SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134762.
July 23, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ @ “BONG DAGIS,” accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an
appeal from the decision dated March 13, 1998 by the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 18339-MN, convicting
appellant Romeo Fernandez a.k.a. “Bong Dagis,” of murder and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and sentencing him to pay the heirs
of the victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P35,000 as
actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the
case are culled from the records.
In an
information dated August 20, 1997, appellant Romeo Fernandez was indicted for
murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of
November 1996, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon
one DANILO BATES y CUASAY, hitting the victim on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the victim multiple stab wounds which caused his
immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On September 26,
1997, appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel pleaded not
guilty. He waived pre-trial, and thereafter trial ensued.
According to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, on November 10, 1996, at around 8:00
P.M., Thelma Bates, mother of the victim, Danilo Bates, left her house in
Davila Street, West Navotas, Navotas, Metro Manila, to look for her son. Danilo
Bates was a book company representative tasked with delivering books to various
provinces.[2] Usually
after returning from a long trip, he would go out of their house to meet with
his friends. That fateful night was no exception. Mrs. Bates found him
conversing with a certain Uric and one Manny in front of the house of one Aling
Paz, on Davila Street.[3] She asked
Danilo to come home with her, as she wanted to sleep already. He said he would
follow shortly.
At around 11:00
P.M. that night, Mrs. Bates went out again to fetch Danilo. However, he was no
longer in front of Aling Paz’s residence. Instead, she found him lying
on a stone bench at the end of an alley at the back of the house of Aling Paz.
He was being stabbed by appellant, Romeo Fernandez. Mrs. Bates was only four or
five meters away from the two and clearly saw appellant stab her son in his
chest at least three times. The scene was illuminated by the light from a
nearby house. She was so shocked she could not move. Appellant swiftly fled
from the scene of the crime.
Assisted by some
neighbors, Danilo was rushed to the Tondo Medical Center. While on the way to
the hospital, Mrs. Bates heard Danilo mention “Dagis,” the appellant’s alias.
Danilo died from multiple stab wounds an hour after reaching the hospital.[4]
Dr. Maria
Cristina B. Freyra, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory,
autopsied Danilo’s corpse. Her findings, which were not contested by the
defense, showed that Danilo died from “multiple stab wounds, trunk.”[5]
Appellant denied
any involvement in Danilo’s death. He claimed he was at home during the
incident, putting his children to sleep. His home was only a few hundred meters
away from the scene of the crime. According to his testimony, he was supposed
to be out fishing that night but the fishing boat had engine trouble and he
went home instead. He did not leave his house until 6:00 A.M. the following
day.[6]
Appellant declared
that he never met the victim. However, he was acquainted with Mrs. Bates whom
he called “Nanay.” After Danilo’s death, he saw her several times at a
place in their neighborhood where she was wont to gamble. She gave no
indication that she suspected him of being her son’s killer. When he was taken
into custody, the police did not inform him of the reason for his arrest. He
likewise denied changing his residence from November 10, 1996, until his arrest
on August 16, 1997.[7]
The defense
presented Rosenda Fernandez, appellant’s wife, to corroborate appellant’s
alibi.[8]
Mrs. Bates was
recalled to the witness stand on rebuttal. She denied meeting appellant after
her son’s death. She insisted that appellant went into hiding after the
incident prompting her to seek assistance from barangay officials. She stressed
that at one time, the barangay captain went to appellant’s house, which was
built over the sea and could only be reached by passing through a series of
crisscrossing, winding gangplanks. Appellant jumped into the sea to avoid
capture.[9]
Appellant then
took the stand anew as a sur-rebuttal witness. He denied all the statements
made by Mrs. Bates in her rebuttal testimony.[10]
The trial court found
appellant’s defense of denial and alibi neither convincing nor satisfactory. It
decided the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Romeo Fernandez guilty of the crime
charged against him in this case, which is murder. In the absence of any
generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua.
Accused Fernandez is also ordered
to pay Thelma Bates the sum of P35,000.00 representing the actual expenses
incurred by her in connection with the death and burial of the victim, plus
P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the loss of the victim’s life and
another sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered
by her due to the untimely death of her son who is the victim in this case.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, the
present appeal with the following lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT HIS GUILT HAVING BEEN
PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]
The crucial
issue in this appeal pertains to the credibility of the prosecution’s lone
eyewitness. Appellant asks that his appeal be considered as an exception to the
well-entrenched rule that findings of trial courts pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts.[13] He submits
that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued certain facts or circumstances
of weight, which if considered, might affect the result of the case. More
particularly, he insists that a careful perusal of the testimony of Thelma
Bates would reveal marked contradictions, implausibilities, and
improbabilities, rendering it both suspect and incredible.
First, appellant points out that while Mrs.
Bates claimed that she was only four to five meters away from her son when he
was stabbed and the place was well lighted, she nonetheless could not describe
the weapon used. According to appellant, her inability to describe the murder
weapon casts doubt on her account.
For the
appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that Mrs. Bates’
inability to identify the murder weapon is a minor and peripheral matter, which
cannot affect her declaration that she saw appellant stab her son. What is
crucial in her testimony is the positive identification of appellant as the
malefactor.
Considering the
evidence and the arguments presented by the appellant and appellee, the records
show that the victim died from multiple stab wounds. This is consistent with
Mrs. Bates’ declaration that she saw appellant stab Danilo several times at the
dead end of an alley in Davila Street, Navotas. Her testimony is thus
materially corroborated by the autopsy conducted on the deceased. It having been
established that the victim died from multiple stab wounds, the failure of Mrs.
Bates to identify or describe the weapon used is of no consequence and cannot
diminish her credibility.[14] For one,
witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with
perfect or total recall. For another, what is vital in her testimony is not her
knowledge of the weapon used, but that she saw appellant stabbing the victim.
The presentation of the murder weapon is not indispensable to the prosecution
of an accused.[15] The
non-identification or non-presentation of the weapon used is not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause where the accused was positively identified.[16]
Second, appellant assails Mrs. Bates’ claim that
the incident occurred at the dead end of the alley where her son was sleeping
and that she saw appellant immediately leave the crime scene. He points out
that if her story were true, he should, by force of circumstance, have seen her
as he would have to pass her in exiting the alley where the incident occurred.
There is nothing
in the records, however, that would support appellant’s claim that in fleeing
from the scene of the incident, he had nowhere to pass except where Mrs. Bates
stood. Moreover, appellant’s testimony that he did not see Mrs. Bates is purely
self-serving. For him to admit that he did see her would have been fatal to his
defense. His second argument thus deserves but scant consideration.
Third, appellant argues that Mrs. Bates’
testimony is incredible and repugnant to the common experience and observation
of mankind since she failed to shout for help on seeing her son being stabbed.
According to appellant, her claim that she was shocked into immobility by the
sight is incredible, to say the least.
It is unfair to
gauge the action of Thelma Bates as “incredible” for there is no prescribed
behavior when one is suddenly confronted with a startling or frightening event.
Different people react differently to a given stimulus or situation, and there
is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience.[17] Her
inability to scream for help was understandable. She was simply shocked into
immobility by a violent and tragic tableau that suddenly met her eyes.
Fourth, appellant points out that it took
Mrs. Bates all of nine months and four days to report the incident to the
police and to execute a sworn statement implicating appellant. This unexplained
delay damages her credibility, according to appellant, in view of the absence
of any showing that he threatened to harm Mrs. Bates or any member of her
family should she report him to the authorities.
Appellant’s
allegation that it took Mrs. Bates over nine months to report the fatal
stabbing of her son to the authorities is not entirely correct. The transcripts
show that she brought the incident to the attention of the barangay
authorities, not just once but twice, but to no avail as appellant was at
large.[18] The
records likewise show she did not file her sworn declaration against appellant
until the latter was in custody.[19] Note that
while the incident took place on November 10, 1996, appellant was apprehended
only on August 16, 1997.[20] Appellant’s
allegation that it took Mrs. Bates more than nine months to make a criminal
accusation against him before the police is, thus, correct. However, delay in
reporting the crime or identifying the malefactors does not affect the
credibility of a witness for as long as the delay is sufficiently explained.[21] When the
police queried Mrs. Bates why she waited until appellant was arrested before
filing her complaint with them, she disclosed that she feared appellant might
kill her, too.[22] Fear of
reprisal has been accepted by this Court as an adequate explanation for the
delay or vacillation in filing criminal charges.[23] The delay
in making the criminal accusation having thus been explained, her credibility
as a witness remains unimpaired.
Fifth, appellant argues that Mrs. Bates’
credibility is further put into doubt since her statement that she saw
appellant stabbing her son in the chest is contradicted by the autopsy findings
that Danilo sustained stab wounds in the trunk.
The OSG contends
that there is no contradiction between Mrs. Bates’ testimony that Danilo was
stabbed in the chest and Dr. Freyra’s findings that Danilo ‘ s death was caused
by multiple stab wounds on the trunk. It submits that the chest is a part of
the trunk, which has been defined as “a human or animal body, not including the
head and limbs.”[24]
Appellant’s
attempt to discredit Mrs. Bates by seeking to distinguish between chest stab
wounds and trunk stab wounds is an exercise in futility. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the term “trunk” includes the chest, for the
trunk is “the human body apart from the head and appendages.”[25] Perforce,
stab wounds in the trunk will necessarily include stab wounds in the chest.
Sixth, appellant faults Mrs. Bates’
testimony for being biased as it was not corroborated by the testimonies of
other witnesses whom she claimed also saw the stabbing incident. He theorizes
that the failure of the prosecution to present the other eyewitnesses would
have an adverse result to its cause.
We note that
Mrs. Bates did disclose that other people witnessed the incident. However, she
clarified that these other witnesses did not want to testify.[26] For this
refusal, she should not be blamed nor her testimony be sweepingly branded as
biased. More often than not, witnesses tend to be reluctant about volunteering
information concerning a criminal case or being involved in a criminal
investigation.[27]
Nor should the
prosecution’s failure to present additional witnesses to corroborate Thelma’s
sole eyewitness account damage its cause. It is, after all, the prerogative of
the prosecution to decide how to conduct its case, and this includes the number
of witnesses it may choose to present.[28] The
failure of the prosecution to present corroborative witnesses does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the testimony of said witnesses, if
presented, would have adverse consequences to its cause.[29] After all,
these witnesses are just as available to the defense for presentation, should
it so desire.
Finally, appellant points to certain
perceived inconsistencies and contradictions in Mrs. Bates’ account which,
according to him, are sufficient to destroy her credibility, viz.: (1)
She declared on direct examination that she went out of her house at 8:00 P.M.
to look for her son. On cross-examination, however, she declared that she went
out of her house the first time at 11:00 P.M. She then changed her answer that
it was for the second time when she went out at 11 o’clock that night; (2) Her
statements on direct and cross-examination that there were other people who
witnessed the incident are contradictory. On direct examination, she claimed
that other people witnessed the crime but refused to be involved, but on
cross-examination, she declared that the place was deserted when the incident
happened; and (3) Her statements on the lighting at the locus criminis likewise
do not dovetail. On direct examination, she averred that the place was well
lighted, but on cross-examination, she said the lights from the nearby houses
were already turned off at the time the crime occurred.
We find,
however, that these supposed inconsistencies refer to minor and inconsequential
details and a calibration of Mrs. Bates’ testimony on the whole shows that
there is consistency as to the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the perpetrator. It is axiomatic that slight variations in
the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters do not
affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of
truth and indicate that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble.[30]
Nonetheless, it
must be stressed that appellant’s perceptions as to the alleged inconsistencies
are not entirely accurate. First, Mrs. Bates did not testify on direct
examination that the first time she went out looking for her son was at eight
o’clock in the evening of November 10, 1996. On direct examination, she
declared that she went out at 11 in the evening to bring her son home.[31] It was on
cross-examination that she had the opportunity to clarify the series of events
that took place that night. Thus, she explained she went out twice that night:
the first time at 8:00 P.M. when she went to tell her son to come home as she
already wanted to sleep, and the second time at 11:00 P.M. to “fetch” her son.[32]
Nor is there any
contradiction between her testimony on direct examination that there were other
people who witnessed the incident and her declaration on cross-examination that
the crime scene was deserted. Mrs. Bates never claimed on direct examination
that the other people who saw the incident were with her in the alley.[33] The
presence of other witnesses cannot be discounted because there were several
houses along the alley, near the scene of the crime. Recall also that she
stated that after her son was stabbed “people started to come out.”[34] She could
have learned about such witnesses after the people came out to help her and the
victim.
With respect to
her testimony on direct examination that she was able to identify appellant
because of “a light coming from a nearby house,”[35] said
declaration does not run counter to her statement on cross-examination that
“the lights from nearby houses were already turned off.”[36] Note that
she never stated that all the lights in the nearby houses were already off.
Moreover, in the latter part of her cross-examination, she averred that the
crime scene was not dark. There was light coming from a nearby house.[37]
The trial court
judge who had the opportunity to observe her demeanor and conduct on the witness
stand gave full faith and credit to Mrs. Bates’ testimony. We cannot do
otherwise. Appellant has failed to point to any fact or circumstance which the
court a quo overlooked or misconstrued which could destroy the veracity
and truthfulness of her testimony. Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the
testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial
court is sufficient to support a conviction.[38]
Against her positive
identification, all appellant can offer is the inherently weak defense of
denial and alibi. His defense has no leg to stand on. For alibi to prosper,
appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime
was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission.[39]
Appellant’s own evidence shows that he was in the immediate environs when the
fatal stabbing occurred. In fact, his house was just a few hundred meters away
from the crime scene. Positive identification, where categorical and
consistent, and absent proof of any ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over denial and alibi, which are not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof.[40] Hence,
this appeal must fail.
But was the
crime committed murder or homicide?
In finding
appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery, the court a quo observed:
In fine, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the prosecution was able to establish by its own evidence the
guilt of the accused in this case. It does not matter that (Thelma) Bates did
not see how the incident started. The killing thru the infliction of stab
wounds on the body of the victim while the latter was sleeping is, definitely,
characterized by treachery.[41]
There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[42] It is
settled that there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping[43] or had
just awakened,[44] because in
such cases the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense. However,
the prosecution must still establish how the attack commenced.[45] When Mrs.
Bates went out of the house to call Danilo, she saw appellant already attacking
her son who was lying on the bench. She claimed that her son was sleeping, but
presented no evidence to show that he was actually asleep when attacked and
thus had no opportunity to defend himself. Where no particulars are known
regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which
resulted in the victim’s death began and developed, it cannot be established
from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[46] Any doubt
as to the existence of the treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[47]
Note that the
information also alleged “evident premeditation.” Our perusal of the records,
however, fails to disclose any factual basis for the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated where
there is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or the time
that elapsed before it was carried out.[48] The
premeditation must be evident and not merely suspected. Absent treachery and
evident premeditation, the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
Homicide is
penalized under the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the
penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period.[49] The time
included in reclusion temporal in its medium period is from fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty
shall range from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The trial court
awarded actual damages in the amount of P35,000 to Thelma Bates. To be
entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof, and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.[50] Our review
of the entire record fails to disclose such credible and satisfactory evidence.
Mrs. Bates admitted she did not keep any of the receipts.[51] The award of
actual damages to her must, therefore, be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72 in Criminal Case No. 18339-MN is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant ROMEO FERNANDEZ alias “BONG DAGIS”
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and is sentenced to a
prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay the victim’s mother,
Thelma Bates, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral
damages, but the award of actual damages in the sum of P35,000 is deleted.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
(Chairman), Mendoza, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 2.
[2] TSN, November 14, 1997, p. 3.
[3] TSN, November 21, 1997, pp. 3-5.
[4] Supra,
note 2 at 9.
[5] Exhibit “B” and sub-markings, Supra, note 1 at
16.
[6] TSN, January 9, 1998, pp. 5-6; TSN, January 16, 1998,
pp. 5-7.
[7] Id. at
7-10; Id. at 2-5.
[8] TSN, January 30, 1998, pp. 4-6, 8-10.
[9] TSN, February 6, 1998, pp. 2-5.
[10] TSN, February 13, 1998, pp. 2-4.
[11] Supra,
note 1 at 39-40.
[12] Rollo, p.
42.
[13] People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, 332 SCRA
485, 494 (2000), citing People vs. Llaguno, G.R. No. 91262, 285 SCRA 124
(1998).
[14] People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, 333 SCRA
823, 832 (2000).
[15] People vs. Mumar, G.R. No. 123155, 333 SCRA
221, 230 (2000), citing People vs. Atanacio, G.R. No. L-39211, 128 SCRA
22 (1984).
[16] People vs.
Tanzon, G.R. No. 129793, 320 SCRA 762, 772 (1999).
[17] People vs. Monieva, G.R. No. 123912, 333 SCRA
244, 252 (2000), citing People vs. Luzorata, G.R. No. 122478, 286 SCRA
487 (1998).
[18] TSN, February 6, 1998, pp. 3, 5-6.
[19] Id. at 6.
[20] His arrest appears to have been in connection with
another offense. See Exhibit “C,” Records, p. 17.
[21] People vs. Arlalejo, G.R. No. 127841, 333 SCRA
604, 612 (2000), citing People vs.
Agsunod, Jr., G.R. No. 118331, 306 SCRA 612 (1999), People vs. Reduca, G.R. Nos.
126094-95, 301 SCRA 516 (1999), People
vs. Banela, G.R. No. 124973, 301 SCRA 84 (1999).
[22] Exhibit “A,” Records, p. 15.
[23] People vs. Navales, G.R. No. 112977, 266 SCRA
569, 588 (1997), citing People vs. Peran, G.R. No. 95259, 215 SCRA 152
(1992).
[24] Citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 641 (1987).
[25] WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(UNABRIDGED) 2456 (1993 ed.)
[26] TSN, November 14, 1997, p. 9.
[27] People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, 257 SCRA
528, 534 (1996), citing People vs. Caraig, G.R. No. 91162, 202 SCRA 357
(1991).
[28] People vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 132171, 332 SCRA
661, 669 (2000), citing People vs.
Requiz, G.R. No. 130922, 318 SCRA 635 (1999).
[29] People vs. Nabunat, G.R. No. 84392, 182 SCRA
52, 56 (1990).
[30] People vs. Muyco, G.R. No. 132252, 331 SCRA
192, 199 (2000), citing People vs. Atad, G.R. No. 114105, 266 SCRA 262
(1997).
[31] TSN, November 14, 1997, p. 4.
[32] TSN, November 21, 1997, pp. 5-6.
[33] Supra,
note 31 at 9.
[34] Supra,
note 32 at 9.
[35] Supra,
note 31 at 6.
[36] Supra,
note 32 at 7.
[37] Id. at 8.
[38] People vs. Listerio, G.R. No. 122099, 335 SCRA
40, 51(2000), citing People vs. Quijon, G.R. No. 103506, 325 SCRA 453,
462 (2000).
[39] People vs. Suitos, G.R. No. 125280, 329 SCRA
440, 448 (2000), citing People vs. Henson, G.R. No. 116732, 270 SCRA 634
(1997).
[40] People vs.
Orbita, G.R. No. 122104, 322 SCRA 321, 327 (2000).
[41] Rollo, p.
19.
[42] People vs. Orio, G.R. No. 128821, 330 SCRA 576,
586-587 (2000), citing Art. 14, REVISED PENAL CODE; People vs. Ybeas,
G.R. No. 98062, 213 SCRA 793 (1992).
[43] People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, 332 SCRA
627, 640 (2000), citing People vs. Evangelista, G.R. Nos. 84332-33, 256
SCRA 611 (1996), People vs. Caringal, G.R. No. 75368, 176 SCRA 404
(1989).
[44] People vs. Cotas, supra, citing People vs.
Atencio, No. L-22518, 22 SCRA 88 (1968), People vs. Yadaon, No. L-1562,
82 Phil. 160 (1948).
[45] People vs. Gaviola, G.R. No. 126125, 327 SCRA
580, 585-586 (2000).
[46] People vs. Orcula, Sr., G.R. No. 132350, 335
SCRA 129, 144 (2000), citing US vs. Pangilion, No. 11480, 34 Phil. 786
(1916), US vs. Perdon, No. 1692, 4 Phil. 141 (1905).
[47] People vs. Santos, G.R. No. 122935, 332 SCRA
394, 401 (2000), citing People vs.
Bahenting, G.R. No. 127659, 303 SCRA 558 (1999).
[48] People vs. Tortosa, G.R. No. 116739, 336 SCRA
604, 613 (2000), citing People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, 286 SCRA 44
(1998), People vs. Timblor, G.R. No. 118939, 285 SCRA 64 (1998).
[49] REV. PENAL CODE, Art. 64 (1).
[50] People vs. Samolde, G.R. No. 128551, 336 SCRA
632, 654 (2000), citing People vs.
Suelto, G.R. No. 103515, 316 SCRA 283 (1999).
[51] TSN, November 21, 1997, p. 9.