EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139821.
DR. ELEANOR A. OSEA, petitioner, vs. DR. CORAZON E.
MALAYA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review from the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated
On
The pertinent portion of Section 99 of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states:
Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or municipal school board shall:
xxx xxx xxx.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and other school officials.
On
In dismissing petitioner’s protest, the Civil Service Commission held that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent’s appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Civil
Service Commission.[5]
On
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review of both Civil
Service Commission Resolution Nos. 980699 and 982958 dated
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari of the August 6, 1999 Decision on the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS MERELY RE-ASSIGNED TO
CAMARINES SUR AND DID NOT REQUIRE THE MANDATORY PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE
II. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO
OPPOSITION MADE WHEN THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED RESPONDENT MALAYA AS DIVISION
SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT BACK IN 1996 AND AS STATED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION THE LAW DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD FIRST CONSULT
THE LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD BEFORE HE MAKES ANY APPOINTMENT AND THAT SECTION 99 OF
THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE APPLIES ONLY TO THE Department of Education,
Culture and Sports SECRETARY, WHO, HOWEVER, CAN ONLY MAKE RECOMMENDATION TO THE
PRESIDENT.[8]
The petition lacks merit.
Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the President.[9] The appointment may not be specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their particular stations was vested in the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary, pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in Department of Education, Culture and Sports Order No. 75, Series of 1996.
In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in
favor of respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on
We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of
Appeals that, under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a
reassignment from
The “plain meaning rule” or verba
legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words
of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[12]
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office.[13]
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee
from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment.[14]
In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional
duties on an incumbent official.[15]
Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial School
Board. Her qualification to the office,
however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment
thereto. While she was recommended by
Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. Petitioner’s designation as
Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly
made subject to further advice from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports.[16] Thus, her designation was
temporary. In fact, there was a need to
recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only
temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions
without violating her right to security of tenure.[17]
Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49204, as well as Resolutions 980699 and 982058 of the Civil Service Commission, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 164-168; penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya, concurred in by
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino.
[2] Ibid., pp.
40-44.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Integrated
Reorganization Plan, Part III, Chapter I, Article IV, par. 5 (c).
[10]
[11]
[12] National Federation of Labor, et al.
v. NLRC, 327 SCRA 158, 165 [2000].
[13] Binamira
v. Garrucho Jr., 188 SCRA 154, 158 [1990].
[14] Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book 5 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), Rule 7, Section 10.
[15] Binamira
v. Garrucho Jr., supra.
[16] Rollo,
p. 24.
[17] De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R
No. 127182,