EN BANC
[A. M. No. CA-01-32.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JUSTICE JOSE B. L. REYES, complainants,
vs. JUSTICES DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, RAMON A. BARCELONA, and ROBERTO
A. BARRIOS [Special Third Division];
ATTY. TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, Division Clerk of Court, Special Fourth Division
and MR. EFREN R. RIVAMONTE, Special Sheriff, Mailing Section, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PARDO, J.:
“Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as ‘men who have a
mastery of the principles
of law, who discharge their
duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and
who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
coordinate to the other two departments of government.’ Those who wield the judicial gavel have the
duty to study our laws and their latest wrinkles. They owe it to the public to be legally
knowledgeable for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.”[1]
The Case
The case before the Court is a verified complaint[2] of the heirs of the late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, represented by Adoracion Reyes, and the heirs of Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes, namely, Ma. Teresa P. Reyes and Carlos P. Reyes against Justices Demetrio G. Demetria,[3] Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A. Barrios, Court of Appeals, Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court, Special Fourth Division, Court of Appeals and Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special Sheriff, Court of Appeals, for violation of Section 11, Rule 59 and Sec. 8, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of court, Sections 3.01 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
The Antecedent Facts
The instant administrative complaint arose from a simple ejectment case filed by complainants against Metro Manila Builders, Inc. (Manila Builders).
Pursuant to a contract executed on
However, Manila Builders violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. Exercising the right to unilateral rescission,[4] complainants sent notice to Manila Builders terminating the lease and demanding that they vacate and surrender the premises subject of the lease agreement, which Manila Builders ignored.
On February 3, 1997, complainants filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 45 a complaint for unlawful detainer based on the breach of the contract of lease,[5] which the trial court decided on May 9, 1997 in complainants’ favor. The trial court ordered Manila Builders evicted from the premises.
On
On
On
On
On the same day, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution[10]
restraining the enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97, MTC,
On April 14, 1998, in Civil Case No. 98-0366, the Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City, Branch 231 dismissed the action
for annulment of judgment on the ground that Manila Builder’s remedy is appeal
in due time, which when withdrawn, was effectively abandoned.[12]
On
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
45,
On the same date (
On
Despite the pending petition with this Court, on
“Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition.
“1. A writ of Execution Pending
Appeal of the Decision of this Court dated
“The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a
certified true copy of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated
“2. Private respondents
and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of this Honorable
Court and are hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are also
directed to make a completer restoration to petitioner of the subject
property.”[15] [Emphasis supplied]
On
“In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio G. Demetria (Ponente) dated September 21, 1998, the Chief of the Mailing
Section is hereby directed to appoint
a special sheriff to execute the
decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998.”[16]
On the same date, respondent Efren R. Rivamonte, process server at the mailing section of the Court of Appeals, was appointed special sheriff to enforce the writ. Accordingly, 2nd Division Clerk of Court Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta issued a writ of execution as follows:
“WRIT OF EXECUTION
“TO MR. EFREN RIVAMONTE
(Designated Special Sheriff
by the Mailing Section,
Court of Appeals,
G R E E T I N G S:
WHEREAS, on
‘WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 113-97 dated May 9, 1997 is SET ASIDE and the Orders dated March 23, 1998 and April 14, 1998, issued in Civil Case No. 98-0366 are likewise SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ordered to restore the subject property in the possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently enjoined from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of the subject property by petitioner until after the expiration of the Contract of Lease.
SO ORDERED.’
“WHEREAS, on
“WHEREAS, on
‘Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant motion.
‘1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this
Court dated
‘The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a certified true copy of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998 to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, and Regional Trial Court, Branch 231 both of Pasay City.
‘2. Private respondents and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of this Honorable Court and are hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are hereby directed to make a complete restoration to petitioner of the subject property.
‘SO ORDERED.
“NOW THEREFORE, You are hereby commanded, pursuant to resolution dated September 18, 1998 which granted petitioner’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to enforce this Writ in accordance with the decision issued on August 21, 1998 by ordering private respondents to restore petitioners of the possession of the subject property, and to make a return of this Writ to this Court within five (5) days from date, with your proceedings endorse thereon.
“WITNESS, the Honorable RAMON A. BARCELONA, Acting Chairman, Honorable DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, and Honorable ROBERTO A. BARRIOS, Members, Associate Justices of the FORMER THIRD DIVISION, this 21st of September, 1998, Court of Appeals, Manila.
“Respectfully yours,
[Sgd.]
“CAROLINE G. OCAMPO-PERALTA
“Division Clerk of Court
“Second Division”[17]
Also on the same date, respondent Rivamonte evicted complainants from the premises and restored possession to Manila Builders.
The Administrative Charges
Aggrieved by irregularities in the proceedings in CA-G. R. SP
Nos. 47158 and 47720, on
On
On
With regard to the resolution of
On the other hand, respondent Justice Demetria maintained that the issuance of the March 23, 1998 resolution temporarily restraining the enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97 has sound basis in law and jurisprudence and was made after a thorough study by him.
Respondent Marigomen noted nothing
erroneous or anomalous upon seeing only two (2) signatures in the resolution of
March 23, 1998, as it is legally permissible for a single justice to issue
restraining orders, citing Rule 58, Section 2,[23]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3, Section 9,[24]
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended.[25]
The Court’s Ruling
Respondents’ submissions are patently without merit. There is no question regarding the authority
of the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary writ of injunction or temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of petitions and appeals within its
jurisdiction, especially in meritorious cases.
What is questionable is the irregular procedure by which the
As it is, only two members of the Court of Appeals, Special
Fourth Division, respondents Justices Demetria, ponente, and
In light of the foregoing, we find that Justice Demetria, as ponente, disregarded
existing rules of procedure. Considering
that what he violated were the same rules of procedure he was expected and
required to observe, such failure to comply was inexcusable. When the law transgressed is elementary, the
failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[26]
As regards respondent Marigomen, we find her explanation deferential to the views of respondent justices. As division clerk of court, she is bound by the prevailing rules of procedure of the Court of Appeals. Among her duties and responsibilities, she shall maintain the records of the Division in an orderly manner and keep watch over the status and progress of cases assigned to the Division.[27] She is expected to immediately report to the Justice assigned to study the case the failure of any party or parties to comply with any resolution or order of the Court within the period prescribed therefor.[28] She should have called the attention of the ponente upon seeing the incomplete signatures on the resolution. It should have been obvious that the resolution issuing a temporary restraining order was intended as a collegiate act, not the order of a single justice. She should not have released and allowed the said resolution to be served on the parties.
Respondent Justice Barcelona may be absolved of administrative complicity regarding the issuance of a temporary restraining order. He had no knowledge about the lack of the requisite third signature before the resolution was promulgated. After affixing his signature, the resolution was not submitted to the Chairman for promulgation and release by the Division Clerk of Court.
However, we find it grossly appalling that the Court of Appeals’
former Special Third Division (
Respondents Justices Barcelona and Barrios state that they were impressed by the good reasons posited by Manila Builders, that is, deprivation of income and its mounting obligations and liabilities. On the other hand, respondent Justice Demetria explained that there is no prohibition, whether expressed or implied, regarding the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision.
We find no merit in respondents’ ratiocinations. Rule 51, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment of the Court of Appeals shall be remanded to the lower court for execution ten (10) days after entry of judgment, unless notice is given that the decision would be appealed to the Supreme Court. By requiring the remand of the records to the lower court after the entry of judgment, the rules completely cut off any authority of the Court of Appeals to directly undertake the execution of the final judgment, much less the authority to order its execution pending its finality.
The Court cannot permit any act or omission, which yanks public
faith away from the judiciary,[30]
for a judge’s utter lack of familiarity with the rules undermines public
confidence in the competence of the courts.[31]
In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence.
He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hand and be proficient
in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.[32]
Respondent justices argue that they did not have prior knowledge
about the pendency of the petition before the Supreme
Court, for had they learned about it, they would not have allowed
the execution of the judgment.[33]
The record belies such pharisaical stance.
In the first place, the Court of Appeals was furnished with a copy of
the petition. Secondly, the petitioners
filed a manifestation expressly opposing execution pending appeal because they
had elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals ignored petitioners’ protestations. Thirdly, the dispositive
portion of the
“Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition.
“1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of
this Court dated
“x x x.”[34]
A scrutiny of the record reveals that respondent Justice Barrios
did not take part in the appointment of respondent Rivamonte
as special sheriff. The Court (Second Division, Cui,
Indeed, respondent Justice Demetria has
shown keen interest in the immediate execution of the decision despite the
Court of Appeal’s lack of authority to appoint a special sheriff. The appointment of a special sheriff, in the
person of respondent Rivamonte, encroached on the
authority of the Supreme Court as the appointing power of all
officials and employees of the judiciary.[36]
The Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint or to direct any of its
employees to appoint a special sheriff,[37]
who was not even bonded as required by law.[38]
With regard to respondent Rivamonte, considering that he relied on the belief that he was performing a ministerial duty of carrying out the orders of his superiors, which he thought to be lawful and valid, and in the absence of malice and bad faith, he may be absolved of administrative liability. However, as the assigned task was not within the scope of his duties as process server in the mailing section, prudence and caution dictated that he declines to perform the assignment. He is hereby warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be meted out with the appropriate penalty.
With regard to the allegation that respondent Justices Demetria, Barcelona and Barrios knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment against complainants in the certiorari petition, a review of
the record would reveal insufficient evidence of bad faith or ill motive on the
part of the magistrates concurring in the ponencia. At most, there was a lack of deliberation
on the issues presented. This would not automatically warrant administrative
sanctions against the justices,[39]
in the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.[40]
In order to discipline a judge, it must be clearly shown that the
judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge
rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[41]
Judges cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of their official
acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or
corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or
administratively responsible.[42]
An erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith in
the absence of proof to the contrary.[43]
We find it apt to stress before we close that it is the duty of
the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary.[44]
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do
so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.[45]
For, the conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery
of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law.[46]
Respondent Rivamonte may be absolved of administrative liability but must be admonished and warned to be more cautious in the discharge of his duties.
The Judgment
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent Justice Demetrio G. Demetria guilty of gross misconduct and imposes on him a fine of P20,000.00.
The Court DISMISSES the complaint against respondent Teresita R. Marigomen with admonition and warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
Finally, the Court DISMISSES the complaint against respondent Efren R. Rivamonte with admonition and warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., no part; used to be counsel for Justice JBL Reyes.
[1] Spouses Bio v.
Judge Valera, 327 Phil. 249, 254 [1996].
[2] Complaint, dated
[3] On
[4] Section 18, paragraph 4 (a) In the event of default or breach of any of the condition of this contract x x x
(b) x x x the LESSOR may, in his absolute discretion
declare the contract cancelled and terminated and require the TENANT to vacate
the leased premises.
[5] Docketed as Civil
Case No. 113-97.
[6] Docketed as CA-G. R.
SP No. 45853.
[7] G. R. Nos. 135180-81, CA
Resolution, Rollo, pp. 181-182 (338 SCRA 282,
289 [2000]).
[8] Docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0366. Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 282 [2000], Rollo,
pp. 14-36, at p. 18.
[9] Docketed as CA-G. R.
SP No. 47158. Ibid., p. 19.
[10] Adopted by Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria and concurred in by Justice Ramon A.
Barcelona only.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 14-36, at p. 19.
[12] Rollo,
pp. 14-36, at p. 20.
[13] Court of
Appeals Decision, CA- G. R.
SP Nos. 47158 and 47720, Rollo, pp.
37-44, at pp. 43-44
[14] Docketed as G. R. Nos.
135180-81.
[15] Rollo, pp. 14-36, at p. 27.
[16] Compliance and
Comment, Annex “A”, Rollo, p. 89. The Second Division is composed of the
following, namely, Justice Emeterio C. Cui, chairman
and Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria, members.
[17] Compliance and
Comment, Annex “B,” Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[18] Rollo,
p. 47.
[19] Comment, Rollo, pp. 54-68.
[20] Comment, Rollo, pp. 73-81.
[21] Compliance and
Comment, Rollo, pp. 85-88.
[22] Comment, Rollo, at pp.
57-60.
[23] SEC. 2. Who may
grant preliminary injunction.- A
preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action or
proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in
the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may
be issued by said court or any member thereof.
[24] SEC. 9. Action by a Justice.- The following may be considered and acted upon by the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report:
a. Motions for bail in appealed criminal cases;
b. Motions or petitions for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining order, and other auxiliary writs;
c. Motions or petitions for extension of time to file petitions for review;
d. Motions or petitions for extension of time to file briefs, answers, replies, comments, oppositions, memoranda, and motions for reconsideration of the disposition thereof; and
e. Motions or
petitions set a case for hearing or oral arguments.
[25] Comment, Rollo, pp. 48-68, at p. 60.
[26] Supena
v. De La Rosa, 334 Phil. 671, 681 [1997]; Madredijo v.
Loyao, Jr., 316 SCRA 544 [1999]; Agunday
v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134 [1999].
[27] Rule 1, Section 11
[c] (2), Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
[28] Rule 1, Section 11
[c] (3), Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Cabańero
v. Judge Cańon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1369,
[31] Northcastle
Properties and Estate Corporation v. Paas,
317 SCRA 148, 153 [1999].
[32] Ortiz v.
Judge Quiroz, 337 SCRA 258, 263 [2000], citing
Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation v.
Paas, supra, Note 31.
[33] Comment, Rollo, pp. 63-77.
[34] Rollo,
p. 27.
[35] Rollo,
p. 89.
[36] Article VII, Section
5(6), 1987 Constitution; Office
of the Court Administrator v. Veneracion,
334 SCRA 145 [2000].
[37] Heirs of the Late
Justice Jose B. L. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 8,
citing Comm. of Public Highways v.
San Diego, 31 SCRA 616, 631 [1970].
[38] Ibid., citing
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Section 330.
[39] Heirs of Julio Rosas
v. Reyes, 188 SCRA 236, 241 [1990].
[40] Madredijo
v. Loyao, Jr., supra, Note 26.
[41] In Re: The Hon. Climaco, 154 Phil. 105, 120 [1974].
[42]
[43] Contreras v.
Judge Solis, 329 Phil. 376, 388 [1996].
[44] Galang
v.
[45] Abundo
v. Judge Manio, Jr., 370 Phil. 850, 870-871
[1999].
[46] Gacayan
v. Pamintuan, 314 SCRA 682, 702 [1999].