THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142532.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOHNNY M. QUIZON, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
A decision, dated
“That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent of gain, and by means of violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, against the consent of the owners thereof, a cash money amounting to P17,000.00 and assorted jewelry, belonging to the Suarez Travel Agency and/or Conchita M. Pasquin, with a total value of no less than P17,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owners thereof in the said total sum; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and carry away the said articles and money, the herein accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and with the use of personal violence upon said Conchita M. Pasquin, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries after accused stuffed her mouth with a clothing an outcry, and as a direct result of which, said Conchita Pasquin died.”[1]
The case for the prosecution was pieced together by the trial court from the testimony of a number of witnesses.
Conchita Magpantay
Pasquin was associated with Suarez Travel Services in
At lunch time on 05 September 1997, Myla
Miclat and her live-in partner Roel
Sicangco went to see Conchita
to hand over the amount of P17,000.00 in payment for Myla’s
round trip plane fare to Guam. While they were inside Conchita’s
office, Johnny Quizon, whom Conchita
introduced as her nephew, came in. Conchita asked her
nephew if he already had taken his lunch. Conchita
told Myla that her nephew was a former drug addict,
and that she was helping him mend his ways. Quizon
was present when Myla gave the money to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was going to purchase the ticket and
instructed her to return later that day to pick it up. It was approximately
Marietta Suarez, the owner of Suarez Travel Services, received a
call at six-thirty in the morning of
On the evening of
Dr. Proceso Mejia, a City Health
Officer of
Dr. Noel Minay, a medical specialist of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a pathological examination on the vital organs of Conchita, particularly, her brain, heart, lungs and pancreas. He concluded that Conchita could have died of cardiac arrest, asphyxiation or ingestion of a considerable amount of poisonous substance.
The case was referred for investigation to SPO2 Danilo Cruz of the Angeles City Detective Group. After
reading the initial report, SPO2 Cruz, accompanied by SPO2 Alfredo Quiambao and a brother of Conchita,
went to Quizon’s house at
Johnny Quizon was arrested at his house
in
The defense gave its version of the incident.
Nimfa Quizon
married the father of Johnny Quizon in 1980, three
years following the death of his first wife, Imelda, a sister of Nimfa. Nimfa took care of Johnny
since he was barely five years old. On the evening of
In convicting Quizon of the crime with which he was indicted, the trial court held:
“The fact of death of victim Conchita Pasquin is beyond dispute. Her cadaver was found in her
bedroom wrapped with a white blanket. There was also a contusion on the right
side of the face and abrasions on the victim’s right and left side of the neck,
right elbow, right forearm and at the palm. Accused likewise admitted that he
went to the office of the victim in the afternoon of
“xxx xxx xxx
“Nobody actually saw how the victim was killed and how the robbery was committed. The Prosecution is relying only on circumstantial evidence to secure the conviction of the accused Johnny Quizon. Under our rules on evidence, ‘an accused can still be convicted even if no eyewitness is available provided that enough circumstantial evidence has been established by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime’ (People vs. Lagao, Jr., 271 SCRA 51.)
“xxx xxx xxx
“No direct evidence was presented by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. We are constrained to consider the circumstantial evidence introduced by the prosecution to determine whether the same would be sufficient to convict the accused:
“1. Conchita Pasquin was a victim of foul play. There were contusions and abrasions on the upper part of the body. The steel door of the office was left open the whole night of the September 5 up to the early morning of September 6, when the victim’s body was discovered. The light of the office was also on and her body was wrapped in a white blanket when discovered. Definitely she could not have died a natural death.
“2. The accused was at the
victim’s office in the afternoon of
“3. The victim was in a
hurry to leave for
“4. When Myla Miclat and her boyfriend
left the victim’s office, there were no other person inside the office except
the accused and the victim at around
“5. At around
“6. At around
“7. At around 10 minutes
before
“8. Myla
Miclat returned that evening at around
“9. On
“10. The police were not able to find him at his girlfriend’s house.
“11. The accused also did not attend the burial.
“12. The alibi given by the accused for not attending the wake and the burial of his aunt was that he was trying to avoid his uncles who were mad at him because he was being suspected of killing his aunt. The accused was arrested by the police at their house where the wake was held one week after the burial hence, he was not really afraid of his uncles.
“13. Instead of helping the police in solving the crime and apprehending the killer of his aunt (as he claims to be innocent) the accused went into hiding immediately after the killing.
“14. The victim was not able
to leave for
“The abovecited circumstances clearly made an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
“xxx xxx xxx
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Johnny Quizon
is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
“Accused Johnny Quizon is further ordered to pay the heirs of Mrs. Marietta Suarez the sum of P34,133.10 as actual damages and to pay the heirs of Conchita M. Pasquin the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.”[2]
In his appeal to this Court, Johnny M. Quizon raised the lone assignment of error that -
“THE
The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an appellee’s brief, submitted to the Court a well-ratiocinated manifestation and motion averring that the existence of every bit of circumstantial evidence was not satisfactorily established. The OSG maintained:
“Appellant should be acquitted and released. The prosecution miserably failed to meet the requirements of circumstantial evidence necessary for conviction.
“First. The trial court
erred in accepting the testimony of Miclat that
appellant was the last person who was with the victim before she died. The
trial court similarly blundered in debunking the testimony of both Sicangco and the appellant that after appellant had left
the office, other persons entered the victim’s office [TSN,
“Q I’m only concern [sic] with the better administration of justice. I know that you want to cooperate so much by your testimony. Now, you are supposed to be a star witness for the presence of the accused in that office. My question is, you did not see the accused doing anything to the victim, is that correct?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q You did not also see whether that man with a collector’s bag went back or not in that office?
“A No sir.
“Q But you know in every office it is usually visited by several persons because of their papers or transaction?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And in that office it is usually visited by several persons because of their papers or transaction?
“A Yes, sir. [TSN,
“Sicangco, on the other hand, testified to the circumstances after they left the travel agency, and whose declaration was never rebutted by Miclat. He stated:
“Q How do you know that
Johnny Quizon arrived at
“A Dahil sa estimate ng pagdating namin sa office at saka iyong interval.
“Q When you left the office together with your live-in-partner, where was Johnny Quizon then?
“A Noong papaalis na kami sa agency, tapos nakita ko si Johnny sa may funeral palabas at habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita ko siya sumakay ng jeep papuntang Dau, Mabalacat.
“Q When you and your wife and Johnny Quizon left the premises, were there still other persons inside the office besides that man and his lady companion?
“A Noong
palabas na kami sa agency, napansin ko si
Johnny sa may likuran. At habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita
ko iyong babae at iyong lalake pumasok sa travel agency.
“Q Did you see Johnny Quizon ride on a jeep?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q To what destination?
“A Dau, Mabalacat.
“Q Before this Court your live-in-partner testified that when you left the office, she did not notice that man and his lady companion entering the office, what can you say about that?
“Court:
Did she testify about a man and a woman?
“Atty. Castillon [defense counsel]:
Yes, Your Honor, during my cross-examination.
“Pros. Quiambao:
[for the government] What she testified was that when she left, the only persons left in the office were the victim and Johnny Quizon.
“Atty. Castillon:
That is what she testified. And I am trying to find out from this witness if that is true.
“xxx xxx xxx
“Atty. Castillon:
Because according to the witness, they came back and entered the office.
“Clearly, the prosecution could present only a witness who saw appellant
in the vicinity of the crime scene on the day the crime was committed. If the
testimony of Sicangco is suspect as being tainted
with pity for a fellow-inmate, it is to be noted that Sicangco
likewise freely admitted of his love for Miclat [TSN,
“That appellant was the last person seen with the victim on the day
she died does not necessarily prove that he killed her. It was not established
that appellant and the victim were together until the crime was committed. It
was not even shown that appellant was the only one who was with the victim
before she died. The travel agency was already opened when Miclat,
Sicangco and appellant came. There were several
persons there even before Miclat and company arrived.
The prosecution has not completely discounted the possibility that there were
other persons who transacted business with the victim when Miclat
and appellant left, considering that the travel agency is a place of business
that caters to several clients. There was an eyewitness, Sicangco,
who declared that at least two persons came after appellant left the office
[TSN,
“True, a person may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence; but the proven circumstances should inexorably lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty person, to the exclusion of all others. Where the evidence presented admits of other conclusions, the accused must be acquitted. Only if the judge below could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant is laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992); People v. Andag, 96 SCRA 861 (1980); People v. Benamira, 277 SCRA 232 (1997)].
“A much graver set of inculpatory circumstantial evidence against the accused were present in People v. Mijares, [297 SCRA 520 (1998)]. Despite that, the accused was acquitted. A seven-year old playmate testified seeing accused Mijares as the last person who was with the victim the night the victim was killed. The victim, a girl of tender age, was found dead. The two most damning circumstances crucial to the prosecution’s case were that 1] appellant was the last person seen with the victim; and 2] his slippers were found at the crime scene. This Honorable Court ruled that these circumstances are subject to two antithetical interpretations, one of guilt and the other of innocence. This case even cited two analogous cases which fall squarely with the case at bar, viz:
“In People v. Ragon, the trial court convicted appellant of murder, based on these circumstances: he and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim, and the cap worn by Ragon’s companion was found beside the victim’s dead body. x x x However, this Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented did not conclusively point to Ragon as the perpetrator of the murder. The presence of the cap of Ragon’s companion beside the dead body only proved that said person, not necessarily Ragon himself, was at the locus criminis. That such cap was found in the vicinity of the crime scene did not necessarily imply that the accused killed the victim.
“In People v. Binamira, the trial court convicted the accused based on the following pieces of circumstantial evidence: (1) he was accosted by security guards near the crime scene; (2) he was walking suspiciously fast; (3) bloodied clothes were allegedly recovered from him. Appellant therein was acquitted because ‘the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and was thus insufficient to support a conviction.’ Indeed, this Court has ruled that a person cannot be held liable for the killing, unless all the proven circumstances point to his guilt.
“The case of People v. Boneo [174 SCRA 612 (1989)] recounts a fisherman who was last seen alive with the Boneo brothers. He accompanied the brothers out to sea late at night to get an animal he was supposed to buy from the other side of the shore. He was found dead and the P3,000.00 he was carrying gone. The Supreme Court waxed poetic when it declared - ‘This rule must be observed with more rigor where the evidence of the prosecution is merely circumstantial, as in the case at bar. While this is not to say that this kind of evidence will never be sufficient to convict, it does mean that it must be especially persuasive if it is to still, as it must, every whisper of doubt that the accused is not innocent. Absent conclusive proof of his guilt, the prisoner must be released and purged of all the stigma of the charge upon his head.’
“In People v. Garcia, [215 SCRA 349 (1992)], this Honorable Court lauded the OSG for ‘utmost objectivity and fairness’ by acquitting the accused because the only circumstance that can be appreciated against him was that the prosecution witness saw him standing near the banana plants about fifteen meters away from the house of the victim minutes before the discovery of the deceased.
“Similar circumstances did not merit a conviction, as in People v. Nicolas, [204 SCRA 191 (1991)], where the accused was present at the store where the victim was killed and with him was found part of the stolen money as well as bloodied pants. In People v. Geron [281 SCRA 36 (1997)], the string of circumstances which the trial court relied upon for conviction consisted of the presence of the accused at the crime scene; he had in his possession articles belonging to the victims at the time he was apprehended; and the accused fled from the crime scene. This Honorable Court held that the above circumstances point to no inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of the accused. It explained that: ‘First, the mere presence of the accused at the locus criminis and his possession of certain items belonging to the victims, while it may have pointed the finger of suspicion at him, cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he has committed the robbery and the attendant killings.’ (at p. 47)
“Second. The trial court was unable to cite any particular circumstance at all to show that appellant in the case at bar had a motive to commit the crime.
“There is absolutely no motive for appellant to rob or kill the
victim. Noteworthy is the testimony of the sister of the deceased, Nimfa Quizon, who testified in
appellant’s favor. Appellant is not her own son, but her nephew [TSN,
“Lest it be forgotten, the Constitution mandates that the accused must be presumed innocent. Hence, if the circumstances are capable of several interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction [People v. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520 (1998)].
“Third. The trial court considered appellant’s failure to attend the funeral rites of the victim as a sign of guilt. This is not so [People v. Andag, supra; People v. Mijares, supra]. Appellant and the sister of the victim testified that the brothers of the victim, uncles of the appellant, strongly suspected him as the killer. He simply followed the order of his step-mother, his aunt Nimfa Quizon, to avoid attending the wake and the burial to avoid any mishap that might occur because of the supposition that he was the killer.
“Fourth. The trial court
faults him for not clearing his name upon notice that he was a suspect and that
he went into hiding, citing that the wicked man flees though no one pursues.
Unfortunately, no such flight could be ascribed to the appellant. The trial
court lost sight of the fact that appellant was not a resident of
“Fifth. The Court’s acceptance of various details as to the irregularity and strangeness of appellant’s actions as constitutive of his guilt like appellant’s hurried leaving of the premises, his leaving the victim behind when both of them were going to Manila, and his alleged lack of cooperation with the police in searching for the true criminal, is premised on a precarious foothold.
“Likewise, there is no testimony as to the death of the victim, but only a general medico-legal explanation that the strangulation of the victim hastened the victim’s heart and lung disease. There is no evidence of fingerprints, hair and skin samples on the deceased that might lead to the identity of the killer. The rope or cloth or blanket that was supposed to have strangled the victim was not presented. There was no testimony that the belongings of the victim were in disarray to show struggle during the crime. The prosecution was unable to present evidence as to how the victim died. The alleged P17,000.00 paid to victim and the pieces of jewelry lost were never presented in court, much less were they found on the appellant.
“As the saying goes: ‘The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.’ [People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36 (1997)]. No court, when confronted with issues that affect the life and liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the latter’s constitutional guarantees and supply deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution with its own bias, suspicion or speculation [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992)].”[4]
The OSG thus prayed:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court in
The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
“Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused. The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.[6] It must be shown (a) that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived have been firmly established and (b) that the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has once said:
“x x x. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.”[7]
Evidently, Conchita Magpantay
Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances
recited by the trial court, however, would be insufficient to create in the
mind of the Court a moral certainty that appellant was the one responsible for
the commission of the crime. Appellant’s mere presence at the locus criminis would
be inadequate to implicate him[8]
in the commission of the crime. No evidence was adduced that appellant was the
last person to see or talk to the victim before she was killed. Roel Sicangco testified that when
he and Myla arrived at Conchita’s
office, the latter had just finished talking to a woman and a man with a
collector’s bag. After Roel and Myla
finished their transaction with Conchita, the same
man and woman, whom they saw earlier, again entered Conchita’s
office. Roel testified that he saw Johnny come out of
the office and board a passenger jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The prosecution failed to show that Sicangco had any good reason to lie. Even while the trial
court had observed that Conchita’s jewelry and money
were never found, no evidence was introduced that appellant had them, or that
he had them in his possession at anytime after Conchita’s
death. The trial court found it strange that appellant did not wait for Conchita when the latter said that she was also leaving for
The fact that appellant did not attend Conchita’s wake is not an indication of either flight or guilt. Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned appellant against going to the wake after he earned the ire of their relatives who had suspected him to be the killer.
Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on the part of the trial court of appellant’s involvement, but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. A finding of guilt based on conjecture, even if likely, cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the complicity in the crime.[9] No matter how weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the prosecution, it has been said, must at all times stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[10] An accused has the right to be presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until and unless it is overturned by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] In case of any reservation against the guilt of accused, the Court should entertain no other alternative but to acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of finding appellant JOHNNY M. QUIZON guilty of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Court further orders appellant’s immediate release from custody, unless he is lawfully held for another lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision immediately and to report to this Court the action taken hereon not later than five (5) days from receipt hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 18.
[2] Rollo, pp. 28-35.
[3] Rollo, p. 60.
[4] Rollo, pp. 102-114.
[5] Rollo, pp. 114-115.
[6]
People vs. Corfin, G.R. No. 131478,
[7]
People vs. Comesario, G.R. No. 127811,
[8]
People vs. Asis, et al. G.R. No. 142531,
[9]
Arce vs. People, G.R. No. 125857,
[10]
People vs. Cañete, G.R. No. 138400,
[11]
People vs. Julian, Jr., G.R. No. 142774`,