SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133643.
June 6, 2002]
RITA SARMING, RUFINO SARMING, MANUEL SARMING, LEONORA VDA.
DE LOY, ERLINDA DARMING, NICANDRA SARMING, MANSUETA SARMING, ARTURO CORSAME,
FELY CORSAME, FEDERICO CORSAME, ISABELITA CORSAME, NORMA CORSAME, CESAR
CORSAME, RUDY CORSAME, ROBERTA CORSAME, ARTEMIO CORSAME, ELPIDIO CORSAME,
ENRIQUITA CORSAME, and GUADALUPE CORSAME TAN, petitioners, vs.
CRESENCIO DY, LUDIVINA DY-CHAN, TRINIDAD FLORES, LUISA FLORES, SATURNINA
ORGANISTA, REMEDIOS ORGANISTA, OFELIA ORGANISTA, LYDIA ORGANISTA, ZOSIMO
ORGANISTA, DOMISIANO FLORES, FLORITA FLORES, EDUARDO FLORES, BENIGNA FLORES,
ANGELINA FLORES, MARCIAL FLORES, and MARIO FLORES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This petition for review
assails the decision[1] dated September 23, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39401, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 in
Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City and the resolution[3] dated April 21, 1998 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The facts as culled from
records are as follows:
Petitioners are the
successors-in-interest of original defendant Silveria Flores, while respondents
Cresencio Dy and Ludivina Dy-Chan are the successors-in-interest of the
original plaintiff Alejandra Delfino, the buyer of one of the lots subject of
this case. They were joined in this
petition by the successors-in-interest of Isabel, Juan, Hilario, Ruperto,
Tomasa, and Luisa and Trinidad themselves, all surnamed Flores, who were also
the original plaintiffs in the lower court.
They are the descendants of Venancio[4] and Jose[5], the brothers of the original defendant
Silveria Flores.
In their complaint for
reformation of instrument against Silveria Flores, the original plaintiffs
alleged that they, with the exception of Alejandra Delfino, are the heirs of
Valentina Unto Flores, who owned, among others, Lot 5734, covered by OCT
4918-A; and Lot 4163, covered by OCT 3129-A, both located at Dumaguete City.
After the death of
Valentina Unto Flores, her three children, namely: Jose, Venancio, and
Silveria, took possession of Lot 5734 with each occupying a one-third
portion. Upon their death, their
children and grandchildren took possession of their respective shares. The other parcel, Lot 4163 which is solely
registered under the name of Silveria, was sub-divided between Silveria and
Jose. Two rows of coconut trees planted
in the middle of this lot serves as boundary line.
In January 1956, Luisa,
Trinidad, Ruperto and Tomasa, grandchildren of Jose and now owners of one-half
of Lot 4163, entered into a contract with plaintiff Alejandra Delfino, for the
sale of one-half share of Lot 4163 after offering the same to their co-owner,
Silveria, who declined for lack of money. Silveria did not object to the sale
of said portion to Alejandra Delfino.
Before preparing the
document of sale, the late Atty. Deogracias Pinili, Alejandra’s lawyer, called
Silveria and the heirs of Venancio to a conference where Silveria declared that
she owned half of the lot while the other half belonged to the vendors; and
that she was selling her three coconut trees found in the half portion offered
to Alejandra Delfino for P15. When
Pinili asked for the title of the land, Silveria Flores, through her daughter,
Cristita Corsame, delivered Original Certificate of Title No. 4918-A, covering
Lot No. 5734, and not the correct title covering Lot 4163. At that time, the parties knew the location
of Lot 4163 but not the OCT Number corresponding to said lot.
Believing that OCT No.
4918-A was the correct title corresponding to Lot 4163, Pinili prepared a
notarized Settlement of Estate and Sale (hereinafter “deed”) duly signed by the
parties on January 19, 1956. As a
result, OCT No. 4918-A was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 5078 was
issued in the names of Silveria Flores and Alejandra Delfino, with one-half
share each. Silveria Flores was present
during the preparation and signing of the deed and she stated that the title
presented covered Lot No. 4163.
Alejandra Delfino
immediately took possession and introduced improvements on the purchased lot,
which was actually one-half of Lot 4163 instead of Lot 5734 as designated in
the deed.
Two years later, when
Alejandra Delfino purchased the adjoining portion of the lot she had been
occupying, she discovered that what was designated in the deed, Lot 5734, was
the wrong lot. She sought the
assistance of Pinili who approached Silveria and together they inquired from
the Registry of Deeds about the status of Lot 4163. They found out that OCT No. 3129-A covering Lot 4163 was still on
file. Alejandra Delfino paid the
necessary fees so that the title to Lot 4163 could be released to Silveria
Flores, who promised to turn it over to Pinili for the reformation of the deed of
sale. However, despite repeated demands,
Silveria did not do so, prompting Alejandra and the vendors to file a complaint
against Silveria for reformation of the deed of sale with damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 41, docketed as Civil Case No.
3457.
In her answer, Silveria
Flores claimed that she was the sole owner of Lot 4163 as shown by OCT No.
3129-A and consequently, respondents had no right to sell the lot. According to her, the contract of sale
clearly stated that the property being sold was Lot 5734, not Lot 4163. She also claimed that respondents illegally
took possession of one-half of Lot 4163.
She thus prayed that she be declared the sole owner of Lot 4163 and be
immediately placed in possession thereof.
She also asked for compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
The case lasted for
several years in the trial court due to several substitutions of parties. The complaint was amended several
times. Moreover, the records had to be
reconstituted when the building where they were kept was razed by fire. But, earnest efforts for the parties to
amicably settle the matters among themselves were made by the trial court to no
avail.
On September 29, 1992,
the trial court found in favor of herein respondents, who were the plaintiffs
below, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs and veritably against the defendants and, as such, renders judgment accordingly, thereby ORDERING the defendants, the heirs of the deceased-defendant SILVERIA FLORES and her successors-in-interest the following:
1) To enter into the reformation of the subject contract or execute a mutual conveyance of sale, by making the one-half (1/2) eastern portion of Lot 4163, the subject of the document of sale, in favor of plaintiff, the late Alejandra Delfino or her heirs and/or successors-in-interest;
2) To sign a document ceding to the heirs of the heirs of Maxima Flores and Venancio Flores the excess of her one-third (1/3) share; and further ordering the heirs of the late Alejandra Delfino to correspondingly sign a document for the return of the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 5734 to the original registered owners, in exchange thereby;
3) To pay to the heirs of the late plaintiff Alejandra Delfino, the
sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and the sum of P10,000.00 as
moral damages;
4) To pay P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus the costs of
this suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
According to the trial
court, the claims of herein respondents were anchored on valid grounds. It noted that Alejandra had been occupying
one-half portion of Lot 4163 since 1956 and it was the one pointed to her by
the vendors. Citing the case of Atilano
vs. Atilano[7], it ruled that when one sells or buys real property, he sells or buys the
said property as is shown to her and as he sees it, at its actual setting and
by its physical metes and bounds, not by the mere lot number assigned to it in
the certificate of title. Thus, it
concluded that from the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that
the object of the sale, as understood by the parties, was that portion “Y” of
Lot 4163 and that its designation as Lot 5734 in the document of sale was a
simple mistake in the drafting of the document, which mistake, however, did not
vitiate the consent of the parties or affect the validity and the binding
effect of the contract between them.
Hence, the remedy of reformation of instrument is proper.[8]
Petitioners appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals agreed that the real intention of the
parties was for the sale of Lot 4163 which Alejandra Delfino had been
occupying, and the designation of Lot 5734 in the deed was a mistake in the
preparation of the document. It noted
that Silveria Flores did not object when Alejandra Delfino took possession of
one-half portion of Lot 4163 immediately after the sale, considering that it
was Silveria’s son, Michael Corsame, who developed the area purchased by
Alejandra.[10]
Aggrieved but undeterred,
the successors-in-interest of defendant Silveria Flores seasonably filed their
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals on the following grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3457 FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT, BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE AND SALE ITSELF, THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SILVERIA FLORES BECAUSE SHE DID NOT SELL HER LAND TO ALEJANDRA DELFINO. HENCE SILVERIA FLORES CANNOT BE BOUND NOR PREJUDICED BY THE CONTRACT OF SALE ENTERED BY ALEJANDRA DELFINO AND HER CO-PLAINTIFFS (CAPITOL INSURANCE & SURETY CO INC. V. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DEL DAVAO, 221 SCRA 98; OZAETA V. CA, 228 SCRA 350).
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO PRONOUNCE THAT SILVERIA FLORES WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE INVOLVING LOT NO. 5734 COVERED BY OCT NO. 4918-A CANNOT BE LEGALLY COMPELLED BY ALEJANDRA DELFINO THRU AN ACTION FOR REFORMATION OF CONTRACT TO EXECUTE A “CONVEYANCE OF SALE” INVOLVING LOT NO. 4163 COVERED BY OCT NO. 3129-A OWNED AND REGISTERED SOLELY IN THE NAME OF SILVERIA FLORES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS WHEN IT RULED THAT THE OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS LOT NO. 4163 COVERED BY OCT NO. 3129-A, DESPITE THE UNASSAILABLE FACT THAT THE OBJECT OF THE SETTLEMENT AND SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS LOT NO. 5734 COVERED BY OCT NO. 4918-A.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO MISTAKE IN THE DRAFTING OF THE DOCUMENT AS WELL AS IN THE OBJECT OF THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE AND SALE BECAUSE THE DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY ATTY. DEOGRACIAS PINILI, THE LAWYER OF ALEJANDRA DELFINO.
6. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS WHEN IT RULED THAT THE GRANDCHILDREN OF JOSE FLORES ARE OWNERS AND COULD SELL THE ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF LOT NO. 4163 TO ALEJANDRA DELFINO DESPITE THE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT LOT NO. 4163 COVERED BY OCT NO. 3129-A IS REGISTERED AND SOLELY OWNED BY SILVERIA FLORES WHO IS PAYING THE REAL PROPERTY TAXES.
7. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT DISREGARDED ARTICLE 1370 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE EVEN IF THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE AND SALE ARE CLEAR AND LEAVE NO DOUBT ON THE INTENTION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES.
8. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT A PUBLIC DOCUMENT EXECUTED AND ATTESTED THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF A NOTARY PUBLIC IS EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS IN CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER AND TO CONTRADICT IT THERE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE NOT MERELY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE (GEVERO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 77029, AUGUST 30, 1990; ZAMBO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 224 SCRA 855; REBULDEDA V. IAC, 155 SCRA 520; CHILIANCHIN V. COQUINCO, 84 PHIL. 714; CENTENERA V. GARCIA PALICIO, 29 PHIL. 470).
9. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED, REVISED AND MODIFIED THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF FRAUD, MISTAKE, INEQUITABLE CONDUCT OR ACCIDENT.
10. THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE HEIRS OF SILVERIA FLORES
TO PAY ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE HEIRS OF
ALEJANDRA DELFINO.[11]
After careful
consideration, we find the following relevant issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not there is a cause of
action for reformation of instrument against Silveria Flores, and consequently
the petitioners; (2) whether or not reformation of the subject deed is proper
by reason of mistake in designating the correct lot number; and (3) whether or
not the heirs of Alejandra Delfino are entitled to actual and moral damages
including attorney’s fees.
In seeking the reversal
of the appellate court’s decision, the heirs of Silveria Flores, herein
petitioners, ascribe to the appellate court several errors: first, the
Court of Appeals committed error in failing to appreciate that there is no
cause of action against Silveria as she was never a party to the contract of
sale; second, the appellate court erred in giving probative value to the
biased testimony of Trinidad Flores to the effect that Lot No. 4163 was
subdivided into two, one-half of which is occupied by her and her siblings; and
third, the appellate court erred in not considering the fact that
Silveria is the only registered owner of Lot 4163. Petitioners submit that the evidence adduced is insufficient to
sustain a decision in respondents’ favor.
Respondents, for their
part, maintain that the present petition is pro forma as it does not
raise any new matter worth considering.
They also assert that the arguments and issues raised by petitioners have
been more than adequately and exhaustively discussed by the trial court as well
as the Court of Appeals.[12]
On the first issue,
petitioners contend that there is no cause of action against them and their
predecessor-in-interest, Silveria Flores, because she and they were not parties
to the contract sought to be reformed.
However, a close perusal
of the deed would show that Silveria Flores was a party to the contract. She is not only the seller of the coconut
trees worth P15 but she was also one of the heirs entitled to the estate of
Venancio and Maxima, one of the heirs of Jose Flores. Her name did not appear as one of the sellers of one-half lot to Alejandra Delfino because she never
sold her share. What was sold was the
one-half share of Jose Flores, as represented by his heirs. It is also established that it was Silveria
Flores herself who delivered the subject lot to the vendee Alejandra
Delfino. Said the lower court:
The truth of the matter, is that what the plaintiffs-vendors really
intended to sell and what Alejandra Delfino intended to buy, of which both of
the parties agreed to be the subject of the transaction, was actually that
parcel of land, with two rows of coconut trees as the dividing line, and which
lot is known as Lot 4163.
This lot, on the western portion, was the very portion which was
pointed to and delivered to Alejandra Delfino by the original defendant
Silveria Flores and her two children, together with the vendors on January 19,
1956. When the title to the said
property was delivered to the notary public, for the preparation of the
document of sale, the title that was delivered was for Lot 5734. So, the document, that was executed, was
done by reason of mistake, inequitable conduct and accident, because the said
document did not express the true and real agreement and intention of the
contracting parties. What was made to
appear in the said document was the sale of the one-half portion of another
lot. Lot 5734, when in truth and in
fact, the subject property sold was Lot 4163.[13] (Underscoring
and italics supplied.)
Through her actions,
Silveria Flores had made the parties to the deed believe that the lot intended
to be the object of the contract was the same lot described in the deed. Thus, by mistake or accident, as well as inequitable
conduct, neither she nor her successors-in-interest could deny involvement in
the transaction that resulted in a deed that now ought to be reformed.
Worth stressing, the
existence of a cause of action is not determined by one’s involvement in a
contract. Participation in a contract
is not an element to determine the existence of a cause of action. The rule is that only the allegations in the
complaint may properly be considered in ascertaining the existence of a cause
of action. Lack of cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint and its existence may be determined only by
the allegations of the complaint.
Consideration of other facts is proscribed and any attempt to prove
extraneous circumstances is not allowed.[14]
The test of sufficiency
of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.[15] An examination of the complaint[16] shows herein respondents, as plaintiffs in
the trial court, are entitled to the relief of reformation of instrument if the
following factual allegations of respondents are deemed admitted, to wit: (1) that Silveria is a co-owner of Lots No.
5734 and 4163, in different shares; (2) that the heirs of Jose, her co-owner in
Lot No. 4163, offered to sell to her their one-half share but she declined for
lack of money; (3) that said share was later sold to Alejandra; (4) that
Silveria was asked to deliver the title of Lot No. 4163 but instead she
delivered the title of Lot No. 5734; (5) that after the sale, Alejandra
occupied one-half portion of Lot No. 4163 while Lot No. 5734 was still in the
possession of Venancio and the heirs of Maxima and Silveria; (6) that it was
only when Alejandra was about to buy the adjacent lot that she realized that
what was indicated in the Settlement of Estate and Sale was Lot No. 5734 and
not 4163. In sum, we find that the
original plaintiffs in the trial court alleged sufficient facts in the
complaint that properly constituted a cause of action against the defendants.
On the second issue,
petitioners contend respondents failed to show, specifically, a cause of action
for the reformation of the instrument in question. Reformation is that remedy in equity by means of which a written
instrument is made or construed so as to express or conform to the real
intention of the parties.[17] As provided in Article 1359 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
An action for reformation
of instrument under this provision of law may prosper only upon the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) there
must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contact; (2) the
instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the
failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due
to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.[18]
All of these requisites,
in our view, are present in this case. There was a meeting of the minds between
the parties to the contract but the deed did not express the true intention of
the parties due to mistake in the designation of the lot subject of the
deed. There is no dispute as to the
intention of the parties to sell the land to Alejandra Delfino but there was a
mistake as to the designation of the lot intended to be sold as stated in the
Settlement of Estate and Sale.
While intentions involve
a state of mind which may sometimes be difficult to decipher, subsequent and
contemporaneous acts of the parties as well as the evidentiary facts as proved
and admitted can be reflective of one’s intention. The totality of the evidence clearly indicates that what was
intended to be sold to Alejandra Delfino was Lot 4163 and not Lot 5734. As found by both courts below, there
are enough bases to support such conclusion.
We particularly note that one of the stipulated facts during the
pre-trial is that one-half of Lot 4163 is in the possession of plaintiff
Alejandra Delfino “since 1956 up to the present.”[19] Now, why would Alejandra occupy and possess
one-half of said lot if it was not the parcel of land which was the object of
the sale to her? Besides, as found by
the Court of Appeals, if it were true that Silveria Flores was the sole owner
of Lot 4163, then she should have objected when Alejandra Delfino took
possession of one-half thereof immediately after the sale. Additionally, we find no cogent reason to
depart from the conclusion of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court,
based on the evidence on record, that Silveria Flores owns only one-half of Lot
4163. The other half belongs to her
brother Jose, represented now by his grandchildren successors-in-interest. As such, the latter could rightfully sell
the land to Alejandra Delfino.
Furthermore, on record,
it has been shown that a spot investigation conducted by a duly licensed
surveyor revealed that Lot 4163 is subdivided into two portions, one belonging
to Silveria Flores and the other to the heirs of Jose Flores.[20] As found by the trial court, if indeed it
was Lot 5734 that was sold, then Silveria Flores was occupying more than her
share of the inherited lot. Thus:
x x x That, with respect to Lot No. 5734 and Lot No. 4292, in an
on-the-spot investigation, made by a licensed surveyor, Mr. Rilthe Dorado, his
findings thereon show that Silveria Flores is in possession on the western
portion of Lot 5734, with an area of more than one-half and, to be exact, with
an area of 2,462, in spite of the fact that she is the registered owner only of
a one-third (1/3) share; and admitting, for the sake of argument, that it was
the one-half portion, of Lot 5734, that was sold, why should Silveria Flores
possess more than 2,190 square meters, which is the 1/2 of Lot 5734, Isabel
Flores, the daughter of Venancio Flores is possessing the middle portion, with
an area of only 884 square meters; and Trinidad Flores Nodado, in
representation of her aunt, Maxima Flores, is possessing an area of 1,034 sq.
m.[21]
As a matter of fact, the
trial court also found that in spite of her title over Lot 4163, Silveria
recognized the right of Jose’s grandchildren over one-half portion of the
property.[22] The trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Trinidad Flores, one of the grandchildren, who testified as
follows:
Q: During the lifetime of Jose and Silveria when they were possessing Lot 4163, did they subdivide it because they were possessing it in common?
A: They subdivided it into two halves.
x x x
Q: And after Jose and Silveria subdivided Lot 4163, they possessed their respective shares of Lot 4163?
A: Yes.
x x x
Q: Now you said that you are the heirs of Jose and Roman Flores (father and son) and so when they died this portion of Lot 4163 devolved on you, did you ever take possession of Lot 4163?
A: Yes, we, the brothers and sisters immediately took possession of
it.[23]
On cross-examination,
Trinidad sufficiently explained why the title to Lot No. 4163 is in the name of
Silveria Flores alone. Thus:
Q: Now, this Lot No. 4163, do you know if this lot is also titled?
A: Yes, it was titled, only in the name of Silveria Flores because
my aunt was not able to go with her; only my aunt was alone at that time.[24]
x x x
Q: And as you have stated earlier, that what you are intending to sell was Lot 4163 to plaintiff Alejandra Delfino, and during this time that you sold this intended lot 4163, you were not aware this particular lot 4163 was titled exclusively in the name of Silveria Flores, is that correct?
A: I knew already that the said lot was already titled, but it was
titled only in the name of Silveria Flores because she was the only one who
went there to have it titled in her name.
And at the time of the sale of the lot, we demanded for the title from
Silveria Flores, and what she delivered was the 5734 (sic).[25]
Petitioners now claim
that the foregoing testimony of Trinidad Flores was biased. But we note that the appellate court
sustained the trial court’s reliance on her testimony, which both found to be
credible. As consistently held, factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court,
are binding upon this Court[26] and entitled to utmost respect.[27] Considering these findings, we see no reason
to disturb the trial court’s finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
the object of the contract of sale, as intended and understood by the parties,
was Lot 4163 covered by OCT 3129-A which Alejandra, and now her heirs, have
been occupying. The designation of the
lot in the deed of sale as Lot 5734, covered by OCT 4918-A, was a mistake in
the preparation of the document. Thus,
we concur in the conclusion reached by the courts a quo that reformation
of the instrument is proper.
However, on the matter of
damages, the award of actual damages in the amount of P5,000 lacks
evidentiary support. Actual damages if
not supported by the evidence on record cannot be granted.[28] Moral damages for P10,000 was also
improperly awarded, absent a specific finding and pronouncement from the trial
court that petitioners acted in bad faith or with malice. However, the award of attorney’s fees for P2,000
is justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code,[29] in view of the trial court’s finding that
the unjustified refusal of petitioners to reform or to correct the document of
sale compelled respondents to litigate to protect their interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 39401 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. It is hereby ordered that the document entitled Settlement of
Estate and Sale be reformed by changing the phrase “Lot 5734” to “Lot 4163”
found in the sixth paragraph of the deed, thereby ceding in favor of
respondents one-half portion of Lot 4163 instead of Lot 5734. The award to
respondents of attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000 is affirmed. However, the award of actual damages in the
amount of P5,000 and of moral damages in the amount of P10,000
are both SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Acting
C.J.,), (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and
Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] CA Rollo, pp.
89-97.
[2] Records, pp. 403-430.
[3] CA Rollo, p.
118.
[4] Father of Isabel,
Juan and Hilario.
[5] Grandfather of
Trinidad, Luisa, Ruperto and Tomasa.
The latter are the children of Roman, one of the sons of Jose.
[6] Id. at 55-56.
[7] G.R. No. L-22487, 28
SCRA 231 (1969).
[8] Rollo, pp.
127-128.
[9] Id. at 17.
[10] Id. at 101.
[11] Id. at 44-46.
[12] Id. at 138.
[13] Id. at
129-130.
[14] Viewmaster
Construction Corporation vs. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 133576, 335 SCRA 540,
546 (2000).
[15] Ibid.
[16] Records, pp. 13-21.
[17] The National
Irrigation Administration, etc. vs. Gamit, et al., G.R. No. 85869, 215 SCRA
436, 454 (1992), citing Conde, et al. vs. Cuenca, et al., G.R. No.
L-9405, 99 Phil. 1056 (1956).
[18] Huibonhoa vs. CA,
et al., G.R. Nos. 95897 & 102604, 320 SCRA 625, 647 (1999), citing NIA
vs. Gamit, supra, note 17 at
451.
[19] Rollo, p.
110.
[20] Id. at 119.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Id. at 120.
[23] Id. at 100.
[24] TSN, January 9,
1991, p. 9.
[25] Id. at 13.
[26] Lorenzana vs. People,
G.R. No. 138666, March 1, 2001, pp. 1 & 9.
[27] Ong vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 95386, 272 SCRA 725, 730, (1997).
[28] Fuentes, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 111692, 253 SCRA 430, 439 (1996).
[29] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
x x x
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
x x x.