FIRST
DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126731. July 11, 2002]
ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner,
vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 128623.
July 11, 2002]
THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS
(SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The twin
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
32405[1] and 37085.[2]
Esteban Yau is
the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case
No. CEB-2058, entitled “Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters Finance
Corporation, et al.,” which included Silverio as one of the defendants. The
decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was
issued on September 17, 1992.
Despite service
of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the
defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. The only asset
of Silverio that could be found for the satisfaction of the judgment was his
proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila
Golf). Accordingly, the sheriff levied upon the Silverio share on December 7,
1992. At the public auction sale on December 29, 1992, Yau emerged as the
highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at P2 Million and the
corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his name.[4]
However, at the
time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already
subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment
dated March 27, 1990[5] and
October 17, 1990[6] obtained
by the Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City before which complaints for sums of money,
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 90-513[7] and
90-271,[8]
respectively, were pending, in which Silverio is also one of the defendants.
On February 11,
1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene[9] in both
cases pending before Branches 62 and 64 of the RTC of Makati City. In an Order[10] dated
March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the motion to intervene in Civil Case No.
90-513 on the ground that the motion was filed after the parties have rested
their respective cases and the same will only unduly delay the disposition of
the case. Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yau’s motion to intervene in
Civil Case No. 90-271 in an Order dated July 1, 1993.[11] Manilabank
sought reconsideration[12] but
Branch 64 denied the same in an Order[13] dated
August 30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for certiorari[14] before
the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32405.
Meanwhile, in a
letter[15] dated September 20, 1993, Yau
formally requested Manila Golf, through its transfer agent, Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC), to cancel the certificate in the name of Silverio and
issue a new certificate in his name by virtue of the Certificate of Sale dated
December 29, 1992 issued in his favor. Yau expressly agreed in the letter that
the certificate to be issued in his name shall be subject to the preliminary
attachments issued in other cases. Manila Golf, however, refused to accede to
Yau’s request, expressing the apprehension that it could be cited for contempt
in view of the fact that notices of garnishment against the Silverio share
directed the club “not to remove, transfer or otherwise dispose of" said
share.
Thereupon, Yau
filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion
for order directing Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.[16] Acting
upon the motion, the said court issued an Order dated March 6, 1995,[17] which was
subsequently amended on March 30, 1995,[18] directing
Manila Golf and/or its transfer agent, FEBTC, to cancel the certificate of
proprietary membership share in the name of Silverio, and in lieu thereof to
issue a new one in Yau’s name, subject to the preliminary attachments in favor
of Manila bank.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on May 2,
1995 a petition for certiorari[19] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No.37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC Cebu City dated March 6,
1995, and amended on March 30, 1995. On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a
Decision[20] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37085 nullifying the Orders of RTC Cebu City. The appellate court found
and declared that when the RTC Cebu City ordered the cancellation of the
Silverio share which was in custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch
64, it interfered with or invaded the jurisdiction of the latter coordinate and
co-equal court, hence, said order is null and void. With his motion for
reconsideration[21] thereto
denied on October 14, 1996,[22] Yau filed
the petition for review subject of G.R. No 126731.
Subsequently, on
January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision[23] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC Makati City (Branch 64) dated
July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271. A
Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the
said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997.[25] Hence,
Manilabank interposed the petition for review subject of G.R. No. 128623.
On motion of
Manilabank,[26] G.R. Nos.
126731 and 128623 were consolidated.[27]
In G.R. No.
126731, Yau assails the reversal of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, directing the
issuance of a new certificate of title in his name. Yau firstly condemns the
Court of Appeals for not dismissing outright the petition of Manilabank in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37805 for its failure to seek reconsideration before RTC Cebu
City, of the latter’s assailed orders prior to filing the petition for
certiorari with the CA. He then contends that he is entitled to the issuance of
a new certificate in his name after he had purchased the same in an execution
sale, despite the Silverio share being subject to a preliminary attachment in
favor of Manilabank. Thus, he submits that in issuing the questioned orders,
the RTC, Cebu City, did not interfere with or invade the jurisdiction of RTC
Makati City, Branch 64, which issued the writ of preliminary attachment
pursuant to which the Silverio share was attached.
In G.R. No.
128623, the issue revolves on the legality of the intervention of Yau in Civil
Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati City (Branch 64). Manilabank argues that Yau
has no legal interest to justify intervention in Civil Case No. 90-271 before
RTC Makati City, Branch 64 nor does he have standing and legal basis to assail
the Writ of Attachment dated September 27, 1990. Manilabank submits that
whatever rights Yau may have in the subject property can be fully protected, as
in fact they are already protected, in a separate proceeding. Besides, the
intervention of Yau will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati City,
Branch 64. Finally, Manilabank contends that allowing intervention after trial
had already been concluded is in violation of the rule that intervention may
only be allowed before or during trial.
At the outset,
this Court notes that, admittedly, Manilabank did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, which directed Manila Golf to
issue a certificate in Yau’s name, prior to initiating its petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 37085) in the CA. Thus, the petition before the
appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA, in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given
the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled that
as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled
exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction,[28] which is
evident in this case.
The Notice of
Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf brought the property into
the custodia legis of the court issuing the writ, that is, the RTC
Makati City Branch 64, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts,
such as the RTC of Cebu, Branch 6. “The garnishment of property operates as an
attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is
brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought
into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A court which
has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No court,
except one having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the premises,
has a right to interfere with and change that possession”.[29]
Thus, the
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference[30] in the regular orders or judgments
of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an
insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the RTC Cebu City to
entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Silverio share
which is under the custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by
virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful
co-existence among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly
described in Parco v. Court of Appeals,[31] thus:
...[J]urisdiction
is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a
corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the
same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the
various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having
as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments.
It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow
confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, and in the
ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and
plead their cause.
It is
furthermore evident from the records that Yau is guilty of forum shopping in
seeking relief before Branch 6 of RTC Cebu City, despite being allowed to
intervene in Civil Case No. 90-271 before Branch 64 of RTC Makati City to
protect his interests in the Silverio share. A party is guilty of forum
shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved adversely,
by some other court. And what is truly important to consider in determining
whether forum shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts and the
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.[32] Since Yau
recognized the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City, Branch 64 to protect his
interest in the Silverio share, he should have desisted from pursuing a similar
remedy or relief before RTC Cebu City inasmuch as the assailed Orders issued by
the latter RTC had the effect of pre-empting the authority of RTC Makati City,
Branch 64, to act and decide upon the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No.
90-271.[33]
Moreover, the
contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the matter in
litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[34] which was
the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court
and the appellate court, “a person may, before or during trial, be permitted by
the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof.” Yau falls under the last instance. It is
recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may
be allowed to intervene[35] and a
purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has
been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of
attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.[36]
Clearly, Yau,
being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the
purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely
affected by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of
attachment issued by Branch 64 of RTC Makati City, should a decision be
rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to intervene to
protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to
protect his interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is under custodia
legis. If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this would result in a
violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial stability or
non-interference.
Lastly, on the
matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the
rules now allow intervention “before rendition of judgment by the trial court.”[37] After
trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted.[38] The
permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the
Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same.[39] The rule
on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in litigation
by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related
therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits.
In view of the foregoing,
the Court is convinced that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in its assailed Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 32405 and 37085.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are
hereby DENIED. The assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 32405 and 37085 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Omar U. Amin,
Seventeenth Division, Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 58-64.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales
and concurred in by then Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and
Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., First Division, Rollo in G.R.
No. 126731, pp. 22-31.
[3] Penned by Judge Ramon AM. Torres, Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, pp. 133-140.
[4] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, p. 141.
[5] Notice of Garnishment dated March 27, 1990, Rollo
in G.R. No. 126731, p. 118.
[6] Notice of Garnishment dated October 19, 1990, Rollo
in G.R. No. 126731, p. 119.
[7] Entitled “The Manila Banking Corporation v.
Delta Motors Corporation and Ricardo C. Silverio.”
[8] Entitled “The Manila Banking Corporation v.
Environmental Integrated Services Corporation and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.”
[9] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 120-123; Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 129-132.
[10] Penned by Judge Roberto C. Diokno, Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, p. 200.
[11] Penned by Judge Delia H. Panganiban, Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, p. 157; Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 105.
[12] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 157A-172.
[13] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, p. 106.
[14] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, pp. 65-103.
[15] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 217-218.
[16] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 210-215.
[17] Penned by Judge L.D. De La Victoria, Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 61-63.
[18] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, p. 64.
[19] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 34-60.
[20] See Note No. 2, supra.
[21] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, pp. 244-248.
[22] Rollo in
G.R. No. 126731, p. 33.
[23] See Note No. 1, supra.
[24] Rollo,
G.R. No. 128623, pp. 301-329.
[25] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, p. 56.
[26] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, pp. 332-348.
[27] Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, p. 376.
[28] Other exceptions to the rule are: (a) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (b) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (c)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(d) where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (f) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (g) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (h) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
[Third Division], 292 SCRA 452, 457-458 [1998] citing Tan v. Court of
Appeals, 275 SCRA 568, 574, 575 [1997].
[29] De Leon v. Salvador, 36 SCRA 567, 574 [1970]
citing National Power Corporation v. De Veyra, 3 SCRA 646 [1961] and
Luciano v. Provincial Governor, 28 SCRA 517 [1969]; Hacbang v.
The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., 8 SCRA 103, 108 [1963].
[30] PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil, 264 SCRA 467,
470 [1996]; Prudential Bank v. Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159, 171 [1990];
Investors’ Finance Corporation v. Ebarle, 163 SCRA 60, 70 [1988];
Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313, 325 [1987]; See also Sterling
Investment Corporation. v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318, 322 [1969]; J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Torres, 21 SCRA 1169, 1172 [1967]; Mas v.
Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34, 37 [1964]; Philippine National Bank v. Javellana,
92 Phil. 525, 527 [1953]; Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., 64 Phil.
119 [1937]; Cabigao and Izquierdo v. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182,
184 [1922].
[31] 111 SCRA 262, 277-278 [1982].
[32] Ramonito
Tantoy, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141427,
April 20, 2001, p. 5 citing Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 487 [1997], Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 [1997].
[33] See Chua v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 85,
89-90 [1993]; Ona v. Cuevas, 83 SCRA 388, 391 [1978] citing Montesa, et.,
et al. v. Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil. 25 [1952].
[34] Now under Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:
Section 1. Who may
intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
the property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
[35] 59 Am Jur 2d, Parties § 150, p. 623 citing Smith v.
Palmer, 268 Ala 686, 110 So. 2d, 287; Liston v. Butler, 4 Ariz App 460,
421 P2d 542.
[36] 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 593, p.
856, citing Matson Nav. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 81 Haw. 270, 916 P. 2d 680
[Haw. 1996], Rubis v. Barasch, 275 Cal. App. 2d 835, 80 Cal. Rptr. 337
[2d Dist. 1969]; Bankers’ Mortg. Co. v. Sohland, 33 Del. 331, 138 A. 361
[Super. Ct. 1927]; Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 101 P.
396 [1090]; Case v. Miller, 68 N.C. App. 729, 315 S.E. 2d 737 [1984];
Miller v. White, 46 W. Va. 67, 33 S.E. 332 [1899].
[37] Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[38] Trazo v. Manila Pencil Co., Inc., 1 SCRA 403,
406 [1961].
[39] Mago v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600, 608
[1999].