FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143790.
May 7, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCIANO BERTULFO y GELEG, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.:
This is an appeal from
the 24 May 2000 decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86 in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68588, finding accused-appellant Marciano
Bertulfo y Geleg (hereafter MARCIANO) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed on Rhiza Oliverio (hereafter RHIZA), imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay to RHIZA P50,000
as indemnity, and P50,000 as moral damages.
The accusatory portion of
the complaint[2] states, thus:
The undersigned (complainant) accuses MARCIANO BERTULFO Y GELEG of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of November 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously undressed (sic) RHIZA OLIVERIO Y HEMOROS and put himself on top of her and thereafter have (sic) carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
MARCIANO entered a plea
of not guilty at his arraignment.
The first witness
presented by the prosecution was 16 year-old RHIZA. She is from Lanao del Norte, but her aunt Normalita Reyes brought
her to Ozamis City and then to Manila with the promise of sending her to
school. After a year and four months since arriving in Manila, however, RHIZA
was still not attending the promised schooling. Instead, Normalita made her
wash clothes, clean the house and take care of two-year old Stephen Bryan,
Normalita’s son with her common-law spouse MARCIANO. Sometime in September
1996, Normalita left the Philippines to work in Japan. Since then, RHIZA stayed
with Stephen in his room, unless MARCIANO was around, where upon she would
leave the room and sleep in the sala.[3]
On 10 November 1996, at
7:00 a.m., while sleeping alone with Stephen in his room, RHIZA was awakened
upon sensing that MARCIANO was beside her.
MARCIANO went on top of her and told her in Cebuano, “Ayaw kang
magsinggit, kung magsinggit ka, patyon kita,”[4] which means, “Do not shout, I will kill you
if you shout.” MARCIANO removed her
shorts and panty then took off his brief.
He then inserted and pushed his penis into her vagina and held and
sucked her breasts. Even in pain, RHIZA
tried to push him away, but her resistance proved unavailing against his brute
force. After the sexual assault, which
lasted for ten minutes, MARCIANO threatened her not to tell anybody or else he
would kill her. RHIZA then went inside
the comfort room and waited for the arrival of her aunt Viola Reyes,
Normalita’s sister. When Viola arrived, RHIZA immediately related her ordeal.[5]
Before the incident,
RHIZA seldom saw MARCIANO in the house because he came home late in the evening
from work. In the succeeding days after the incident, MARCIANO religiously
stayed in the house, constantly watching her and Viola. Viola called up
Normalita to inform her about the rape incident. On 14 November 1996, when RHIZA had mustered enough courage to
report the rape, she requested her aunt Viola and a certain Jenny Tamparo to
accompany her to the Baesa Police Station in Quezon City to file a complaint
for rape against MARCIANO. At the
Police Station, RHIZA executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay.[6] Upon prior instructions from her Aunt
Normalita, RHIZA, Viola and Stephen left the apartment and brought along with
them their personal belongings because Normalita did not want her son to be
involved in the case.[7]
On cross-examination, the
defense counsel confronted RHIZA with a document entitled “Pinagsamang
Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Reklamo”,[8] dated 18 November 1996, bearing her and
Viola’s signatures. RHIZA explained
that after the complaint was filed, she and her Aunt Viola were threatened by
Emma Tan, sister of MARCIANO, that they will send them to jail and file charges
against them for kidnapping Stephen and for qualified theft.[9] RHIZA declared that she was forced to sign
said affidavit of desistance because of Emma’s threats. Later, however, threats notwithstanding,
RHIZA pursued her complaint.[10]
The prosecution then
presented Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, medico-legal officer at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. She testified that she
interviewed and conducted a physical examination on the person of RHIZA on 15
November 1996.[11] Her findings are contained in Medico-Legal
Report No. M-1693-96,[12] pertinent portions of which read as follows:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish brown areola and nipple from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the light brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type and congested hymen with deep healing laceration at 7 o’clock position and shallow healing laceration at 5 o’clock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and virgin size vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is tight with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethal smears are negative for gram negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.
Dr. Freyra further
testified that lacerations are inflicted only on the first sexual contact. She noticed strong resistance when she
inserted her examining finger in the hymen of RHIZA, more so when she inserted
the speculum, which has a bigger diameter.
This indicated that RHIZA’s hymen was not penetrated very often or that
she seldom engaged in sexual intercourse.
Dr. Freyra concluded that her findings were compatible with recent loss
of virginity.[13]
The last witness for the
prosecution was Mario Hermos, RHIZA’s uncle.
He declared that he was with RHIZA and Viola when the two were brought
to Camp Karingal, and corroborated the testimony of RHIZA that Emma Tan told
her to drop the rape case against MARCIANO; otherwise she would pursue the case
for kidnapping filed against her and Viola.[14]
For the defense, MARCIANO
testified first. He declared that on 10
November 1996, after coming home from the office at 7:00 p.m., he left their
apartment with his friend Junilo Servida and another occupant of the apartment
to play bowling. When they arrived home at 2:30 a.m. of the following day, 11
November 1996, he saw RHIZA and several occupants of the apartment drinking
beer and brandy. He proceeded to the
room of Stephen and slept there, until 7:00 a.m. Nothing unusual had happened in their apartment from the time he
came home that night of 10 November until 14 November 1996 at 2:00 p.m. On said date, he suddenly felt uneasy and
nervous while he was at his office. He
decided to go home and when he arrived at the apartment, he saw that all his
belongings and RHIZA, Viola, Lani and his son Stephen were gone. He looked for his son but did not see him
anywhere, so he returned home. While
resting that evening, he heard someone knock at the door. The door was forcibly opened and a man poked
a gun at him. He saw several men in
civilian clothes and they brought him to Camp Karingal where he learned that
the men were police officers.[15]
The other witnesses for
the defense were Leopoldo David, Junilo Servida, Police Officer Orecio Jurado,
and Dr. Antonio Rebosa. Leopoldo, owner
of the apartment where MARCIANO stayed, testified on the description of the
apartment and the room where the rape incident was allegedly committed. Junilo corroborated MARCIANO’s testimony
that they played bowling on 10 November 1996, and that they saw RHIZA and other
occupants of the apartment drinking beer when they returned later. He proceeded to the second floor of the
apartment and slept in another room.
MARCIANO, who was following him, slept in the room of his son Stephen.
Police Officer Jurado was
presented to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that RHIZA and
Viola were threatened and forced to sign the affidavit of desistance. He
admitted, however, that before RHIZA and Viola signed the affidavit of
desistance, there was a threat that they would be charged with kidnapping and
qualified theft. Neither did he bring RHIZA and Viola before a notary
public. He merely gave them a copy of
the affidavit of desistance.[16]
Dr. Antonio Rebosa, a
physician, explained the findings made by prosecution witness Dr. Ma. Cristina
Freyra. He concluded that the healing
laceration, as recorded in the medico-legal report of Dr. Freyra, indicated
that the laceration could have been inflicted one to four days prior to the
examination. In the absence of any
other finding, the hymenal laceration was due to sexual intercourse.[17]
The trial court gave full
faith and credence to the testimony of RHIZA. It characterized RHIZA’S
narration of facts as straightforward, sincere, candid and consistent. Thus, in its challenged Decision,[18] the trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding
the accused MARCIANO BERTULFO y GELEG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant Rhiza H. Oliverio the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages with costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
MARCIANO seasonably appealed to us from the adverse
judgment.
In his Appellant’s Brief[19], MARCIANO asserts that the trial court
erred:
I
XXX IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ALLEGED THREATS MADE BY THE ACCUSED PREVENTED COMPLAINANT FROM RESISTING THE RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PHYSICAL MAKE-UP OF THE APARTMENT, THE NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS THEREIN AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMPLAINANT MADE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME HIGHLY IMPROBABLE.
II
XXX IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS A TIMID AND SHY BARRIO LASS.
III
XXX IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE MEDICO LEGAL REPORT.
IV
XXX IN NOT ACCEPTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE DESPITE THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY WHICH WAS NOT OVERCOME.
V
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED ANTICIPATED THE REACTION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER RELATIVES.
VI
XXX IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPLAINANT MAY HAVE BEEN ILL-MOTIVATED TO FILE THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
VII
XXX IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
In the first six assigned
errors, MARCIANO attacks the appreciation of facts by the trial court,
particularly on the character, personality and credibility of RHIZA, her lack
of resistance during the sexual assault, the delay in filing the complaint, the
actions and reactions of MARCIANO, and the alleged motive behind the filing of
the complaint for rape. He also argues
that the medical report did not conclusively establish the fact of rape. Moreover, the place where the crime was
allegedly committed was not conducive for the commission of rape because the
risk of getting caught was extremely high.
Anent his last assigned
error, MARCIANO alleges that he was denied his constitutional rights upon his
arrest, and the illegality of his arrest was not at all touched by the trial
court.
The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) counters that credibility weighs heavily in favor of
the evidence for the prosecution and that the affidavit of desistance cannot
prevail over the same. The OSG asserts
that there is no showing of improper motive on the part of RHIZA to falsely
charge and testify against MARCIANO.
As to MARCIANO’s last
assigned error, the OSG avers that police officers are presumed to have
regularly performed their official duties.
MARCIANO failed to rebut this presumption. Even assuming that there was, indeed, a violation of his
constitutional right, MARCIANO is estopped from questioning it at this stage.
He should have raised it before his arraignment.
We affirm MARCIANO’s
conviction.
The issues raised
primarily deal with the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
appreciation of facts by the trial court.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court
has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators
of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion,
the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer, or the forthright tone of a ready reply; of the furtive glance, the
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or
lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien.[20]
This rule, however,
admits of such exceptions as where there exists a fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or if
the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.[21] These exceptions are not present in the case
at bar.
We cannot sustain
MARCIANO’s insinuation of ill-motive on the part of RHIZA. A lass of tender age would not concoct a
tale of defloration and consequently subject herself to an examination of her
private parts, undergo the trauma and humiliation of a public trial, and
embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped, if she
was not in fact raped.[22]
MARCIANO’s argument that
RHIZA bore no injury is irrelevant. In proving rape, it is not necessary that
the act was committed with genital injury.
In fact, a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape.[23] Nonetheless, the testimony of Dr. Freyra, and
her findings conclusively supported the testimony of RHIZA that she was
sexually assaulted. Dr. Freyra opined
that RHIZA was no longer a virgin and had sexual intercourse about one to four
days prior to the day she was examined on 15 November 1996, exactly five days
after the incident on 10 November 1996.
Rape is committed when
intimidation is used on the victim. Intimidation, which includes coercion, is a
relative term, depending on the difference in age, size and strength of the
parties, and their relationship. It can
be addressed to the mind as well. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that
the force or intimidation employed be so great or be of such character that it
can not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose of the accused. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s
perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard-and-fast
rule. It is, therefore, enough that it
produces fear - fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands
of the accused, something horrible would happen to her at the moment or
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she should report the
incident. Intimidation would explain
the absence of any sign of struggle, which would otherwise indicate that the
victim fought or tried to fight off her attacker.[24]
Likewise, failure to
immediately report a rape incident does not diminish the victim’s credibility
nor undermine her charge of rape. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the
authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is
baseless and fabricated. It is a fact
of life that the victim would rather privately bear the ignominy and pain of
such an experience than reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapist’s
making good on his threat to hurt her.
It is doctrinally settled that delay in reporting a rape case due to
threats is justified. Here, RHIZA was threatened with death by MARCIANO.[25]
Furthermore, rape need
not be committed in an isolated place, as MARCIANO contends. Lust is no
respecter of time, place and kinship and may be committed even inside cramped
quarters. Rape can be committed in
places where people congregate, in parks, along the road, within school
premises, inside an occupied house, and even in a room where other members of
the family are also sleeping. There is
no rule that rape can only be done in seclusion.[26]
The defense belabored the
existence and evidentiary value of the affidavit of desistance executed by
RHIZA and Viola before the police authorities.
As explained by RHIZA, the affidavit was already prepared and she signed
it only on account of fear and threat of being put to jail for kidnapping and
qualified theft if she did not withdraw the rape case she filed against
MARCIANO on 14 November 1996, four days prior to the signing of the affidavit
of desistance. This fact was even
admitted by defense witness Police Officer Jurado during his cross-examination.
The latter further admitted that RHIZA and Viola did not appear before any
notary public in connection with the preparation of such affidavit of
desistance.
Affidavits of desistance
are easily obtained for monetary consideration or through intimidation. Thus,
they are treated with suspicion and reservation.[27] In this case, the affidavit of desistance
must not be dignified. RHIZA, in her
tender age, courageously declared in open court that she pursued the rape case
and disregarded the affidavit of desistance because she wanted to obtain
justice. Besides, she signed it under
duress and had nothing to do with its
preparation. The police officer who prepared
it must be made to face the consequences of his misconduct.
The issue of failure by
the arresting officers to inform MARCIANO of his constitutional rights requires
strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcers acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[28]
MARCIANO’s claim that he
was arrested without a warrant is belatedly made. He should have raised the
question on the validity of his arrest before his arraignment, but he did not.
On the contrary, he voluntarily submitted himself under the court’s
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he participated in
the trial and presented his evidence. He is, thus, estopped from questioning
the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest, or in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused, must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first
time by MARCIANO on appeal. He did not
move for the quashal of the information. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial conducted free from error.[29]
Having been charged with
simple rape only, with no modifying circumstance, the penalty that should be
imposed on MARCIANO should be reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the
penalties prescribed under Article 335, in relation to Article 63, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A No. 7659. The penalty imposed by the
trial court is correct. And under
current case law the trial court’s award of P50,000, as indemnity, and P50,000,
as moral damages, is likewise correct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 24 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68588, finding
MARCIANO BERTULFO y GELEG guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party RHIZA
OLIVERIO P50,000, as indemnity, and P50,000, as moral damages,
plus costs, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago,
and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Original Record
(OR), 348; Rollo, 19. Per Judge Teodoro A. Bay.
[2] OR, 1; Rollo,
4.
[3] TSN, 2 April 1997,
13-14, 17, 29-30; TSN 15 April 1997, 12-13.
[4] Id., 7-8; Id., 20.
[5] TSN, 2 April 1997,
6-11.
[6] Exhibit “A,” OR,
122.
[7] TSN, 2 April 1997,
41-42; TSN, 15 April 1997, 25.
[8] Exhibit “1,” OR,
288.
[9] The said charges
filed against them were dismissed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 103, in its Joint Decision of 4 December 1998 in Criminal Cases Nos.
97-70360-61, entitled People v. Reyes, et al. (Exh. “1.”)
[10] TSN, 15 April 1997,
23-24, 27;
[11] Id., 5.
[12] Exhibit “D,” OR,
126.
[13] TSN, 15 April 1997,
7, 10.
[14] TSN, 29 September
1997, 5.
[15] TSN, 12 May 1999,
5-6, 9-12.
[16] TSN, 26 January
1999, 4, 6.
[17] TSN, 14 December
1999, 4.
[18] Supra note 1,
35.
[19] Rollo, 52.
[20] People v.
Abella, 339 SCRA 129, 144-145 (2000).
[21] People v.
Quejada, 223 SCRA 77 (1993).
[22] People v.
Gonzales, 338 SCRA 678, 689 (2000).
[23] People v.
Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693, 727 (2000).
[24] People v.
Ardon, G.R. Nos. 137753-56, 16 March 2001.
[25] Id.
[26] People v.
Panganiban, GR No.138439-41, June 25, 2001; People v. Julio Francisco,
344 SCRA 110, 120 (2000); People v. Ardon, supra note 24.
[27] People v.
Bermudez, 309 SCRA 124, 137 (1999); People v. Mumar 333 SCRA 221, 232-33
(2000).
[28] People v. Sy
Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 41 (2000); Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 1,
13 (2000); People vs. Uy, 327 SCRA 335, 350 (2000);
[29] Filoteo, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, 264 (1996), citing People v. Lopez,
254 SCRA 95,105-106, (1995); People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835, 854
(2000).