SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135536.
June 6, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VICENTE GARCIA TURTOGA alias “RICKY,” DOMINADOR REGANA alias “JUN MARGALLO,”
and 3 JOHN DOES, accused,
VICENTE GARCIA TURTOGA alias “RICKY,” accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated September 4, 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, in Criminal Case No. 94-0398, as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Vicente Turtoga alias “Ricky” GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE and HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Appellant Vicente Turtoga
alias “Ricky,” with Dominador Regana alias “Jun Margallo” and three John Does,
were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The Information[3] dated March 9, 1994 reads:
That on or about the 25th day of January 1994 in the municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with three (3) John Does, whose true names are still unknown, and all of them mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one Elena Padilla and against the will of said complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest from her cash money and pieces of jewels amounting to the total sum of P60,000.00, belonging to said Elena Padilla and her husband, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforementioned amount of P60,000.00;
That on the occasion of said robbery and inorder to insure the commission of the said felony, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and slash the neck of said Elena Padilla, thereby causing her serious physical injuries which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment,
appellant[5] pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced soon thereafter.
The prosecution presented
eight witnesses, namely: the victim’s husband, Col. Nicanor Padilla; Police
Officers SPO2 Elpidio Soquiña and Police Section Chief David Catipay, Nicanor
Alfonso, Carlito Rosales, Rolando Diño, Rogelio Lumagbas and Dr. Roberto Garcia
of the NBI.
As the lone witness for
the defense, appellant denied any participation in the commission of the crime
and proffered alibi in his defense.
COL. NICANOR PADILLA[6] testified that at around 7:00 A.M. of
January 25, 1994, he woke up to find his wife, Elena Padilla, no longer beside
him. He did not find this unusual as Elena would normally wake up at around
4:00 or 5:00 A.M. to water her garden. The couple slept together in an upstairs
bedroom. Nicanor went down to make himself a cup of coffee. It was then that he noticed that both the
front and back doors of the house were open, although the gate and the terrace
doors were still padlocked. He thought that it was Elena who opened the doors
and was only out in the garden watering her plants. He wondered though why it was taking her so long to come into the
house as she usually did when he was already downstairs. Nicanor went out through the back door and
immediately saw his wife lying on her back. He thought that she had a heart
attack but when he tried to help her sit down, to his utter shock, Elena’s head
flipped to the left side of her shoulder, revealing a gaping wound on her neck.[7]
After recovering his
composure, Nicanor went to another room downstairs to get coins to make a phone
call to his son. He found the door to
the room wide open and the room had apparently been ransacked. Drawers were on
his bed and papers were scattered all over.
He also discovered that all his money placed in an envelope was gone and
pieces of jewelry were also missing. These were valued at P60,000.[8]
When Elena was lying in
state at the Funeraria Nacional in Quezon City, the police arrived and with
them was appellant Vicente Turtoga, also known as “Ricky”. Nicanor readily
identified Turtoga as one of the men who previously worked for him and his
wife.[9] Nicanor then recalled that at around the
last week of November 1993, Turtoga and another worker named Dominador Regana
alias “Jun Margallo” went to their house and begged his wife to give them
work. The two were told to come back
the following day. The next day, they came with their carpentry tools. They were to add to the height of the hollow
block fence from five to eight feet high.[10] The two worked daily from Monday to Saturday
and it was on Saturdays when they received their wages for the week from his
wife. Nicanor narrated that during
Saturdays, his wife always paid them on the “terasa/balkonahe” of their
house. Whenever she was short of cash, she would go to Nicanor’s room downstairs
to get more. She did this in full view of the two workers.[11]
The work lasted until
December 23, 1993 when Mrs. Padilla asked them to temporarily stop work for the
Christmas holidays. As instructed, the men returned after Christmas, but were
told to just resume work after the New Year. A day or two after the New Year,
only appellant Turtoga returned. When Nicanor asked him what happened,
appellant said he needed to borrow money from Mrs. Padilla to pay for their
rent or else his family was going to be evicted. However, Mrs. Padilla refused
the request and instead scolded the appellant. Turtoga gruffly and hurriedly
left.[12]
Witness NICANOR ALFONSO,[13] a carpenter, corroborated Col. Padilla’s
testimony that appellant Vicente Turtoga and his co-accused Jun Margallo, had
worked at the Padilla house in December 1993.
He often saw them there.
SPO2 ELPIDIO SOQUIÑA,[14] testified that in the course of police
investigation, he met Rolando Diño who told them where accused Jun Margallo
lived.[15] When they went to the given address, they
talked to Margallo’s wife, Dolores Margallo, who informed them that Jun
Margallo had not returned home since January 25, 1994.[16]
Witness CARLITO ROSALES[17] testified that Dolores gave him a letter[18] from appellant Turtoga who was then in
Olongapo, with a message that appellant wanted to surrender. In his letter, appellant stated that
Margallo had no complicity in the crime. The same piece of paper was brought by
Dolores to the police station and given to SPO2 Soquiña. He identified the
letter in court.[19]
Section Chief Inspector
DAVID CATIPAY[20] testified that several witnesses were
invited to shed light on the matter. Among those who volunteered information
was the wife of Jun Margallo. Her affidavit states that the night before the
incident occurred, her husband and three companions were drinking at their
house. When she asked what it was they were talking about, her husband kicked
her. The affidavit was presented and identified by Catipay in court. On the
basis of the information contained in the letter handed to him by SPO2 Soquiña,
the same document which came from Dolores Margallo, they were able to ascertain
the whereabouts of appellant Turtoga. Catipay led the stake out operation in
Olongapo and shortly thereafter, Turtoga was apprehended. However, despite
continuing surveillance, accused Dominador Regana alias Jun Margallo remains at
large. So do three co-accused John
Does.
ROGELIO LUMAGBAS
testified[21] that between the hours of five and six in
the morning of January 25, 1994, he was with his friend Abelardo Mendez at the
latter’s house, situated about four or five meters from the back of the house
of the Padillas. He was helping to fix Abelardo’s house. At the time in
question, the witness and Abelardo were standing face to face, with Abelardo facing
the back portion of the Padillas’ house. Abelardo suddenly shouted “Oy, may
taong galing kina Mrs. Padilla, tumalon sa bakod.”[22] Rogelio immediately turned and saw three
persons walking hurriedly away from the direction of the Padillas’ fence.[23] Rogelio only saw their backs. He stated that
two of them were wearing white t-shirts while the other one wore a red t-shirt.
One of the persons in white was carrying a bag tucked under his armpit.[24] Rogelio could not identify them as he was
unable to see their faces. However, the witness stated that the persons were of
medium height. At this point in the proceedings, appellant was made to stand
and turn his back towards the witness. Rogelio then stated that Turtoga’s
height approximated that of one of the persons he saw that day.[25]
For his defense,
appellant VICENTE “RICKY” GARCIA TURTOGA,[26] testified. He denied knowing the spouses
Padilla[27] and claimed that at the time of the
incident, he was in Olongapo. He said on January 6, 1994, he went to Olongapo
with Jun Margallo upon the latter’s request, in order to help fix the house of
an old couple who were Margallo’s relatives.[28] He stayed there for three weeks but could
not recall the old couple’s names.[29] He did not collect wages for the work as he
was moved with pity for the old couple’s situation,[30] although he previously testified that he
accepted the work in Olongapo to be able to send money to his siblings.[31] Further, he testified that he previously
worked as a helper in a memorial park for five months since he arrived from
Bohol.[32] He denied writing the letter stating that he
wanted to surrender. He averred that he suffered in the hands of the police who
forced him to confess. He also said he
was not assisted by counsel when he was forced to admit to the crime.[33]
The trial court convicted
appellant.[34] Quoted hereunder are the circumstances upon
which the decision was anchored:[35]
First, the accused Vicente Turtoga alias “Ricky” and Dominador Regana alias “Jun Margallo” were workers of the victim. They were able to work in the victim’s house since the accused Jun Margallo has been known to the victim and her husband when he was introduced to them by witness Nicanor Alfonso, the person who regularly does the carpentry jobs in the victim’s house in March, 1993 when the latter needed a helper in the work he was doing in the victim’s house.
Second, the accused Vicente Turtoga alias “Ricky” was introduced to the victim and her husband by his co-accused Jun Margallo when the latter asked her to give them jobs to do in the victim’s house from November, 1993 up to December 23, 1993.
Third, everytime the victim pays them their weekly wage which was always done in the “terasa”, and the victim’s money runs short, she always goes to her husband’s room downstairs to get the money so that the wages of the workers will be fully paid, and the victim does it in full view of the accused.
Fourth, the fact that the money and jewelries in the room of Mr. Padilla downstairs were the ones that were lost.
Fifth, the accused “Ricky” went to the house of the victim shortly after New Year, 1994 to borrow money, but the victim did not accommodate him, and instead, she lambasted him with words which led him to leave in a hurry without showing any respect to the old woman.
Sixth, the accused Jun Margallo and Vicente Turtoga were the last people who had contact with the victim and her husband, aside maybe from their family because they were seen by witness Nicanor Alfonso working in the Padilla residence in December, 1993, since the former was also working at a place not far from the Padilla residence.
Seventh, the witness Nicanor Padilla readily recognized the accused Vicente Turtoga as one of their workers without pointing to him as the perpetrator of the crime when the accused was brought by the police to the victim’s wake at Funeraria Nacional to be identified by Mr. Padilla.
Eighth, the accused Vicente Turtoga is lying when he said that he does not know the victim or her husband since he was readily identified by the victim’s husband as one of their workers and by witness Nicanor Alfonso as having seen him work in the victim’s house in December, 1993.
Ninth, accused Jun Margallo and his co-accused Vicente Turtoga left their place since January 25, 1994 and went to Olongapo to hide and not merely to do repair works in the house of Jun Margallo’s cousin.
Tenth, accused Vicente Turtoga made conflicting testimonies when asked if he was paid or not when they did repair works at Jun Margallo’s cousin’s house in Olongapo, and that, he cannot even name the names of the people with whom he worked for and stayed with in Olongapo, the family name of his alleged cousin whom he allegedly stayed with for five (5) months after he came from the province, and the number of persons who were staying in his cousin’s house at Sampaloc Site II, the place where he allegedly lived.
Eleventh, he cannot give straight answers or name names and he was just mumbling things during his testimony in Court, and could not give a straight answer.
Twelfth, accused Vicente Turtoga failed to present other witnesses to corroborate his allegation that he could not have committed the crime since he was in Olongapo when it happened.
For the crime of robbery
with homicide, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
In his appeal before us,
he assigns but one error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
NECESSARY TO CONVICT HIM.[36]
Thus, the issue for
resolution is whether there is sufficient evidence to establish appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Priorly, we must inquire whether the testimonies
of the witnesses for the prosecution vis-à-vis those of the defense are
credible. Likewise, we must resolve whether the requisite elements to convict
the accused-appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence have been proved.
On the issue of
credibility, the trial court found the testimony of appellant riddled with
the contradicting statements. His demeanor at the witness stand was marked by
studied hesitance. His inability to recall basic and vital information relative
to his whereabouts during the critical period when the offense was being
committed, and soon thereafter, inevitably led the court to dismiss appellant’s
testimony as a mere concoction to support his defense of alibi.[37] As a
result, the trial court rejected his defense. Given that alibi is easy to
fabricate, we agree that appellant’s defense is weak. As the trial court noted, his testimony on this score was
uncorroborated.[38]
In contrast, the positive
assertions of the prosecution witnesses contradict appellant’s testimony. Col.
Nicanor Padilla positively identified the appellant as the companion of Jun
Margallo when both were hired to improve the Padillas’ fence. This fact was
corroborated by witness Nicanor Alfonso who saw appellant at work in the
Padilla premises. That Col. Padilla knew Turtoga could not be doubted. Col.
Padilla had seen and conversed with appellant on several occasions. Col.
Padilla’s declaration to the police that he knew Turtoga upon seeing the latter
at the wake was spontaneous. Thus, appellant’s complete denial that he was
acquainted with the Padilla spouses failed to convince the trial court. In our view, his credibility had been
tested, and found wanting.
We also find incredible
that appellant failed to remember even the names of the two old people with
whom he stayed in Olongapo. If it were true that appellant had stayed with this
couple, fixed their house and developed such pity for them enough to forego
asking for his wages, then it would not be unreasonable to expect appellant to
at least know their names. Appellant stated that the reason he went to Olongapo
was to earn money in order to send cash to his siblings. But he contradicted himself in the same
breath when he declared that he did not ask for payment for his labor out of
pity for the old couple. These declarations are badges of unreliability. In the face of testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who have not been shown to harbor any improper motive to falsely
testify, appellant’s testimony is not only riddled with contradictions but also
utterly lacks credibility. In this assessment of the trial court, we fully
concur. For, as previously held in People
vs. Emanence,[39] the matter of assigning values to the statements of witnesses in court
is within the competence of the trial court, who had seen their manner and
demeanor during trial.
Coming now to the main
issue: Is the prosecution evidence against the accused-appellant sufficient
to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt?
Despite appellant’s
protestation of innocence, the trial court found that the circumstances adduced
and proven by the prosecution form an unbroken chain leading to a fair and
reasonable but ineluctable conclusion pointing to the appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.[40] As already discussed, the trial court
believed the prosecution witnesses but did not give credence to appellant’s
testimony for being inconsistent. His
demeanor on the witness stand was less than straight-forward; his testimony was
far from candid. His alibi turned out
to be a mere concoction.
The trial court paid
emphatic attention to the testimony of witnesses concerning the incident
between the victim and the appellant. Their last meeting ended on a bad note
when Mrs. Padilla scolded the appellant for being a spendthrift. She refused to
lend money to appellant who claimed he was in dire need. Appellant resented
this denial and left in a huff. Moreover, appellant hurriedly left for Olongapo
on January 25, 1994. Such circumstance
bespeaks of flight indicative of guilt.
In its Brief for the
People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for affirmance, stating
that although it was unable to present direct evidence in this case,[41] the circumstances outlined by the trial
court have shown the following indicators of accused-appellant’s guilt: motive,
flight and unusual conduct.[42] The OSG reiterates that the evaluation of
appellant’s testimony and the findings of the trial court deserve great weight
on appeal.[43]
We note that in his
Brief, appellant emphasizes the fact that none of the prosecution witnesses had
testified actually seeing him going to the victim’s house just before she was
slain. He contends that there is paucity of evidence indicating that appellant
alone could have known or had access to the victim’s house and the room where
the money and jewelry were kept. Appellant submits that, granting the evidence
for the defense may be weak, the evidence for the prosecution is no better.
Appellant likewise invokes the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In the present case, the
trial court was confronted with the situation wherein direct evidence is not
available to pinpoint the perpetrators of the crime. Notably, there was no eyewitness
presented at the trial nor was any confession made available in regard to the
commission of the crime. But the trial
court had recourse to the doctrine of available circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution in this case.
At times it is essential to resort to circumstantial evidence, since to
insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free
and deny proper protection to the community.[44]
Going carefully through
the circumstances found by the trial court, in the course of a painstaking
review of the records of this case, we find no cogent reason to reverse the
trial court’s conclusions. The totality of these factual findings proves beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant’s complicity in the dastardly act.
The following
circumstances were proven: (1) The
appellant knew and was known to the Padilla spouses. Together with co-accused
Dominador Regana alias Jun Margallo, appellant worked for the spouses from late
November until just before Christmas of 1993. (2) Appellant lied under oath
when he completely denied this fact during his testimony. (3) Appellant and his co-accused knew where
Mrs. Padilla kept her money. During the time appellant and his co-accused
worked for the Padillas, the victim paid them their weekly wage which was
always done on the terrace of the house. When the victim’s money ran short, she
would proceed to her husband’s room downstairs to get the extra cash. This was
done by the victim in full view of the two workers, who had the opportunity to
observe her actions closely. (4) The
same room downstairs was the one ransacked; from there were taken the money and
jewelry lost. (5) In early January of 1994, appellant alone went to see Mrs.
Padilla. He wanted to borrow money which he needed urgently for the payment of
arrears in rentals to avoid eviction of his family. Mrs. Padilla refused
appellant’s request and instead, the victim scolded appellant. Without a word,
appellant left in a huff. (6) Soon after the alleged offense was committed,
three persons were seen climbing over the fence of the Padillas. Witness
Rogelio Lumagbas saw the three walking hurriedly away from the place. One of
them had a bag tucked under his armpit. (7) Appellant and co-accused Dominador
Regana alias Jun Margallo left for Olongapo on January 25, 1994, the same day
when the crime was committed in the early hours of the morning. (8) The other
co-accused have likewise fled and remain at large. (9) Appellant failed to
substantiate his defense of alibi. His testimony was found to be inconsistent,
his demeanor highly suspect and his answers less than truthful.
We cannot ignore the
tedious process undergone by the prosecution in piecing the evidence together
in order to bring the appellant to justice. Painstaking police work resulted in
his apprehension. Save for the victim’s husband, we note that the prosecution
witnesses were police officers and impartial third persons who had no motive to
falsely testify against appellant. Moreover, it is likewise highly improbable
that Col. Padilla, the victim’s husband, would falsely accuse an innocent
person of the crime, for his natural inclination would be to pinpoint the real
culprit.[45] When there is no evidence that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit.[46]
Motive and opportunity
speak eloquently in this case. While motive of the accused in a criminal case
is generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive
becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence on the commission of the
crime is purely circumstantial.[47] Appellant was in dire need of money when he
approached the victim. But she refused to lend him any, and even openly scolded
him. It was established that appellant left in a huff without showing courtesy
to Mrs. Padilla. Appellant and co-accused Margallo did not return to work
anymore on the succeeding days, contrary to the instructions of Mrs. Padilla.
Thereafter, Mrs. Padilla was robbed and killed. Her money and jewelry were
taken on the occasion of the killing in the early hours of January 25, 1994.
The Padillas had no known enemies. Only the accused and his co-workers had
frequented the Padilla home in the course of their work. Who could have done the dastardly act?
In the present case,
motive proved to be the key element in establishing appellant’s guilt through
circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court. Robbery as a motive
explains the killing.[48] Coupled with evidentiary facts from which it
may be inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive could be sufficient
to support a conviction.[49]
In conjunction with
motive, we also take into account the finding of the trial court that appellant
had previously worked for the Padillas for several weeks, giving him and his
co-accused ample opportunity to plot their evil course of action. That they had
access to the inside of the house or at least knew how it appeared inside, is
shown by the fact that they were paid on the terrace of the house from which
vantage point they could see the room where the valuables were kept. In
addition, appellant knew that the occupants of the house were an elderly
couple. Thus, appellant was equipped with the necessary information to carry
out the crime. He took advantage of vital insider’s information at the
opportune time to consummate the offense.
Compounding the evidence
against him is his inability to substantiate his defense of alibi. The trial
court found that appellant was not able to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the locus criminis.[50] In sum, not only did appellant have the
motive to perpetrate the crime, these circumstances likewise show that
appellant had the opportunity to commit the same on the date, place and time in
question.
In addition, there is the
circumstance of flight by both the appellant and his co-accused. Flight, with
no plausible explanation therefor is a clear indication of guilt.[51] Put another way, unexplained flight
evidences guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.[52]
Well-taken is the
prosecution’s contention that, although individually, some of the circumstances
seem innocuous and do not appear incriminatory,[53] when all the circumstances are taken
together, especially with the circumstances of motive, flight and unusual
conduct, it leads to no other conclusion but that the accused and his
co-accused are guilty. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the
guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular
piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a
convincing picture pointing towards the inescapable conclusion that the accused
is the author of the crime.[54] The foregoing evidence found by the trial
court is consistent with the culpability of the accused and inconsistent with
his defense of denial and alibi.
His demeanor and the
contents of his testimony as found by the trial court belied his protestations
of innocence. Considering that appellant had a motive duly evinced by the facts
and the same was consistent with the nature of the crime committed, plus the
circumstance of unexplained flight, appellant’s fate was sealed in the eyes of
the trial court. In our view, beyond reasonable doubt, appellant’s guilt has
been convincingly proved.
In the assailed decision,
however, we note that the trial court failed to award damages. Consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,[55] the sum of P50,000 is awarded as
civil indemnity for the death of Elena Padilla. As actual damages, the amount
of P60,000 should also be awarded corresponding to the value of the cash
and jewelry stolen.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 274, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to DAMAGES. Appellant
is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide. Consequently, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law. Further, appellant is also directed to pay
the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P60,000
as actual damages.
Let a copy of this
decision be furnished to the Director-General of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) so that
the other accused who are still at large could be apprehended and promptly
brought to the bar of justice.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona,
JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
23-38.
[2] Id. at 38.
[3] Id. at 13.
[4] Ibid.
[5] All the other
accused are at large.
[6] TSN, November 14,
1994, pp. 3-26.
[7] Id. at 4-7.
[8] Id. at 8-10.
[9] Id. at 11-12.
[10] Id. at 12-15.
[11] Id. at 16-19.
[12] Id. at 19-21.
[13] TSN, April 12, 1995,
pp. 20-31.
[14] TSN, December 5,
1994, pp. 3-30.
[15] Id. at 10-11.
[16] Id. at 12.
[17] TSN, February 27,
1995, pp. 3-17.
[18] Records, pp.
308-309, Marked as Exhibit “I”.
[19] Supra, note
14 at 13-14.
[20] See TSN, December 5,
1994, pp. 16-17.
[21] TSN, April 12, 1995,
pp. 4-31.
[22] Id. at 9.
[23] Id. at 9-10.
[24] Id. at 12.
[25] Id. at 13.
[26] TSN, October 16,
1996, pp. 4-15.
[27] Id. at 10,
13-14.
[28] Id. at 8.
[29] Id. at 12.
[30] TSN, February 10,
1997, p. 18.
[31] Supra, note
26 at 14.
[32] Id. at 9.
[33] Id. at 14-15.
[34] Rollo, p. 33.
[35] Id. at 68-70.
[36] Id. at 64.
[37] Id. at 33.
[38] Ibid.
[39] G.R. No. L-23106,
116 SCRA 613, 623 (1982).
[40] Rollo, pp.
35-37.
[41] Id. at 116.
[42] Id. at 117.
[43] Id. at 120.
[44] People vs. Andal,
G.R. No. 124933, 279 SCRA 474, 486 (1997), citing People vs. Ramos, G.R.
No. 104497, 240 SCRA 191, 198 (1995).
[45] People vs. Dela
Cruz, G.R. No. 138516-17, 343 SCRA 357, 376 (2000).
[46] People vs. Faco,
G.R. No. 115215, 314 SCRA 505, 516 (1999).
[47] People vs. Ragundiaz,
G.R. No. 124977, 334 SCRA 193, 209 (2000) citing People vs. Cayetano,
223 SCRA 770, 777 (1993).
[48] See People vs. Jarandilla,
G.R. Nos. 115985-86, 339 SCRA 381, 392 (2000).
[49] People vs. Taliman,
G.R. No. 109143, 342 SCRA 534, 546 (2000) citing People vs. Yip Wai
Ming, G.R. No. 120959, 264 SCRA 224, 236 (1996); People vs. Villaran,
G.R. No. 119058, 269 SCRA 630, 636 (1997) and People vs. Bernal, G.R.
No. 113685, 274 SCRA 197, 203 (1997).
[50] Rollo, p. 33.
[51] People vs. Zuela,
G.R. No.112177, 323 SCRA 589, 608-609 (2000).
[52] Supra, note
46 at 517.
[53] Rollo, p.
117.
[54] People vs. Fabon,
G.R. No. 133226, 328 SCRA 302, 316 (2000).
[55] People vs. Guarin,
G.R. No. 125964, 317 SCRA 234, 242 (1999).