THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141986.
July 11, 2002]
NEPLUM, INC., petitioner,
vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Within what
period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment
acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the
decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the
offended party? Our short answer is:
from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge
of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of
the service of the notice of the decision.
The
Case
Before us is a
Petition[1] for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the February 17, 2000 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 133) in Criminal Case No.
96-246. The Order reads in full as follows:
“Opposition to Notice of Appeal
being well-taken, as prayed for, the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of
Appeal are denied due course.”[3]
The foregoing
Order effectively prevented petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of the
criminal proceedings in which the accused was acquitted based on reasonable
doubt.
The
Facts
The factual
antecedents, as narrated by petitioner in its Memorandum,[4] are as
follows:
“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial
court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246
acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during
such promulgation.
‘2.01.1 The private prosecutor
represented the interests of the petitioner who was the private offended party
in Criminal Case No. 96-246.’
“2.02 On 12 November 1999, the
petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment.
“2.03 On 29 November 1999,
petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect)
of the Judgment.
‘2.03.1 Considering that 27
November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration
on 29 November 1999, a Monday.’
“2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday,
petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court
denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
“2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday,
petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by
registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
“2.06 On 17 February 2000, the
Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the
private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s
Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal x x x.”[5]
Ruling
of the Trial Court
The RTC refused
to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal[6] and
Amended Notice of Appeal.[7] It
accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was
being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended
Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial
court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.
Hence, this
Petition.[8]
The
Issue
In its
Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:
“Whether the period within which a
private offended party may appeal from, or move for a reconsideration of, or
otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action should
be reckoned from the date of promulgation or from the date of such party’s
actual receipt of a copy of such judgment considering that any party appealing
or challenging such judgment would necessarily need a copy thereof, which is in
writing and which clearly express the factual and legal bases thereof to be
able to file an intelligent appeal or other challenge.”[9]
The
Court’s Ruling
The Petition is
unmeritorious.
Preliminary Matter:
Mode of Review
Petitioner
brought this case to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Petition seeks to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order of the RTC
which, in effect, disallowed petitioner’s appeal of its Judgment.
An ordinary
appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) is “taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.”[10]
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the
disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for
review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final
order direct to the Supreme Court.
However, the questioned Order is not a “decision or final order” from
which an appeal may be taken. The
Rules of Court states explicitly:
“No appeal
may be taken from:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) An order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal;”[11]
On the other
hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy that petitioner should
have used, in view of the last paragraph of the same provision which states:
“In all the above instances where
the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”[12]
In turn, Rule
65, Section 1, provides:
“SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”[13] (Italics supplied)
By availing
itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the Petition merits an
outright dismissal.[14] Supreme
Court Circular No. 2-90[15]
(hereinafter “Circular”) is unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an
inappropriate mode of appeal thus:
“4. Erroneous Appeals – An
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong
or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.”[16]
The same Circular
provides that petitioner’s counsel has the duty of using the proper mode of
review.
“e) Duty of counsel – It is
therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or
order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the errors
he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law; then upon such basis
to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to
follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that
any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client’s
cause.” [17]
This Court has
often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow scrupulously the
requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or
imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.[18]
On this score
alone, the Petition could have been given short shrift and outrightly dismissed. Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the
issue presented and its far-reaching effects, the Court will deal with the
arguments raised by petitioner and lay down the rule on this matter. As an exception to Circular 2-90, it will
treat the present proceedings as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Main Issue:
Timeliness of Appeal
Petitioner
contends that an appeal by the private offended party under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure must be made within 15 days from the time the appealing
party receives a copy of the relevant judgment. It cites Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.
– An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from
the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his
counsel.” (Italics supplied)
The italicized
portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for the
reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from
the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioner’s
assertion that “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy of
the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider the judgment from
which an appeal will be taken.”[19] Thus, it
concludes that the 15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted
from the time the losing party actually receives a copy of the decision or
order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it
“could not be expected to capture or memorize all the material details of the judgment
during the promulgation thereof.”[20] It
likewise poses the question: “why require all proceedings in court to be
recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of
utilizing these written [documents]?”[21]
We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we
could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be
counted from the promulgation of the judgment.
In People v. Tamani,[22] the Court
was confronted with the question of when to count the period within which the
accused must appeal the criminal conviction.
Answered the Court:
“The assumption that the
fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the
decision was allegedly served on appellant’s counsel by registered mail is not
well-taken. The word ‘promulgation’ in section 6 should be construed as
referring to ‘judgment’, while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as
referring to ‘order’.”[23]
The
interpretation in that case was very clear.
The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of
the decision. Text writers[24] are in
agreement with this interpretation.
In an earlier
case,[25] this
Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:
“It may, therefore, be stated that
one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a notice to that effect
within fifteen days from the date the decision is announced or promulgated to
the defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing the
judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the
judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court.”[26]
Clear as those
interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar,
because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are
confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect only. Thus, the question arises whether the
accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the
same as that for the private offended party.
We answer in the negative.
No Need
to Reserve
Independent Civil Action
At the outset,
we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal ones. Thus,
the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[27] 33,[28] 34[29] and 2176[30] of the
Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here
are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based
on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they
are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file
a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.
Thus, deemed
instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from
the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil
interest therein.[31] By the
same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal case
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil
liability ex delicto.
And this is
precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability
arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.
Period for Perfecting an Appeal
Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure declares:
“Section 6. When appeal to be
taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance
of the period begins to run.”
This provision
is similar, though not identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules
invoked by petitioner. The difference
is that the former makes clear that promulgation refers to “judgment,”
and notice refers to “final order appealed from.”
Taken on its
face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal, whether by
the accused or by the private offended party, must be counted from and
understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation of the
judgment. This provision mentions the
presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in certain instances,
and/or the counsel or representative of the accused. Petitioner is correct in observing that the private offended
party is not required to be present during the promulgation; in fact, the said
party is not even mentioned in the provision.
For clarity, the
2000 Rule on the promulgation of judgment is quoted in full hereunder:
“Section 6. Promulgation of
judgment – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
“If the accused is confined or
detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place
of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept
the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided,
that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail
can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
“The proper clerk of court shall
give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If
the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from
prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
“In case the accused fails to
appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
“If the judgment is for conviction
and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.”[32]
Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the
Offended Party
Clearly, the
Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private
offended party, who is not even required to be present during the
proceedings. Since the judgment may be
promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from
that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service
of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its
promulgation to the accused. It is only
through notice to the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is
only from that date that the complainant will have knowledge of the need to
elevate the case. Till then, the remedy
of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.
We clarify also
that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited to
appeals of judgments rendered by regional trial and inferior courts. In higher courts, there is no promulgation
in the concept of Section 6 Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
a decision is promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk
of court, who then causes copies to be served upon the parties or their
counsels.[33] Hence,
the presence of either party during promulgation is not required.
The period to
appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
cannot be applied equally to both accused-appellant and private offended
party. Further bolstering this argument
is the second sentence of this provision which mandates as follows:
“x x x. This period for perfecting
an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has
been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run.”[34] (Italics supplied)
The above-quoted
portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the reglementary
period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence. However, it is clear that the procedure operates
only in relation to the accused. This
conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the
period to appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel
of the accused is given notice of the order overruling the motion for
reconsideration or for new trial.
Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was
taken by the accused, not by the private offended party.
Indeed, the
rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same
as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not completely identical,
the former may be suppletory to the latter.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, “[t]he appeal from the civil
aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for all intents and purposes, an
appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal cannot affect the
criminal aspect thereof.”[35] Being
akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil
Procedure.
In People v. Santiago,[36] the Court
has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended
party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor
general. As a rule, only the solicitor
general may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant
may not undertake such appeal.
However, the
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal
of the accused. As such, the present
appeal undertaken by the private offended party relating to the civil aspect of
the criminal judgment can no longer be considered a criminal action per se,
wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by
law. Instead, it becomes a suit
analogous to a civil action.
Being in the
nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings
brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of
the latter’s original jurisdiction.
Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal.[37] An appeal
by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.[38] For the
private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to
appeal from the “promulgation” of the judgment to the accused.
In sum, we hold
that an offended party’s appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a
judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or the final order appealed from.
To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to cause, in
criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended
parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors. This step will enable them to appeal the
civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances.
General Rule Not Applicable to the Present Case
Having laid down
the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now
determine its application to the present controversy. In short, was petitioner’s appeal timely filed?
If we were to
follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January 31,
2000 was on time, considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its
counsel only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed
on November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.
However, a
peculiar circumstance in this case militates against this conclusion. Here, the private prosecutor himself was
present during the promulgation of the Judgment. This fact is undeniable, as petitioner itself admits his presence
in its Memorandum as follows:
“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial
Court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246
acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused and her counsel as
well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such
promulgation.”[39] (Italics supplied)
Further, private
prosecutor[40] even
signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29, 1999, a signature which in
unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he represents -- herein
petitioner.
Having been
present during the promulgation and having been furnished a copy of the
judgment at the time, private offended party was in effect actually
notified of the Judgment, and from that time already had knowledge of the need
to appeal it. Thus, the very raison
d'être of this Decision is already satisfied: the filing of an appeal by
the said party, only after being notified of the Judgment. As argued by respondent, “did not the public
and private prosecutors acquire notice of Judgment at its promulgation because
of their presence? Notice of the
judgment may not be defined in any other way x x x.”[41]
Petitioner
stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party. It harps on the fact that -- based on
constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential edicts -- judgments must be
in writing and with the factual and legal bases thereof clearly expressed.
Petitioner
posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the
Judgment, for “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy
[thereof which] they can review or refer to from time to time.”[42] To rule
otherwise would supposedly deny them due process.
We clarify. If petitioner or its counsel had never been
notified of the Judgment, then the period for appeal would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to
attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that
date. But fiction must yield to
reality. By mere presence, the offended
party was already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and
should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed.
Besides, all
that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial court’s Decision to the
CA. There was no reason why it could
not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse Judgment
during the promulgation.[43] Parties
and their counsels are presumed to be vigilant in protecting their interests
and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to
technicalities.
Appeal Not Part of Due Process
It should be
stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a procedural
remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.[44] Hence, its
requirements must be strictly complied with.[45] The
failure of petitioner to file a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus
rendering the Judgment final and executory, is not a denial of due
process. It might have lost its right
to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
It would be
incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[46] Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[47] “The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the
orderly disposition of appealed cases.
In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules
need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims
and caprices of appellants.”[48]
Neither has
petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of
proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such
deviation.[49]
A fundamental
precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly
observed, for they are indispensable interdictions against needless delay and
for an orderly discharge of judicial business.[50] After
judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. Just as the losing party has the
right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party
also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.[51] This
principle becomes even more essential in view of the fact that the criminal
aspect has already been adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed Order AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
54-73.
[2] Rollo, p.
73; issued by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.
[3] Assailed RTC Order, Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo,
p. 73.
[4] Rollo, pp.
131-143.
[5] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp.
132-133; italics supplied.
[6] Annex “F” of the Petition; ibid., pp. 88-89.
[7] Annex “G” of the Petition; id., pp. 91-92.
[8] The Court deemed the case submitted for resolution on
May 16, 2001, upon receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum signed by Atty. Riche L.
Tiblani of Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & Santos. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Horacio R.
Makalintal Jr., was filed on April 6, 2001.
[9] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 133.
Original in upper case.
[10] §2(a), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, an appeal in cases decided by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by a petition for
review, not by a simple notice of appeal.
[11] §1(d), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
[12] Ibid.
[13] §1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Court.
[14] Sea Power
Shipping Enterprises, Inc v. CA, GR No. 138270, June 28, 2001.
[15] Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, signed by the
then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan.
[16] Ibid. at
No. 4.
[17] Id. at No.
4(e).
[18] Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, supra.;
Ybañez v. CA, 253 SCRA 540, February 9, 1996.
[19] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 137.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Id.
[22] 55 SCRA 153, January 21, 1974.
[23] Ibid., p.
157, per Aquino, J. (later CJ).
[24] Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Annotated, 1998 ed., pp. 497-498; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV,
1999, p. 595.
[25] Landicho v. Tan, 87 Phil 601, November 16,
1950.
[26] Ibid., p.
605, per Bautista Angelo, J.
[27] “ART. 32. Any
public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages.
“(1) Freedom of religion;
“(2) Freedom of speech;
“(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
“(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
“(5) Freedom of suffrage;
“(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
of law;
“(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
“(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
“(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
“(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
“(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
“(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
“(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
“(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
“(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
“(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
“(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise
of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
“(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has
not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
“(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
“In any of the cases
referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
“The indemnity shall include
moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
“The responsibility herein
set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.”
[28] “ART. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.”
[29] “ART. 34. When
a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor.
The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.”
[30] “ART. 2176. Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)”
[31] Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity &
Diversity, 2000 ed., pp. 214-215.
[32] §6, Rule 120, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[33] §9, Rule 51, 1997 Rules of Court; §4, Rule 56, 1997
Rules of Court.
[34] §6, Rule 122, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[35] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p.
139. Italics supplied.
[36] 174 SCRA 143, June 20, 1989.
[37] §2, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
[38] §3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
[39] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 2; rollo, p. 132.
[40] Atty. Froilan Rocas; records, p. 245-A.
[41] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 124.
[42] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 137.
[43] Republic v. CA, 322 SCRA 81, January 18, 2000.
[44] Oro v.
Judge Diaz, GR No. 140974, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug Corp. v. CA,
335 SCRA 567, July 13, 2000; Ortiz v. CA, 299 SCRA 708, December 4,
1998.
[45] Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996;
Del Rosario v. CA, 241 SCRA 553, February 22, 1995.
[46] Casim v.
Flordeliza, GR No. 139511, January 23, 2002.
[47] People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27,
1982.
[48] Del Rosario v. CA, supra, at p. 557,
per Bidin, J.
[49] Republic v. CA, supra.
[50] Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA, 265 SCRA 50,
November 28, 1996.
[51] Ibid.