EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152295.
July 9, 2002]
ANTONIETTE V.C.
MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA
DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader of the Senate of
the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker,
CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his
capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local Government of the House of
Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The
Case
Before us is a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to prevent the
postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (“SK” for brevity) elections
originally scheduled last May 6, 2002.
The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement
for membership in the SK.
Petitioners, who
are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayer’s and class suit, on
their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. Petitioners
claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in
the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later
date. Under the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15
but not more than 21 years old.
Petitioners
allege that public respondents “connived, confederated and conspired” to
postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SK
to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age.
Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but
not more than 21 years old will be “summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and
obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.”[1]
Thus,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction -
“a) To
prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec
resolution/directive and other respondents’ issuances, orders and actions and
the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.
b) To
command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set by the
present law and in accordance with Comelec Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to
expedite the funding of the SK elections.
c) In the
alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason, there
must be a definite date for said elections, for example, July 15, 2002, and the
present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were elected on
May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for
any SK elective position even if they are more than 21 years old.
d) To
direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK in every
sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their post after the barangay elections.”[2]
The
Facts
The SK is a youth
organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang
Barangay (“KB” for brevity). The KB
was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without
specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to provide its members with
the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental
importance.[3]
The Local
Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those
youths “at least 15 but not more than 21 years of age.”[4] The SK remains as a youth
organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs “to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual,
moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth.”[5] The SK in every barangay is composed
of a chairperson and seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every
barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least
six months and who meet the membership age requirement.
The first SK
elections took place on December 4, 1992.
RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996
and every three years thereafter. RA
No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections
under rules the Comelec shall promulgate.
Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections on May
6, 2002.
On February 18,
2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (“Montesclaros” for brevity) sent
a letter[8] to the Comelec, demanding that the
SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter
within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial
relief.
On February 20,
2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (“Chairman Benipayo” for brevity), then Comelec
Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House[9] and the Senate President[10] about the status of pending bills
on the SK and Barangay elections. In
his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was “operationally very
difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the
Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that
proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK
elections to November 2002.
Ten days lapsed
without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of
Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002 recommending
to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding
the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.[12]
On March 6,
2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills
postponing the SK elections. On March
11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (“Bicameral Committee” for
brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report[13] recommending approval of the
reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14] and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The Bicameral Committee’s
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and
lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years
of age.
On March 11,
2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On March 11,
2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill and on
March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The President
signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.
The Issues
Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in
support of their petition:
“I.
RESPONDENTS
ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.
II.
RESPONDENTS
ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE, DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK
MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17] (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD
COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.
III.
RESPONDENTS
ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME
IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT
THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE.
IV.
THE
INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES
CONTRARY TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE,
IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND CONSTITUTION.”[18]
The
Court’s Ruling
The petition is
bereft of merit.
At the outset,
the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired
since petitioners filed this petition:
1. The
May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as
scheduled.
2. Congress
enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and candidates for the SK
elections must be “at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the
election.”[20] RA No. 9164 also provides
that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.
3. The
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the
conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections.
Petitioners, who
all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections disenfranchises them, preventing them from voting and being voted for
in the SK elections. Petitioners’
theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later than May 6,
2002, the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn
21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the
SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership
age of 15 but not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven
million youths. The public respondents’
failure to hold the elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and
other youths similarly situated.
Thus,
petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold
the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections
should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents
from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the
membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow
petitioners and those who have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to
participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.
The Court’s
power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[21]
In the instant
case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review. While seeking to
prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are
nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later
than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has
reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK
elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention.
Petitioners’
prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial
review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court.
A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional
right or duty. The Court has no power
to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress. The power of judicial review
cannot be exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states –
“Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill.
The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is
enacted, not before.
Under the
separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law,
or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal
rules. Thus, the following acts of
Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial
restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by
each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by
each chamber of Congress. Absent a
clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights
of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over
the internal processes or procedures of Congress.[23]
The Court has
also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that
Congress should enact into law. The
judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the
power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a
law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do
so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by
the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of
government.
Under RA No.
9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original
charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to
youths less than 18 years old.
Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age
requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always
subject to amendment or repeal by Congress.
The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for
the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]
The Court cannot
also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an
election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than
18 years old. A law is needed to allow
all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK
members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to
enact an amendatory law. Petitioners’
remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention.
Petitioners have
no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is
about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled.[25] A party must also show that he has
a real interest in the suit. By “real
interest” is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[26]
In the instant
case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those
who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to
those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18
years old. The new law restricts
membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased
to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July
15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly,
petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK
elections.
This petition
does not raise any constitutional issue.
At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset
the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet
enacted into law. After the passage of
RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that
could be unconstitutional. To grant
petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court
will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in
an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]
The only
semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise
is their claim that SK membership is a “property right within the meaning of
the Constitution.”[28] Since certain public offices are
“reserved” for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally protected
“opportunity” to occupy these public offices.
In petitioners’ own words, they and others similarly situated stand to
“lose their opportunity to work in the government positions reserved for SK
members or officers.”[29] Under the Local Government Code of
1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations in a municipality,
city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city
council or provincial board, respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the
barangay is an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31] The president of the national
federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the National
Youth Commission, with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary.[32]
Congress
exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right
to SK membership. Only those who
qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by
law. Congress may amend at any time the
law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office
is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.”[33] No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public
office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the Court already
ruled:
”Again,
for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office a “property.”
It is, however, well settled x x x that a public
office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due
process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea
of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the
officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man
or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds
the office as a trust for the people he represents.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, who
apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start
that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of
a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners
a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local
legislative councils. The
constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any
proprietary claim to public office.
Even the State policy directing “equal access to opportunities for
public service”[35] cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio
public offices.
Moreover, while
the State policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement in public affairs,[36] this policy refers to those who
belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to
join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group
defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee
reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling
to his office. In the same manner,
since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they
cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
The petition
must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement
of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now
the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK
elections. This law also fixes the date
of the SK elections. Petitioners are
not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Petitioners have
not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners
contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of the
following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5,
2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003; (2) the
letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference
Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.
The Comelec
exercised its power and duty to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall”[37] and to “recommend to Congress
effective measures to minimize election spending.”[38] The Comelec’s acts enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute proof,
as claimed by petitioners, that there “exists a connivance and conspiracy
(among) respondents in contravention of the present law.” As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,[40] the “Comelec, as the government
agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is
entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the
elections.”
The 1987
Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections.
The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has
demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in holding the
SK elections on May 6, 2002. The
presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress
the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course
of its official duties.
Grave abuse of
discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.[41] Public respondents having acted
strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave
abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.
Petitioners
contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK
officers to perpetuate themselves in power, depriving other youths of the
opportunity to serve in elective SK positions.
This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK
officials can remain in office only until their successors have been elected or
qualified. On July 15, 2002, when the
SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all incumbent SK
officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio
public offices.
In sum,
petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this
suit. This petition presents no actual
justiciable controversy. Petitioners do
not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
4-5.
[2] Ibid., pp.
14-15.
[3] Second Whereas Clause of PD No. 684; See also
Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243 SCRA
422 (1995).
[4] This was the same membership qualification in Section
116 of the Local Government Code of 1983.
Earlier, PD No. 1102, issued on February 28, 1977, had increased the age
requirement to “twenty-one years of age or less.”
[5] Section 426 of the Local Government Code enumerates
the powers and functions of the Sangguniag Kabataan as follows: “Section
426.Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The Sangguniang
Kabataan shall: (a) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the
objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance with the applicable
provisions of this Code; (b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social,
political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical
development of the members; (c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of
which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund of the sangguniang
kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the
specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first
satisfied; (d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to
effectively carry out its programs and activities; (e) Submit annual and end-of-term reports to the sangguniang
barangay on their projects and activities for the survival and development of
the youth in the barangay; (f) Consult and coordinate with all youth
organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and program
implementation; (g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the
implementation of youth development projects and programs at the national
level; (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as the sangguniang barangay may determine or delegate; and (i) Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.”
[6] Rollo, pp.
47-55. Resolution No. 4713 is entitled
“Rules and Regulation on the Registration of Members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan in Connection with the May 6, 2002 Election of Members of the
Sangguniang Kabataan.”
[7] Ibid., pp.
56-61. Resolution No. 4714 is entitled “Calendar of Activities and
Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts in Connection with the May 6, 2002 Election
of Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan.”
[8] Ibid., pp.
62-63.
[9] Ibid., p.
64.
[10] Ibid., p.
65.
[11] Entitled “In Re: Position of the Commission on
Elections on the Postponement or Synchronization of the Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections within the year 2002.”
[12] Ibid., pp.
66-68.
[13] Ibid., pp.
69-71.
[14] “An Act amending Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the `Local Government Code of 1991’, as amended, resetting the
elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan officials to the first Monday of
November, 2002, and for other purposes.”
[15] “An Act providing for a synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan elections on the second Monday of November 2002, repealing
Republic Act No. 8524, and for other purposes.”
[16] Represented by Atty. Abraham A. Mantilla.
[17] This should read “more.”
[18] Rollo, pp.
25-26.
[19] “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending Republic Act No. 7160, As Amended,
Otherwise Known As `The Local Government Code of 1991’, And For Other
Purposes.”
[20] Sections 6 and 7 of RA No. 9164.
[21] Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora,
338 SCRA 81 (2000).
[22] Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic,
190 SCRA 782 (1990).
[23] Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); See also Arroyo v. De Venecia,
277 SCRA 268 (1997); Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628
(1995).
[24] Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1998 Ed., p. 152.
[25] Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora,
342 SCRA 449 (2000).
[26] Caruncho III v.
Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 693 (1999).
[27] See Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 320
SCRA 486 (1999).
[28] Petition dated March 11, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p.
8.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Section 438, Local Government Code of 1991.
[31] Section 390, Local Government Code of 1991.
[32] Section 5, RA No. 8044.
[33] Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[34] 41 Phil. 188 (1920).
[35] Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
[36] Section 13, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
[37] Section 2, paragraph (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.
[38] Section 2, paragraph (7), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.
[39] Salcedo vs.
Comelec, 312 SCRA 447 (1999).
[40] G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002.
[41] Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, see
note 21.