FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-02-1614. July 31, 2002]
ROMEO CORTEZ, complainant, vs. DANTE C. SORIA,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint-Affidavit dated
February 10, 1999, complainant Romeo Cortez charged respondent Dante Soria,
Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, with Conduct
Unbecoming of a Government Employee. It
appears that respondent acted as witness in a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
whereby Gloria Dela Cruz mortgaged her parcel of land to complainant and his
wife. Subsequently, respondent also
acted as attorney-in-fact of complainant and his wife.[1]
Respondent was later appointed as
attorney-in-fact of Fructuosa S. Pedro and, in such capacity, he bought the
mortgaged property for and in behalf of Fructuosa S. Pedro. Thereafter, respondent, still acting for and
in behalf of Fructuosa S. Pedro, filed a complaint for legal redemption and
consignation against complainant. It
was further alleged that respondent led a group of men who entered the property
subject of the mortgage and cut the trees therein.[2]
In an Affidavit dated June 22,
2000, respondent denied that he was appointed as agent of complainant and his
wife but admitted that he was appointed by Fructuosa S. Pedro as her
attorney-in-fact for purposes of filing and prosecuting an action for legal
redemption against complainant and his spouse before the Regional Trial Court
of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55.
Complainant filed a motion to dismiss the said case but the same was
denied. After complainant failed to
answer the complaint, respondent moved that complainant be declared in default,
which motion was granted by the trial court.[3]
Respondent argued that there was
no conflict of interest on his part as he was only performing his duties as an
attorney-in-fact. According to him, if
it were true that he cut trees on the property, the same would constitute a
crime for which complainant should have first filed a complaint before the Barangay
Lupon, then to the police authorities of the locality. He alleged that the complaint was intended
to harass him because complainant could no longer defend himself in the civil
action, having been declared in default.
Furthermore, the complaint was filed to frustrate respondent’s
application to travel abroad.
The records show that the
complaint filed by complainant against respondent before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, docketed as Ombudsman Case No. OMB-1-99-0413, for
Violation of R.A. No. 3019, was dismissed on June 28, 1999.[4] Complainant’s motion for reconsideration was denied
on August 23, 1999.[5]
Pursuant to the Court’s Resolution
dated January 17, 2001,[6] complainant and respondent manifested their
willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[7]
Respondent compulsorily retired on
March 31, 1999, but his clearance has not yet been acted upon on account of the
pendency of the instant administrative case against him.
It should be stressed that
cessation from office of a respondent because of death[8] or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service
nor renders said administrative case moot and academic.[9] In other words, the jurisdiction that was this
Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost
by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case.[10] The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer
from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he shall still be answerable.[11] As pointed out by the Court in Gallo v. Cordero:[12]
This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would
be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications
. . . If innocent, respondent public
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government
which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves the to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.
Since the administration of
justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the
strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness.[13] Thus, as an officer of the court who is required to
conduct himself with propriety and decorum, a sheriff must be circumspect and
proper in his behavior.[14] Above all else, he must be beyond suspicion.[15]
Certainly, respondent’s acceptance
of his designation as attorney-in-fact to file an action in the same branch
where he is employed, against a party to whom he had been an attesting witness
in an earlier transaction involving the very property subject of the action,
cannot but raise the suspicion that the assignment was accepted for less than
noble motives. Indeed, there is the
distinct possibility that respondent will intercede or intervene in his
official capacity as sheriff in the said case.
Had respondent been imbued with that
requisite degree of propriety demanded of all those involved in the
administration and dispensation of justice, he would have in good grace
declined the assignment at the outset.
That would have forestalled the suspicion that he was impelled by
dubious considerations to accept the position.
His claim that there was no conflict of interest in his acceptance of
the assignment is but a tenuous excuse to the prohibition against engaging
directly in private business imposed on all officials and employees of the
judiciary.[16]
Furthermore, while judicial
officials and employees are not prohibited from engaging in gainful activities
other than their judicial functions, the permission to do so is circumscribed
by the unmistakable command that they should regulate extra-judicial activities
to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties.[17] Needless to state, such conflict is greatly magnified
in this case when respondent accepted an appointment as attorney-in-fact for
the singular purpose of prosecuting a complaint in the court where he is
employed.
In fact, Fructuosa S. Pedro’s
choice of respondent to act as her attorney-in-fact creates the disturbing
thought that the latter’s services were purposely sought to help her in
the proceedings filed before the trial court.
The impropriety of respondent’s involvement in the controversy cannot be
gainsaid, for Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states in no
uncertain terms that:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.[18]
Indeed, the act of respondent in
accepting the position of attorney-in-fact for Fructuosa S. Pedro, “for a
period of ten (10) years from execution or until revoked by another
instrument,”[19] can be properly called “moonlighting.”[20] As the Court pointed out in Hipolito v. Mergas:[21]
While “moonlighting” is not normally considered as a serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held by respondent, it obviously amounts to a malfeasance in office. In sum, he is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the discharge of his duties that prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.
Indeed, respondent failed to
observe that degree of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required
of him as a Sheriff when he engaged in such irrelevant activities.[22]
As had been stated earlier, the
administration of justice is a sacred task and it demands the highest degree of
efficiency, dedication and professionalism.[23] In this regard, the Court finds it necessary to
reiterate that sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice
and as agents of the law, high standards are expected of them.[24] They should always hold inviolate and invigorate the
tenet that a public office is a public trust.[25]
The conduct required of court
personnel must be beyond reproach and must always be free from suspicion that
may taint the judiciary.[26] It is therefore incumbent upon every member of the
judiciary family to work hand in hand in restoring and upholding, rather than
destroying the integrity of the courts to which they belong.[27]
The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommends that respondent be fined in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). We find the
recommendation reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Dante C.
Soria, Sheriff IV is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for Conduct Unbecoming of a Government Employee, to
be deducted from whatever retirement benefits may be due him.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2] Ibid., pp.
3-7.
[3] Id., pp.
15-17.
[4] Id., pp.
18-20.
[5] Id., pp.
21-23.
[6] Id., p. 26.
[7] Id., pp. 27,
29-30.
[8] Mañozca v. Domagas,
248 SCRA 625 [1995]; Apiag v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997].
[9] Sy Bang v. Mendez,
287 SCRA 84, 92 [1998]; Tuliao v. Ramos, 284 SCRA 378, 388 [1998]; Secretary of
Justice v. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301 [1977].
[10] Flores v. Sumaljag,
290 SCRA 568, 569 [1977].
[11] Lilia v. Fanuñal, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1503, 13 December 2001; Cabarloc v. Cabusora, 348 SCRA
217, 226 [2000]; Cadauan v.
Alivia, 344 SCRA 174 [2000].
[12] 245 SCRA 219 [1995].
[13] Anonymous v.
Geverola, 279 SCRA 279 [1997].
[14] Elipe v. Fabre, 241
SCRA 249, 253 [1995].
[15] Bilag-Rivera v.
Flora, 245 SCRA 603, 612 [1995]; OCA v. Fuentes, 247 SCRA 506, 516 [1995].
[16] Biyaheros Mart
Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr., 232 SCRA 707, 712 [1994]; see
Rules 5.02, 5.03, 5.06 (1) and 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[17] Canon 5, Code of
Judicial Conduct; see also Rule 5.07 of the same Code.
[18] See also Miranda v. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M.
No. RTJ-01-1665, 29 November 2001; Marces, Sr. v. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503
[1996].
[19] Annex B, Complaint;
Rollo, p. 3.
[20] Biyaheros Mart
Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr., supra.
[21] 195 SCRA 6, 10
[1991].
[22] Biyaheros Mart
Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr., supra.
[23] Contreras v.
Mirando, 280 SCRA 608, 610 [1997].
[24] Llamado v. Ravelo,
280 SCRA 597 [1997].
[25] Ventura v. Concepcion, 346 SCRA
14, 18 [2000].
[26] Abanil v. Ramos, Jr., 346
SCRA 20, 24 [2000].
[27] Contreras v.
Mirando, supra, p. 611.