FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129682.
March 21, 2002]
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAŃAGAS-PAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is a petition for
review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon[2] which confirmed petitioners’ title over the
lots subject of the instant petition. Petitioners further seek to annul and set
aside the resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals denying their urgent
motion to recall the judgment entered[4] in the land registration case.
The antecedent facts are
as follows:
Sometime in November
1960, petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and
Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon an
application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to Lots 1
and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in
San Narciso, Quezon.[5]
On May 4, 1961, the Court
of First Instance entered an order of default against the whole world, except
spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten (10) days to
file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioner’s predecessors,
Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the coverage of the
application. The remaining parcel of
land covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of 3,804.261 square meters.
On June 15, 1967, the
Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners’ title to
the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT
No. O-12665 was issued in the name of petitioners.
Almost eighteen (18)
years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings in
LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of First Instance of
Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register
of deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land
as part of the public domain.[6]
The Republic claimed that
at the time of filing of the land registration case and of rendition of the
decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under
LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180;
hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners’ title thereto can not be confirmed for
lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land in the manner and for
the length of time required by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. Neither did petitioners have
any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No. 496, as
amended. Consequently, the Court of
First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over the res and any
proceedings had therein were null and
void.[7]
On the other hand,
petitioners raised the special defenses of indefeasibility of title and res
judicata. They argued that due to
the lapse of a considerable length of time, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon in the land registration case has become final and
conclusive against the Republic.
Moreover, the action for reversion of the land to the public domain is
barred by prior judgment.[8]
In a decision promulgated
on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that the land in
question was forestral land; hence not registrable. There was no evidence on record to show that the land was
actually and officially delimited and classified as alienable or disposable
land of the public domain. Therefore,
the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the application for registration and to decide the same. Consequently, the action to declare null and
void the June 15, 1967 decision for lack of jurisdiction did not
prescribe. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondents, and as prayed for:
(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 is hereby declared null and void, and accordingly set aside;
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. O-12665, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-84439, T-93857 and T-117618 deriving therefrom, as well as any other derivative titles, are declared null and void;
(c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province is ordered to cancel said titles; and
(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted to the State.
Without pronouncement as to costs.”[9]
On July 16, 1986,
petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the afore-cited decision[10] reiterating that the land in question was
agricultural because it was possessed and cultivated as such long before its
classification as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955. Petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation of said land for agricultural and cattle
raising purposes as far back as the Spanish regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director of Lands,[11] private interest had intervened and
petitioners acquired vested rights which can no longer be impaired by the
subsequent classification of the land as timberland by the Director of
Forestry.
On August 20, 1986, the
appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[12] On December 12, 1986, the decision of June
27, 1986 attained finality and judgment was entered in the book of entries of
judgments.[13]
On April 2, 1987,
petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside entry of judgment on the ground
that Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila, petitioners’ counsel of record, was not
furnished a copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.[14] In the absence of such notice, the decision
of the appellate court did not become final and executory.
On October 22, 1987, the
Court of Appeals set aside and lifted the entry of judgment in CA-G. R. SP No.
07115 and directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners’ counsel a copy of
the August 20, 1986 resolution.[15]
For petitioners’ inaction
despite service of the August 20, 1986 resolution, the June 27, 1986 decision
became final and executory. On March 2,
1988, entry of judgment was again made in the land registration case.
On September 4, 1995,
Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as counsel for petitioners.[16]
On April 1, 1996,
petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. George I. Howard, filed with the
Court of Appeals an urgent motion to recall the entry of judgment,[17] which was denied by the appellate court on
December 16, 1996.[18]
The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that it raised arguments
already discussed and resolved in the urgent motion to recall entry of
judgment.[19]
Hence, the instant
petition for review.[20]
Petitioners claim that
their title to the land became incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year
after issuance of the decree of registration.
Hence, the Republic’s cause of action was barred by prescription and res
judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years from
the time the decree of registration was made.
Contrary to the appellate court’s findings, the land is agricultural and
the inclusion and classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as
timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of the land in question since time immemorial and for more than
thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for registration in
1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside entry of
judgment in the land registration case.
The petition lacks merit.
Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.[21]
Evidence extant on record
showed that at the time of filing of the application for land registration and
issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of
petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain, as
per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985,
thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang, San Narciso, Quezon, containing an area of 3,804.261 square meters as described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-117618 x x x registered in the name of Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Mańgas is verified to be within the Timberland Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The land is, therefore, within the administrative jurisdiction and control of the Bureau of Forest Development, and not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law.
[Sgd.]ARMANDO
CRUZ
Supervising
Cartographer[22]
This fact was even
admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the court a quo on
March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classified as
forming part of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.[23] Since no imperfect title can be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued to
herein petitioners is considered void ab initio.[24]
Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.[25] To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.[26]
In the case at bar, there
was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as disposable or
alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.[27] Declassification of forest land is an
express and positive act of Government.[28] It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed
waived.[29] It calls for proof.[30]
The court a quo
found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republic’s failure
to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural
purposes, a finding which is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land.
There is a big difference
between “forest” as defined in the dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a
classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive of what appears on the
land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes. The “forest land” started out
as a “forest” or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and
underbrush. However, the cutting down
of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert
the land of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable
agricultural land.[31]
The classification of
forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or
status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.[32] A person cannot enter into forest land and
by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards
an eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect
title.[33]
As ruled in the case of Heirs
of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:[34]
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Moreover, the original
text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, which took effect
on December 1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricultural land of the
public domain are subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:
Section 48. x x x
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that
the applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must prove that the land is
alienable public land.[35] In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do
so.
Petitioners’ contention
that the Republic is now barred from questioning the validity of the
certificate of title issued to them considering that it took the government
almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does
not run against the State.[36] The lengthy occupation of the disputed land
by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the
patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is
inalienable and indisposable.[37]
In light of the
foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside the June 15, 1967
decision of the court a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted
back to the public domain. Since the
land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same. Any
proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the
respect accorded to a valid judgment.
Consequently, the Court
of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners’ motion to set aside the judgment
rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official leave.
[1] Promulgated on June
27, 1986; Justice Tensuan, ponente, Justices Zosa, Mendoza and
Javellana, concurring. Court of Appeals Records, pp. 116-121.
[2] In LRC Case No.
91-G, LRC Rec. Case No. N-19930.
[3] Dated December 16,
1996 and July 2, 1997 in AC-G.R. No. SP-07115, entitled Republic of the
Philippines, et al. v. Getulio Pagkatipunan, et al.
[4] Dated March 2, 1988.
[5] Docketed as LRC No.
91-G.
[6] Docketed as AC-G.R.
SP No. 07115, Court of Appeals Records, pp. 1-7.
[7] Court of Appeals
Records, p. 4.
[8] Ibid., pp.
33-38.
[9] Court of Appeals
Records, pp. 116-121, at pp. 120-121.
[10] Ibid., pp.
124-155.
[11] 48 O.G. 3967;
CA-G.R. No. 5430-R, June 13, 1962.
[12] Court of Appeals
Records, p. 157.
[13] Ibid., pp.
158-159.
[14] On July 16, 1986,
Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila of the Quasha law firm entered his appearance as lead
counsel for petitioners, in
collaboration with the previous counsel, Atty.
Milberto B. Zurbano. Atty.
Doronila informed the court that henceforth, all copies of motions, orders,
judgments and papers relative to the land registration case should be
addressed to him.
[15] Court of Appeals
Records, p. 210.
[16] Ibid., p.
215.
[17] Ibid., pp.
218-221.
[18] Ibid., pp.
226-228.
[19] Court of Appeals
Records, p. 254.
[20] Rollo, pp.
8-34.
[21] Menguito v.
Republic, 348 SCRA 128, 139 [2000], citing De Ocampo v. Arlos, 343 SCRA
716, 724 [2000].
[22] Certification, Court
of Appeals Records, p. 69.
[23] Court of Appeals’
Decision of June 27, 1986, citing TSN, March 10, 1986, p. 11.
[24] Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296, 310 [1998].
[25] Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, 346 [1993].
[26] Santiago v.
De Los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 152 [1974].
[27] Ituralde v.
Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293, 296 [1999], citing Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 181
SCRA 443, 448 [1990].
[28] Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, Note 24, at p. 347.
[29] Director of Land
Management v. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 455, 461 [1989].
[30] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476, 481 [1987].
[31] Ibid., at pp.
482-483.
[32] Dela Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230, 236 [1998].
[33] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 29, at p. 482.
[34] 126 SCRA 69, 75
[1983].
[35] Republic v.
Doldol, 295 SCRA 359, 364 [1998].
[36] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 721,734 [1989].
[37] De la Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 31, at p. 236.