THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944.
July 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is an
appeal from the Decision[1] dated
December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in
Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425[2] as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
“That on or about March 13, 1999,
in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug
commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the
corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.”[3]
During the
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued.
Evidence for the
prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V
Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock
at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a
complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they
later found at the economy section.[4] The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was
informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched,
but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his
baggage. The accused took a Samsonite
suitcase and brought this back to the cabin.
When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase,
revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to
be “shabu,” the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship
captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.[5] At about
6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and
RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody
of the accused and the seized items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight
(8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.[7] When asked
about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested
by a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter’s
brother in Iligan City.[8] The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men
brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,[9] while the
packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in
Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as “shabu,” weighing
399.3266 grams.[10]
The accused
testified and proffered his own
version. On March 11, 1999, at about
10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican “Alex” Macapudi, a
neighbor who has a store in Marawi City.
He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing
sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi’s brother at
the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a
big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or “maleta” containing the
sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of
Macapudi.[11] He stayed
at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of
March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his
baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark
ahead of the other passengers. There,
he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While
they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman
whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that
he was suspected of stealing jewelry.
He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was
frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to
get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big
luggage and Macapudi’s Samsonite suitcase.
He left the small “maleta” containing sunglasses and brushes for
fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the
big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he
claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the
suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they
suspected to be “shabu.” They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and
asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine
Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.[12]
On December 27,
1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the court finds the
accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment
since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such preventive detention
shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his
sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the
National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.”[13]
Hence, this
appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
“I.
THE COURT
A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT
A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.“[14]
On the first
assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant
to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends that People
v. Marti[15] is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform
the duties of a policeman.
The contentions
are devoid of merit.
The right
against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.[16] Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.[17] Whenever
this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search
and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government
or its agent. As held by this Court in
the case of People v. Marti,[18] “[i]n the
absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.”[19] The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]
In the case
before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after
they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no
merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed
and tasked to maintain peace and order.
The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function.
In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the
state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
invoked.
On the second
assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of
the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained
“shabu.” He submits that without
knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of
the crime charged.[21]
We are not
persuaded.
In a prosecution
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.[22] The first
two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact
undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910
in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,[23] this
Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs
must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed
together with the possession or control of such articles.[24] It has
been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.[25] Hence,
the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.[26]
In this respect,
the accused-appellant has utterly failed.
His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not
given credence by the trial court. We
find no reason to disagree.
Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.[27] Moreover,
evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits
that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected.[28] Why he
got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a
combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small “maleta” for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of
expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,[29] but he
brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive
sunglasses, and even watches.[30]
The things in
possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.[31] To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. In this case,
the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed
by the trial judge:
“First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka
Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really
exist or simply a figment of the imagination?
He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who
has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City.
But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living,
breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the
Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he
does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could
testify and support the claim of the accused.”[32]
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case
at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will
take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous
drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting
accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against
the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Valerio M. Salazar.
[2] The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
[3] Rollo, p.
15.
[4] Appellee’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 89.
[5] TSN, July 8, 1999, pp. 10-14, 24-28.
[6] Exhibit “I-2”.
[7] Exhibits “I-3” to “I-10”.
[8] TSN, July 9, 1999, pp. 40-41.
[9] TSN, July 7, 1999, p. 36.
[10] Id., pp.
8-16. Exhibit “B”.
[11] TSN, July 23, 1999, pp. 4, 28-30.
[12] Id., pp.
8-17; TSN, August 25, 1999, p. 14.
[13] RTC Decision, p. 9;
Rollo, p. 68.
[14] Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 48.
[15] 193 SCRA 57 (1997).
[16] Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[17] Art. III, Sec. 3. “(1) x x x x x x x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
[18] Supra note
15.
[19] Id., p.
64. See also Waterous Drug
Corporation v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735, 747 (1997); and People v.
Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66, 81-82 (1999).
[20] Id., p.
67.
[21] Appellant’s Brief, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[22] People v. Chen Tiz Chang, 325 SCRA 776,
790-791 (2000).
[23] 17 Phil 463 (1910).
[24] Supra, p.
465.
[25] Id.; People v. Baludda, 318 SCRA 503, 511
(1999), citing U.S. v. Bandoc,
23 Phil 14 (1912).
[26] People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, 551 (1997).
[27] People v. Mendez, 335 SCRA 147 (2000).
[28] Appellant’s Brief, p. 9; Rollo, p. 56.
[29] TSN dated July 23, 1999, pp. 12-13.
[30] Id., p.
30.
[31] Rule 151, Section 3(j) of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
“Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – x x x
x x x x x x
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that the things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him.”
[32] RTC Decision, p. 8;
Rollo, p. 67.