EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 138934-35.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are before this Court for review from the decision,[1]
dated February 26, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to
death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday
the amounts of P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant charged him with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against the latter’s will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed in the dwelling of the said party during nighttime while [she] was asleep inside her room.
Act contrary to law.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with robbery with rape as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the
City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly
weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation
on the person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
from Michelle Darunday y Jintula
the sums of P3,650.00, belonging to said offended party and [on] the
occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her
will, and inside her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed inside the dwelling of the offended party and during nighttime the latter not having given provocation for the offense.
Act contrary to law.[3]
When arraigned on
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda, Erma Blanca,[4] Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, Leo Asan, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies are as follows:
Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda
testified that at around
Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday,
Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They stayed in a bedroom on the ground
floor. That same night,
While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of
a man. The man had his head covered with
a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches
long. He warned Erma not to shout or he
would kill her. He then asked Erma where
her money was, and the latter pointed to the wall where she had hung the bag
which contained her money. Michelle, who
by then was already awake, told Erma to give the man her money so he would
leave. Erma gave the man P300.00,
but the latter said to give him all her money.
He told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more, he
would kill her. For this reason, Erma
gave the rest of her money. Afterwards,
she was told to lie on her side facing the wall. The man then turned to
Michelle and Teresa. Michelle gave him
her money, but Teresa said her money was in the other room. However, she was not allowed to leave the
bedroom. The man was able to get P500.00
from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle.
After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. He ordered her to take off her t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she did not do as he commanded. He then went on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he had difficulty doing so, he instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more to insert his penis, but again failed. The man then rose from the bed and took some soapy water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelle’s vagina. He finally succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle’s vagina. Michelle felt great pain and pleaded with the man to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only stopped after satisfying his lust.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough.
On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man’s face because of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had panes through which the light filtered in.
After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and
talked to the three women. He told
Michelle that he used to make catcalls at her and called her a beautiful girl
whenever she passed by his place but Michelle had ignored him. He told them that he was from Hinigaran, but later took back his statement when Teresa
told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near
Hinigaran. Michelle then told him that she worked at
the City Engineer’s Office and graduated from the
After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with
her again. Michelle pleaded with him,
but the man threatened to call his companions and said it would be worse for
her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie
on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a
blanket to cover herself and returned to her a pair of earrings which he had
taken from her. He then left, but not
before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill
them.[7]
Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second
floor of their house, toying with a flashlight, when he saw from his bedroom
window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house. It was around
Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the assailant, but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at Michelle’s request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She
embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police
headquarters, where she was referred to the Women’s Desk to report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of
Michelle’s aunt at around 5 to 6 o’clock in the evening.[9]
PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly after the commission of the crime, also testified for the prosecution. He said that the assailant was described to him as wearing long hair and having a rough projection on the back of his neck, small eyes, a slim body, and a brown complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon, returned to the police station to report the rape committed against her. Tancinco entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred Michelle to the Women’s Desk.
In the morning of
The following day, on
Thus, on
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan,
Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around
Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station.
When accused-appellant was brought there, he saw Michelle and
blushed. Michelle looked at him and
recognized him as the man who had robbed and raped her on
At the
Michelle Darunday executed an
affidavit, dated
Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department, examined Michelle Darunday and made the following findings and remarks:
1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the posterior fourchette.
2. New Lacerations noted on
the hymenal ring on the following location
3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain.
4. Presently, patient with menstruation.
In my opinion, the
patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains of pain upon urination)
and possible Medical treatment if necessary, for about 7 to 10 days. And if
necessary, psychiatric evaluation & management is also recommended.[16]
Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said
there was penetration of the victim’s vagina as shown by the fact that the hymenal rim had lacerations at the 1, 3, and
Leo Asan, an employee at the City
Health Office in
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a different account of the events that led to the arrest of accused-appellant. Their version is as follows:
Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on
In the evening of P600.00
as well as a P200.00 bonus.
Hence, at P600.00, telling her to use P400.00
for New Year’s Day.[19]
Accused-appellant also saw Elias[20] Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron Lavilla because a cockfight derby was being held that day in their barangay. Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and found him at the basketball court. Aaron’s mother asked accused-appellant to help her bring to the cockpit some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accused-appellant obliged.
At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him
to take care of his cocks. Accused-appellant asked Aaron Lavilla
to go with him to the cockpit, but the latter continued playing basketball and
only proceeded to the cockpit after the game was finished. The derby ended at around
At about
As to the circumstances of accused-appellant’s arrest, PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino and Ricardo Villaspen
testified that at around 11 o’clock in the morning of January 3, 1997, three
members of the Bacolod police, led by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, went to the headquarters of the Pontevedra police to ask for help in locating a person
named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, who was wanted in connection with a case
for robbery with rape. Although Tancinco and his companions showed their mission order to Gemarino, they did not show a warrant for
accused-appellant’s arrest. Nonetheless, Gemarino
told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra
police and Ricardo Villaspen, the tanod
commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the
The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded to the house of accused-appellant in Barangay Miranda, but the latter was not there. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game. After informing him that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group invited accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters.
Nestor Dojillo, the barangay
captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police
station. He testified that when accused-appellant, together with Tancinco and his companions, arrived at the police station,
he (Nestor Dojillo) followed them to the
investigating room. Inside the room were
Michelle Darunday, three members of the
Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to
After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house so that he could be identified by another complainant. But this complainant likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and longer hair. Accused-appellant was returned to the police headquarters.
At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco
talked to accused-appellant and told him that he would help him if
accused-appellant confessed to the crime.
But accused-appellant again refused because he said he had not done
anything wrong. The police then began
beating him up again. PO3 Tancinco burnt accused-appellant’s lips and tongue with a
lighted cigarette.[29]
At around
Lucila Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital (CLMMH), identified in court[31] the medical certificate (Exh. 12) issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries sustained by accused-appellant, to wit:
# 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF T12.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.
# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA.
X-RAY # 280 dated
“No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination.”[32]
The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome[33]
Jayme, General Manager of Royal Express Transport,
Inc., who testified that the last bus trip from Kabankalan
to
On
WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a thorough, painstaking and exhaustive review and examination of the evidence adduced in this case, that the accused ANTHONY ESCORDIAL y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, punished under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The commission of the crime was attended by three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1, the accused is hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH.
He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00,
representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.[35]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED TO THE EFFECT THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN NEVER BE THE ROBBER-RAPIST WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE DARUNDAY ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, AS THE FORMER (ESCORDIAL) DID NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES, CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST).
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES FIT WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRUTH OF THE
MATTER IS THAT THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT EVER MADE BY ANYBODY
PRIOR TO THE “WARRANTLESS ARREST” OF THE ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER
WITNESSES WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND SIGNED ONLY SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE
ACCUSED WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE OF PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF MIRANDA AND THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PONTEVEDRA), AND RICARDO VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN PONTEVEDRA) TO THE EFFECT THAT MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER IN PONTEVEDRA POLICE STATION.
4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE LATTER’S SUBJECTION TO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT LETTING HIM KNOW OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN A POLICE LINE UP DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS BEING LINED UP ONLY THE ACCUSED WAS HANDCUFFED.
6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT VERY EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING THE SAME, GIVEN THE DISTANCE, THE INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE, IF NOT DESTROY, THE CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION.
7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE FAILED TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO
TO
8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE TO COMMIT THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON A WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT REFUTE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE ACQUAINTED WITH THE
COMPLAINANT AND WHISTLED AT THE LATTER SEVERAL TIMES.[36]
The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of the evidence against him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge.[37] Art. III, §2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase “personal knowledge” in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause” which means “an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officer making the arrest.[38]
In these cases, the crime took place on
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged against him during his arraignment on
[The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity
of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them and participated in the trial.
Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact
that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an
otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when
all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.[41]
B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides that “[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant’s rights under this provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.
C. Of greater significance
is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of
his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest
in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest.[42] However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in
various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a
police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons
gathered for that purpose.[43]
During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been
recognized as “critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution” which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these
pre-trial proceedings “might well settle the accused’s
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”[44]
We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the
start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.[45]
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately
when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific
questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132,
§36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived
his right to object to the admissibility of these testimonies.[47]
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the “fruits of the poisonous tree.”[48] This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court’s conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof,[49] it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character, qualities, and expertise of the assailant who robbed and raped Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records are bereft of any description of the assailant made by these prosecution witnesses prior to his arrest as the affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were executed only after his arrest; (3) the testimonies of the defense witnesses, namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo, and Ricardo Villaspen, show that Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant when the latter was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4) Tancinco’s testimony that Michelle Darunday properly identified accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said witness had motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the identification of accused-appellant at the Bacolod police station was tainted because only accused-appellant was handcuffed among the persons presented to the prosecution witnesses; and (5) it was highly improbable for the prosecution witnesses to identify the assailant by face considering the distance, the intensity of light, and the circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime.
A. Jason Joniega[50]
and Mark Esmeralda[51]
pointed to accused-appellant as the man they saw on the night of
The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based
upon observations of the suspect other than the line-up identification.[55]
As held in United States v. Wade:[56]
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these
situations is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed
2d 441, 455, 83 S Ct 407, “‘[W]hether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959).” See also Hoffa v
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the test as laid down in that case.
1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailant’s face was covered with cloth when he entered the room and that she was blindfolded when she was raped.[57] She could thus only see the assailant’s eyes, which Michelle described as chinito (chinky),[58] although she testified that she could also identify his voice.[59] Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she immediately recognized accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated:
PROS. CARDINAL:
Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any development of your case?
WITNESS:
That
was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a suspect in the
PROS. CARDINAL:
Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra?
WITNESS:
My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators.
. . . .
PROS. CARDINAL:
Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened?
WITNESS:
We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I was there in the room of the police sitting.
. . . .
PROS. CARDINAL:
So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?
WITNESS:
I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then later the suspect arrived.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can you tell us what was the reaction of the suspect?
WITNESS:
When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me because I was behind the desk after the door, and then he was so fresh saying that he was a good man, but when he saw me he blushed and moving his head asking, “Ano ang sala ko sa imo? (What did I do to you?), I did not do anything.” But when I looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure that he was the man.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do anything, what was [your] reaction?
WITNESS:
I
just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done anything, but
the policeman said that his case is rape.
Then, he was asked to take off his t-shirt and I just looked at him and
then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man for investigation and while
the policeman was recording, that suspect approached me and told me that, “You
do not know
PROS. CARDINAL:
What was your reaction?
WITNESS:
I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, “You think you cannot be identified because you covered yourself?”
PROS. CARDINAL:
And then what did he answer?
WITNESS:
He
just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our home.[60]
A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the
identification of accused-appellant by Michelle Darunday,
has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for “being pointedly
suggestive, generat[ing]
confidence where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told, subvert[ing] their reliability as [an eyewitness].”[61]
In these cases, Michelle knew that she was going to identify a suspect when she
went to Pontevedra.
Upon seeing accused-appellant escorted by Tancinco
and his colleagues in the
Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of suggestibility in a lineup confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty. Moreover, the need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around
them. This desire to conform produces an
increased need to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too,
feel that the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly
vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other witnesses as to whom
they suspect of the crime. . .[62]
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility concerning the identity of accused-appellant. The possibility that her identification of accused-appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this Court.
Michelle’s identification of accused-appellant is further rendered
dubious by the disparity between her description of her attacker and the
appearance of accused-appellant. In her
affidavit, dated
P - Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado nakita mo bala ang iya hitsura? (At the time that you were abused by the suspect, did you see what he looked like?)
S- Wala,
kay tungod nga may tabon ang
akon mata, apang matandaan ko guid ang
iya tingog, mata, ang iya
malaka nga biguti, ang structure sang iya lawas, ang
supat sang iya kamot, ang iya
bibig, ang madamo nga “kelloid”
sa iya lawas
kag ang iya
baho. (No,
because I was blindfolded but I can remember his voice, his eyes, his thin
mustache, his body structure, the smoothness of his hands, his mouth, and the
numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.)[63]
Michelle’s affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her assailant when the latter was
raping her. But, when she testified in
court, Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids
on accused-appellant although she said that his skin was rough.[64]
This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino
who said that he did not see any lump on the back of accused-appellant when he
tried to look for it.[65]
In fact, it would appear that accused-appellant had no such markings on his
back but had only small patches which could not even be readily seen.[66]
In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellant’s
appearance and Michelle’s description of her attacker, the trial court dwelt on
the apparent roughness of accused-appellant’s skin and the probability that
Michelle might have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant.[67]
However, mere speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of proof
beyond reasonable doubt required by law to be established by the prosecution.[68]
Michelle Darunday was a civil engineer in the City
Engineer’s Office in
Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of
Michelle’s identification is her lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant
at the Pontevedra police headquarters. Defense
witnesses PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino,[69]
Ricardo Villaspen,[70]
and Nestor Dojillo[71]
testified that Michelle failed to see any identifying marks on
accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in pinpointing the latter as
the culprit. With Gemarino being a policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay captain, these witnesses were all, in one form or
another, connected with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed to
ascribe any ill motive on the part of these defense witnesses, who are without
doubt respectable members of the community, their testimonies that Michelle
showed no reaction in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up in Pontevedra police station deserve greater credence than the
testimony of Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him
that accused-appellant was her attacker.
The defense evidence established that Tancinco
was an abusive policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-appellant’s
guilt and who had no compunction in doing whatever means necessary, legal or
illegal, to ensure his conviction. We note further that the testimonies of
these defense witnesses coincide with Michelle’s testimony that she kept quiet
when she saw accused-appellant at the Pontevedra
police station on
For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and
in-court identification of Michelle Darunday to be
insufficient to establish accused-appellant as the person who robbed and raped
her and her companions on the night of
2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when he was raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in open court as the person whom she saw that night.[74] Certain circumstances in these cases lead us to believe, however, that Erma Blanca did not really see the assailant and that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are:
First, the police blotter, dated
Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the
Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca[77]
was prepared on
B. Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on
To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. The acquittal of accused-appellant is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 53,
The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Per Judge B. Gellada.
[2] Records, p. 1.
[3]
[4] Also referred to as
Irma Blanca or Erma Blanco in the transcript of stenographic notes.
[5] Referred to as Tia Pasing in the transcript of
stenographic notes.
[6] TSN (Jason Joniega), pp. 6-11,
[7] TSN (Erma Blanca),
pp. 5-44, 62-67,
[8] TSN (Mark
Esmeralda), pp. 17-23,
[9] TSN (Erma Blanca),
pp. 54-59,
[10] TSN (PO3 Nicolas Tancinco), pp. 3-43,
[11] TSN (Michelle Darunday), pp. 43-50,
[12] TSN (Allan Aguillon), p. 5,
[13] TSN (Jason Joniega), pp. 12-13, July 29, 1997; TSN (Mark Esmeralda),
pp. 27-29, July 31, 1997; TSN (Erma Blanca), pp. 52-53, Aug. 7, 1997; TSN (Ma.
Teresa Gellaver), pp. 40-43,
[14] Exh.
L; Records, pp. 15-18.
[15] TSN (Michelle Darunday), pp. 55-59,
[16] Exhs.
D or 5; Records, p. 499.
[17] TSN (Dr. Joy Ann Jocson), pp. 6-16,40-53, 57-58,
[18] TSN (Leo Asan), pp. 3-7,
[19] TSN (Anthony Escordial), pp. 8-14,
[20] Referred to as Ely
in the transcript of stenographic notes.
[21] TSN (Anthony Escordial), pp. 14-19,
[22] TSN (Elias Sombito), pp. 22-33,
[23] TSN (Aaron Lavilla), pp. 19-30,
[24] TSN (PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino), pp. 9-21,
[25] TSN (Nestor Dojillo), pp. 30-45,
[26] TSN (PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino), pp. 24-33,
[27] TSN (Ricardo Villaspen), pp. 15-20,
[28] TSN (Anthony Escordial), pp. 21-25,
[29]
[30] TSN (PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino), pp. 36-49, Feb. 3, 1998; TSN (Ricardo Villaspen), pp. 21-35, Feb. 5, 1998; TSN (Nestor Dojillo), pp. 46-57, April 17, 1998; TSN (Anthony Escordial), pp. 33-36, May 25, 1998.
[31] TSN (Lucila Jocame), pp. 5-10,
[32] Exh.
11; Records, p. 488.
[33] Spelled as Gerome in the transcript of stenographic notes.
[34] TSN (Jerome Jayme), pp. 73-86,
[35] Decision, pp. 87-88;
Records, pp. 794-795.
[36] Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, pp. 14-17; Rollo, pp.
167-170.
[37] TSN (PO3 Nicolas Tancinco), p. 176,
[38] Posadas v.
Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388, 397 citing People v. Doria, 301
SCRA 668, 709 (1991).
[39] Records, p. 76.
[40] People v. Pacistol,
284 SCRA 520, 597 (1998).
[41] People v. Timon, 281 SCRA 577, 597 citing People v. Nazareno,
260 SCRA 256, 263 (1996).
[42] De la Torre
v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196 (1998); People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994).
[43] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
[44]
[45] People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 (1994).
[46] Gilbert v.
[47] People v. Hermoso,
343 SCRA 567 (2000).
[48] People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67 (1997); People v. Pacistol,
284 SCRA 520 (1998).
[49] People v. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 (1995).
[50] TSN (Jason Joniega), pp. 11-12,
[51] TSN (Mark
Esmeralda), pp. 12, 23-24, 28,
[52] TSN (Erma Blanca),
pp. 31, 53,
[53] TSN (Ma. Teresa Gellaver), pp. 40-41,
[54] TSN (Michelle Darunday), pp. 49-50,
[55]
[56] 388
[57] TSN (Michelle Darunday), p. 39,
[58] TSN (Michelle Darunday), p. 40,
[59]
[60]
[61] People v. Niño,
290 SCRA 155 citing People v. Cruz, 32 SCRA 181, 186 (1970).
[62] Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
969 (1977). Excerpts reprinted in
Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation 419-429,
428 (1993).
[63] Exhs.
L or 9; Records, p. 15 (emphasis added).
[64] TSN (Michelle Darunday), p. 124,
[65] TSN (PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino), p. 88,
[66] TSN (PO3 Nicolas Tancinco), pp. 53-54,
[67] Decision, pp. 71-72;
Records, pp. 778-779..
[68] People v.
[69] TSN (PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino), pp. 28-31,
[70] TSN (Ricardo Villaspen), pp. 16-17,
[71] TSN (Nestor Dojillo), pp. 34-38,
[72] People v. Galera,
280 SCRA 492 (1997).
[73] People v. Sapal,
328 SCRA 417 (2000).
[74] TSN (Erma Blanca),
pp. 30-31,
[75] Exhs.
C and C-1; Records, pp. 496-497.
[76] TSN (Erma Blanca),
pp. 47-50,
[77] Exh.
2; id., p. 49.
[78] People v. Delmendo, 109 SCRA 350 (1981); People v. Aquino, 93 SCRA 772 (1979); People v. Bulawin, 29 SCRA 710 (1969); People v. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451 (1967); People v. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769 (1967).
[79] People v. Arlalejo,
333 SCRA 604 (2000).
[80] TSN (Aaron Lavilla), pp. 19-30,
[81] TSN (Elias Sombito), pp. 22-33,
[82] TSN (Nestor Dojillo), pp. 26-27,
[83] People v.
Padilla, 177 SCRA 129 (1989).