THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143794.
VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE L. LUISON, JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Litigation is a not a “trial and error” proceeding. A party who moves for a new trial on the ground of “honest mistake” must show that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against it. A new trial is not a refuge for the obstinate.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Viking Industrial Corporation assails the Court of Appeals (a) Decision[1] dated February 29, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55253 finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City, in granting petitioner’s motion for new trial; and (b) Resolution[2] dated June 28, 2000 denying its motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1993, petitioner extended to respondent Jose L. Luison, Jr. a loan amounting to P2,000,000.00
secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Two years thereafter, petitioner demanded
from respondent the payment of P19,102,916.39, purportedly representing
the principal amount of the loan, plus
interest and penalties. Respondent
disputed the accuracy of the amount. Thus,
petitioner threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage, prompting
respondent to file a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief [3]
with the RTC, Branch 77,
On
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. holds that the principal
amount of the loan is only P1,453,500.00;
2. orders the reduction of the interest stipulated in the promissory note and deed of real estate mortgage from 60% per annum to 30% per annum only to commence on the first week of October 1993;
3. orders the injunction permanent until and/or unless respondent (now petitioner) makes the necessary adjustment or correction of its computation of petitioner’s (now respondent’s) total indebtedness as determined by this Court in page six (6) of this Decision;
4. orders respondent (now petitioner) to pay petitioner by
way of attorney’s fees the amount of P150,000.00;
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner received a copy of the above judgment on
Upon respondent’s motion, the RTC issued an Order dated
“Pursuant to the Order of the honorable Court dated October 15,
1996 ordering the undersigned to implement the dispositive portion of the
Decision dated July 8, 1996 rendered on the above-entitled case, undersigned
accordingly implement the same by tendering to respondent Far East Bank Cheque provided SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY NINE CENTAVOS (P790,605.59) ONLY which was received
by respondent thru Mr. Brilly Bernardez
who claimed that said amount was only a partial payment and who instructed Mrs.
Rosalie Pascual to issue a receipt thereof.
However, pursuant to said dispositive portion of the Decision and on
the basis of petitioner’s Manifestation dated
Petitioner refused to acknowledge the full satisfaction of the judgment by default. Thus, respondent filed two motions, to wit: (1) “Ex-Parte Motion to Require Viking Industrial Corporation (petitioner) to Cause the Cancellation of the Annotation of Mortgage and to Return (to respondent) the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100313” dated November 29, 1996; and (2) “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Enjoin the Ex-officio Sheriff of Quezon City or his Authorized Deputies from Selling at Public Auction the Subject Property” dated January 3, 1997.
The RTC, this time, presided by Judge Normandie
B. Pizarro, denied respondent’s twin motions in its Order dated
Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC overturned its order and reinstated the judgment by default.[4] The court also granted respondent’s twin motions earlier mentioned. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.[5]
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45643.[6]
On
“We rule for respondents.
“Concededly, as the trial court had aptly observed, summons and other court processes, before the amendment in the designation of the corporation’s name from Viking Trading Corporation to that of Viking Industrial Corporation, were received by agents of Viking Trading Corporation which turned out to be the same employees working for Viking Industrial Corporation. We quote:
‘It is glaringly clear in this case that summons was served at
That is not all. The initial
notice of hearing for the application of temporary restraining order was served
upon respondent VIKING TRADING CORPORATION thru a certain LUZ GRAGASIN at NO.
“From all that appear on record
and by petitioner’s own admissions, all summons, notices and orders issued by
the trial court were duly served on Viking Trading
Corporation and/or Viking Industrial Corporation
with its place of business at No. 315, Roosevelt Avenue, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City.
“Furthermore, circumstances
indicate a waiver on the part of petitioner Viking of any alleged defect in the
jurisdiction over its person arising from defective or even want of process for
its failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the trial court at the
first opportunity.
“It should be noted that
Viking never raised the issue of improper service of summons until the trial
court issued a writ of execution pursuant to its Decision dated
“Moreover, even when court
notices were in the name of then Viking Trading
Corporation, one Mr. Brilly Bernardez,
President of Viking Industrial Corporation,
voluntarily appeared before the court a
quo to represent petitioner Viking Trading
Corporation (Hearing of 6 June 1996).
As the trial court declared:
‘x x x VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION thru its President, Mr. Brilly Bernardez, personally appeared during the hearing of June 6, 1996, and expressly and unqualifiedly admitted being the respondent in the present case. That Mr. Brilly Bernardez was not authorized to appear and represent VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION is clearly untenable for his appearance before the court was under the color of authority and he is now estopped from questioning the same. Hence, from this consideration alone, the voluntary appearance of the President of respondent VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION may be considered as equivalent to service (Sec. 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court). Thus, the Court may validly declare the respondent in default for failure to file its answer within the reglementary period.’ (Ibid. at p. 57)
“Ergo, by seeking affirmative reliefs through the filing of
responsive pleadings (i.e., Annexes ‘T’, ‘W’, ‘X’, Rollo) before the trial
court, not to mention its various participation in the proceedings in said court
by its President, Brilly Bernardez,
and its counsel, Atty. Luciano S. Borja, other than to object to lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner Viking had in effect voluntarily submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
x x x
“WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari but the same was dismissed in it’s Resolution dated
Despite having exhausted all judicial remedies - from the RTC to
this Court - still, petitioner was unwilling to yield. It resorted to a second round. On
“1. That respondent acted
in the honest mistake that, before it should file its responsive pleading
thereto, the petition which had been served on it for “Viking Trading
Corporation” must first be corrected to reflect its true corporate name, an
issue it had pursued to its end at the appellate courts, and that by reason of
which its rights had been impaired;
2. That the evidence adduced in this court is
insufficient to justify said judgment; and
3. That said judgment is against the law.”
Surprisingly, the RTC was convinced. On
“In its motion for new trial, respondent stressed that its refusal to file its answer is far from being frivolous as, in fact, it once was shared by no less than this Court; and that, although it failed to win the approval of the appellate courts, its belief on such legal position and its pertinent reliance thereon, although erroneous, constitute an honest mistake.
“The Court is
persuaded. The natural reaction of any
one sued under an erroneous name is to question and/or ignore that suit. In this case, respondent did precisely what
it thought was right when it decided to ignore the summons. The vehemence and perseverance of the
respondent in pursuing that course of action, spending time and money bringing
the issue up to the highest court of the land, to the mind of the Court, is a
clear indication of its honest belief in its cause even if those efforts
ultimately failed. The Court, therefore,
finds that respondent’s failure to file its answer or responsive pleading was
on account of an honest mistake which is a valid ground for a new trial (Section
1 (a), Rule 37, Rules of Court, as amended).”
Respondent moved for reconsideration, stressing that the judgment
by default is already final and duly executed and, therefore, cannot be set
aside. He cited Judge Salvador’s Order
dated
In the Order dated
Hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
55253. On
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner’s main argument is that it received a copy of the
judgment by default only on
Respondent counters that there is conclusive proof on record that
petitioner was served a copy of the judgment by default on
We rule for respondent.
The core issue in this case is whether petitioner filed its
motion for new trial seasonably. Thus,
it is imperative to determine whether it received a copy of the judgment by
default only on
Succinct and unmistakable is the consistent pronouncement that this Court is not a trier of facts. And well entrenched is the doctrine that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law.[8] Corollarily, a question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts.[9]
Whether petitioner was served a copy of the judgment by default
only on
As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are supported by the records, as in this case.
We quote the Court of Appeals’ incisive findings on the matter, thus:
“Private respondent’s
contention that they received only the decision on
“Also, the judgment of the lower court was executed by the Deputy
Sheriff on
“Thus, in our mind, we are
not convinced that private respondent did not receive a copy of the
decision. We are more inclined to
believe the Presiding Judge who issued the Order dated
“The Presiding Judge could not have specifically mentioned the date
We find no cogent reason why we should review the above findings of the Appellate Court which are sustained by the records.
At any rate, even if the motion for new trial was filed on time, still, the same should not have been granted by the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it committed an “honest mistake” in not filing an answer to respondent’s petition for prohibition and declaratory relief because of its belief that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner’s “honest mistake” hardly qualifies as a ground for a new trial. Section 1 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
“SECTION 1, Grounds of and period for filing a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. -- Within the period for taking an appeal,
the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final
order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or”
Definitely, petitioner’s reliance on “honest mistake” is misplaced. The mistake referred to above is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law. Its lawyer believed that he should not file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded. Had petitioner’s counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, particularly Section 4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have committed a mistake which, unfortunately, binds his client. Those Rules are quoted below:
“SEC. 4. Formal amendments. – A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
“SEC. 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing of the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds.
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.”
Clearly, petitioner’s counsel, instead of ignoring respondent’s petition, should have filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over its person as the summons (with a copy of the petition) served upon it is defective. Definitely, his invocation of “honest mistake” is misplaced. He could have prevented such mistake if only he is conversant with the Rules.
At any rate, the issue of whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment by default has been settled by this Court.
What we see in petitioner’s conduct is its obsession to exalt technicality over actuality. It is willing to close its eyes to reality if only to win its case through a technicality. Hence, in the end, it must suffer for its obstinacy.
In fine, we hold that petitioner’s motion for new trial is just a last-ditch attempt to revive a lost case. To grant it will set a precedent allowing a new trial upon a party’s mere acknowledgement that in failing to file an answer, he committed an “honest mistake.” In effect, there will be no end to litigation. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision and Order of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55253 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman),
[1] Rollo at 23-39. Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. wrote the ponencia with Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.
[2] Rollo at 40.
[3] Entitled “IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING THE CORRECT COMPUTATION OF INDEBTEDNESS AND/OR VALIDITY OF INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES STIPULATED IN A PROMISORY NOTE AND REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, JOSE L. LUISON, JR., petitioner, - versus - VIKING TRADING CORPORATION, respondent.
[4]
Order dated
[5]
Order dated
[6]
Entitled, “Viking Industrial
Corporation, petitioner, - versus - Hon. Normandie
B. Pizarro, as Judge RTC of
[7] “ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on
‘G.R. No. 135189 (Viking
Industrial Corporation vs. Jose Luison, Jr., et
al.) -
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 11, 1998, the Court resolved to DENY the petition for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.’
and that the same has, on
[8] Valmonte vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 41621,
[9] Spouses
Batingal
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128636,