EN BANC
[G.R. No. 144036.
May 7, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTOR UGANG, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.:
As if deprivation of her
reasoning powers was not enough.
Compounding her misery, Lanie Jumuad (hereafter LANIE), then an
18-year-old demented girl, was also stripped of her, perhaps, only remaining
treasure -- her virginity. Worse, its
loss was caused by one who was supposed to help protect it, her uncle Victor
Ugang (hereafter VICTOR).
In an information[1] docketed as Criminal Case No. S-2893 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, VICTOR was
charged with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That, in the afternoon, on or about the 29th day of December, 1996, in the municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one LANIE JUMUAD, his 18 years old mentally ill niece, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment,
VICTOR, with the assistance of counsel de officio, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.
The first witness
presented by the prosecution was Julito Amantiad, a neighbor of LANIE and cumpadre
of VICTOR. According to him, at 1:30
p.m. of 29 December 1996, he, VICTOR and Leonilo Nonong were drinking tuba in
his store in Lapero, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. After they had consumed half a gallon of tuba, VICTOR, who was
already drunk, left without saying a word and proceeded to the house of LANIE,
which was about fifteen fathoms away from Julito’s store.[2]
Curious why VICTOR did
not return, Julito went to LANIE’s house.
He knew that LANIE was alone because he was asked by her mother before
leaving to look after LANIE, who was demented.
He peeped through a hole on the wall of the house and saw LANIE naked,
with one of her legs spread while the other was tied to a post. VICTOR was on top of her, with his shorts
down to his knees and his erect penis pumping up and down into her vagina. LANIE’s face was expressionless. Julito then went back to his store and told
Leonilo that VICTOR was having sexual intercourse with LANIE.[3]
Leonilo Nonong, VICTOR’s cumpadre,
corroborated the testimony of Julito.
To verify Julito’s story that VICTOR was having sexual intercourse with
LANIE, Leonilo went to LANIE’s house.
There, he saw VICTOR already standing and pulling up his underwear, with
his pants still on his knees. LANIE was
lying down naked on a wooden bench.
Suspecting what had happened, Leonilo pulled VICTOR and said: “You are
fool! [sic]” He forthwith brought VICTOR back to Julito’s store and
entrusted him to Rodrigo, LANIE’s brother, who was then in the store. Upon being informed of what VICTOR happened
to his sister, Rodrigo knocked down VICTOR.
VICTOR admitted that he committed a sin and asked for forgiveness.[4]
Dr. Marcelino Lacaya,
Chief of the Sindangan District Hospital, testified that it was Dr. Alan Arthur
Vercide who examined LANIE on 22 January 1997, but at the time of the request
for the issuance of a medical certificate, Dr. Vercide was not around. Hence, on the basis of the handwritten
report of Dr. Vercide, which was recorded[5] and made part of the OPD Records of Sindangan
District Hospital, Dr. Lacaya issued a medical certificate[6] and signed the same in behalf of Dr. Vercide.[7] The certificate reads:
Genitalia - labia minora and majora in close apposition intoritus nulliparous, admits 1 finger with ease, hymenal orifice about 2-3 cm. in diameter with old laceration at 5 o’clock and 7 o’clock
(-) fresh lacerations,
(+) whitish discharges
Pregnancy test - not done (No reagent)
Sperm Analysis - not done
VICTOR was the sole
witness for the defense. He admitted
that LANIE is his niece but denied having carnal knowledge of her on 29
December 1996. According to him, after
leaving his drinking companions at the store of Julito, he proceeded to the
house of LANIE to take a rest. LANIE
was alone in the house. At the time,
she was naked, with one of her feet tied, as she was insane. He just sat and leaned on the wall about
three feet away from LANIE. Since he had
a hard time sitting with his tight short pants, he pulled up his shorts and
fixed his long pants. It was at this
juncture that Leonilo saw him. He
denied having asked for forgiveness from Rodrigo. Although Rodrigo did not have any quarrel with him, prosecution
witnesses Julito and Leonilo had rift with his wife because of money matters in
their chapel, of which Julito, Leonilo and his wife were officers. Despite this quarrel, he drank with them.[8] VICTOR further asserted that Julito testified
against him because the latter was after money. During his arraignment, Rodrigo approached him; asked for P10,000
to be given to the witnesses for the prosecution; and warned him that if he
would not deliver the money, he would languish in jail. However, VICTOR admitted that Julito and
Leonilo did not personally ask him for any consideration, nor did they promise
to retract their statements in exchange for something.[9]
The trial court gave full
faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. It disregarded VICTOR’s
defense of denial. Accordingly, in its
Decision[10] of 2 June 2000, it found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of death and to pay the victim in the amounts of P75,000 as indemnity
and P50,000 by way of moral damages.
In his Appellant’s Brief,[11] VICTOR submits this sole assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING VICTOR UGANG TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF DEATH.
VICTOR argues that he
could not be sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, since LANIE was already
demented at the time of the commission of the offense and that she is his
relative by consanguinity in the fifth degree only, her father being his first
cousin. In order that death penalty may
be imposed, the victim must have become insane by reason or on the occasion of
the rape or that the accused is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree. VICTOR then
prays that the penalty imposed upon him be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In the Appellee’s Brief,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) notes that
VICTOR simply protests the trial court’s imposition on him of the death penalty
without challenging his conviction. It
agrees with VICTOR that the trial court erred in appreciating against him the
qualifying circumstance of relationship and the insanity of the victim because
LANIE was already insane at the time of the rape and the relationship between
LANIE and VICTOR is beyond the third civil degree.
After the OSG had
submitted its Appellee’s Brief, VICTOR, through his new counsel, submitted a
Supplemental Appellant’s Brief.[13] This time, he assigned the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS AND IMPARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION; HENCE, RENDERING THE JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID.
In support of the first
assigned error, VICTOR points out the failure of the prosecution to (1) present
LANIE as a witness; (2) present medical evidence to prove that LANIE is indeed
demented; and (3) prove the presence of force, intimidation, and violence in
the commission of the alleged rape. He
asserts that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is not
conclusive that someone had sexual intercourse with LANIE. He also questions the credibility of the
witnesses in view of their alleged conflicting and inconsistent testimonies.
Anent the second assigned
error, VICTOR argues that in order that insanity could be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in rape, it must be so alleged in the information and
must be proved as the result of rape.
However, in this case, insanity was not alleged in the information;
besides, it is undisputed that LANIE was already insane at the time she was
allegedly raped. Neither does the
qualifying circumstance of relationship by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree exist, since he is a relative in the fifth civil degree of
consanguinity, he being only a first cousin of LANIE’s father.
As to his third assigned
error, VICTOR asseverates that the clarificatory questions asked by the trial
judge were more in aid of the prosecution.
The judge prompted the prosecution to present the photograph of the
victim as evidence in this case and to ask more questions regarding it. Such act is contrary to the principle of
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
It was established by the
prosecution that LANIE had been insane since she was 14 years of age. Her brother Rodrigo and neighbors Julito and
Leonilo attested to her insanity. She
could not give coherent answers to questions.
She would dance by herself even without music. She would walk around the community naked; if forced to wear
clothes, she would tear them up. Once,
she destroyed the building materials of their house. Hence, Rodrigo was constrained to tie her to a post or wooden
bench inside their house.[14]
LANIE’s insanity was
admitted by VICTOR during his direct examination and cross-examination.[15] In fact, he invokes it in support of his argument
that insanity could not qualify the crime of rape, since it was not the result
of the rape, it being in existence already at the time of the commission of the
crime.[16]
With the fact of insanity
being undisputed, the prosecution was justified in not presenting LANIE as a
witness. Section 21(a), Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence disqualifies from being witnesses persons whose
mental condition is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others.
It is true that, as
pointed out by the appellant in his Manifestation (in lieu of Reply-Brief), the
medical certificate stating that LANIE was suffering from schizophrenia cannot
be admitted as evidence of her insanity.
The physician who examined LANIE and issued said certificate was not
presented as a witness; hence, the accused was deprived of his right to
confront or cross-examine her.[17]
Nevertheless, it was not
necessary for the prosecution to submit a medical report and present the
examining physician. We have ruled that
mental abnormality may be proved by evidence other than medical evidence or
psychiatric evaluation; it may be established by testimonies of witnesses.[18] In this case, as stated earlier, LANIE’s mental
condition was sufficiently proved by the testimonies of LANIE’s brother and
neighbors, who both had ample opportunity to observe her demeanor. Besides, VICTOR admitted in open court that
LANIE was insane. Under Section 4, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, an admission, oral or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceeding in the same case does not require proof.
It is settled that where
the victim cannot testify by reason of mental incapacity, conviction for rape
may be based on circumstantial evidence.[19] Here, although LANIE could not testify because of
her insanity, the commission of the crime of rape was proved with moral
certainty by an eyewitness, Julito Amantiad.
From a big hole on the split bamboo walling of LANIE’s room, he clearly
saw VICTOR on top of the naked LANIE, with his erect penis going up and down
her private part. Aside from Julito’s
testimony, the congruence of the following circumstances point to VICTOR as the
perpetrator of the crime:
1. It is admitted by VICTOR that he was at LANIE’s house at the time the rape was committed;
2. When Leonilo followed VICTOR inside LANIE’s house, he saw the latter in the act of pulling up his underwear, with his pants still down to his knees; while LANIE was lying down on the floor naked;
3. When VICTOR was
confronted by LANIE’s brother Rodrigo regarding the incident, he asked for the
latter’s forgiveness. Such act was an
admission of guilt;[20] and
4. VICTOR also admitted his
guilt when the matter was brought to the Barangay Captain.[21]
Additionally,
in asking in his original Brief for nothing but a reduction of the penalty,
VICTOR admitted the commission of the crime he was charged with and convicted
of.
We agree with the
appellant that the medical certificate containing the findings of hymenal
lacerations in LANIE’s vagina cannot be given any evidentiary weight. In People v. Aliviano,[22] the medical certificate which was identified and
interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded probative value because
the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its identification. Similarly, in this case, since the doctor
who examined LANIE was not presented to testify on his findings, the medical
certificate issued on his behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be
admitted as evidence. Since a medical
certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who
issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications.[23] In any event, medical examination or medical report
is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape, for it is merely
corroborative evidence.[24]
Anent the absence of
evidence of force and intimidation, we rule that the same does not militate
against the finding of rape. Under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the
governing law in this case, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented. The prosecution need not
prove the presence of force and intimidation because proof of the allegation of
the fact that the victim, LANIE, was mentally ill at the time of the commission
of the crime will suffice for the conviction of rape.
VICTOR’s sole defense of
denial is unsubstantiated. We have time
and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
a witness. A mere denial, just like
alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.[25]
In his further attempt to
cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, VICTOR points to
alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rodrigo and Leonilo as to
(1) who informed Rodrigo of the rape incident; (2) where VICTOR met Rodrigo;
and (3) whether Leonilo and Julito were present at the time Rodrigo confronted
VICTOR about the incident. The
inconsistencies on these matters are too trivial and inconsequential to merit
even a short shrift. Time-honored is
the doctrine that discrepancies referring to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the veracity of the witnesses’ declarations. In fact, they strengthen, rather than
impair, the witnesses’ credibility, for they erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.[26]
VICTOR next asserts that
considering that Julito was requested by LANIE’s mother to watch over LANIE
while she was away, it was unnatural
and unbelievable that he did not do anything to protect LANIE when he saw her
being sexually abused.
We find nothing unnatural
in the way Julito reacted to what he had witnessed. We have long recognized that different people react differently
to a given situation. There is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling, or frightful experience. One
person’s spontaneous response may be aggression, while another’s may be cold
indifference.[27]
While we affirm the trial
court’s judgment of conviction, we do not agree with the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty on the basis of the relationship between VICTOR
and LANIE under the following provision of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The
information merely states that LANIE is VICTOR’s niece. It does not state the specific degree of
their relationship Moreover, it turned
out during the trial that their
relationship is within the fifth degree of consanguinity only. Besides LANIE was not under 18 years old
when the rape was committed.
Neither can the
imposition of death penalty be justified under the following provision of the
same Article:
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
The information does not
state that LANIE became insane by reason or on the occasion of the rape; it
merely alleges that LANIE is VICTOR’s 18-year old mentally-ill niece. Moreover, the prosecution and the defense
are one in saying that LANIE was already mentally-ill or demented at the time
she was raped.
It may not be amiss to
state that under Article 266-B (10) of R.A. No. 8353, otherwise known as “The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997,” amending further Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, if the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder, or physical handicap of the victim at the time of the
commission of the rape, the death penalty shall be imposed. But since this law took effect only on 22
October 1997[28] and the crime was committed on 29 December 1996, it
cannot be applied to this case. Such
provision, being unfavorable to the accused, cannot be given retroactive
effect.
To conclude, VICTOR could
only be liable for simple rape.
No other modifying
circumstance having been proved, the penalty that can be imposed on VICTOR
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua,
the lesser of the penalties prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Conformably with current
case law, the trial court’s award of indemnity is reduced from P75,000
to P50,000; and the award of P50,000 for moral damages is warranted even
without need of pleading or proof as basis thereof.[29]
The belated claim of
VICTOR that the trial judge was biased against him for propounding questions
that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask is
without merit. There is no showing that
the trial judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of
the case at bar. He is therefore
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of
the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” On the whole, we find that the
questions propounded by the trial judge were merely for clarification
purposes. It is a judge’s prerogative
and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. Questions which clear up dubious points and
bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative.[30] The mere fact that the presiding judge asked
clarificatory questions during the trial does not make him a biased judge.[31]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant VICTOR UGANG is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of simple rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the offended party, LANIE JUMUAD, the
amounts of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P50,000 as
moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, 8.
[2] TSN, 21 August 1998,
3-5, 8, 11.
[3] Id., 5-6,
11-17.
[4] TSN, 23 October
1998, 4-8, 15.
[5] Exhibit “B,” OR, 52.
[6] Exhibit “C,” Id.,
53.
[7] TSN, 8 January 1999,
2-3.
[8] TSN, 11 February
2000, 3-7, 10-11, 14.
[9] Id., 6, 15.
[10] Original Record
(OR), 84; Rollo, 13. Per Judge
Wilfredo G. Ochotorena.
[11] Rollo, 47-54.
[12] Id., 94-114.
[13] Rollo,
122-160.
[14] TSN, 21 August 1998,
13-17; TSN, 23 October 1998, 5, 15-16; TSN, 11 June 1999, 16-17.
[15] TSN, 11 February
2000, 4-5, 11.
[16] Rollo, 53.
[17] People v.
Nguyen Dinh Nhan, 200 SCRA 292, 297 [1991].
[18] Id.; People v.
Romua, 272 SCRA 818, 829 [1997]; People v. Almacin, 303 SCRA 399, 408
[1999].
[19] See People v.
Romua, supra; People v. Perez, 307 SCRA 276 [1999].
[20] People v.
Cabanela, 299 SCRA 153, 160 [1998]; People v. Almacin, supra note
18, at 411.
[21] Exhibit “A,” OR, 4.
[22] 335 SCRA 371 [2000].
[23] People v.
Aliviano, supra, at 382-383.
[24] People v.
Juntilla, 314 SCRA 568, 582 [1999]; People v. Lasola, 318 SCRA 241, 252
[1999]; People v. Lacaba, 318 SCRA 301, 314 [1999]; People v.
Aliviano, supra note 22, at 382-383.
[25] People v.
Villanueva, 339 SCRA 482, 501 [2000].
[26] People v.
Villanueva, supra note 26, at 499; People v. Paraiso, G.R. No.
131823, 17 January 2001.
[27] People v.
Gutierrez, 339, 452, 457 [2000].
[28] People v.
Lacaba, supra note 23, at 316.
[29] People v.
Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]; People v. Flores, 311 SCRA 170 [1999].
[30] People v.
Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, 226-227 [1998].
[31] Barbers v.
Laguio, Adm. Matter No. RTJ 00-1568, 15 February 2001.