FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149692.
July 30, 2002]
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JULIAN DELA
CRUZ AND MAGDALENA TUAZON, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact and co-heir,
VIRGILIO C. ALVENDIA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FLORENTINO QUINTOS, SR.,
namely, FLORENTINO QUINTOS, JR. and GLORIA QUINTOS BUGAYONG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before Us is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioners seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution dated May 29, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals[1] which
dismissed their petition for review of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (Branch 38) on
the ground that the petition was filed out of time; and, the Resolution dated
August 29, 2001[2] denying
their motion for reconsideration.
Sometime in
1996, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan
an action for reconveyance with damages[3] against
respondents alleging, among others,
that they are the children of the late Ariston dela Cruz, who was the only
forced and legal heir of his deceased
parents, Julian dela Cruz and Magdalena Tuazon who died intestate; that
sometime in 1897, Magdalena Tuazon purchased from Herminigildo and Filomena
Tiong a certain parcel of land located at Heroes Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan
consisting of 605 square meters and
since then respondents and their
predecessors had been in continuous occupation and adverse possession of the subject land; that sometime in 1987, private respondents’ predecessor Florentino
Quintos, Sr., filed an application for the judicial registration of a certain land which included petitioners’ land; that the land registration court
granted Quintos’ application and decreed the land in Florentino Quintos’
name and OCT No. 22665 was subsequently issued; that OCT No. 22665 was partitioned into four separate lots and
petitioners’ land was covered by TCT No. 173052; that respondents
subsequently filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4118) for illegal
detainer against petitioners for the latter’s refusal to vacate the subject
land which resulted in petitioners’ ejectment
from the subject property.
Respondents
filed their answer with counterclaim, alleging that the subject land had always belonged to respondents’ late father
Florentino Quintos, Sr., who in turn inherited the same from his mother,
Dolores Tuazon; that the affidavit evidencing petitioners’ ownership of the subject
land was not attached to the complaint; that respondents’ predecessors merely
tolerated petitioners’ possession of the subject land; that petitioners never
filed their opposition to respondents’ application for registration despite
knowledge thereof; that the land registration case which was the basis for the
issuance of OCT No. 22665 in the name of the predecessor of respondents
was a proceeding in rem which
bound all persons whether notified or not.
On January 29,
1999, a decision[4] was
rendered by the MTC declaring petitioners as the legal owners of the land
covered by TCT No. 173052 and ordering respondents to convey to petitioners the
subject land and to pay damages to petitioners. [5]
Respondents
filed their appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan
(Branch 38). On January 19, 2000, the
RTC[6] reversed
the decision of the MTC dismissing the complaint, declaring respondents as the
absolute owners of the subject land and ordering petitioners to pay damages to
respondents.
Petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration
which the trial court denied in a Resolution dated March 8, 2000.[7]
On April 18,
2000, petitioners, through counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review which she subsequently filed on May 2, 2000.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review for being filed
out of time since the certification issued by Postmaster Elizabeth I. Torio of
Dagupan City Post Office and the affidavit of Ricardo C. Castro, Clerk III of
the Regional Trial Court show that the trial court’s Resolution dated March 8,
2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was received by the
secretary of petitioners’ counsel on
March 16, 2000, thus the filing of the petition was filed 28 days late.
Petitioners’
counsel filed her Comment to respondents’ motion to dismiss
alleging that when she arrived in her
office on April 3, 2000, she found copies of pleadings and correspondence
including a copy of the trial court’s Resolution dated March 8, 2000 denying
her motion for reconsideration; that she thought that these pleadings and
correspondence were all received on April 3, 2000; that upon receipt of
respondents’ motion to dismiss, she confronted
her secretary who told her that the envelope containing the
Resolution was only opened on April 3, 2000 and her secretary
could not recall if the Resolution was
among those she received on March 16, 2000.
On May 29, 2001,
the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners’ petition for
review for being filed out of time. It found the explanation given by
petitioners’ counsel unconvincing since she failed to give the reason why the
envelope was opened only on April 3, 2000; that counsel’s secretary did not
even admit that she actually received the said Resolution; that it is the
counsel’s duty to adopt and strictly maintain a system that efficiently takes
into account all court notices sent to her and she failed to instruct and remind her secretary on what
should be done with respect to such notices and processes. Petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated August 29, 2001.
Hence, the
present petition on the following grounds:
1) The appellate court rejected and refused to consider the valid
reason submitted by the petitioner’s counsel for the apparent delay in the
filing of the petition for review with said court; hence the dismissal of the
petition was tainted with grave abuse of discretion;
2) Granting, arguendo, that there is a basis for the dismissal of
the petition, the appellate court should have applied the principle of liberal
construction of the Rules pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (1997 RCP), considering the valid and meritorious case of
petitioners.
3) In either case, it is respectfully submitted that the appellate
court has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
in dismissing outright the petition for review as to call for the supervision
of this Honorable Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.[8]
We deny the
petition.
Section 1, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, provides that the petition shall be
filed and served within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.[9] In the
instant case, it has been established that the resolution denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was received by the
secretary of petitioners’ former counsel on March 16, 2000, thus the last day
of the 15-day period within which to file the petition for review with the
respondent court was March 31, 2000. Considering that counsel filed a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review with the respondent court
only on April 18, 2000, the judgment of the RTC subject of the petition for
review had already become final and executory.
Consequently, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for being
filed out of time since it has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition
much less to alter a judgment.
This Court has
invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[10] The
failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of
defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.[11] The right
to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law.[12] The party
who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirement of the
rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost. [13]
We agree with
the CA when it found that the reason advanced by petitioners’ former counsel,
which is that she received the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration only on April 3, 2000 as she found it on her table on the same
date, unacceptable. The negligence of her secretary in failing to immediately
give the trial court’s resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration upon receipt to the counsel and the negligence of counsel to
adopt and arrange matters in order to ensure that official or judicial
communications sent by mail would reach her promptly cannot be considered
excusable. The Court has also often
repeated that the negligence of the clerks which adversely affect the cases
handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.[14] The
doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because
otherwise, “there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that prior counsel had not be sufficiently diligent, or
experienced, or learned.[15]
Petitioners
claim that there should be a liberal construction of the rules of procedure in
order to effect substantial justice and appeal to this Court’s exercise of
equity jurisdiction. We are not
persuaded. There is no showing in this
case of any extraordinary circumstance which may justify a deviation from the
rule on timely filing of appeals. As
held in the case of Tupas vs. CA:[16]
“Rules of procedure are intended to
ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose
that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, has
often been “suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in
the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance
of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a
statute or a rule of court. (Limpot vs. CA, 170 SCRA 369)
xxx xxx xxx
“For all its conceded merits,
equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.
Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and we repeat it
now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive
rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they
may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of
the law as long as it remains in
force. The applicable maxim, which goes
back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists- and is now still reverently
observed- is `aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.’” (Aguila vs. CA, 160 SCRA
359)
At any rate, we
find no reversible error committed by the RTC in dismissing petitioners’
complaint for reconveyance against respondents. Petitioners’ claim of ownership was based on the affidavit of
Herminigildo and Filomena Tiong executed on November 9, 1926 which stated among
others that they were the former owners in common of the subject parcel of land
which they sold to Magdalena Tuazon (petitioners’ predecessor in interest) on
or about the year 1897. However, such
affidavit was not accompanied by any instrument showing the sale between the
Tiong spouses and Magdalena Tuazon. By
itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership,[17] thus it
cannot serve as the basis of ownership of the petitioners. Moreover, the RTC found that there was no
tax declaration or title in the name of the Tiong spouses to evidence their
ownership of the subject land. On the
other hand, respondents’ ownership of the subject land was by virtue of a land
registration case where the land registration court found sufficient the well
documented evidence submitted by applicant Florentino Quintos, Sr. (
respondents’ predecessor in interest ) to prove their ownership of 2,048 sq.
meters lot which included the subject land.
In civil cases,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of his opponent.[18] The RTC
had correctly ruled that petitioners failed to show sufficient proof of
ownership over the subject land covered by TCT No. 173052 so as to entitle them
the return of the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court
of Appeals’ Resolution dated May 29, 2001 and Resolution dated August 29, 2001
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, concurred in by Justices Romeo A. Brawner
and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; CA- G.R. SP
NO. 58545; Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[2] Rollo, pp.
27-28.
[3] Ibid, pp.
50-54.
[4] Penned by Judge
Hermogenes Fernandez: Civil Case No. 4182; Rollo, pp. 55-81.
[5] Rollo, pp.
80-81.
[6] Ibid, pp. 82-96; Penned by Judge Leo
M. Rapatalo; Civil Case No.
17975.
[7] Ibid,
pp.97-100.
[8] Ibid, p. 15.
[9] Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing- A party desiring to appeal from
a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
[10] Villanueva vs. CA, 205 SCRA 537, 543 citing
Reyes vs. Carrasco, 38 SCRA 296 (1971); Republic, et al. vs. Reyes,
etc., et al., 71 SCRA 450 (1976); Borre, et al., vs. CA, et al., 158
SCRA 560 (1988); Sublay vs.
NLRC; 324 SCRA 188
[11] Villanueva vs. CA, supra citing Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. vs.
Lagradante, et al., 99 Phil 434 (1956);
Pabores vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 104 Phil 505 (1958);
A.L. Ammen Transportation , Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., 12 SCRA 508 (1964).
[12] Ibid,
citing Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 152
SCRA 540 (1987); Borre, et al vs. CA, supra.
[13] Ibid,
citing Ozaeta vs. CA, et. al., 179 SCRA 800 (1989).
[14] Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. CA, 162 SCRA
371, 375 (1988).
[15] Gacutana-Fraile
vs. Domingo, 348 SCRA 414, 422 (2000).
[16] 193 SCRA 597, 600 (1991).
[17] Cequeña vs.
Bolante, 330 SCRA 216, 223-224 (2000).
[18] Javier vs. CA, 231 SCRA 498, 504 (1994).