FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150660.
July 30, 2002]
CALS POULTRY SUPPLY
CORPORATION and DANILO YAP, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO ROCO and CANDELARIA
ROCO, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
For our
resolution is the motion for reconsideration of the Court’s minute Resolution
dated April 1, 2002, denying the petition for review filed by CALS Poultry
Supply Corporation (hereinafter referred to as CALS) of the Court of Appeal’s
decision in favor of herein private respondents Alfredo Roco and Candelaria
Roco. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming the Labor
Arbiter’s decision which dismissed private respondents’ complaint for illegal
dismissal against CALS. Private
respondents filed a comment on the motion for reconsideration as required by
the Court.
CALS Poultry
Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressed chicken and
other related products and managed by Danilo Yap.[1]
On March 15,
1984, CALS hired Alfredo Roco as its driver.
On the same date, CALS hired Edna Roco, Alfredo’s sister, as a helper in
the dressing room of CALS.[2] On May 16, 1995, it hired
Candelaria Roco, another sister, as helper,[3] also at its chicken dressing plant
on a probationary basis.
On March 5,
1996, Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against CALS and Danilo Yap
alleging that Alfredo and Candelaria were illegally dismissed on January 20,
1996 and November 5, 1996, respectively.[4] Both also claimed that they were
underpaid of their wages.[5] Edna Roco, likewise, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
alleging that on June 26, 1996, she was reassigned to the task of washing dirty
sacks and for this reason, in addition to her being transferred from night
shift to day time duties, which she considered as management act of harassment,
she did not report for work.[6]
According to
Alfredo Roco, he was dismissed on January 20, 1996 when he refused to accept
P30,000.00 being offered to him by CALS’ lawyer, Atty. Myra Cristela A.
Yngcong, in exchange for his executing a letter of voluntary resignation. On the part of Candelaria Roco, she averred
that she was terminated without cause from her job as helper after serving more
than six (6) months as probationary employee.
The Labor
Arbiter on April 16, 1998, issued a decision dismissing the complaints for
illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter found that Alfredo Roco applied for and was granted a
leave of absence for the period from January 4 to 18, 1996. He did not report back for work after the
expiration of his leave of absence, prompting CALS, through its Chief
Maintenance Officer to send him a letter on March 12, 1996 inquiring if he
still had intentions of resuming his work.
Alfredo Roco did not respond to the letter despite receipt thereof,
thus, Alfredo was not dismissed; it was he who unilaterally severed his
relation with his employer.[7]
In the case of
Candelaria Roco, the Labor Arbiter upheld CALS’ decision not to continue with
her probationary employment having been found her unsuited for the work for
which her services were engaged. She
was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were terminated on November 15,
1995.
Edna Roco,
according to the Labor Arbiter, began absenting herself on June 25, 1996. She was sent a memo on July 1, 1996
requiring her to report for work immediately, but she did not respond.[8]
In their
position papers, the complainants claimed that they were not given their
overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, 13th month pay, allowances. They were also not given their separation
pay after their dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter, however, denied their claims, stating that they had not substantiated
the same; on the other hand, CALS presented evidence showing that complainants
received the correct salaries and related benefits.
The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in a decision promulgated on January 17,
2000, affirmed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter.
On appeal by
Alfredo, Candelaria and Edna Roco to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
set aside the NLRC’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Alfredo and
Candelaria Roco to their former positions without loss of seniority of rights
and benefits, with full payment of backwages.
However, in the case of Edna Roco, the Court of Appeals found that her
appeal cannot be favorably considered as she actually abandoned her work without
justification.
In holding that
Alfredo Roco did not abandon his employment, but was illegally dismissed, the
Court of Appeals ratiocinated:
xxx (P)etitioner Alfredo can not be
said to have abandoned his employment.
The failure of Alfredo to report for work was justified under the
circumstances. The positive assertion
of petitioner that when he reported for work on January 20, 1996, he was told
that his services were already terminated is more convincing than the mere
denial of respondent Danilo Yap. Petitioner
Alfredo’s failure to inquire from private respondent as to the cause of his
dismissal should not be taken against him.
It should be noted that when the secretary of respondent Danilo Yap
conveyed the order of dismissal, Alfredo took steps to verify the same from the
company’s Chief Maintenance Officer Rolando Sibugan who confirmed said
order. The filing of the illegal
dismissal case against CALS by petitioner Alfredo negates the charge of
abandonment. Private respondent failed
to show that Alfredo clearly and unequivocably performed overt acts to sever
the employer-employee relationship.
xxx
In termination cases, the burden of
proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee from his employment
rests upon the employer, and the latter’s failure to do so would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
Abandonment as a just and valid ground for termination means the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment, and
the burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear, deliberate and
unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment
without any intention of returning.
Other than its self-serving claim that petitioner Alfredo did not report
for work, private respondent failed to adduce other evidence of any overt act
of Alfredo showing an intent to abandon his work. In short, private respondent failed to discharge the burden.
Moreover, not only was there a lack of a valid cause for the dismissal of
petitioner Alfredo; the record of the case is devoid of any evidence that
Alfredo was afforded his right to due process.
If Alfredo was dismissed because of his abandonment of work, CALS should
have given him a written notice of termination in accordance with Section 2,
Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which
provides:
Section 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission
constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the
worker’s last known address.
In the instant case, private
respondent failed to present as evidence such notice despite every company’s
standard policy to record and file every transaction including notices of
termination.
CALS’ contention that the letter of
Rolando Sibugan inquiring from Alfredo whether he still had intention of
resuming work is a manifestation of its willingness to reinstate the latter to
his former position, thereby negating any intention on its part to dismiss
Alfredo, is not well-taken. The fact
that the employer later made an offer to re-employ Alfredo did not cure the
vice of his earlier arbitrary dismissal.
The wrong had been committed and the harm done. Notably, it was only after the complaint had
been filed that CALS, in a belated gesture of good will, sought to invite
Alfredo back to work. CALS’ sincerity
is suspect. Its offer of reinstatement
is doubtful since the same could not have been made if Alfredo had not
complained against it. Whether the
offer was sincere or not, the same could not correct the earlier illegal
dismissal of Alfredo. It must be borne
in mind that CALS’ offer to reinstate Alfredo was obviously an attempt to
escape liability from having illegally terminated the latter’s services. Hence, CALS incurred liability under the
Labor Code from the moment Alfredo was illegally dismissed, and the liability
was not abated as a result of CALS’ offer to reinstate.[9]
In ruling in
favor of Candelaria Roco, the
appellate court held that when her
employment was terminated on November 15, 1995 (she was hired on May 16, 1995),
it was four (4) days after she ceased to be a probationary employee and became
a regular employee within the ambit of Article 281 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
ART. 281. Probationary employment. - Probationary employment shall not exceed six
months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
Not satisfied
with the decision of the Court of Appeals, CALS and Danilo Yap brought before
us the petition for review on certiorari claiming that said court erred
in ruling that respondents Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco were illegally
dismissed and that they are entitled to any money claims.
In considering
that Alfredo Roco was illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals relied on his allegation that on January 20,
1996 when he reported for work, following his leave of absence from January 10
to 18, 1996, he learned from Elvie Acantelado, a secretary of Danilo Yap that
he was already separated from his employment.
Yet, as observed
in the decision of the NLRC, he did not even attempt to verify from Danilo Yap,
the owner and general manager of CALS, if his employment was being terminated
and the cause of the termination. Elvie
Acantelado denied vehemently having told Alfredo that he was being dismissed.
Private
respondents also stated in their position paper that Alfredo was told by CALS’
lawyer to sign a resignation letter in consideration of P30,000.00. Strangely, apart from this bare allegation,
which finds no corroboration, there is no explanation when, where and how was
the offer made. Alfredo did not advance
any theory why CALS wanted him to resign.
Atty. Myra Cristela Yngcong, counsel for CALS’ categorically denied
having offered Alfredo Roco P30,000.00
in exchange for his resignation. She
explained that, in fact, she met Alfredo for the first time when he appeared
before the Labor Arbiter on April 23, 1996.
On Alfredo’s
assertion that CALS’ letter dated March 12, 1996 asking him to report for duty
was just an afterthought because it was sent after Alfredo filed his complaint
for illegal dismissal on March 5, 1996.
CALS maintains that it came to know of the complaint filed by the Rocos
with the Labor Arbiter only on April 4, 1996 when it received the Notification
and Summons dated March 25, 1996 from the Labor Arbiter.
On the other
hand, CALS imputed an ulterior motive for the complaint filed by the Rocos
against it. It said it was manipulated
by their relatives Domingo Roco against whom CALS filed several criminal cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on account of Domingo Roco’s failure to fund the
checks he issued as payment for CALS
products he had purchase.
From the facts
established, we are of the view that Alfredo Roco has not established
convincingly that he was dismissed. No
notice of termination was given to him by CALS. There is no proof at all, except his self-serving assertion, that
he was prevented from working after the end of his leave of absence on January
18, 1996. In fact, CALS notified him in
a letter dated March 12, 1996 to resume his work. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that Alfredo, as well
as Candelaria Roco, was not dismissed.
Their findings of fact are entitled to great weight.
In Chong Guan
Trading v. NLRC, et al.,[10] we held:
After a careful examination of the
events that gave rise to the present controversy as shown by the records, the
Court is convinced that private respondent was never dismissed by the
petitioner. Even if it were true that
Mariano Lim ordered private respondent to go and that at that time he intended
to dismiss private respondent, the record is bereft of evidence to show that he
carried out this intention. Private
respondent was not even notified that he had been dismissed. Nor was he prevented from returning to his
work after the October 28 incident. The
only thing that is established from the record, and which is not disputed by
the parties, is that private respondent Chua did not return to his work after
his heated argument with the Lim brothers.
xxx
In this case, private respondent’s
failure to work was due to the misunderstanding between the petitioner’s
management and private respondent. As
correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, private respondent must have construed
the October 28 incident as his dismissal so that he opted not to work for many
days thereafter and instead filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, petitioner interpreted
private respondent’s failure to report for work as an intentional abandonment. However, there was no intent to dismiss
private respondent since the petitioner is willing to reinstate him. Nor was there an intent to abandon on the
part of private respondent since he immediately filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal soon after the October 28 incident.
It would be illogical for private respondent to abandon his work and
then immediately file an action seeking his reinstatement xxx. Under these circumstances, it is but fair
that each party must bear his own loss, thus placing the parties on equal
footing.
xxx.
With respect to
Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed on probationary
basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995
and her services were terminated on November 15, 1995 due to poor work
performance. She did not measure up to
the work standards on the dressing of chicken.
The Labor Arbiter sustained CALS in terminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
ruling.
The Court of
Appeals did not disagree with the NLRC’s finding that Candelaria was dismissed
because she did not qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the company to her at the time of her
employment.[11]
The standards
required by the National Meat Inspection Commission for dressing plants with
Double “AA” Rating to which CALS’ employee were brief and with regard to which
Candelaria failed to comply are stated in
part in the affidavit dated
March 7, 1997 of Rolly Villaeba, Cold Storage Supervisor of CALS’ Dressing
Plant:
xxx
2. As Cold Storage Supervisor of Cals; Dressing Plant,
I am responsible among others, for briefing the new employee on the workflow in
the dressing plant, the nature of their respective jobs pursuant to the said
workflow, and the work standards required of them by Cals, as well as seeing to
it that Cals work standards are complied with/followed by the employees.
xxx
4. It is the NMIC standard that the dressing of
chickens and its parts must stricly (sic) observe the chronological order of
the following workflow, to wit:
1. Depinning
2. Detoing
3. Removals of entrails/cecum/liver/
Gizzard/heart/
Bile
4. Removal of Lungs
5. First Wash
6. Second Wash
7. Third Wash
8. Carcass Quality Control
a. Selection of Carcass
b. Leg
Bonding
c. Weighing
d. First
Chilling
e. Final
Chilling
xxx
9. For the duration of Candelaria Roco’s
probationary employment, she failed to comply with Cals standards in the work
assigned to her. First, she
frequently failed to observe the allowable inches to be cut, which must only be
1.5 inches, in performing the surgical incision of the chicken butt, either she
cuts it too long, thereby distorting the appearance of the chickens or she cuts
it too short, thereby making it difficult to remove the chicken parts without
damaging these parts; Second, she frequently mishandles the pull-out of
chicken parts, such that, she damaged said parts; Third, she frequently
completes her assigned tasks in twenty (20) to even twenty-five (25) seconds,
over and above the required time limit, which is only eight (8) to ten (10)
seconds. Resultantly, the
chickens/parts which passed through her hands frequently suffer from premature
decomposition/bacterial or salmonella contamination;
10. By reason of the foregoing, Cals’
management deemed it best to terminate her probationary employment.
xxx[12]
However, the
Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC ruling on the ground that at the time
Candelaria’s services were terminated, she had attained the status of a regular
employee as the termination on November 15, 1995 was effected four (4) days
after the 6-month probationary period had expired, hence, she is entitled to
security of tenure in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code.
CALS argues that
the Court of Appeals’ computation of the 6-month probationary period is
erroneous as the termination of Candelaria’s services on November 15, 1995 was
exactly on the last day of the 6-month period.
We agree with
CALS’ contention as upheld by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
Candelaria’s services was terminated within and not beyond the 6-month
probationary period. In Cebu Royal
v. Deputy Minister of Labor,[13] our computation of the 6-month
probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same
calendar date of the 6th month
following. Thus, we held:
The original findings were
contained in a one-page order reciting simply that ‘complainant was employed on
a probationary period of employment for six (6) months. After said period, he underwent medical
examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that
he is suffering from PTB minimal.
Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by
respondent.’ The order then concluded that the termination was ‘justified.’
That was all.
As there is no mention of the basis
of the above order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll authority
submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on
probation on February 16, 1978. Even
supposing that it is not self-serving, we find nevertheless that it is
self-defeating. The six-month period of
probation started from the said date of appointment and so ended on August 17,
1978, but it is not shown that the private respondent’s employment also ended
then; on the contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, ‘an employee who is allowed
to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.'’
Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August
21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer.
WHEREFORE, our Resolution of April 1, 2002
denying the petition is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered REVERSING the
decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it ruled in favor of herein
respondents and the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.