SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132604.
March 6, 2002]
VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Enterprises, petitioner, vs. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., and LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This petition for review
on certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision dated January 30,
1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51553. That decision affirmed the decision in Civil
Case No. 88-2220 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction, ordering CVS Garment and
Industrial Company (CVSGIC) and petitioner Venancio Sambar to pay private
respondents jointly and solidarily the sum of P50,000 as temperate and
nominal damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages, and P25,000 as
attorney’s fees and litigation costs, and ordering the Director of the National
Library to cancel Copyright Registration No. 1-1998 in the name of Venancio
Sambar.
The facts are as follows:
On September 28, 1987,
private respondents, through a letter from their legal officer, demanded that
CVS Garment Enterprises (CVSGE) desist from using their stitched arcuate design
on the Europress jeans which CVSGE advertised in the Manila Bulletin.
Atty. Benjamin Gruba,
counsel of CVSGE, replied that the arcuate design on the back pockets of
Europress jeans was different from the design on the back pockets of Levi’s
jeans. He further asserted that his
client had a copyright on the design it was using.
Thereafter, private
respondents filed a complaint against Sambar, doing business under the name and
style of CVSGE. Private respondents
also impleaded the Director of the National Library. Summons was sent to Sambar in his business address at 161-B Iriga
corner Retiro, La Loma, Quezon City.
Atty. Gruba claimed that
he erroneously received the original summons as he mistook it as addressed to
his client, CVSGIC. He returned the
summons and the pleadings and manifested in court that CVSGE, which was formerly
doing business in the premises, already stopped operation and CVSGIC took over
CVSGE’s occupation of the premises. He
also claimed he did not know the whereabouts of Sambar, the alleged owner of
CVSGE.
Thereafter, private
respondents amended their complaint to include CVSGIC. When private respondents learned the
whereabouts of Sambar and CVSGE, the case was revived.
Private respondents
alleged in their complaint that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an
internationally known clothing manufacturer, owns the arcuate design trademark
which was registered under U.S. Trademark Registration No. 404, 248 on November
16, 1943, and in the Principal Register of trademarks with the Philippine
Patent Office under Certificate of Registration No. 20240 issued on October 8,
1973; that through a Trademark Technical Data and Technical Assistance
Agreement with Levi Strauss (Phil.) Inc. (LSPI) in 1972, LS&Co. granted
LSPI a non-exclusive license to use the arcuate trademark in its manufacture
and sale of Levi’s pants, jackets and shirts in the Philippines; that in 1983,
LS&Co. also appointed LSPI as its agent and attorney-in-fact to protect its
trademark in the Philippines; and that sometime in 1987, CVSGIC and Venancio
Sambar, without the consent and authority of private respondents and in
infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands
to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim pants
under the brand name “Europress” with back pockets bearing a design similar to
the arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the
buying public, prejudicial to private respondents’ goodwill and property right.
In its answer, CVSGIC
admitted it manufactured, sold and advertised and was still manufacturing and
selling denim pants under the brand name of “Europress”, bearing a back pocket
design of two double arcs meeting in the middle. However, it denied that there was infringement or unfair
competition because the display rooms of department stores where Levi’s and
Europress jeans were sold, were distinctively segregated by billboards and
other modes of advertisement. CVSGIC
avers that the public would not be confused on the ownership of such known
trademark as Levi’s, Jag, Europress, etc..
Also, CVSGIC claimed that it had its own original arcuate design, as
evidenced by Copyright Registration No. 1-1998, which was very different and
distinct from Levi’s design. CVSGIC
prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim.
Petitioner Venancio
Sambar filed a separate answer. He denied
he was connected with CVSGIC. He
admitted that Copyright Registration No. 1-1998 was issued to him, but he
denied using it. He also said he did
not authorize anyone to use the copyrighted design. He counterclaimed for moral and exemplary damages and payment of
attorney’s fees.
After hearing, the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner
from manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on
their back pockets. CVSGIC and petitioner
did not appear during the October 13 and 27, 1993 hearings, when they were to
present evidence. Consequently, the
trial court ruled that they waived their right to present evidence.
On May 3, 1995, the trial
court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;
b) ordering the defendants CVS Garment and Industrial Company and Venancio Sambar to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the sum of P50,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Private respondents moved
for a reconsideration praying for the cancellation of petitioner’s copyright
registration. The trial court granted reconsideration in its July 14, 1995
order, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;
b) ordering the defendants CVS Garment and Industrial Company and Venancio Sambar to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the sum of P50,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and to pay the costs;
c) ordering the Director of
the National Library to cancel the Copyright Registration No. 1-1998 issued in
the name of Venancio Sambar.[2]
Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals which on January 30, 1998 decided in favor of private
respondents as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[3]
In this instant petition,
petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I. ...RULING THAT THERE WAS AN INFRINGEMENT OF RESPONDENT’S ARCUATE MARK.
II. ...RULING THAT PETITIONER IS JOINTLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH CVS GARMENTS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF RESPONDENT’S ARCUATE MARK.
III. ...IN
ORDERING, THERE BEING NO INFRINGEMENT OR UNFAIR COMPETITION, THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND CANCELLATION OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION NO. 1-1998 ISSUED IN THE
NAME OF PETITIONER.[4]
Briefly, we are asked to
resolve the following issues:
1. Did petitioner infringe on private
respondents’ arcuate design?
2. Must we hold
petitioner solidarily liable with CVS Garments Industrial Corporation?
3. Are private
respondents entitled to nominal, temperate and exemplary damages and
cancellation of petitioner’s copyright?
On the first issue,
petitioner claims that he did not infringe on private respondents’ arcuate
design because there was no colorable imitation which deceived or confused the
public. He cites Emerald Garment
Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, 251 SCRA
600 (1995), as authority. He disagreed
with the Court of Appeals that there were confusing similarities between Levi’s
and Europress’ arcuate designs, despite the trial court’s observation of
differences in them. Petitioner
maintains that although the backpocket designs had similarities, the public was
not confused because Levi’s jeans had other marks not found in Europress
jeans. Further, he says Levi’s long
history and popularity made its trademark easily identifiable by the public.
In its comment, private
respondents aver that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that there was
infringement in this case. The
backpocket design of Europress jeans, a double arc intersecting in the middle
was the same as Levi’s’ mark, also a double arc intersecting at the center. Although the trial court found differences
in the two designs, these differences were not noticeable. Further, private respondents said,
infringement of trademark did not require exact similarity. Colorable imitation enough to cause
confusion among the public, was sufficient for a trademark to be
infringed. Private respondents
explained that in a market research they conducted with 600 respondents, the
result showed that the public was confused by Europress trademark vis
the Levi’s trademark.
We find that the first
issue raised by petitioner is factual.
The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of this
Court in a petition for review.
Although there are exceptions to this rule, this case is not one of
them.[5] Hence, we find no
reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals that Europress’ use of
the arcuate design was an infringement of the Levi’s design.
On the second issue,
petitioner claims that private respondents did not show that he was connected
with CVSGIC, nor did they prove his specific acts of infringement to make him
liable for damages. Again, this is a
factual matter and factual findings of the trial court, concurred in by the
Court of Appeals, are final and binding on this Court.[6] Both the courts below found that petitioner had a
copyright over Europress’ arcuate design and that he consented to the use of
said design by CVSGIC. We are bound by
this finding, especially in the absence of a showing that it was tainted with
arbitrariness or palpable error.[7] It must be
stressed that it was immaterial whether or not petitioner was connected with
CVSGIC. What is relevant is that
petitioner had a copyright over the design and that he allowed the use of the
same by CVSGIC.
Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred when it said that he had the burden to prove
that he was not connected with CVSGIC and that he did not authorize anyone to
use his copyrighted design. According
to petitioner, these are important elements of private respondents’ cause of action
against him, hence, private respondents had the ultimate burden of proof.
Pertinent is Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court[8] which provides that the burden of proof is the duty
of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by
the amount of evidence required by law.
In civil cases, the burden of proof may be on either the plaintiff or
the defendant. It is on the latter, if
in his answer he alleges an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if
established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim, which
prima facie, the plaintiff already has because of the defendant’s own
admissions in the pleadings.[9]
Petitioner’s defense in
this case was an affirmative defense.
He did not deny that private respondents owned the arcuate trademark nor
that CVSGIC used on its products a similar arcuate design. What he averred was that although he owned
the copyright on the Europress arcuate design, he did not allow CVSGIC to use
it. He also said he was not connected
with CVSGIC. These were not alleged by
private respondents in their pleadings, and petitioner therefore had the burden
to prove these.
Lastly, are private
respondents entitled to nominal, temperate and exemplary damages and
cancellation of petitioner’s copyright?
Petitioner insists that
he had not infringed on the arcuate trademark, hence, there was no basis for
nominal and temperate damages. Also, an
award of nominal damages precludes an award of temperate damages. He cites Ventanilla vs. Centeno, G.R.
No. L-14333, 1 SCRA 215 (1961) on this.
Thus, he contends, assuming arguendo that there was infringement,
the Court of Appeals still erred in awarding both nominal and temperate
damages.
Petitioner likewise said that
the grant of exemplary damages was inconsistent with the trial court’s finding
that the design of Europress jeans was not similar to Levi’s design and that no
pecuniary loss was suffered by respondents to entitle them to such damages.
Lastly, petitioner
maintains that as Europress’ arcuate design is not a copy of that of Levi’s,
citing the trial court’s findings that although there are similarities, there
are also differences in the two designs, cancellation of his copyright was not
justified.
On this matter, private
respondents assert that the lower courts found that there was infringement and
Levi’s was entitled to damages based on Sections 22 and 23 of RA No. 166
otherwise known as the Trade Mark Law,[10] as amended, which was the law then governing. Said sections define infringement and
prescribe the remedies therefor.
Further, private respondents aver it was misleading for petitioner to
claim that the trial court ruled that private respondents did not suffer pecuniary
loss, suggesting that the award of damages was improper. According to the private respondents, the
trial court did not make any such ruling.
It simply stated that there was no evidence that Levi’s had suffered
decline in its sales because of the use of the arcuate design by Europress jeans. They offer that while there may be no direct
proof that they suffered a decline in sales, damages may still be measured
based on a reasonable percentage of the gross sales of the respondents,
pursuant to Section 23 of the Trademark law.[11]
Finally, regarding the
cancellation of petitioner’s copyright, private respondents deny that the trial
court ruled that the arcuate design of Europress jeans was not the same as
Levi’s arcuate design jeans. On the
contrary, the trial court expressly ruled that there was similarity. The cancellation of petitioner’s copyright
was justified because petitioner’s copyright can not prevail over respondents’
registration in the Principal Register of Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer. According to private
respondents, the essence of copyright registration is originality and a copied
design is inherently non-copyrightable.
They insist that registration does not confer originality upon a copycat
version of a prior design.
From the foregoing
discussion, it is clear that the matters raised by petitioner in relation to
the last issue are purely factual, except the matter of nominal and temperate
damages. Petitioner claims that damages
are not due private respondents and his copyright should not be cancelled
because he had not infringed on Levi’s trademark. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found there was
infringement. Thus, the award of
damages and cancellation of petitioner’s copyright are appropriate.[12] Award of damages is clearly provided in Section 23,[13] while cancellation of petitioner’s copyright finds
basis on the fact that the design was a mere copy of that of private
respondents’ trademark. To be entitled
to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the
author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or
evasively imitating the work of another.[14]
However, we agree with
petitioner that it was error for the Court of Appeals to affirm the award of
nominal damages combined with temperate damages[15] by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. What respondents are entitled to is an award
for temperate damages, not nominal damages.
For although the exact amount of damage or loss can not be determined
with reasonable certainty, the fact that there was infringement means they
suffered losses for which they are entitled to moderate damages.[16] We find that the award of P50,000.00 as
temperate damages fair and reasonable, considering the circumstances herein as
well as the global coverage and reputation of private respondents Levi Strauss
& Company and Levi Strauss (Phil.), Inc.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 30, 1998, of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51553 AFFIRMING the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, dated July 14, 1995, is hereby
MODIFIED so that nominal damages are deleted but the amount of P50,000 is
hereby awarded only as TEMPERATE DAMAGES.
In all other respects, said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, to wit:
a) the writ of preliminary injunction is made permanent;
b) the defendants CVS
Garment and Industrial Company and Venancio Sambar are ordered also to pay the
plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, and to pay the costs; and
c) the Director of the National Library is ordered to cancel the Copyright Registration No. 1-1998 issued in the name of Venancio Sambar.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] RTC Records, p. 260.
[2] Id. at
274-275.
[3] Rollo, p. 20.
[4] Id. at 34.
[5] Salcedo vs.
People, G.R. No. 137143, 347 SCRA 499, 504-505 (2000).
[6] Id. at 1.
[7] David vs. Manila
Bulletin Publishing Company, Inc., G.R. No. 139272, 347 SCRA 68, 69 (2000).
[8] Section 1, Rule 131:
Burden of Proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount
of evidence required by law.
[9] Paras. Rules of
Court 448 (Third Edition, 2000).
[10] Section 22. Infringement, what constitutes. Any person
who shall use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or trade-name
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods,
business or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source of
such business; or reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such
mark or trade-name and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods,
business or services, shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for
any or all the remedies herein provided.
Section 23. Actions, and damages and injunction for infringement. - Any person entitled to the exclusive use of a registered mark or trade-name may recover damages in a civil action from any person who infringes his rights, and the measure of the damages suffered shall be either the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed his said rights, or the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of the defendant of the value of the services in connection with which the mark or trade-name was used in the infringement of the rights of the complaining party. In cases where actual intent to mislead the public or to defraud the complaining party shall be shown, in the discretion of the court, the damages may be doubled.
The complaining party, upon proper showing, may also be
granted injunction.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Heirs of Crisanta
Y. Gabriel-Almoradie vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, 229 SCRA 15, 30
& 34 (1994).
[13] See note 10.
[14] Hoffman vs. Le
Traunik, 209 Federal Reporter 375, 379 (1913).
[15] Ventanilla vs.
Centeno, No. L-14333, 1 SCRA 215, 216 (1961).
[16] Art. 2224, Civil
Code: Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered where the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.