THIRD DIVISION
[AC No. 99-634.
June 10, 2002]
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
After agreeing to take up
the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering
is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint
for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
“x x x x x x x x x
“That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
“That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which
services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary
complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A,
the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
“That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be
sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the
instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
“That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
“That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
“That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
“That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
“That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I
confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28,
1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being
caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money
for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered
to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999,
in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies
of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
“That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;”
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999,
pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant
“for being totally outrageous and baseless.” The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former’s law partners. After
their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against
Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After
Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this
letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed
to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so.
Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the
former’s law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to
the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the
case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant
to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant’s wife
All of these respondent
did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said
that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the
latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent,
whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the
latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted
to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant
promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999,
complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent’s secretary and
told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of
the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant,
informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before
the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid
was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February
1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land
owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the
parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999,
complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondent’s acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using
his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive
renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondent’s checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that
he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had
been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP’s
Recommendation
In its Report and
Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
“x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill
complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and
that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by
his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and
his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his
part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year.”[4]
The Court’s
Ruling
We agree with the
Commission’s recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client’s Funds
Central to this case are
the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the
money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that
complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence,
the former’s failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges
that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was
for attorney’s fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded.
Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client’s cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty,
and integrity of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this
Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The
former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the
kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A
lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former’s business.
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect
to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment
is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client
relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former’s fees.[8] Hence, despite the
fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and
that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had
agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time,
in order to protect the client’s interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal
matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise
constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.[9] They owe entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client’s rights,
and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is
the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted
that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed
upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for
something else. Moreover, upon discovering the “mistake” -- if indeed it was
one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant’s attention to the matter and should
have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice
of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age,
members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional
but a secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is
a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may
be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to
the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that
lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in
their professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the
funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a lien upon the
client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such
fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of
their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to
do so constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to
protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from
an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with
it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public.[18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and
thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned
the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do
not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the
bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of
violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all
courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to
include a copy in respondent’s file.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.
[1] Records, pp. 2-3.
[2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Id., at pp.
20-28.
[4] Report and
Recommendation, pp. 10-11; records, 261-262.
[5] R. Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1997 ed., p. 156.
[6] Sipin-Nabor v.
Baterina, AC No. 4073, June 28, 2001.
[7] Hilado v.
David, 84 Phil. 569, September 21, 1949.
[8] Junio v.
Grupo, AC No. 5020, December 18, 2001.
[9] Aromin v.
Boncavil, 315 SCRA 1, September 22, 1999.
[10] Tan v. Lapak,
350 SCRA 74, January 23, 2001.
[11] Cantiller v.
Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246, December 18, 1989.
[12] Canlas v.
Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, August 8, 1988.
[13] R. Agpalo, supra,
p.12.
[14] Ibid., p. 13.
[15] Medina v.
Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, September 26, 1964.
[16] Sipin-Nabor v.
Baterina, supra; Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694, March 27, 2000,
citing Obia v. Catimbang, 196 SCRA 23, April 19, 1991.
[17] Tanhueco v.
De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760, April 25, 1989.
[18] Aromin v.
Boncavil, supra.
[19] Montano v.
Integrated Bar of the Phils. et al., AC No. 4215, May 21, 2001.