FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143885-86.
MERCED TY-DAZO and ROLANDO QUIMINALES, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Merced Ty-Dazo and Rolando Quiminales
assailing the Resolutions, dated
The antecedent facts are as follows: on
Since petitioner Ty-Dazo was a public
official (municipal mayor of Salcedo,
On the other hand, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 23656
(OMB-VIS-CRIM-03-0347) was received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas on
On
Similarly, on
Petitioners then filed their motions for reconsideration of the
aforesaid resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Acting on these motions, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Joint Resolution, dated
Petitioners now come to this Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying their motions to dismiss.
Petitioners contend that the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman constitutes a violation
of their rights to due process and speedy trial. The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly already
received the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in
1994. However, it was only on
Petitioners take exception to the pronouncement of respondent Sandiganbayan that they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their cases by the filing of the motion for reinvestigation. Said motion was allegedly filed precisely to bring to the attention of respondent Sandiganbayan that the unreasonable length of time that it took the Office of the Ombudsman to file the information in Criminal Case No. 23656 violated petitioners’ right to due process and right to the speedy disposition of their cases.
To support their contention, petitioners rely mainly on our ruling in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan[4] where we ruled that the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the then Tanodbayan violated the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases.
The petition lacks merit.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.[5]
In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[6]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[7]
In Tatad, this Court held that
“the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing
the information” constituted a violation of the right of the accused to due
process and to a speedy disposition of cases after it took into consideration
several attendant circumstances, namely: that political motivation played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there
was a blatant departure from the established procedure prescribed by law for
the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and that the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of
the facts on record.[8]
Reliance by petitioners on Tatad is utterly misplaced. In the first place, there is no showing that the filing of the cases against petitioners was politically motivated. Moreover, unlike in Tatad, the established procedure prescribed for the conduct of preliminary investigation was observed in this case. Petitioners were given the opportunity to submit their respective evidence to refute the charges against them before the corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as noted by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the delay, thus:
[T]he Court notes that notwithstanding their present claim that the
lapse of time from the conduct of the preliminary investigation until the
filing of the cases already violated their constitutional right to due process,
accused filed a motion for reinvestigation of this case, which, admittedly,
served to further delay the case.[9]
The Court thus finds that there is no basis for petitioners’
allegations that their constitutional rights to due process and speedy
disposition of cases against them. The
bare allegation that it took the Ombudsman more than three (3) years to
terminate the preliminary investigation and file the necessary information
would not suffice. As earlier stated, “a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.”[10]
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the assailed resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are tainted by grave abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 19-22.
[2]
[3]
[4] 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
[5] Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 (1999); Gonzales vs.
Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (19991).
[6] Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 136757-58,
[7] Binay
vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[8] Tatad
vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 83; See
also Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan, id.
[9] Resolution, Criminal
Case No. 23656, September 23, 1999, p. 3; Resolution, Criminal Case No. 22021,
October 1, 1999, p. 3.
[10] Tai Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 317
SCRA 521 (1999).