EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147870.
July 31, 2002]
RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner,
vs. ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May local
legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly
impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local
officials?
This purely
legal issue was posed in connection with a dispute over the mayoralty seat of
San Vicente, Palawan. Considering that
the term of the contested office expired on June 30, 2001,[1] the present case may be dismissed
for having become moot and academic.[2] Nonetheless, we resolved to pass
upon the above-stated issue concerning the application of certain provisions of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The undisputed
facts are as follows:
On August 5,
1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Palawan an administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and
culpable violation of the Constitution.[3] Complainants alleged that
respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement
with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998
elections. They argue that the
consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position
within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the
1987 Constitution.
In his answer,
respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired
him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s.
1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the
appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a
consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or
position as prohibited by the Constitution.
On February 1,
2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent guilty of
the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
service.[4] Respondent appealed to the Office
of the President which, on May 29, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan.[5]
Pending
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the
President, or on June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Consequently, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed
as SPL Proc. No. 3462.[6] The petition, seeks to annul, inter
alia, the oath administered to petitioner.
The Executive Judge granted a Temporary Restraining Order effective for
72 hours, as a result of which petitioner ceased from discharging the functions
of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was
raffled to Branch 95 which, on June 23, 2000, denied respondent’s motion for
extension of the 72-hour temporary restraining order.[7] Hence, petitioner resumed his
assumption of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
On July 4, 2000,
respondent instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office
of the President; (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan; and (3) the June 23, 2000 order of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95.
On March 16,
2001, the Court of Appeals[8] declared void the assailed
decisions of the Office of the President and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Palawan, and ordered petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan.[9] A motion for reconsideration was
denied on April 23, 2001.[10] Hence, the instant petition for
review.
The pertinent
portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
An elective local official may
be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper
court. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from
the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal
from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a
court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et
al. v. Guingona, et al.,[11] we held that “[t]he Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last
paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.”
Article 124 (b),
Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed from office
on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds
enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the
proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.[12]
As held in Salalima,[13] this grant to the “disciplining
authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond
the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations. No rule or regulation may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government
Code. Implementing rules should
conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which
operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to
the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules.[14]
Verily, the
clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial
prerogative is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President,
including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of
the President can suspend or remove an elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later
disposition, may I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of
identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and
since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case
may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this
later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase “PROPER
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN” simply by “COURTS”. Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali
iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. “OR THE PROPER
COURT.”
Senator Saguisag. “OR THE PROPER
COURT.”
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr.
President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be
incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture the other ideas that
have been elevated.
x x x x x x x x x.[15]
It is beyond
cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from
service is lodged exclusively with the courts.
Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
“disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials,
is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not
just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or
partisanship of the disciplining authority.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and
not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove.[16] As explained by the Court in Lacson
v. Roque:[17]
“…the abridgment of the power to
remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification, and
was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted
authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices
and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an
unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] See Rollo, p. 422.
[2] Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, et al.,
254 SCRA 397, 403-404 [1996],citing Atienza v. Commission on Elections,
239 SCRA 298 [1994]; Abeja v. Tañada, 236 SCRA 60 [1994]; Yorac v.
Magalona, 3 SCRA 76 [1961].
[3] Rollo, p.
74.
[4] Rollo, p.
135.
[5] Rollo, p.
208.
[6] Rollo, p.
212.
[7] CA Rollo, p. 94.
[8] Third Division, composed of Associate Justices
Hilarion L. Aquino (ponente); Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (member); and Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez (chairman).
[9] Rollo, p.
32 .
[10] Rollo, p.
55.
[11] 257 SCRA 55, 100 [1996].
[12] Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative
Complaints. --- A verified complaint against any erring local elective
official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a
highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be
filed before the Office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality
shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official
shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
[13] Supra,
citing Regidor v. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507 [1989]; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA, 33 SCRA 585 [1970]; Manuel v.
General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660 [1971].
[14] Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code
of 1991, The Key to National Development, 171 [1993 ed.].
[15] Deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government
Code of 1991, August 1, 1990, pp. 39-40.
[16] Salalima v. Guingona, supra.
[17] 92 Phil. 456, 464 [1953].