RAFAEL T. FLORES,
HERMINIO G.R. No. 154714
C. ELIZON, ARNULFO
S.
SOLORIA, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA,
and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. LYDIA QUERUBIN
LAYOSA,
In her capacity as
Judge of RTC,
Quezon City, Branch
217, Promulgated:
BENIGNO S. MONTERA
and
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1]
dated May 2, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2002 of the
Sandiganbayan in SCA No. 009.[2]
On December 16, 1991, respondent Benigno Montera (Montera) of the Enforcement, Investigation and Prosecution Department of the National Food Authority (NFA) filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Judy Carol L. Dansal and Ronaldo Vallada, together with petitioners Rafael T. Flores, Herminio C. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria, with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.
After conducting a preliminary investigation,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information charging petitioners
with the offense of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC).
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607 and raffled to
Branch 217 of the RTC.
The Information reads:
The
undersigned accuses JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, Department Manager, RAFAEL T. FLORES,
Asst. Department Manager, HERMINIO C. ELIZON, Division Chief III, ARNULFO S.
SOLORIA, Security Officer, RONALDO VALLADA, Security Guard, all from the
National Food Authority Central Office, Quezon City, of the Crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under Article
315 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That
sometime in or about July 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused taking advantage
of their respective official positions, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously falsify the
Daily Time Record of the said accused Ronaldo Vallada for the month of July
1991, by making entries therein to make it appear that Vallada reported for
work as Security Guard at the National Food Authority, when in truth and in
fact said accused very well knew that Vallada never reported for work for the
month of July 1991 and with the use of said falsified Daily Time Record,
accused were able to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada amounting to
Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Four Pesos and Four Centavos (P2,244.04)
which the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated and
converted to their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of NFA in
said sum.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
Subsequently, the
prosecutors filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion. On
January 17, 2001, the RTC issued an Order suspending petitioners pendente
lite for a period of ninety (90)-days.
The trial court held that Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019),
otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” mandates that a
public official charged under a valid information for an offense under said
Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property shall be suspended from office while the
criminal prosecution against him is pending in court.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
January 17, 2001 Order but the same was denied by the RTC in another Order
dated June 8, 2001.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the RTC erred in
ordering their suspension pendente lite even though the crime charged in
the Information is within the ambit of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
On
May 2, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It affirmed
the trial court’s suspension pendente lite of the accused because the
offense for which they are charged is included in the offenses referred to in
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019. It further stated that the Information is
valid because it sufficiently informs the accused that they are being charged for
estafa through falsification of public document even though the word “fraud” or
“deceit” is not used therein.[5]
Petitioners moved to reconsider the
aforementioned decision but their motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated August 15, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contend that the
Sandiganbayan erred in affirming their suspension pendente lite by the
RTC since the offense for which they
are charged does not fall under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, and in ruling that
the trial court’s order of suspension is valid although it was issued upon
motion of a person who had no right to intervene in the criminal case.[6]
While petitioners concede that the Information
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense of falsification of public
document, they assert that it does not contain an averment of fraud or deceit
on their part. Hence, they claim that
the Information does not charge them with estafa but only falsification
of public document. Accordingly, they claim that their suspension from office
during the pendency of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607 is not warranted under
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019.[7]
Petitioners further contend that the
Sandiganbayan disregarded settled doctrines in criminal procedure[8]
when it affirmed the RTC’s order suspending them pendente lite even
though the motion for their suspension was filed not by the prosecutor but by
the private complainant Montera.[9]
In their Comment, the People of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, argue that the Information
sufficiently alleges the elements of estafa through falsification of public
document under Article 318 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.[10] According to the People, this complex crime is an “offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property” under Section 13, R.A. 3019. Thus, the suspension pendente lite of petitioners is justified under the
aforementioned provision.[11]
The People also point out that the other
ground raised by petitioners in support of their position that the RTC’s order
of suspension is invalid, i.e., that the order was issued upon motion of
the private complainant, not the prosecutor was raised by them before the
Sandiganbayan and cannot therefore be pleaded for the first time before this
Court. In any case, the People
explained that the filing by Montera of the first and second motions for
petitioners’ suspension pendente lite was with the conformity of the
public prosecutor.[12]
In reply, petitioners assert that the Information
states that they are being charged with estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article
315, not Article 318, of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, they maintain that the Information is invalid
because it does not sufficiently allege the elements of estafa under paragraph
1(b), Article 315.[13]
The issues presented by the petitioner are (i) whether the offense charged in the information falls within the coverage of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, and (ii) whether the motion for suspension filed by the counsel for the government agency concerned in this case, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, sufficed to enable the lower court to issue the suspension order pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
There is no merit in
the petition.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Suspension
and loss of benefits.—Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is settled that
once a court determines that the information charging a public officer with an
offense under R.A. No. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,[14]
or any other offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property is valid, it is bound to issue an order of preventive suspension of
the accused public officer as a matter of course.[15]
The order of suspension pendente lite,
while mandatory in nature, is by no means automatic or self-operative. Before
such suspension is imposed, a determination as to the validity of the
information must first be made in a pre-suspension hearing. There is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct
of such hearing, as the Court has previously explained in several cases:
…No
specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings
against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded
the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided
for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court…
.
. .
Likewise, he is accorded the right to
challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for
which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a
motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of
the Rules of court.
However, a challenge to the validity
of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused
is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or
of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only
in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion
to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to
the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to
an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019
or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code (Emphasis supplied).[16]
It therefore suffices that the accused
is afforded the opportunity of challenging the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him and that the information charging the accused of any of
the offenses mentioned under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 is found to be valid
before the court suspends the accused pendente lite.
In the present case, the record shows
that petitioners were given the chance to dispute the validity of the Information
against them and the January 17, 2001 Order suspending them for ninety
(90)-days while their case is pending when they opposed Montera’s motion for
their suspension.
More importantly, both the RTC and the
Sandiganbayan found that the Information alleges the elements of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document and that the
offense falls within the ambit of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, thereby making
their suspension pendente lite mandatory.
Parenthetically, it would seem that the
averments in the Information allege the complex crime of estafa under
paragraph 2(a),[17] Article
315, through falsification of public document.
Under paragraph 2(a), the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the
accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (2) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must
have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.[18]
The Information against
petitioners alleges that petitioners
took
advantage of their respective official positions and, conspiring with one
another, falsified the daily time record (DTR) of accused Ronaldo Vallada for
July 1991 to make it appear that he reported for work during that month when,
in truth, he did not, and used the falsified DTR to collect Vallada’s salary in
the amount of P2,244.04 for July
1991, and thereafter appropriated and converted the said amount to the damage
and prejudice of the National Food Authority (NFA). Petitioners’ acts of falsifying Vallada’s DTR prior to the collection of his salary for July 1991
from the NFA, using the same DTR to collect Vallada’s salary, causing the NFA
to release Vallada’s salary on the basis of the falsified DTR and to suffer
losses of P2,244.04 satisfy the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a),
Article 315.
Still, any error in the Information,
with regard to the specification of the particular mode of estafa, allegedly
committed by petitioners will not result in its invalidation because the
allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners that they are being charged
with estafa through falsification of public document.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among
others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.[19] However, the Court has clarified in several
cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section
or subsection of the statute punishing, it is not controlling; what actually
determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged
in the information.[20]
The Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San[21]
is instructive:
…Notwithstanding the apparent
contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and
hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the
information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the
body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands
charged and for which he must be tried.
The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice….
From
a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the
accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting
up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the
information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the
fiscal in the caption of the information.
That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above
all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right,
how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading
is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal.
In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest
until the trial has ended. For his full
and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights.
The real and important question to him is, “Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?” not, “Did you commit a crime named murder?” If
he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say
what the crime is or what it is named….[22]
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy
between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which
states that petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by
the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under
Article 318) and the absence of the words “fraud” or “deceit” in the Information,
the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual
allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting
their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in
general committed through the offense of falsification of public document.[23] As the Sandiganbayan correctly held:
Every element of which the offense is
composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to
the definition and the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in order
to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for him to suitably
prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense.
It is not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language of
the statute. What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible
and reasonable certainty.
Moreover, reasonable
certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that is required is that
the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense of which the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable
him to intelligently prepare his defense, and if found guilty, to plead her
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense [Balitaan v. CFI of
Batangas, 115 SCRA 729].
In other words, if the offense is
stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately
know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it
describes the crime defined by law.
In the case at bar, although the
word “deceit” or “fraud” was not specifically alleged in the information,
nonetheless, the same alleges the manner by which deceit or fraud was
committed; that it was committed by falsifying the daily time record of accused
Vallada; and that it was committed by using said falsified daily time record to
collect the corresponding salary of Vallada to the damage and prejudice of the
National Food Authority. To our mind these allegations are sufficient to
maintain the validity of the information.
The language is clear and explicit, and is equivalent to an allegation
that the crime was committed with fraud or deceit. Thus, the inescapable conclusion
is that the information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner
by which the deceit or fraud was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that
is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is
reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the fraudulent intent of
the accused can be gleaned from their act of using the falsified document to
draw the salary of the accused Vallada.
The accused would not have made use of the falsified document except and
unless to defraud the government.
It must be noted that the crime for
which the accused are charged is the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document wherein the falsification of the public
document is a necessary means to commit the estafa. In this type of crime, the
offense of falsification is considered already consummated even before the
falsified document is used to defraud another.
The damage to another is not caused by the falsification of the document
but by the use of the falsified document.
Veritably, the information sufficiently alleges the crime charged. And
inasmuch as the offense imputed falls within the ambit of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, suspension pendente lite of the accused should
accordingly follow (Emphasis supplied).[24]
It bears stressing that the words
“fraud” or “deceit” need not be used in an information for the allegations
therein to sufficiently allege the offense of estafa. It is enough that acts
constituting abuse of confidence or deceit, which are indispensable to estafa,
are averred in the information in such a manner that would sufficiently apprise
an accused that he is being charged with that offense. Whether the act involved constitutes “abuse
of confidence” or “deceit” within the technical meaning of the terms as used in
Article 315, it is inescapable that it falls within the common and generic
signification[25] of “fraud”
as used in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
In any case, the information in question
not only alleges the elements of estafa through falsification of public
document with sufficiency, it also clearly states that petitioners are charged
with having committed fraudulent acts involving government funds. Thus, whether on the face of the Information,
the offense charged is estafa under paragraph 1(b),[26]
or paragraph 2(a)[27]
of Article 315, or under Article 318,[28]
through falsification of public document, or even only falsification of public
document, is of no consequence. For the
purpose of resolving the propriety of petitioners’ suspension pendente lite,
it is sufficient that the Information unequivocally recites that the
offense charged involves fraud upon government or public funds or
property.
Evidently erroneous is petitioners’
contention that the offense of falsification of public document alone, which
according to them is what is charged in the Information, would not
warrant their suspension pendente lite. The Information alleges
that petitioners falsified Vallada’s DTR by making entries therein to make it
appear that he reported for work at the NFA in July 1991 when, in truth and in
fact, he did not. What was purportedly
falsified is a DTR which the government agency, concerned here, as in other
government agencies, had to use in
determining the salary to be paid to the accused Ronaldo Vallada as its
employee for the period covered thereby, as well as his earned leave credits.[29] The falsification of one’s DTR to cover up
his absences or tardiness automatically results in financial losses to the
government because it enables the employee concerned to be paid salary and to
earn leave credits for services which were never rendered. Undeniably, the
falsification of a DTR constitutes or foists a fraud involving government
funds.
Now, the issue of whether the motion to
suspend petitioners filed by Atty. Montera may validly trigger the assailed
suspension order.
As the offense for
which petitioners are charged clearly falls under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, it
follows that their suspension pendente lite is mandatory pursuant to the
said law and pertinent jurisprudence. The trial court is left with no
alternative but to order the suspension of the accused public official pendente
lite upon being convinced that the information charges the accused with
acts of fraud involving government funds.
Its duty to order the suspension of the
accused pendente lite is mandatory in character[30]
and must be issued by the court regardless of whether the prosecution files a
motion for the preventive suspension of the petitioners, or if the motion is
filed by the counsel of the government agency concerned, with or without the
conformity of the public prosecutor. In fact,
Section 13, R.A. 3019, as worded, allows the court to issue such
suspension order motu proprio.
The Court in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[31] emphasized the mandatory nature of the preventive suspension required under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 in this wise:
[S]ection 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer
against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title
7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property is filed. The
Court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or
not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or
frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way
that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to
determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of
the court.[32]
Again, in Socrates
v. Sandiganbayan,[33]
the Court reiterated the doctrine that the preventive suspension under Section
13, R.A. No. 3019 is compulsory, thus:
…[I]t is
evident that upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it
becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the
court’s discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on
the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before
the appellate courts….
Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court
must issue the order of suspension as a matter or course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is
not a penalty. It is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In
fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension... . Taking into consideration the public policy involved in
preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the
protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private
interest of the accused.[34]
The obligatoriness of
the task of the trial court and the inevitability of the suspension from office
of the accused pending termination of the case under Section 13 of the
Anti-Graft Law effectively settle the second issue and cogently eviscerate
petitioners’ negative position on the question.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairman
|
|
|
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
L Associate Justice
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
[1]Penned
by Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi and concurred in by Justices Edilberto G.
Sandoval and Raoul V. Victorino.
[2]Rafael T. Flores, et al. v. Hon. Lydia
Q. Layosa, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 217, et al.
[4]This motion which was filed on July 25,
2000 was the second motion to suspend pendente lite filed by the
prosecution. Prior thereto, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
information on the ground that the delay in the termination of their
preliminary investigation was violative of their rights to due process of law
and to a speedy disposition of the case against them, but the same was denied
by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari
with this Court but said petition was dismissed for lack of merit (see Dansal
v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 145). The
prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pending litigation but the
motion was opposed by the accused who manifested before the RTC that they would
be filing a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision in G.R.
No. 126814. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by this
Court, the prosecution filed the second motion to suspend accused pendente
lite on July 25, 2000 (Petition, Id. at 14-15).
[8]Petitioners cited the cases of Caes v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 74989-90, November 6, 1989, 179
SCRA 54; People v. Beriales, G.R. No. L-39662, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 361;
Gorospe and Gorospe v. Gatmaitan, 98 Phil. 600 [1956]; and Tan v. Gallardo,
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 306.
[14]Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code refers to crimes committed by public officers, including bribery, frauds
against the public treasury and similar offenses and malversation.
[15]Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636; Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328; Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-61776
to 61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383.
[16]Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, supra
note 15, citing Luciano v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 187; People v. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511.
[17]Estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article
315 is committed with deceit, i.e., by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; specifically, by using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits.
[20]Naya v. Abing, G.R. No. 146770,
February 27, 2003; People v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 116200-02, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA
283; People v. Banihit, G.R. No. 132045, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 86; People
v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 168; People v. Juachon,
G.R. No. 111630, December 6, 1999, 319 SCRA 761; People v. Salazar, G.R. No.
99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v. Sandoval, G.R. Nos. 95353-54,
March 7, 1996, 254 SCRA 436; People v. Escosio, G.R. No. 101742, March 25,
1993, 220 SCRA 475; U.S. v. Lim San, 17
Phil. 273 (1910).
[23] The elements of estafa in general are:
(a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of
deceit; and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. (Santos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
71523-25, 72420-22, 72384-86, 72387-39, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 386, citing People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 104739-44,
282 SCRA 105 (1997)). The elements of
falsification of public document, on the other hand, are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer, employee or notary public; (b) he takes advantage
of his official position; (c) he falsifies a document by committing any of the
acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (i.e., [1]
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; [2]Causing it
to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate; [3] Attributing to persons who have participated in
an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; [4]
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; [5] Altering true dates;
[6] Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning; [7] Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such
copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original;
or [8] Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in
a protocol, registry or official book).
[25]“Fraud” is defined as an instance or an
act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation
(Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language, 1993 Ed., p. 904). It is also defined as
“An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in
reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to
surrender a legal right. A false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it
to his legal injury. Anything calculated to deceive, whether by a
single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is
false, whether it be by direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silent, word
of mouth or look or gesture. . . A
generic term, embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and includes all
surprise, trick, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. .
. ‘Bad faith’ and ‘fraud’ are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty,
infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990 Ed. p. 660, citations
omitted).
[26] Article 315.
1. With
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
. . .
(b) by misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
[28]Other deceits.- The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount
of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon
any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not
mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
[29]See Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No.
41-98 (1998) which states, among others, that 24 days of actual service
entitles a government employee to one day vacation leave and one day sick
leave; and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04-91 (1991) on habitual or frequent
absenteeism and tardiness which penalizes the act of covering up for one’s
absences or tardiness by falsifying one’s DTR.
[30]Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, supra,
note 15, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, 118896-97, February
20, 1996, 253 SCRA 773; Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.110503, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 103.