FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131734.
March 7, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEPITO (Piting) SEBASTIAN y SINDOL, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is an appeal from
the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan,
Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 09-700, convicting accused-appellant of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity.
The facts as narrated by
the prosecution witnesses are as follows: On the night of June 3, 1991, a
certain Cesar Dumaoal hosted a pre-wedding celebration in his house in Buguey,
Cagayan. The victim and the
accused-appellant were among those invited to attend the celebration. At about 8:00 o’clock of the same evening,
when the victim and his companions were about to enter the gate of the host’s
house, accused-appellant approached them and told the victim that he had been
wanting to see him. Thereafter,
accused-appellant entered the house of Cesar Dumaoal. The victim sensed danger, thus he was advised by his friends to
go home. When the victim’s group was
about to go home, however, accused-appellant and his cohorts blocked their
way. The victim’s group decided to stay
inside the house of Cesar Dumaoal, and they were told to stay in the mess hall. In the course of the celebration, the operator
played a loud rock song. At that
instant, accused-appellant rushed to the victim and shot him. The bullet tore
through the abdomen of the victim, causing his death. Then, accused-appellant fled.[2]
On the other hand,
accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He testified that he was on the dance floor with a lady companion
when he heard that somebody was shot.
When he ran towards the scene of the disturbance, he saw the wounded
victim being carried by a certain Celso Upano.
He thereafter entered and sought cover inside the house of Cesar
Dumaoal.[3]
On March 14, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentences him to reclusion perpetua. He is further directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
No costs.[4]
In the instant appeal,
accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and that he
should be convicted only of homicide.
It is well settled that
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. [5]
In the case at bar, the
sudden and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim clearly shows that the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The alleged animosity between the victim and
accused-appellant, as well as their encounter which preceded the shooting
incident, will not preclude treachery because said qualifying circumstance may
still be considered even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his
person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[6] Here, accused-appellant evidently timed his
attack with the sudden blast of music.
The shot was therefore a complete surprise to the victim, rendering him
utterly defenseless at the time of the assault. Hence, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
However, as to the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, there is merit in
accused-appellant’s contention that said circumstance should not have been
considered in the case at bar. The
elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the accused
to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the
accused has clung to his determination; (3) a lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.[7] As there is neither evidence of planning or
preparation to kill nor of the time when the plot was conceived, evident
premeditation cannot be considered in the instant case.[8]
Nevertheless, the crime
committed is still murder in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. At the time
of the commission of the crime on June 3, 1991, murder was punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death.
Since neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances were proved, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period,[9] i.e., reclusion perpetua.
In addition to the civil
indemnity of P50,000.00, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, which needs no proof considering that the
conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged is sufficient to justify
said award.[10]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 09-700,
finding accused-appellant Pepito (Piting) Sebastian y Sindol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased
the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Emerito M.
Agcaoili.
[2] TSN, August 19, 1992, pp.
3-12 and October 12, 1993, pp. 4-11.
[3] TSN, April 4, 1995, pp.
7-13.
[4] Rollo, p.
31.
[5] People v. Lascota,
275 SCRA 591, 598 [1997], citing People v. Torres, 247 SCRA 212 [1995];
and People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 [1994].
[6] People v. Tobias,
267 SCRA 229, 255 [1997], citing People v. Manlusoc, 258 SCRA 1 [1996].
[7] People v. Salvador,
et al., 279 SCRA 164, 178 [1997], citing People v. Ganzagan, Jr.,
247 SCRA 220 [1995].
[8] People v. Nazareno,
et al., 260 SCRA 256, 282 [1996], citing People v. Salvador, 224
SCRA 819 [1993].
[9] Article 64(1), Revised Penal
Code.
[10] People v. Panado,
348 SCRA 679, 690-691 [2000].