FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133657.
May 29, 2002]
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Before us is a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998[1], which granted the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent British Steel Asia Ltd. (British
Steel) and ordered the dismissal of petitioner Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation’s (Remington) complaint for sum of money and damages. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as
culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 21, 1996,
petitioner filed a complaint[3] for sum of money
and damages arising from breach of contract, docketed as Civil Case No.
96-79674, before the sala of Judge Marino M. De la Cruz of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 22. Impleaded
as principal defendant therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro
Trading GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent
British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action against them. On April 7, 1997, the RTC denied the motions
to dismiss,[4] as well as the
ensuing motion for reconsideration.[5] ISL then filed its
answer to the complaint.
On the other hand,
respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals,[6] docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 44529. Respondent
claimed therein that the complaint did not contain a single averment that
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of
petitioner’s legal rights. Apart from
the allegation in the complaint’s “Jurisdictional Facts” that:
1.05. Defendants British
Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading Gmbh, while understood by the plaintiff as
mere suppliers of goods for defendant ISL, are impleaded as party defendants
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.[7]
no
other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid cause of
action against it. Since petitioner failed
to plead any cause of action against respondent as alternative defendant under
Section 13, Rule 3,[8] the trial court
should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint insofar as respondent was
concerned.
Meanwhile, petitioner
sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factual
allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 10[9] of the Rules of
Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of
right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto.[10]
Subsequently, petitioner
filed a Manifestation and Motion[11] in CA-G.R. SP No.
44529 stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together
with said Amended Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the special
civil action be suspended.
On January 29, 1998, the
trial court ruled on petitioner’s Motion to Admit Amended Complaint thus:
WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is NOTED and further proceedings thereon and action on the other incidents as aforementioned are hereby held in abeyance until final resolution by the Honorable Court of Appeals (Special 6th Division) of the petition for certiorari and prohibition of petitioner (defendant British) and/or Manifestations and Motions of therein private respondent, herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Thereafter, on February
24, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
44529 as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge to dismiss without prejudice the Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 against petitioner British Steel (Asia) Ltd. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In the same decision, the
Court of Appeals addressed petitioner’s prayer for suspension of proceedings in
this wise:
The incident which transpired after the filing of the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition are immaterial in the resolution of
this petition. What this Court is
called upon to resolve is whether the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint against
it. The admission or rejection by the
lower court of said amended complaint will not, insofar as this Court is concerned,
impinge upon the issue of whether or not said court gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.[14]
Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, which was denied in a
resolution dated April 28, 1998. Hence,
this petition, anchored on the following grounds:
-I-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT EVEN AS SAID COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY AMENDED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND SUFFICIENT CAUSES OF ACTION ARE AVERRED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SEC. 2, RULE 10 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
-II-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IF THE PETITIONER
WANTS TO PURSUE ITS CASE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT HAS TO REFILE THE
COMPLAINT, THUS PRE-EMPTING THE RIGHT OF THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND COMPELLING THE PETITIONER TO LITIGATE ITS CAUSES OF ACTION
AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANT IN A SEPARATE
ACTION, THEREBY ABETTING MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.[15]
The basic issue in this
case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action, despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right
to amend the defective complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court. Stated differently, the query
posed before us is: can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right
before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its
dismissal before the higher court?
Section 2, Rule 10[16] of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that
a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is
served. This only means that prior to
the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.[17] The reason for this rule is implied in the
subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10[18]. Under this provision, substantial amendment
of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been
served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up
his defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be
said that the defendant’s rights have been violated by changes made in the
complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense
that can be altered[19] or affected by the amendment of the complaint in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10.
The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the
allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the
plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the
filing of an answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the
plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been
served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss[20] or any other
proceeding contesting its sufficiency.
Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under
Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a
defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the
adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of
pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of
justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits
without regard to technicalities. This
principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants
from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of
every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.[21]
In this case, the remedy
espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment will precisely result
in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the defendants
would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical
advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for
petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly amend the
complaint as a matter of right. The
amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action,
as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
The fact that the other
defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar
petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the
defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as
a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the
non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.[22]
Furthermore, we do not
agree with respondent’s claim that it will be prejudiced by the admission of
the Amended Complaint because it had spent time, money and effort to file its
petition before the appellate court.[23] We cannot see how
the result could be any different for respondent, if petitioner merely re-filed
the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As adverted to earlier, amendment would even work to respondent’s
advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the trial
court. Consequently, the amendment
should be allowed in the case at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the
rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998 and April 28,
1998, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22 is further ordered
to ADMIT petitioner’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 and to
conduct further proceedings in said case.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and
Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 21;
per Special Second Division composed of Associate Justices Corona
Ibay-Somera, Ramon U. Mabutas and Hilarion L. Aquino, ponente.
[2] Ibid., at 34.
[3] Id., at 36.
[4] Id., at
74-83.
[5] Id., at 84.
[6] Id., at
85-94.
[7] Id., at 37.
[8] SEC. 13. Alternative
Defendants. - Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several
persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants
in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be
inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.
[9] SEC. 2. Amendments
as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in
the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
[10] CA Records, p. 100.
[11] Id., at
114-115.
[12] Supra, Note 1
at 197-198.
[13] Id., at 32.
[14] Id., at
31-32.
[15] Id., at 6.
[16] Supra, Note
8.
[17] See Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals,
Daity Salvosa, and Ray Dean Salvosa, 271 SCRA 286, 289 (1997), citing Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1979 ed., p. 362.
[18] SEC. 3. Amendments
by Leave of Court. – Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears
to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after
notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
[19] Siasoco v.
Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 195 (1999).
[20] F. D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 1997 ed., p. 183.
[21] Heirs of Marcelino
Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, et al., 280 SCRA 870, 882 (1997), citing
Sedeco v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 96, 103 (1982); Calabig v.
Villanueva, 135 SCRA 300, 307 (1985); Cabutin v. Amacio, 170 SCRA
750, 756 (1989); Eugenio v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425, 435 (1990).
[22] Supra, Note
19 at 194, citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 1, p. 646 and
case cited therein.
[23] Supra, Note 1
at 216.