsider Order of 07 June 2000 etc. On 20 December 2001, Judge Simbulan
issued an order denying the motion; rejecting the accounting submitted by the
Baltazars; and ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. A second Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order
dated 20 December 2001 was filed by the Baltazars which was likewise denied on
17 January 2002. Later, upon the motion
of the Baltazars, Judge Simbulan inhibited himself from hearing the case. The case was then re-assigned to RTC, Branch
43 presided by respondent Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda.
Complainant
contends that for the third time the Baltazars filed an urgent Motion to
Reconsider Order dated 17 January 2002.
During the hearing on the motion, complainant’s counsel emphasized that
the motion ought to be denied for being pro-forma and actually the third motion
filed by the Baltazars seeking the reconsideration of the Order dated 07 June
2000 which cited them in contempt of court.
The Pantigs observed that during said trial Atty. Pangalangan, counsel
for the Baltazars, was unusually silent and it was respondent Judge who was
actively arguing with their counsel. Sensing bias on the part of the judge they
requested their counsel to file a motion for her inhibition. Their suspicion
was confirmed when on 19 February 2002 respondent Judge issued an order
granting the motion and setting aside the Order of 01 September 1999 which
cited the Baltazars in contempt of court. The same order accepted the
accounting previously rejected by Judge Simbulan and considered the same as
their substantial compliance with the accounting mandated by the dispositive portion
of the Decision dated 05 April 1984 even in the absence of any receipt or
voucher showing how the expenses were incurred.
c)
JUDGE PEDRO M. SUNGA,
JR.
Complainant alleges that respondent Judge Pedro M.
Sunga, Jr., issued an Order dated 07 June 2000 in LRC No. N-850 N-35668
ordering the imprisonment of the Baltazars until they comply with the Order
dated 10 February 1998. However, upon
the Baltazars’ filing of an “Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order of 07 June 2000”
dated 27 June 2000, respondent Judge immediately recalled the Warrants of
Arrest issued against respondent Baltazars without first giving the plaintiffs
the opportunity to comment on the said motion.
d)
JUDGE PAMELA ANN A.
MAXINO
Complainant avers that he is one of the plaintiffs in a forcible entry case against the Baltazars docketed as Civil Case No. 732. On 13 August 2001, respondent Judge Maxino ordered expunged the Position Paper and the supporting affidavits of the Baltazars for having been filed out of time and considered the case submitted for decision. On 31 August 2001, Atty. Pangalangan filed a Motion for Reconsideration which did not contain a notice of hearing. Instead of disregarding the motion for being defective, respondent Judge, on 06 September 22001, set the said motion for hearing on 28 September 2001. Complainant’s counsel objected thereto saying that the court had no obligation to set the motion for hearing and that such hearing would unnecessarily delay the case. Yet the hearing proceeded. On 03 October 22001, respondent judge instead of deciding the case, merely inhibited herself as a consequence of which the case remained pending and the Baltazars were given the undue advantage of staying on the fishpond for some more years to the prejudice of the Pantigs.[4]
Respondent judges submitted their respective comments
denying that their acts constituted conduct unbecoming of officers of the
Court. As summarized by the OCA, the comments of respondent judges follow:
1.
COMMENT dated 02 May 2002 of
respondent Judge Lamberto A. Daing, Jr.
Respondent Judge Daing avers that although the
pending incident in the subject case was the motion to dismiss and the
opposition thereto, he claims that both parties already presented their
respective evidence on the merits. Several documents were allegedly submitted
by them revering to some records of no less than three separate cases aside
from the pleadings and decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Due to these voluminous records, he admits that through sheer inadvertence and
oversight, he was able to resolve the pending incident only on 10 May 2002. He
asserts though that his inaction was not attended or brought about by malice or
ill-motive to unjustifiably favor one party over another.
2.
COMMENT dated 06 May 2002 of
respondent Judge Carmelita S. Gutierrez-Fruelda denying the charge against her.
Respondent Judge Fruelda states that the charge
against her hinges on the Order dated 19 February 2002 which she issued as the
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 43, San Fernando City, Pampanga, in LRC No.
N850 N-35668 entitled “Baltazar Pantig, et al vs. Venancio Baltazar,” the
dispositive portion of which, inter alia, states:
“Considering
all the foregoing, this Court believes and so holds that, in view of the
compliance by the Baltazars (thru counsel) with the Decision and the Orders
aforestated, by rendering an accounting of the produce of the fishpond from
1969 up to the present, notwithstanding that some entries in the accounting may
not be acceptable to the opposing party, there is still compliance made by the
respondents. Since there was compliance
the fine of P25,000.00 for each of the respondents must be reconsidered
and the Warrant of Arrest issued against all the respondents must necessarily
be recalled.”
Respondent Judge Fruelda in justifying her afore-mentioned Order states, inter alia, thus:
a.
Specifically, the April 5,
1984 Decision, required the person of VENANCIO BALTAZAR, and none other to
render an accounting of the income and expenses of the fishpond from 1969 to
the present;
b. The person of Venancio Baltazar failed to render the
ordered accounting until he died on February 5, 1979;
c.
The record does not show that
the respondents, who were cited for contempt and ordered imprisoned, were duly
named substitutes to the principal respondent, the deceased Venancio
Baltazar. Neither were they appointed
executors or administrators of the estate of the deceased respondent.
d.
In fact, there is no showing
in the record that the respondents, who were ordered arrested, had a hand in
the management and administration of the subject fishpond for them to get
involved in the matter of rendering an accounting which is personal in nature;
e.
The order for these
respondents to render an accounting, otherwise face incarceration, compelled
them to hire a public accountant who prepared one for them, and hence, upon
submission of the same would be treated as full compliance of the order, the
non-acceptance of the same by petitioner notwithstanding. As such, the re-issuance of the warrants of
arrest against them would be iniquitous and unjust;
xxxxxx
i.
If the herein complainant
found error in the questioned order of the undersigned respondent Judge, the
proper remedy, if she may suggest, is to attach the same in a petition for
certiorari, as the same is not proper for an administrative complaint against
the judge issuer thereof.
3.
COMMENT dated 22 April 2002 of
respondent Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr. denying the charge against him.
Respondent Judge alleges that as the then designated
Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 41, he issued the Order dated 07 June
2000 in LRC No. N-850 N-35668 finding defendant Baltazars guilty of indirect
contempt and ordering them to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each and to be
imprisoned until they comply with the Order dated 23 June 1998 by rendering an
accounting of the produce of the fishpond in issue from 1969 up to the
present. One 15 June 2000, he issued
the corresponding Order of Arrest. On
23 June 2000, counsel for the Baltazars filed an “Urgent Motion to Reconsider
Order of 07 June 2000 and to Set Aside Order of Imprisonment or to Quash
Warrant of Arrest for Having Become Moot and Academic” wherein the required
accounting was incorporated. According to respondent Judge, considering that
the Baltazars had already submitted the required accounting, he immediately
ordered the recall of the warrants of arrest per his Order dated 27 June 2000.
He argues that whether or not the submitted accounting is correct and/or
acceptable to complainant is of no moment for as long as an accounting was
submitted as required by the order. The parties may prove the correctness or
incorrectness of the accounting by submitting evidence thereof but in the
meanwhile the court cannot order the Baltazars to be imprisoned until the
accounting submitted is proven correct.
4.
COMMENT dated 15 May 2002 of
respondent Judge Pamela Ann A. Maxino denying the charges against her.
Respondent Judge Maxino says that the subject Civil
Case No. 732 for forcible entry, together with three (3) other Criminal Cases
Nos. 2068, 2080 and 2081 involving the same parties, were assigned to her by
the Executive Judge after the Presiding Judges of Sasmuan, Branch 2 of Guagua
and Floridablanca inhibited themselves from hearing said cases. Relative to civil Case No. 732, she admits
that she issued the Order dated 13 August 2001 granting the plaintiff’s motion
to expunge the Baltazars’ Position Paper, Specific Offer of Exhibits and the
Affidavits of their witnesses for having been filed out of time. She further admits that she gave due course
on the Baltazars’ motion for reconsideration by setting the same for hearing
although said motion did not contain any notice of hearing because she later
realized the importance and evidentiary value of the position paper, exhibits
and affidavits which, in a forcible entry case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, are submitted in lieu of evidence presented during trial
and without which the Baltazars’ would be left without any evidence at
all. Thus, she set the motion for
hearing in order for her to have a second hard look at her earlier ruling and hear
the parties’ respective arguments.
Moreover,
respondent Judge mentioned the case of Sun Uy Giok vs. Matusa, 101 Phil. 727
cited in 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 233 [6th Revised
Edition, 1997], wherein the Court held as follows:
“x x x. Where
plaintiffs have had the chance to present and did not present their objection
to the motion to dismiss, the Honorable Supreme Court held that the ends of
justice had been served and the court’s failure to note that on the date of the
hearing of said motion, plaintiffs had no notice thereof became an error
without prejudice which may well be overlooked. x x x.”
She claims that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 332
received the Order dated 06 September 2001 setting the motion for
reconsideration for hearing on 28 September 2001. They were afforded the opportunity to comment on or oppose the
motion for reconsideration as they in fact filed a Manifestation with
Respectful Objections on 20 September 2001.
Hence, they were not prejudiced.
And following the aforequoted ruling of this Court, the error in the
notice of hearing may well be overlooked.
As
to her order of inhibition, respondent Judge maintains that she had no other
recourse but to inhibit herself from hearing the forcible entry case as well as
the related Criminal Cases Nos. 2068, 2080 and 2081 because in Criminal Case
No. 2068, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Norben O. Dimalanta, et al.”
for frustrated usurpation of real rights in property, the accused therein
alleged that she (respondent Judge) had taught or coached the prosecution on
what to do and not to do thereby accusing her
of bias and partiality in favor of the Baltazars. Although it was
baseless and untrue, she opted to inhibit herself to avoid any appearance of
impropriety.[5]
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez, as
approved by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., recommends that the
charges against Judges Gutierrez-Fruelda, Sunga, Jr. and Maxino be dismissed
because the acts complained of pertained to the exercise of their judicial
discretion. However, he recommends that Judge Daing, Jr. be fined P2,000
for his delay in resolving the motion to dismiss. To the DCA, there was no
reasonable excuse for Judge Daing’s failure to promptly decide the case since
judges must have an efficient recording and filing system to ensure the speedy
disposition of cases.
We adopt the recommendations of the OCA with modification.
With regard to respondent Judges Gutierrez-Fruelda, Sunga,
Jr. and Maxino, the Court finds that the acts[6]
complained of as constituting conduct unbecoming of public officers were not
tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith and thus, not subject
to disciplinary action by this Court.[7]
We have ruled that, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous.[8]
A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment unless there is proof that
the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit an
injustice. Thus,
as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake
of a judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor.[9]
In
the case at bar, the questioned orders of respondent judges were well-reasoned
and legally sound. Although the accounting of the Baltazars was unsatisfactory
to the Pantigs, one was nevertheless still rendered and thus the order of the
court was deemed complied with. If
complainant did not approve of the accounting submitted by the Baltazars, then
he should have filed an action questioning it instead of seeking to hold them
in direct contempt. Certainly, an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate course of action when judicial remedies exist (such as a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal) and are available to question an allegedly
irregular or aberrant judicial act. Obviously, if subsequent developments prove
the judge's challenged act to be correct, then there would be no reason to
proceed against him at all.[10]
The Court
notes, however, that the execution of the decision in complainant’s favor has
long been delayed. The April 5, 1984 decision awarding ownership of the fishpond
to complainant became final and executory in 1997. It has been seven years
since then and complainant is still not in possession of his property. The judge handling the case should not
condone the delaying tactics of complainant’s opponent and ought to dispose of
the case at the soonest possible time.
With regard
to Judge Daing, Jr., the Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA that
respondent judge should be fined for his unreasonable delay in resolving the
motion to dismiss. Judge Daing took almost two years to resolve the motion to
dismiss in violation of Section 15(1), Article 8 of the Constitution[11]
which requires him to resolve such matters within 90 days from the submission
of the last pleading. His only explanation for the delay was inadvertence and
oversight due to the voluminous case records. This does not excuse him from
administrative sanction by this Court.
Canon 6, Section 5[12] of the new Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. In the case of Guintu vs. Judge Lucero,[13]
we said that:
Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending
before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the
Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The judge is likewise guilty of a violation
of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a
magistrate shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. This Court
cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when there is an
all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of
congestion and delay which have long plagued our courts. Thus, judges are
called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance
of their duties. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the
90-day requirement for deciding a case but should, in fact, persevere in its
implementation. The people’s faith in the administration of justice would be
greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts
which, unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended
deliberations, could be expected to act with dispatch.
Under Section
9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is classified as a less serious offense.
A judge who is found guilty of a less serious charge may either be (1)
suspended from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months, or (2) fined in the amount of more than P10,000
but not exceeding P20,000.[14]
In this case,
Judge Daing should be meted a fine of P20,000
as a reminder to all judges of their paramount duty to resolve cases with
dispatch.
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered approving the findings and recommendation of the
Court Administrator with modification:
1.
Judge Lamberto A. Daing is hereby ordered to PAY a fine of P20,000 and is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; and
2.
the charge of conduct unbecoming of
officers of the Court against Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda, Judge Pedro M.
Sunga and Judge Pamela Ann Maxino is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R :
Associate
Justice
Chairman
[1] Rollo, pp.1-5.
[2] RTC Decision dated April 5, 1984.
[3] Pantig vs. Baltazar, 191 SCRA 830 [1990].
[4] OCA Recommendation, pp. 1-3.
[5] OCA Recommendation, pp. 3-5.
[6]
a. Judge Carmelita
Gutierrez-Fruelda – for issuing the Order dated 19 February 2002 in LRC No.
N-850 N-35668 setting aside the Order of 01 September 1999 citing the Baltazars
in contempt of court and accepting as compliance the accounting submitted by
the latter;
b.
Judge Pedro M. Sunga,
Jr. – for issuing the Order dated 27 June 2000 in LRC No. N-850 N-35668
ordering the recall of the warrants of arrest issued against respondent
Baltazars; and
c. Judge Pamela Ann A. Maxino – for issuing the Order dated 06 September 2001 in Civil Case No. 732 setting the Motion for Reconsideration for hearing despite its alleged defect of lack of notice of hearing and for issuing an order of inhibition.
[7] De Leon vs. Judge Bonifacio, 280 SCRA 434 [1997].
[8] Uy vs. Judge Medina, 342 SCRA 393 [2000].
[9] Riego et al. vs. Judge Leachon, Jr., 268 SCRA 777 [1997].
[10] Supra note 2.
[11] “Sec.15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.”
[12] Formerly Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
[13] 261 SCRA 1, 7 [1996].
[14] Section 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court.