EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC. July 29, 2002]
IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF
THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
On December 11,
2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing
respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements
in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law
(Republic Act No. 7080)[1] which was then pending resolution:
Quoted hereunder are newspaper
articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera
concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before the
Court. The statements are italicized
for ready identification:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday,
November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court
to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were
“greatly disturbed” by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court
justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two
other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder
Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
“We are afraid that the Estrada
camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices ---considering that
it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most
likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague, “ the group said.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday,
November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap
pals, foes
xxx
“people are getting dangerously
passionate...emotionally charged.” Said lawyer Leonard de Vera of the Equal
Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a
decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would
trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power
II.
xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far
worse than the “jueteng” scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor
turned out to be true.
“People wouldn’t just swallow
any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail.”
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to
direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In his Answer,
respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer
that he “suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for
all these ugly rumors and reports” that “the Court would vote in favor of or
against the validity of the Plunder Law” to protect the credibility of the
Court.[3] He explained therein:
(4) In short, the integrity of the
Court, including the names of the Honorable Members who were being unfairly dragged
and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side of the issue, was
being viciously attacked. To remain
silent at this time when the Honorable Court was under siege by what appeared
to be an organized effort to influence the court in their decision would and
could lend credence to these reports coming from anonymous sources.[4]
Respondent
admitted further to “having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that
it would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estrada’s lawyers
to declare the plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness”
because he and his group were “greatly disturbed” by such rumors.[5]
Anent the
November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having
said that the people were “getting dangerously passionate...emotionally
charged,” pending the court’s resolution on the petition filed by former
President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder Law, respondent claimed
that such statement was “factually accurate.”[6] He also argued that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he
said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional
“would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People
Power II.”[7]
Furthermore,
respondent justified his statement and said that “the people wouldn’t just
swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong” as an expression of
his opinion and as “historically correct,” citing the ouster of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos through people power in 1986, and the resignation of former
President Estrada from office as a result of pressure from the people who
gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for being a
farce, and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the
Filipino people.[8]
While he
admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having
made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to
bring it into disrepute.[9]
After a careful
consideration of respondent’s arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for
uttering statements aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding
in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The judiciary,
as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to
afford redress of wrongs for the violation of said rights[10] must be allowed to decide cases
independently, free of outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of
democracy, as well as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty
of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of
justice.[11]
Thus, Rule 71,
Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold
liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed
against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect.[12]
Respondent
cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors
that it would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a
decision declaring it as such was basically wrong and would not be accepted by
the people—as utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom
of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and
authority, and interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public
interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.[13]
Thus, the making
of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein.[14] It is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every extraneous
influence as they resolve the issues presented before them.[15] The court
has previously held that--
xxx As important as the maintenance
of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner
free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted
upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as
an unprejudiced tribunal.[16]
In People vs.
Godoy,[17] this Court explained that while a
citizen may comment upon the proceedings and decisions of the court and discuss
their correctness, and even express his opinions on the fitness or unfitness of
the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the
important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade
the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the people to
disregard and set naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of
the liberty of speech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very
foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of
justice.[18]
Clearly,
respondent’s utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by
the public cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of
constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not fair
criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against
it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk
earning the ire of the public. Such statements show disrespect not only for the
Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust and
undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that
the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right
of the parties to have their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal,
uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.[19]
It is
respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice[20] and in the Supreme Court as the
last bulwark of justice and democracy.
Respondent’s utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his
protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and
bring pressure on the Court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found
GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is hereby FINED in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] G.R. No. 148560 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan [3rd Division] and People of the Philippines).
[2] SC En Banc Resolution dated December 11,
2002.,
[3] Answer, p. 2.
[4] Id., at
2-3.
[5] Id., at 3.
[6] Id., at 5.
[7] Id., at
6-7.
[8] Id., at
7-8.
[9] Id., at
10.
[10] See Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
[11] Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 SE 2d 405, 409
(1953).
[12] People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, 77 (1995).
[13] Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez, 166 SCRA 316, 354
(1988).
[14] Id., at
95.
[15] Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA
542, 547 (1987), citing In re Stolen, 216 NW 127.
[16] In re:
Sotto, 82 Phil 595, 602-603 (1949).
[17] Supra.
[18] Supra, at
95, citing State vs. Morril, 16 Ark 384.
[19] See Nestle Philippines vs. Sanchez, supra.
[20] In re
Sotto, supra, at 602.