EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 139341-45. July 25, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. ERNESTO FERNANDEZ, appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When
the prosecution’s evidence, consisting mainly of the complainant’s testimony,
fails the test of moral certainty demanded by the law and the rules, the
accused must be acquitted. It then
becomes this Court’s duty to uphold the constitutional right of the accused to
be presumed innocent regardless of the weakness of the defense.
The Case
For
automatic review before this Court is the September 30, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union (Branch 32) in Criminal Case Nos. A-3177,
A-3274, A-3275, A-3276 and A-3277, finding Ernesto Fernandez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of rape and sentencing him to death for
each count. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING consideration[s], the accused Ernesto Fernandez
a.k.a. “Tang-ked” is hereby found GUILTY of the five (5) criminal cases for
Rape for which he is charged and he is hereby sentenced in all the five (5)
cases to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to pay the complainant Yolanda
Fernandez damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case or P250,000.00
and to pay the cost of the proceedings.”[2]
The
Information for Criminal Case No. A-3177[3] dated November 29,
1996, reads as follows:[4]
“That on or about
the 2nd day of October, 1995, in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the father and
person-in-charge of the custody and care of the offended party, with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the offended party Yolanda Fernandez, a minor then fourteen
(14) years old, to her damage and prejudice.”[5]
The
four (4) other Informations (Criminal Case Nos. A-3274,[6] A-3275,[7] A-3276[8] and A-3277,[9] all dated January
17, 1997) indicted appellant for the same crime against the same victim on four
different dates, October 3, 4 and 15 -- all in 1995 -- and “in or about the
month of April 1996.” Appellant was
arraigned twice, first on July 29, 1997[10] for Criminal Case
No. A-3177; and the second on September 17, 1997[11] for Criminal Case
Nos. A-3274 to A-3277. In both
instances, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de parte,[12] pleaded not guilty.[13] After pretrial and
trial in due course, the lower court rendered its assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In
its Brief,[14] the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the facts in the following manner:
“Private
complainant Yolanda Fernandez is the illegitimate daughter of appellant Ernesto
Fernandez and Percilita Garcia. Percilita Garcia, on the other hand, is
appellant’s step-daughter, being the daughter of his common-law wife Espirita
Costales with her first husband, who was then living with appellant in
Namonitan, Sto. Tomas, La Union, when she was raped and impregnated by
appellant. On October 10, 1982,
Percilita Garcia, who was then 18 years old, gave birth out of wedlock to appellant’s
child, complainant Yolanda Fernandez, in appellant’s house in Namonitan, Sto.
Tomas, La Union. After giving birth to Yolanda, Percilita went to live in her
brother Ernesto Garcia’s house, also in Namonitan, until she went to Manila in
1984 and stayed there for good, leaving Yolanda to the care and custody of
appellant and her mother Esperita.
“Since birth,
Yolanda lived with her father, appellant Ernesto Fernandez, and her grandmother
Espirita Costales, appellant’s common-law wife, in appellant’s house in
Namonitan, Sto. Tomas, La Union. She went to school at Cupang Elementary School
in Namonitan, which was a walking
distance from their house. She was in Grade V when she was serially raped by
[her] father, appellant Ernesto Fernandez, inside their house starting October
2, 1995, which forced her to quit schooling. At the time, Yolanda was twelve
(12) going [on] thirteen (13) years old, and was living in the house of
appellant together with appellant, her grandmother Espirita Costales and her
5-year old sister Catherine Fernan[d]ez who is also appellant and Percilita’s
daughter. Previous to these rape incidents, appellant had started abusing
Yolanda as early as when she was five (5) years old by touching her breasts and
other parts of the body.
“THE FIRST RAPE (Criminal Case No. A-3177)
“On October 2,
1995 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Yolanda was sitting in the sala of
their house when appellant came near her. Just the two [of] them were in the
house at the time, because her grandmother and Catherine were out selling fish.
Appellant pulled her by the arm to her room which was located south of the sala
of the house. As he pulled her towards her room, he warned her not to tell
anyone. When they got inside the room, appellant undressed her, by removing
first her T-shirt, then her short pants, then her panty and bra. She tried to
fight back, boxed his back, and tried to run away but appellant caught her and
laid her down on her bed. After laying her down on the bed, he kissed her
cheeks, her lips and on her breasts; touched her body and her private parts
with his hand; then he held his penis, opened her legs wide and inserted his
penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions for a while. She felt pain in
her anybody [sic] because he would kill her, and then he left. She then put her
clothes on.
“THE SECOND RAPE (Criminal Case No. A-3274)
“On October 3,
1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, while Yolanda was alone at the
kitchen of their house washing the dishes, appellant arrived and pulled her
inside his own room. There, he removed her dress (bestida), her bra and her
panty, and laid her to his bed. She tried to run away but he caught her. He
then laid her down on his bed and thereupon, inserted his penis and had sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain inside her vagina. While doing the act,
appellant kissed her breasts, cheeks and lips. After the intercourse, appellant
warned her that he would kill her should she report what happened, then he
left.
“THE THIRD RAPE (Criminal Case No. A-3275)
“On October 4,
1995, at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning, Yolanda was sweeping in the house
when appellant kissed her all over her body and then pulled her to her room.
Only she and the appellant were in the house at the time. Once inside her room,
appellant removed first her skirt, then her blouse and then her bra and panty.
When she was totally naked, he [lay] her down on the bed. Despite her
resistance by pushing him away, appellant again succeeded in inserting his
penis inside her vagina. He also kissed her. She felt pain in her vagina and in
her breasts as he did the pumping motion. After the intercourse, appellant
warned her, that he would kill her; then, he left.
“THE FOURTH RAPE (Criminal Case No. A-3276)
“On October 15,
1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Yolanda was sitting alone in the
kitchen of their house, as her grandmother and sister Catherine had already
left to sell fish, when appellant approached and pulled her towards her room.
She tried to resist but he was very strong in pulling her. Once they got inside
her room, appellant embraced her, kissed her cheeks and mashed her breasts.
Then he undressed her and laid her on the bed. He again warned her not to
reveal it to anybody, or he would kill her. Then he placed himself on top of
her, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a pumping motion. She felt
pain in her vagina. It took appellant a few minutes to stay on top of her.
After consummating the sexual act, appellant left. Yolanda remained inside
their house.
“THE FIFTH RAPE (Criminal Case No. A-3277)
“After October 15,
1995, Yolanda was raped again and again, the dates and the number of times she
could no longer remember nor recall. Even after she was already pregnant with
appellant’s child, appellant still kept on raping her. On July 3, 1996, she gave
birth in their house to appellant’s child, a baby girl whom they named Marimar
Fernandez.”[15] (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
On
the other hand, appellant’s version of the facts is as follows:[16]
“The defense
presented the oral testimonies of Winifreda Butay and Ernesto Fernandez.
“The first
witness, Winifreda Butay, is a Chief of Police of Burgos, La Union. Before she
became Chief of Police of Burgos, La Union, she was assigned at the Women’s
Desk of San Fernando, La Union. On July 1997, she accompanied an insane victim
of a vehicular accident to the DSWD Substitute Home Care for Women in Urayong,
Bauang, La Union. While she was there, Yolanda Fernandez approached her and
introduced herself that she was from San Fernando, La Union. She asked Yolanda
why she was there and the latter informed her that she was taken by the DSWD
and NBI because she filed a rape case against her father. When she asked why
she filed a rape case Yolanda answered that it was her mother who instructed
her to reveal that it was her father who raped her. She asked why, and Yolanda
said that her parents were quarreling. She further inquired as to who raped
Yolanda. The latter answered that it was her boyfriend, Jonathan Camiro. She
said that when Yolanda was confiding to her, two (2) personnel of the DSWD were
listening to their conversation. The said personnel were Remelie Guillermo and
Edwina Masi. While she was talking with Yolanda, the two (2) approached them
and said that Yolanda gave them the same story. She again asked Yolanda who
raped her and why she filed a case against her own father. She gave the same
answer that her mother taught her what
to say and that it was her boyfriend who impregnated her. During that time, the
two (2) DSWD personnel were still listening. She told the DSWD about the case
and she was informed that the DSWD already sen[t] a written communication to
the NBI, but the NBI, however, didn’t respond. She said that she received a
letter from the mother of Yolanda prohibiting her from talking to or visiting
Yolanda.
“The last witness,
Ernesto Fernandez, is the accused[.] He admitted that he is the father of the
alleged victim but said that Catherine is not [his] daughter because Percy gave
birth in Manila. He denied vehemently the rape charges filed against him but
admitted that he tied Yolanda to a mango tree to force her to admit as to who
impregnated her. However, he denied kicking her abdomen to abort the baby. The
uncle of Yolanda talked to her and the latter admitted to her uncle that it was
Jonathan Camiro who got her pregnant. Upon knowing this, he asked a Barangay
councilman to talk to the father of Jonathan, but the latter denied that he
impregnated Yolanda. During the dates of the alleged rapes, he was working at
San Fernando, Pampanga. On June 26, 1996, the DSWD personnel and the assigned
NBI Agent went to their house to get Yolanda, whom he voluntarily allowed to go
with them. He didn’t know where they brought Yolanda. He only came to know that
a complaint was filed against him when he received a subpoena requiring him to
file a counter-affidavit which he identified in open court.”[17] (Citations
omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The
RTC gave full credence to the testimony of complainant, noting that “she
narrated the circumstances before, during and after the alleged rape in a
positive and straightforward manner.”[18] On her part, no
ill motive for accusing her own father of the crime of rape was found by the
trial court.[19]
Having
accepted complainant’s testimony, the RTC ruled that appellant had indeed succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of his daughter who, at the time of the rape, was
under eighteen years of age. It
sentenced him to death, one each for the five (5) counts of rape he had been
charged with.
Hence,
this automatic review.[20]
Issues
In
his Brief, appellant faults the RTC with this lone assignment of error:
“The lower court
gravely erred in imposing the death penalty upon accused-appellant despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove the real age of the victim.”[21]
The Court’s Ruling
The
appeal is meritorious; the prosecution’s evidence does not pass the test of
moral certainty. Hence, appellant must
be acquitted.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant
did not raise the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence as an issue. This Court, however, looked into it motu
proprio, consistent with the principle that an appeal in a criminal action
opens the whole case for review.[22]
Any
review of a rape case begins with the settled reality that accusing a person of
this crime can be done with facility.[23] Thus, the
testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution.[24] It may not be easy
for her to prove the commission of rape; yet, it is even more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove his guilt.[25] This principle
must be viewed in relation to that which holds that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[26]
To
be sure, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with
clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. What is required
of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty.[27] Upon the
prosecution’s failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional
duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has
imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life[28] or, worse -- as in
this case -- put him to death.
Complainant’s Dubious Testimony
The
court a quo describes the testimony of the victim as “positive,
straightforward, explicit and spontaneous”;[29] hence, sufficient
to convict appellant of rape. This
Court believes otherwise.
We
are not unmindful of the general rule that the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and
even finality on appeal.[30] However, this
principle does not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to determine whether
material facts or circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the
trial court.[31] In the past, we
have not hesitated to reverse judgments of conviction, where there were strong
indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charge was false.[32]
After
a judicious examination of complainant’s testimony, which is the main evidence
for the allegation of rape, we cannot subscribe to the RTC’s assessment of it
as straightforward and unwavering.
Quite the contrary, we believe that no conviction can arise from it on
the following grounds.
1. Unreliability
Complainant
testified that the first incident of rape happened on October 2, 1995, at 6:00
p.m.[33] But on
cross-examination, she testified that on the afternoon of that day, she went
out to fetch her Inang.[34] It would have been
a simple matter to reconcile these two events, if complainant simply clarified
that one happened after the other.
Surprisingly, during her direct examination, she did not even remember
that she had gone out to pick up her Inang that afternoon.
What
baffles this Court is the fact that complainant was sure of the time of the
alleged rape; she was likewise sure of the time her Inang arrived.[35] But the girl could
not remember what time she had gone out to fetch her grandmother. Complainant could have easily estimated the
time she had done so, if indeed the events transpired as she recounted them,
because one event logically followed the other.
The
same recall selectiveness is repeated in her testimony as to the alleged second
and third incidents of rape. On direct
examination, she claimed that on October 3, 1995, she was raped for the second
time at 7:00 a.m.[36] But on
cross-examination, she said that she had just left her Inang at that
same time in the place where the latter was to get a ride.[37] As to the third incident
of rape allegedly committed on October 4, 1995, complainant testified that she
was raped at 6:00 a.m.[38] Again, on
cross-examination, she declared that at that very same time, she and her sister
Catherine had brought their Inang to the place where the old lady would
get a ride.[39]
As
before, following the narration of events given by complainant, one can
logically infer that after the rape, she accompanied her grandmother up to the
place where the latter would get a ride; or the other way around -- after
fetching her Inang, she returned home and was raped. However, complainant could make no such
connection between the two events. The
only way to reconcile these events is to suppose that they happened in
succession, but her failure to recall a closely connected sequence of events
immediately preceding or succeeding the supposed rape[40] casts doubt on the
veracity of her statements and erodes her credibility.[41]
The
pattern that emerged was that when defense counsel made no reference to the
supposed rape incident, she became unsure whether her testimony during direct
examination on the alleged rape coincided with the times of the activities she
mentioned at the latter portion of the cross-examination.
These
discrepancies were material. Yet, they were not explained in the direct or
redirect examinations even when the trial was continued on succeeding
dates. Neither were they discussed in
the Decision of the trial court.
2. Inconsistency
A
careful analysis of the testimony of complainant will reveal that she kept on
giving statements that were inconsistent or contradictory.
First,
she
testified that she stopped schooling in October 1995, because her stomach was
already bulging due to her pregnancy.[42] She categorically
declared that she became pregnant because appellant had raped her.[43] But later, still
on direct examination, she averred that she was raped for the first time on
October 2, 1995. She testified:
“Q When for the first time did this Ernesto
Fernandez [rape] you?
A October 2, sir.
Q What year?
A In 1995, sir.”[44]
x
x x x
x x x x x
“Q But you claimed that he only raped you for
the first time on October 2, 1995?
A Yes, sir.”[45]
It
bewilders this Court how she could have stopped schooling in October 1995 due
to her pregnancy, which allegedly resulted from the first instance of rape
committed by appellant, also in October of that same year. She said, in fact, that her stomach was
already “bulging”[46] at this time. If such were the case, then not only did her
pregnancy occur simultaneously with the first rape but, more incredibly, her
pregnancy preceded the rape.
Second,
in
her testimony she alleged that at the time of the second rape, she was on her
way to school.[47] This allegation
contradicted her earlier statements, during both the direct and the redirect
examinations,[48] that she had
already stopped schooling on October 2, 1995.
Third, when asked by the
public prosecutor what she did after that rape, she said that “she left their
house to go to her Uncle Boyet.”[49] But when asked the
same question by the trial court, again she responded, “I went to school.”[50]
Fourth,
she
also said in her testimony that on October 4, 1995, she was with her sister
Catherine when they brought their grandmother to the place where the woman
would get her ride. Almost in the same
breath, though, complainant said that she and her sister went home. Later, the former clarified that on that
date, she went home while her sister Catherine accompanied their grandmother in
selling fish.[51]
3. Inadequacy
Showing
lack of substance in her testimony, complainant could not even relate details
of the final rape allegedly committed sometime in April 1996. Besides giving no details, she gave the
impression that the occurrence itself was doubtful. When questioned by the trial court, she testified thus:
“COURT QUESTION:
Q. How about in the year 1996, do you remember
if you were raped by him?
A No more.”[52]
4. Complainant’s Perfunctory Manner of Testifying
Although
it is settled that the accused may be convicted of rape simply on the basis of
the complainant’s testimony,[53] this principle
holds true only if such testimony meets the test of credibility.[54] This requires that
the testimony be straightforward, clear, positive and convincing.
What
particularly caught the Court’s attention was the manner in which complainant
gave her testimony. We note that all
the major circumstances before, during and immediately after the alleged rape
were indirectly provided by the prosecutor through his questions. In fact, when one sifts through the
testimony of complainant, it becomes evident that she simply affirmed, denied
or supplied the missing facts in response to the questions propounded by him.
Such testimony cannot be considered positive or categorical.
Although
the trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the questioning of a
child witness,[55] we must not lose
track of the basic tenet that the truth must be ascertained.
When
one scrutinizes the testimony of complainant, one will easily notice that her manner
of testifying seems to be so mechanical that, in the alleged four instances of
rape, both her actuation and that of appellant were almost always
identical. To the Court, her narration
seemed to come from memorization by rote, rather than genuine recollection, and
thus sounded perfunctory or routinary. Moreover, when asked questions on events
contemporaneous or immediately before or after the alleged rape, she seemed to
falter in giving immediate, positive and categorical responses.
Owing
to the character of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim is the focal
point around which the charges naturally revolve. Therefore, the degree of reliability, consistency and adequacy of
her testimony on material points -- as well as the very manner in which she
gives such testimony -- can either sustain or negate conviction.[56]
Tainted Testimony of
Complainant’s
Mother
It
is clear that conviction may arise from any categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter. In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that when
there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission
of the crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists,
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[57] Further, this
Court has reiterated time and time again that it is most unlikely for a young
girl like complainant, or even her family, to impute the crime of rape to no
less than a relative and to face social humiliation, if not to vindicate her
honor.[58]
However
settled these principles, they do not apply to the case at bar. We note from
Defense Witness Winifreda Butay’s testimony that complainant admitted to having
been instructed by her mother to testify to having been raped by the
father. We also had the occasion to
examine the testimony of complainant’s mother, who openly testified how she
herself had allegedly been raped by appellant.[59] Without passing
judgment on that incident, we note the animosity she felt towards him. The mother’s ill motive clearly supported
Butay’s testimony that complainant had accused her father of raping her after
being coached by her own mother to do so.
This point will be discussed shortly.
Unrebutted Testimony of
Credible Defense
Witness
Most
damaging to the cause of the prosecution was the testimony referred to above --
that of Defense Witness Winifreda Butay, a police officer assigned to the
Women’s Desk of Burgos, La Union. In
July 1997, she accompanied complainant to the DSWD (Department of Social
Welfare and Development) Substitute Home Care for Women in Urayong, Bauang, La
Union. Having had the opportunity to
interview complainant, Butay testified as follows:
“Q And what happened with this Yolanda Fernandez
when she saw you?
A When this victim saw me, I ask her from
where she is and she told me that [she is] from Sto. Tomas, La Union.
Q What happened next?
A I asked her name and she uttered Yolanda
Fernandez.
Q After she told you her name, what happened
next?
A I inquired from her.
Q What did you inquire from her?
A I inquired from her, what happened to her.
Q And what was the answer of Yolanda
Fernandez?
A She was taken by the DSWD and NBI for them
to [take] care of her or custody of her and she told me also that she filed a
case [of rape] against her father, Ernesto Fernandez.
Q And when she told you tha[t], what happened
or what did you do?
A I asked her, why she filed a case against
her father and she told me that her mother taught her that she will tell that
her father was the one who raped her.
Q And did you ask her why did her mother
[teach] her to file a case against her father?
PROS. CATBAGAN:
Objection,
your honor, that is only a hearsay.
COURT:
Objection
over[r]uled, that is a conversation.
What
was the answer?
A She told me that her mother and father are
quar[r]eling.
Q Could you quote the exact Ilocano dialect
before this Court [what] she told you?
A Yes sir.
Q What was it?
A I ask[ed] her ‘Apay nga indarum mo ni
tatang mo ti rape’ (Why did you charge your father with rape) and she answered
‘Isumet ngamin ti inbaga ni Nanang ko’, nga idarum ko ni tatang ko ti rape’,
and after that I ask[ed] her did your father rape you and she said no and then
I asked her again who is then the person who raped you, she answered ‘didiay
nobyok’ (my boyfriend).
Q Did you [ask] her the name of her suitor?
A Yes sir.
Q And what was the answer that was revealed?
A My boyfriend Jonathan Camiro.
Q And what else did she [reveal] to you
regarding Jonathan Camiro?
A I asked he[r], is it not true that he was
the one who raped you.
Q And what was the answer of Yolanda
Fernandez?
A He was the one.”[60]
x
x x x
x x x x x
“Q And what did she say to them
A And what she said to them she also told me.
Q And what is that?
A She said: (‘Isu met ti imbaga ni
Nanangco’) That is what my mother said.
Q What [was] Yolanda Fernandez referring to?
A Yolanda Fernandez told me ‘that it was not
my father who impregnated me’ she said.
Q Did you ask Yolanda Fernandez who
impregnated her?
A Yes, your honor, and said: ‘my boyfriend
Jonathan Camiro.’
Q Where [were] these two DSWD [personnel] when
Yolanda Fernandez told you that?
A They were in front of me, your honor.
Q How far Madam witness?
A This far, sir. (Witness is pointing to
one-half meter).
Q Did you ask Yolanda Fernandez if she was
actually raped by [her] father?
A Yes, and she told me again: ’Saan nga ni tatangco
ti nangsicog caniac.’ (It was not my father who made me pregnant).
Q Did you ever ask her why she filed the case
against her father?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And what was the answer?
A I asked her: ‘why then did you file a case
against your father or why is it [that it is] your father whom you charged?’
(Apay ngarud nga ni tatangmo ti indarum mo?).
Q And what was the answer?
A Yes, because that is what my mother told me
(Wen ta isu met ngarud ti imbaga ni nanangco cania).
Q Did you ask her why her mother want[s] her
to charge Ernesto Fernandez?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was the answer?
A She told me in Ilocano again. (Wen ta
agap-apada). Yes because they are quarreling.”[61]
We
find no logical reason for Witness Butay to testify falsely. The public
prosecutor tried to discredit her by implying that there was a friendly
relationship between her and appellant.
However, no concrete proof showing that her testimony was biased was
ever presented.
Granting
for the sake of argument that there was a friendly relationship between Butay
and appellant, it did not impair or in any way affect the weight of her
testimony. We have often held that the
relationship of a witness with the accused does not automatically affect the
veracity of the former’s testimony.[62] Friendship alone,
even if true, is not reason enough to discredit and label Butay’s testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence.
Epilogue
Given
the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that complainant has not been a
victim of rape, or that appellant’s defense of alibi and denial can be given
full faith and credence. We only stress
that her testimony was unable to pass the exacting test of moral certainty that
the law demands and the rules require to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of
overcoming appellant’s presumption of innocence.[63]
A
conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt -- moral certainty that the accused is guilty.[64] The defense may be
weak, but the prosecution is even weaker.[65] As a result of
this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.
The
Court has aptly said: “It is better to
liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not
been proved by the required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court’s
support of ardent crusaders waging all-out war against felons on the loose,
when the People’s evidence fails to prove indubitably the accused’s authorship
of the crime of which they stand accused, it is the Court’s duty -- and the
accused’s right -- to proclaim their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.”[66]
WHEREFORE, the automatically
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union in Criminal
Case Nos. A-3177, A-3274, A-3275, A-3276 and A-3277 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, Ernesto Fernandez is ACQUITTED
and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.
The
director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this
Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from
receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide,
Jr., C.J., on leave.
Bellosillo,
J., no part. Did not take part in deliberations.
[1] Penned by Executive Judge Leo M.
Rapatalo; rollo, pp. 29-79; records, pp. 158-208.
[2] RTC Decision, p. 51; rollo,
p. 79; records, p. 208.
[3] Rollo., pp. 15-16; records, folder 5, pp.
2-3.
[4] Signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Gloria D. Catbagan, with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Francisco M.
Tejano.
[5] Information dated November 29, 1996;
rollo, p. 15; records, folder 5, p. 2.
[6] Rollo, pp. 7-8; records, folder 1, pp.
1-2.
[7] Ibid., pp. 9-10; folder 2, pp. 1-2.
[8] Id., pp. 11-12; folder 3, pp. 1-2.
[9] Id., pp. 13-14; folder 4, pp. 1-2.
[10] Order dated July 29, 1997; records,
p. 24.
[11] Order dated September 17, 1997; ibid,
p. 46.
[12] Atty. Placido Garcia Jr.
[13] Supra, notes 10 and 11.
[14] Appellee’s Brief was signed by
Solicitor General Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo
G. Urbiztondo and Solicitor Luis F. Simon.
[15] Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-9; rollo,
pp. 174-180.
[16] Appellant’s Brief was signed by
Attys. Bartolome P. Reus and Ma. Vanessa B. Donato-Balmaceda of the Public
Attorney’s Office.
[17] Appellant’s Brief, p. 5-7; rollo,
p. 102-104.
[18] RTC Decision, p. 31; rollo,
p. 59; records, p. 188.
[19] Ibid.
[20] This case was deemed submitted for
resolution on September 21, 2001, upon receipt by this Court of appellant’s
Reply Brief. Earlier, appellant’s Brief
was received by the Court on February 27, 2001, while appellee’s Brief was
received on June 20, 2001.
[21] Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; rollo,
p. 98. Original in upper case.
[22] People v. Arves, 343 SCRA
123, October 13, 2000; People v.
Balacano, 336 SCRA 615, July 31, 2000; People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA
40, July 5, 2000; People v.
Buluran, 325 SCRA 476, February 15, 2000; People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA
613, February 15, 2000.
[23] People v. Galvez, GR Nos.
136867-68, September 25, 2001; People
v. Navarette, GR Nos. 136840-42, September 13, 2001; People v. Babera, 332 SCRA 257,
May 30, 2000; People v. Mijano,
311 SCRA 81, July 23, 1999; People v.
Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228, April 21, 1999.
[24] People v. Flores, GR No. 141782,
December 14, 2001; People v. Manayan, GR Nos.
142741-43, October 25, 2001; People
v. Morales, GR No. 134292, August 16, 2001.
[25] People v. Manayan, supra;
People v. Galvez, supra; People v. Queigan, GR Nos.
133586-603, February 19, 2001.
[26] Ibid.
[27] §2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
[28] People v. Aballe, GR No. 133997,
May 17, 2001.
[29] RTC Decision, p. 31; rollo,
p. 59; records, p. 188.
[30] People v. Plana, GR No. 128285,
November 27, 2001; People v. Villanos, 337 SCRA 78, August 1, 2000; People v. De Guzman, 333 SCRA
269, June 8, 2000; People v.
Palma, 308 SCRA 466, June 17, 1999.
[31] People v. De la Cruz, GR No. 137967,
April 19, 2001; People v. Domogoy,
305 SCRA 75, March 22, 1999.
[32] Ibid.; People v. Medel, 286 SCRA 567,
February 26, 1998.
[33] TSN, September 17, 1997, pp. 6-7.
[34] TSN, October 15, 1997, p. 3.
[35] TSN, September 17, 1997, p. 14.
[36] Ibid., p. 15.
[37] TSN, October 15, 1997, p. 4.
[38] TSN, September 17, 1997, p. 20.
[39] TSN, October 15, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[40] People
v. Bautista, GR No. 123557, February 4, 2002.
[41] Ibid.
[42] TSN, September 17, 1997, p. 5.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Id., p. 6.
[45] Id., p. 14.
[46] Id., p. 5.
[47] TSN, September 17, 1997, p. 19.
[48] TSN, October 15, 1997, p. 7.
[49] TSN, September 17, 1997, p. 19.
[50] Ibid.
[51] TSN, October 15, 1997, p. 5.
[52] TSN, October 2, 1997, p. 6.
[53] People v. Taño, 331 SCRA 449,
May 5, 2000; People v. Ambray,
303 SCRA 697, February 25, 1999; People
v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, November 6, 1997; People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246,
February 13, 1997; People v. Rosare, 264 SCRA 398, November 19, 1996.
[54] Ibid.
[55] People
v. Daganio, GR No. 137385, January 23, 2002.
[56] People
v. Pajarillo, GR Nos. 143755-58, February 20, 2002.
[57] People
v. Sansaet, GR No. 139330, February 6, 2002; People v. Quezada, GR Nos. 135557-58,
January 30, 2002; People v.
Lanita, GR No. 134101, September 5, 2001; People v. Alay-ay, GR Nos.
137199-230, August 23, 2001; People v.
Banela, 301 SCRA 84, January 18, 1999.
[58] People v. Libo-on, GR No. 136737,
May 23, 2001; People v.
Villadares, GR No. 137649, March 8, 2001; People v. Namayan, 246
SCRA 646, July 18, 1995.
[59] TSN, August 5, 1997 pp. 5-7.
[60] TSN, November 13, 1997, pp. 5-7.
[61] TSN, November 20, 1997, pp. 4-6.
[62] People v. Morial, GR No. 129295,
August 15, 2001; Roca v. CA, GR
No. 114917, January 29, 2001; People
v. Oposculo Jr, 345 SCRA 167, November 20, 2000.
[63] People v. Pajarillo, supra.
[64] People v. Bautista, supra.
[65] Ibid.; Chua v. People, GR No. 128095,
January 19, 2001; Rueda v.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 129064, November 29, 2000; People v. Guinto,
184 SCRA 287, April 6, 1990.
[66] People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 39,
October 17, 1997, per Romero, J.