FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114944.
May 29, 2002]
MANUEL C. ROXAS and AHMED S. NACPIL, petitioners, vs. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman and
JOSE DE FERRER, Deputy Special Prosecutor, and the HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Before us is the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner Manuel C. Roxas seeking to set aside our
Decision dated June 19, 2001 which dismissed the instant petition, anchored on
the following arguments:
I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE INSTANT CASE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO UNNECESSARILY AND EXCESSIVELY ENTANGLE THE HONORABLE COURT WITH THE TASK OF UNDULY REVIEWING OR INTERFERING WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL PREROGATIVES OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
II
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THERE EXIST MORE THAN SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR THE HONORABLE COURT TO FIND VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE INSTANT CASE WHEN THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.
III
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
THE DECISION HAS SERIOUS AND FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE CONSIDERING THAT BECAUSE OF IT, NO DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE WILL EVER ACHIEVE FINALITY.[1]
Respondents were required
to file their respective comments to the motion.[2] In its Comment,[3] the Office of the
Special Prosecutor argued that the issues presented in the Motion for
Reconsideration have already been raised, resolved and passed upon by this
Court. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General, in his Comment,[4] maintained that
petitioner Roxas was not denied due process since he was no stranger to the
proceedings; the reinvestigation was just a continuation of the investigation
of the case where petitioner was a party-respondent.
In order to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration, it is helpful to restate the salient antecedent
facts.
Manuel C. Roxas was the
Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee
of the Philippine Constabulary–Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of
sixty-five units of fire trucks. After
the public bidding, General Cesar P. Nazareno created a Technical Evaluation
Committee, headed by General Mario Tanchanco, which was sent to Korea and Japan
to conduct ocular inspections of the plant facilities and equipment of the five
qualified proponents. Thereafter, the
Technical Evaluation Committee recommended for procurement the Morita Isuzu and
Nikki-Hino fire trucks.
Meanwhile, the Bids and
Awards Committee voted to recommend to Director General Cesar Nazareno the
procurement of Ssangyong fire trucks.
Instead of acting on this recommendation, Gen. Nazareno created a Review
Committee headed by Gen. Gerardo N. Flores, which found that there was a failure
to bid. Gen. Nazareno thus instructed
the Bids and Awards Committee to reconsider its earlier recommendation and to
conduct further evaluation of the proponents, but this time limiting itself to
the two Japanese brands recommended by the Technical Evaluation Committee,
namely, Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino.
The Bids and Awards Committee subsequently voted to award the contract
to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikki-Hino.[5]
Accordingly, the contract
of sale of sixty-five units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen.
Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was
prepared and signed by Col. Nicasio Custodio, Chief of the PNP Logistics
Support Command; Major Obedio Espeña, Acting Chief, PNP Procurement Center;
Gen. Cesar Nazareno; and DILG Secretary Luis Santos.
Thereafter, Custodio,
Espeña and Nazareno, together with the PNP Chief Accountant, Generosa Ramirez,
prepared the disbursement vouchers, authorizing the payment to Tahei Co., Ltd.
of the sum of P167,335,177.24, as marginal deposit for the sixty-five fire
trucks.
The COA subsequently
discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid price of Tahei
Co., Ltd. to be only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the purchase order showed the unit
price as P2,585,562.00, resulting in a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of
fire truck or a total of P19,030,570.00.
On February 12, 1993,
DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the following:
1. Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP
2. Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP
3. Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco
4. Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.)
5. P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP
6. P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP
7. CInsp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP
8. Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP
9. Dir. Nicasio Custodio, PNP
10. Supt. Obedio Espeña, PNP
11. Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos
12. Ms. Generosa Ramirez
After preliminary
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment
of all respondents, except Generosa Ramirez.[6] On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Manuel Roxas, Ahmed Nacpil,
Diosdado Codoy, Juhan Kairan and Generosa Ramirez.[7] This was approved
by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated April 15,
1993.
Hence, formal charges
were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco,
Custodio, Osia, Espeña and Santos, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18956.[8] Roxas, Nacpil,
Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included in the criminal information.
Flores and Tanchanco
moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, on October 19, 1993, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and
Tanchanco. In the same resolution,
however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas,
Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case No.
18956. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de
Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation. Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the
recommendation.
Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the
Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the charge against the movants
be dismissed. However, Deputy Special
Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed an amended information with the Sandiganbayan impleading Roxas, Nacpil
and Kairan as co-accused.[9]
Thus, Roxas and Nacpil
filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition,
seeking to annul the orders of the Ombudsman directing their inclusion as
accused in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The petition was
dismissed in our Decision dated June 19, 2001 on the ground that the Ombudsman
did not lose jurisdiction over petitioners after the charges against them were
dismissed, considering that the reinvestigation was merely a repeat
investigation. Likewise, petitioners
were not denied due process when the Ombudsman issued the assailed orders
because they were able to file their counter-affidavits during the preliminary
investigation.
After a careful and
meticulous review of the case, we find merit in the Motion for Reconsideration.
The records show that the
participation of petitioner Roxas in the transactions complained of is limited
to the following:
(1) He was the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP.
(2) He wrote a letter to Mrs. Carol de Jesus of Ssangyong Corporation informing her that her company had been selected as the supplier of fire trucks.
(3) Upon the directive of Gen. Nazareno, he conducted an immediate review of the recommendation of the Bids and Awards Committee which awarded the supply contract to Ssangyong and, instead, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Review Committee, again upon specific orders of Nazareno.
(4) He submitted a memorandum to Gen. Nazareno that Majority of the members of the Bids and Awards Committee have chosen the Nikki-Hino brand over Morita Isuzu.
Based on these
established facts, the Review Committee of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, in a Memorandum dated April 15, 1993, recommended the dismissal of
the charges against petitioner on the following considerations:
The action of [the Bids and Awards] Committee in choosing Ssangyong over Kanglim does not appear to have caused any damage to the Government or any party because it did not materialize. This action was nullified on order of Gen. Nazareno and upon recommendation of the Review Committee. Therefore, this does not merit a lengthy discussion. Suffice it to stay that the procedure followed by the committee which resulted in the choices of Ssangyong does not indicate any irregularity. Neither does it suggest an unwarranted choice considering that Ssangyong was the next lower bidder to V.G. Roxas-Kanglim.
What is of significance was the action of the INP BAC which chose Nikki-Hino as the final winning bidder. It is this action that resulted in the nullification of the previous action by the INP BAC and the purchase of 56 units of fire trucks at a price much higher than the prices for Kanglim or Ssangyong Fire Trucks.
Records show that Gen. Nazareno issued the Order directing this Committee to reconsider its previous actions. To this Order was attached the recommendation of Chairman Mario C. Tanchanco of the Technical Evaluation Committee for the consideration of the Japanese fire trucks only namely: Nikki Hino and Morita Isuzu. In other words, the authority of the INP BAC this time to conduct the bidding was limited to only Nikki Hino and Morita Isuzu by no less than the approving authority and the highest ranking commander of the INP.
This Committee’s action, in the light of General Nazareno’s order, appeared to be regular and proper because it chose the lowest bidder among the Japanese fire trucks supplied to them by General Nazareno. It could not possibly consider Ssangyong because its previous action choosing Ssangyong was precisely ordered set aside. Neither could it choose Kanglim because this was not recommended in the Tanchanco report which was appended by General Nazareno in the abovestated Order addressed to the INP BAC.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason to hold the members of
the INP BAC liable for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. However, we make exception to respondent
P/Supt. Reynold Osia because he was implicated by Supt. Concordio Apolonio in
his sworn statement (page 73, Records) as the one who acted as liaison of
General Nazareno in discreetly sending his messages to the members of the INP
BAC to vote in favor of Nikki Hino. It
can be said that respondent Osia cooperated with General Nazareno in the
manipulative scheme to corner the award in favor of Tahei Co., Ltd. We therefore hold respondent Osia liable for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law.[10]
The foregoing
recommendation was unanimously approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De
Ferrer, Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
During the
reinvestigation, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
indictment of petitioners on the assumption that: “The said persons of the Bids and Awards Committee who voted for
the Nikki-Hino perfected and awarded the contract to Nikki-Hino. Their cooperation was indispensable for the
consummation of the contract which was irregular.”[11]
Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration. On February
10, 1994, the team of Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza,
Special Prosecution Officer II Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos and Special Prosecution
Officer I Cornelio L. Somido recommended that petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration be granted, saying:
It appears that the charge against respondents Roxas, Nacpil and
Kairan was previously dismissed by this Office by virtue of the approved
resolution dated April 15, 1993. For
this reason, as far as the said respondents are concerned, there being no
motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant (underscoring
supplied), the said respondents ceased to be parties in this case. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for
reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal
of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made
the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their
right to due process.[12]
At first blush, it would
appear that the findings of the Special Prosecution Officers on April 15, 1993
and February 10, 1994 are well supported by the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation. This
notwithstanding, the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, in their
marginal notes, disapproved the recommendation on February 10, 1994.
Ordinarily, we will not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.[13] However, we find
that the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule,
more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and
the charges are manifestly false.[14] In cases where the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions.[15]
Be that as it may, we
recognize that the power to investigate offenses of this nature belongs to the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.[16] While the
Ombudsman may have erred in disregarding the recommendations of the Special
Prosecution Officers which appear to be substantiated by the record, he should
be allowed an opportunity to review his decision and, where necessary, correct
it.
Furthermore, it appears
that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor
reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every
litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.[17]
Under Rule II, Section 7
of Administrative Order No. 07, i.e., the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, motions for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman must be
filed within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. It is significant to note in this case that no motion for
reconsideration was filed from the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the
charges against petitioners. Hence,
petitioners had a right to consider the complaint against them as closed. Indeed, every litigation must come to an
end; otherwise, it would become even more intolerable than the wrong and
injustice it is designed to correct.[18]
For all intents and
purposes, therefore, petitioners were no longer parties in the criminal
action. Evidently, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor thought so too. It
did not give petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which would have
enabled them to participate in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause against petitioners, it
should have first given them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be
heard before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The finding of probable
cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had neither knowledge of
nor participation in violated their right to procedural due process. At the very least, they should have been
notified that the complaint against them has not yet been finally disposed of;
or that the fight was not yet over, so to speak. They should have been apprised of their possible implication in
the criminal case to enable them to meet any new accusations against them
head-on, and to prepare for their defense.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated April June 19, 2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Office
of the Ombudsman for further proceedings for the determination of probable
cause against petitioners Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil in
OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0016.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and
Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p.
385.
[2] Ibid., p.
418.
[3] Id., pp.
431-446.
[4] Id., pp.
448-460.
[5] Id., p. 94.
[6] Record, Vol. I, pp.
4-20.
[7] Ibid., pp.
21-34.
[8] Id., pp. 1-3.
[9] Ibid., Vol.
I-A, pp. 467-469.
[10] Rollo, pp.
129-130.
[11] Ibid., p. 65.
[12] Id., pp.
71-72.
[13] Venus v.
Desierto, 298 SCRA 196, 214 [1998].
[14] Ibid.
[15] Cabahug v.
People, et al., G.R. No. 132816, February 5, 2002; Venus v. Desierto, supra.
[16] Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.
[17] People v.
Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, July 19, 2001.
[18] Provincial Government
of Quezon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 132885, October 11, 2001.