Casim vs Flordeliza : 139511 : January 23, 2002 : J. Vitug : Third Division

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139511. January 23, 2002]

JESUS A. CASIM, petitioner, vs. BRUNO CASIM FLORDELIZA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated 30 April 1999, dismissing herein petitioner's appeal, as well as its resolution of 28 July 1999, denying a reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The petition originated from an action filed on 01 September 1991 by Jesus Casim against Bruno Casim Flordeliza (Civil Case No. 91-2566) for the return or reconveyance of certain property located in the cities of Makati and Parañaque.

The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

In his complaint, petitioner (then plaintiff) claimed that when he moved to Metro Manila from the Bicolandia region with his family to start the "J. Casim Concrete Products and Gravel and Sand" business, he brought along with him respondent Bruno Flordeliza, his nephew, who was orphaned at an early age, jobless, and had several children to support. Petitioner later supported respondent and his family, even allowed him to use his surname Casim, and employed him in the business. Eventually, respondent rose from a minor employee to a co-manager position, with ample power and authority to make bank deposits, as well as to withdraw funds therefrom, in the operation of petitioner's business. Giving full trust and confidence in respondent, petitioner allowed respondent to purchase valuable real property in Makati and other places with petitioner's funds and to place the property thus acquired in the name of respondent. Respondent, after his marriage, opened a business similar to that of petitioner with funds lent by the latter. Respondent, however, in breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him by petitioner, disposed or sold some of the property without the latter's knowledge and consent. Then, sometime in September 1981, respondent even initiated Civil Case No. 2137 against petitioner before the Makati RTC claiming co-ownership of a property in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, bought by petitioner for expansion of the business. By this time, petitioner had already lost all trust and confidence in respondent and started demanding from him the return of the various pieces of property which were bought with petitioner's funds, as well as the recovery of sums taken by respondent, which demands the latter ignored.

Respondent (then defendant) filed an answer, on 04 February 1992, invoking several special and affirmative defenses and alleging, among other things, that (1) petitioner waived or abandoned all claims he had against respondent when petitioner signed two documents, entitled "Release and Quitclaim," dated 26 February 1981, and "Mutual Release and Quitclaim," dated 19 March 1981; (2) while petitioner claimed that his relationship with respondent was based on an express trust, said trust, however, was not reduced into writing and was, therefore, unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; and (3) assuming that petitioner's action against him is based on an implied trust, his cause of action had long prescribed.

The respective pre-trial briefs of petitioner and respondent were filed on 24 March 1992.

On 02 June 1992, respondent filed a motion to set the special and affirmative defenses for hearing and to meanwhile suspend the pre-trial. The motion was granted by the trial court in an order, dated 13 January 1993, setting the hearing on the special and affirmative defenses for 20 April 1993. The hearing was reset to 20 May 1993 due to the absence of petitioner's counsel.

Civil Case No. 2137 (referred to in Civil Case No. 91-2566) was initiated by Bruno Casim Flordeliza (herein respondent) on 17 September 1981 against the spouses Jesus Casim (herein petitioner) and Margarita Casim for annulment of a deed of absolute sale executed on 04 June 1979 and the annulment and cancellation of TCT No. 30459 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV, in the name of the spouses. Respondent claimed one-half of the property involved plus P13,000,000.00 in damages, attorney's fees and costs. This case was raffled to Branch 62 of the RTC of Makati presided by Judge Roberto Diokno. The trial in Civil Case No. 2137 was eventually terminated, and Judge Diokno rendered, on 20 June 1996, a decision dismissing the complaint of respondent "for annulment of deed of sale and damages," against petitioner. The court found that respondent, taking advantage of his college degree, had tricked the unlettered petitioner into signing the documents "Release and Quitclaim," dated 26 February 1981, and "Mutual Release and Quitclaim," dated 19 March 1981, which were prepared without giving petitioner an opportunity to understand their contents. From the adverse decision, respondent appealed (Civil Case No. 2137) to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed C.A.-G.R. CV No. 54204.

Respondent, at the same time, filed in Civil Case No. 91-2566 a motion to disqualify Judge Roberto Diokno from further hearing Civil Case No. 91-2566 on the ground that the judge might no longer be able to resolve Civil Case No. 91-2566 with impartiality and fairness. Judge Diokno forthwith inhibited himself from the case. Civil Case No. 91-2566 was then re-raffled to Branch 141 of the Makati RTC presided by Judge Manuel D. Victorio. On 20 May 1996, a hearing on respondent’s special and affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 91-2566 was finally scheduled by Judge Victorio. On said date, respondent did not adduce evidence or proffer oral argument in support of his said defenses but opted to merely file a "Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Special and Affirmative Defenses." Petitioner thereafter filed his reply memorandum.

In an order, dated 17 February 1997, Judge Victorio directed that the resolution of respondent's special and affirmative defenses be held in abeyance until the parties would have presented, respectively, their evidence on the merits. Later, however, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration of the 17^th February 1997 order, Judge Victorio, promulgated an order, dated 13 August 1997, dismissing the complaint of petitioner against respondent.

Petitioner moved to have the order of dismissal reconsidered by Judge Victorio. The motion was denied on 29 December 1997. Whereupon, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal," dated 28 January 1998, elevating to the Court of Appeals (docketed CA-G.R. CV No. 59522) the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint. In an order, dated 15 September 1998, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to file the appellant's brief within 45 days from receipt of the order. Petitioner sought an extension of time which the Court of Appeals granted, in its order of 01 December 1998, allowing petitioner to file his brief until 04 February 1999.

On 03 February 1999, petitioner filed a motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 59522 to consolidate the appeal with CA-G.R. CV No. 54204 (the appeal of respondent from the decision of Judge Diokno against him in Civil Case No. 2137) pending with the Sixth Division of the Court claiming that the two cases were theretofore consolidated by the Makati RTC; that petitioner won the first case with the dismissal of respondent's complaint (Civil Case No. 2137) in the lower court, following which respondent immediately moved to inhibit the presiding Judge Diokno from further handling the second case (Civil Case No. 91-2566) which was then re-raffled to Branch 141 presided over by Judge Victorio; that one of the issues raised in the first case (Civil Case No. 2137) was the validity of the “Release and Quitclaim” and “Mutual Release and Quitclaim,” also relied upon by respondent in the second case (Civil Case No. 91-2566), which documents Judge Diokno (in Civil Case No. 2137) found to be null and void, holding that the signatures of petitioner thereon were obtained by trickery and fraud; that Judge Victorio dismissed the second case (Civil Case No. 91-2566) without even conducting a hearing on the affirmative defenses of respondent; that the issues in the two appeals involving the same parties were intimately inter-related; and that if the two appeals were consolidated, there could be a single and final decision on the inter-related issues raised in the two appeals.

On 24 February 1999, petitioner filed his appellant's brief in CA-G.R. CV No. 59522.

Respondent opposed the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner, claiming that it had no factual and legal basis and moved to dismiss the appeal of petitioner because of his failure to file on time his appellant's brief; that only one copy of the brief was served on respondent; and that the brief had no page references to the record. Petitioner excepted and argued that his counsel did not file an appellant’s brief in his behalf within the extended period given by the court because he (counsel) was waiting for the action of the appellate court on his motion for consolidation; that petitioner did not know that his counsel had not filed his appellant’s brief and found out about it only when his son inquired from the Court of Appeals on the status of the case; that in order to avoid the late filing of his brief, he took the initiative of filing his appellant’s brief himself; that the grounds for the dismissal of his appeal invoked by respondent were merely directory, the overwhelming consideration being the merits of the case; that he furnished appellee with one copy of his brief and his failure to furnish the latter with two copies of his brief was not fatal; that the lack of subject index in his brief did not result in any prejudice to appellee because the brief had only 23 pages which were consecutively numbered; that his appeal was not intended for delay; that mere technicalities of procedure should not override the right of a litigant to be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause; and that the consolidation of his present appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 59522) with the earlier appeal taken by respondent (CA-G.R. CV No. 54204) was called for considering that the two appeals involved the same parties and inter-related issues. Petitioner thus prayed that his brief, already filed with the appellate court, be admitted. Petitioner subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals a "Subject Index" to his appellant’s brief.

In a resolution, dated 30 April 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal in CA-G.R. No. 59522. A motion for reconsideration proved to be unavailing; hence, the instant petition for review. Petitioner would now urge that -

"1. The Court of Appeals denied justice to petitioner and gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his appeal in CA-GR SP No. 59522 on minor, harmless, and innocuous technical grounds, notwithstanding that petitioner, a non-lawyer and of low education, had to file his own appellant's brief to avoid delay in its filing, and his appeal appears to be very meritorious.

"2. The Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in putting harmless and trivial technicalities above substantial justice in dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-GR SP No. 59522, thereby denying petitioner's right and opportunity to have his cause determined free from the constraints of technicalities.

"3. The Court of Appeals, instead of dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-GR SP No. 59522, should have granted the motion of petitioner's counsel to consolidate petitioner's appeal in CA-GR SP No. 59522 with the earlier CA-GR CV No. 54204 involving the same parties and the same intimately interrelated issues, which consolidation would have led to a common study and decision of the two cases and thereby promote the interest of justice and a fair and correct determination of the intimately interrelated issues therein."[1]

Respondent, refuting particularly the veracity of petitioner's allegation on the alleged absence of a hearing on his affirmative defenses before the trial court, pointed out thusly:

"Prior to the issuance of the August 13, 1997 Order dismissing the Complaint, the Records of this case shows that a hearing on the special and affirmative defenses was conducted on May 7, 1997. Both counsels for petitioner and respondent were present during the said hearing. Hence, there is no truth to the claim of petitioner that `Judge Victorio [Branch 141] dismissed the second case C.C. No. 91-21566 without even conducting a hearing on respondent's affirmative defenses' (Petition, at 8).

"In filing his Appellant's Brief with the Court of Appeals on February 24, 1999, petitioner:

"a. filed his Appellant's Brief twenty (20) days late;

"b. served respondent herein only one (1) copy, instead of the two (2) copies required by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the September 15, 1998 Order of the Court of Appeals;

"c. the Appellant's Brief has no page references to the record as required in Rule 44, Section 13(a), (c), (d) and (f);

"d. the Appellant's Brief has no subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited as required in Rule 44 Section 13(a);

"e) the Appellant's Brief likewise does not contain a clear and concise statement of the issues of fact and law, which statement is required under Rule 44, Section 13(e);

"f) the Appellant's Brief is not organized in the order provided in Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."[2]

The issues raised, in fine, would focus on whether the Court of Appeals was justified in dismissing the appeal to it of petitioner or should have ordered the consolidation of the case with CA-G.R. CV No. 54204 still pending with the appellate court.

Petitioner does not deny his procedural infractions for his appeal to be considered by the Court of Appeals but seeks an indulgence from this Court for the relaxation of the rules. Quite unfortunately, this plea is not all up to this Court for to conclude otherwise would be to fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure it has been mandated to observe. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 44, 46 and 50 which are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the appellate court, truly cannot be ignored. The rules provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner at the prescribed time in an orderly confrontation before a judge whose authority is acknowledged.[3] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye on and tolerate the transgressions of these rules.

A notice to file the appeal brief was received by petitioner on 22 September 1998, and he, originally, had until 06 November 1998 within which to file the appeal brief. He requested for an extension of 45 days stating in his motion of 05 November that, while his brief had been drafted, he, however, needed additional time to finalize it. The Court of Appeals granted the request and gave petitioner until 04 February 1999 to file his brief with a warning that no further extension would be given. It was several days after, or on 24 February 1999, when the brief was finally submitted on the excuse that the delay in the service and filing of appellant's brief was due to his counsel's "oversight and belief in good faith that the motion for consolidation would be granted" by the Court of Appeals and "that there (might) be no need to file a brief for petitioner as the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV No. 54204 could just be adopted." It was completely wrong for petitioner to anticipate a favorable ruling on his motion. Parenthetically, the motion for consolidation itself was filed only on 03 February 1999, just a day before the last day of the extended period for filing the appellant's brief.

The appellant's brief itself could be faulted for being in contravention with Section 7 and Section 13, Rule 44, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[4] that could justify the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e),[5] of the Rules.

It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as being merely "harmless and trivial technicalities" that can just be discarded. As this Court so explained in Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals[6] -

"Petitioners' plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants' Brief does not deserve any sympathy. Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. In People vs. Marong, we held that deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants."[7]

Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court finds it to be inappropriate to still touch on the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.