THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140235 & 142748. May 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO DARAMAY JR., appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The sole testimony of a
rape victim, if clear and credible, is sufficient to convict the accused. Denials cannot prevail over positive
assertions.
Statement of
the Case
Pedro Daramay Jr. appeals
the June 24, 1999 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City (Branch 37) in Criminal Case Nos. Ir-4716 and
Ir-4717, in which he was adjudged guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Pedro Daramay, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Criminal Case No. Ir-4716 as principal
thereof, and hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify Diana Estadilla P60,000.00 as moral
damages.”[2]
Appellant was charged
with two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed on January 14, 1998 and January
31, 1998. The Information on the first
charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. Ir-4716, reads as follows:
“That on or about the 14th day of January, 1998, in
Barangay San Vicente, Bato, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge [of] one Diana
J. Estadilla, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice in such amount as shall be proven in court.”[3]
On the other hand, the
second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. Ir-4717, reads thus:
“That on or about the 31st day of January, 1998, in
Barangay San Vicente, Bato, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge [of] one Diana
Estadilla, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice in such amount as shall be proven in court.”[4]
During his arraignment on
July 7, 1998, appellant pleaded “not guilty”[5] to both
charges. After due trial on the merits,
the RTC convicted him of rape in Criminal Case No. Ir-4716, but dismissed
Criminal Case No. Ir-4717 for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[6] the Office of the
Solicitor General presents the prosecution’s version of the factual incidents
as follows:
“At about 11:00 o’clock in the morning of January 14, 1998, Diana J. Estadilla, married and a resident of San Vicente, Bato, Camarines Sur left her house at San Vicente, Bato, Camarines Sur to buy ice at a nearby store. On her way to the store, appellant Pedro Daramay, Jr., Diana’s neighbor, who was standing at the doorway of his house called Diana. Thinking that appellant was being neighborly, Diana approached appellant without any hesitation. However, when Diana reached appellant’s doorway, the latter suddenly grabbed Diana’s hand and dragged her inside his house. Diana shouted for help but appellant instantly covered her mouth with his hand. To immobilize Diana, appellant pushed her against the wall, facing it, and pressed the full weight of his body against hers. Appellant covered her mouth with his left hand. Afterwards, appellant removed his shorts and brief by using his right hand. Immediately thereafter, appellant pulled down Diana’s short pants and panty likewise using his right hand. Aroused, appellant attempted to penetrate Diana but did not succeed as she had vehemently resisted. Appellant persisted. He forcibly pried open Diana’s legs by kicking them hard and when they were apart, he forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Diana felt weak as appellant made push and pull movements. After satisfying his lust, appellant threatened Diana that harm would befall her and her family if she were to tell anyone of the incident. Trembling and petrified, Diana immediately went home. Having be[e]n intimidated, Diana did not go out of her house nor did she reveal to her husband what appellant did to her.
“On March 11, 1998, Diana executed a sworn statement relative to the incident before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua, Bato, Camarines Sur.
“A warrant of arrest of appellant was issued by Hon. Orlando L.
Espinas, then Pairing Judge, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 37, Iriga City.”[7]
Version of
the Defense
In his Brief[8], appellant did not
present a statement of facts. He simply
denied that any incident of rape occurred on January 14, 1998. However, he admitted having had consensual
intercourse with complainant on another occasion.[9] In an attempt to
cast doubt on the probability of the occurrence of the alleged rape on January
14, 1998, he stated that she continued to go to his house even after that
date. He cited two specific instances
to support his claim: (1) on January 31, 1998, she allegedly went to his house
on the pretext that she wanted his wife to teach her how to make cassava cake;
and (2) on January 21, 1998, complainant supposedly requested him to go to her
house to repair the water pump, which he refused to do to avoid any scandal.[10]
Ruling of the
Trial Court
The RTC ruled that the
self-serving assertions of appellant that he had been seduced by complainant
cannot prevail over her positive and candid statements. It gave credence to her testimony, because
it was positive, clear and straightforward.
Noting her appearance to be that of a simple, reticent and
unsophisticated woman, the trial court opined that she could not have seduced
him, whom her family considered to be a good neighbor.
Hence, this appeal.[11]
Issue
In his eight-page Brief,
appellant assigns this single error for our consideration:
“The trial court erred in not appreciating vital testimonies of
Aida Estadilla and in convicting the appellant in Crim. Case No. Ir-4716.”[12]
The Court’s
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Appellant assails the
lower court’s Decision for giving credence to the “weak evidence” presented by
the prosecution.
We disagree. First, the records clearly show that
complainant testified positively, clearly and credibly on how she had been
raped by appellant on January 14, 1998.
The relevant portions of her testimony are reproduced as follows:
“WITNESS
A I was walking going to the store to buy ice and that devil man called for me.
PROSECUTOR RAMOS:
Q Who is that man?
A Daramay, Jr.
Q The person you just pinpointed a while ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was he when he called you?
A He was in his house by the door.
Q And where is his house located?
A In San Vicente, Bato, Camarines Sur.
Q And what did you do when the accused in this case, Pedro Daramay, called you?
A When he called for me, trusting that he was our neighbor, I went near him.
Q And what happened next when you went near to him?
A He suddenly grab[bed] my hand and pulled me inside his house.
Q And what did you do when the accused grabbed you and pulled you inside his house?
A When he grabbed my hand I shouted but he covered my mouth and he pulled me inside his house.
Q When the accused pulled you inside his house[,] what happened there?
A He pushed me to the wall.
Q And then?
A He pushed me to the wall and since I was so nervous he pinned me to the wall and he removed his shorts and brief and after that he also removed my shorts and my panty and I was very nervous at that time.
Q And what did you do when the accused was removing your panty?
A He started having sexual intercourse with me and when I was not giving in[,] he kicked my leg.
COURT:
While you were standing and pinned against the wall?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR RAMOS:
Q And when the accused kicked you what happened next?
WITNESS:
A He pushed me to the wall and that was the time he was able to insert his penis [into] my vagina.
Q And what were you doing also when the accused was inserting his penis [in]to your vagina?
A I was already very weak and I could not resist because he was pushing me very tightly.
Q And what else happened when the accused inserted his penis [in]to your vagina?
A The insertion took a while and after he had used me he already sent me home and he did not allow me to go to the store to buy ice because he threatened me that I should not tell anybody.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court how the accused threatened you?
A He told me, ‘Huwag kang magsumbong kahit kanino, kung hindi may mangyayari sa pamilya mo.’ (Don’t tell anybody especially your husband or else something will happen to your family.[)]
Q And what was in your mind after the accused threatened you with those x x x words?
A I was not x x x my usual self because I often remember what had happened to me.
Q By the way, what did you do when the accused was raping you?
A I was very nervous; I [didn’t] know what that man was doing to me.
COURT:
Q Do you mean to tell the court that you [did] not know what the accused did to [you] because of your nervousness?
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor because he was very strong.
Q How did you know that the accused here inserted his penis [in]to your vagina?
A I noticed it when it was already slippery when something came out.
Q So at the time that the accused penetrated his penis into yours you did not know what was happening?
A No[,] because I was really very nervous and I did not know what was happening.
COURT:
Proceed.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q You said that you noticed that it was already slippery because something came out. What was that?
WITNESS:
A Tamod or semen.
COURT:
Q Why were you able to know and you even [say] that it was like coconut milk?
A Because when I reached home I washed my organ and I felt it was slippery.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q Are you familiar [with] semen or tamod?
COURT:
She is a married woman.
WITNESS:
A Yes, because I am already married.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q Did you know from whom it came?
ATTY. BELTRAN:
I think she is incompetent to testify on that.
COURT:
She already relayed here that there was penetration and it means who penetrated her was the accused.
ATTY. BELTRAN:
That is presumption.
COURT:
Let the answer remain on record.
WITNESS:
A From the accused.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q After the accused told you to go home and no longer buy ice[,] where did you go?
A I did not proceed anymore to the store. I just went home and I did not go out of the house anymore.
Q Did you inform your family or your husband that the accused raped you?
A No, I did not tell them especially my husband because I pitied my husband.
Q Is that the only reason why you did not inform your husband what happened to you?
A I don’t want to tell him right away.
COURT:
Q The question is if that was the only reason, why did you not tell your husband?
WITNESS:
A Because I was afraid and I [didn’t] want to tell him right away.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q And why [were] you afraid?
A As I have said I was so afraid and I did not want to tell my husband right away.
Q Why, did you not [say] a while ago that you were threatened by the accused?
A Yes, sir.”[13]
Second, this Court agrees with the RTC that it is
highly inconceivable for a simple and unsophisticated wife and mother like
complainant to fabricate a tale of rape, considering that this could cause
humiliation to her family and jeopardize her relations with her husband.[14] Moreover, no bad blood existed between her family
and that of appellant, as his own wife admitted. In fact, it was shown during the trial that complainant and her
family were very close to his family, which even considered her as one of their
own.[15] This fact makes it improbable for her to accuse
appellant out of spite or revenge.
Victim’s
Testimony
Sufficient to Convict
Jurisprudence states that
the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining
witness.[16] This is especially true in a rape case in which,
oftentimes, only two persons are involved -- the offender and the offended
party.[17] Thus, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible,
is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
It is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed; and that if her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.[18] Appellant’s denial cannot prevail over complainant’s
direct, positive and categorical assertion which rings with truth. Denial, being inherently a weak defense,
cannot outweigh complainant’s positive testimony.[19] As between a positive and categorical testimony
which has a ring of verity on the one hand and a bare denial on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail.[20]
Minor Details
Insufficient to Discredit
Appellant asserts the
alleged improbability of his intercourse with complainant, who testified that
he was behind her while she was standing up.
In the light of her harrowing experience, she cannot be expected to
recall where she was facing when he raped her.
What is important is her vivid recollection that he sexually attacked
her against her will.[21]
Trial Court’s
Factual Findings
Binding and Conclusive
Appellant alleges that
the RTC erred in not appreciating the testimony of complainant’s daughter, Aiza
Estadilla. However, nowhere in his Brief
does he explain why he considers this an error.
Time and time again, this
Court has said that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by a trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand; and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under examination.
Its findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate
courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[22] Since appellate courts have access only to inanimate
transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses during
the trial and to the various documentary evidence adduced by both parties, they
must rely on the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of the
witnesses.[23]
In the present case,
appellant has not shown why the RTC erred in giving more credence and weight to
the testimony of complainant. Verily,
the trial court had the opportunity to see the witnesses on the stand and to
determine by their conduct and demeanor whether they were testifying truthfully
or simply lying.[24]
The RTC correctly awarded
moral damages to the rape victim, who is presumed to have suffered moral
damages entitling her to such award.[25] However, the grant should be reduced to P25,000. Also,
the trial court erred in not awarding the victim indemnity ex delicto. It has been the practice of the Court to
award outrightly the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to victims of
rape.[26]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that an award
of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto be granted to the victim in
addition to moral damages which is hereby fixed at P25,000. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
[1] Written by Judge
Ernesto B. Amisola.
[2] RTC Decision, p. 15;
rollo, p. 41; records, p. 121.
[3] Rollo, p. 10.
[4] Rollo, p. 27.
[5] Order dated July 7,
1998; records, p. 18.
[6] Signed by Assistant
Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio L.
Villamor and Solicitor Enrique Z. Trespeces.
[7] Appellee’s Brief,
pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 106-107.
Citations omitted.
[8] Signed by Atty.
Eustaquio S. Beltran.
[9] Appellant’s Brief,
p. 2; rollo, p. 53.
[10] Ibid., pp. 3
& 54.
[11] The case was deemed
submitted for decision on March 5, 2001, upon receipt by this Court of
appellant’s one-page Reply Brief signed by Atty. Eustaquio S. Beltran.
[12] Appellant’s Brief,
p. 3; rollo, p. 54. Original in
upper case.
[13] TSN, October 5,
1998, pp. 7-9.
[14] Rollo, p. 33.
[15] TSN, January 7,
1999, p. 4.
[16] People v.
Dado, 244 SCRA 655, June 1, 1995.
[17] People v.
Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, July 11, 1996.
[18] People v.
Lao, 249 SCRA 75, October 6, 1995.
[19] People v.
Acabo; 259 SCRA 75, July 17, 1996; People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526, March
26, 1997; People v. Travero, 276 SCRA 301, July 28, 1997; People v.
Erese, 281 SCRA 316, November 5, 1997; People v. Pontilar Jr., 275 SCRA
338, July 11, 1997.
[20] People v.
Biago, 182 SCRA 411, February 21, 1990.
[21] People v.
Gonzales Jr., GR Nos. 143143-44, January 15, 2002.
[22] People v.
Pontilar Jr., supra.
[23] People v.
Acabo, supra; People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325, September 23, 1996.
[24] People v.
Lao, supra.
[25] People v. Gonzales
Jr., supra.
[26] People v.
Narido, 316 SCRA 131, October 1, 1999.